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Abstract 
Using Japan's existing free trade agreements (FTAs) this thesis analyses the country's 
current FTA policy by focusing on the fonnation of domestic preferences regarding 
bilateral, mini lateral and proposed region-wide FTAs. The two-level game metaphor 
(Putnam 1988) is combined here with the international political economy (lPE) 
approach in order to analyse the complex interactions between various levels of factors 
influencing main actors' preferences. The two-level game model is used to separate the 
international and domestic levels of policy formation process and to conceptualise the 
latter as bargaining between various groups of actors (domestic negotiations). The thesis 
argues that preferences of discussed domestic groups together with the specific policy 
fonnation process are central to explaining Japan's FTA policy and its current impasse. 
The thesis conceptualises this policy as embedded in a broader economic and political 
environment, both on a national and an international level. Changes in this environment 
can affect actors' preferences and lead to changes in country's free trade agreements 
policy. This study analyses the added value of consecutive FTAs from the perspective of 
their main clients, as well as technical aspects of their hannonisation, multilateralisation 
or consolidation. It also discusses Japan's approach to overlapping FTA regulations. 
Therefore, the research is set within the overarching theoretical debate of 
multilateralising bilateralism which attempts to determine the feasibility of harmonising 
bilateral FTAs into broader agreements. The thesis focuses predominantly on the 
desirability of such hannonisation from the perspective of Japan's main actors. This 
study is based on in-depth interviews conducted in Tokyo in January 2009 and between 
March 20 I 0 and December 2011. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
1.1 Introduction 
Japan was the first Northeast Asian country to sign a free trade agreement (FTA). As of 
January 2012 it had 13 free trade agreements), including a minilateral agreement with 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership, AJCEP). In March 2010, Japan's trade volume with its FTAs partners 
approximated 15.9 percent of its total trade volume and a further 22.3 percent with 
prospective FTA partners (FTAs under negotiations) 2. In addition, the country is 
participating in three coexisting frameworks with regional economic integration agenda 
including a possible negotiation of a regional FTA: ASEAN plus China, Japan and 
South Korea (ASEAN+3); ASEAN plus China, Japan, South Korea (hereafter Korea), 
India, Australia and New Zealand (ASEAN+6) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum. In November 2011, Japan has also announced its participation in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Using Japan's existing FTAs this thesis explains the 
country's current FTA policy by looking at the formation of domestic preferences 
regarding bilateral, minilateral (the agreement with ASEAN) and proposed region-wide 
FTAs. The two-level game metaphor (Putnam 1988) is combined here with the 
international political economy (lPE) approach in order to analyse complex interactions 
between various levels of factors influencing main actors' preferences. The thesis argues 
that preferences of discussed domestic groups together with the specific policy 
formation process are central to explaining the country's FTA policy and its current 
impasse. It also provides new empirical evidence in multilateralising bilateralism debate 
and discusses Japan's approach to dealing with overlapping FTA regulations, as well as 
to future regional integration. 
This is a qualitative study which focuses on preferences of selected domestic 
groups and their role in the FTA policy formation process. The thesis looks at domestic 
preferences for: 1) bilateral FTAs with East Asian states, although treaties with other 
countries are also discussed, 2) the AJCEP, and 3) proposed region-wide agreements. 
This study analyses the added value of consecutive FTAs from the perspective of their 
I For a full list of Japan's FTAs see Appendix 1. 
2 Interview no. 9. 
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main clients as well as technical aspects of their harmonisation, multilateralisation or 
consolidation. Therefore, the research is set within the overarching theoretical debate of 
multilateralising bilateralism which attempts to determine the feasibility of harmonising 
bilateral FTAs into broader agreements 3 • The thesis focuses predominantly on the 
desirability of such harmonisation from the perspective of Japan's main actors which 
were chosen due to their direct or indirect involvement in the FTA policy formation 
process. This selection was based on a literature review and initial fieldwork research 
which involved interviews with Japanese scholars, FTA analysts and representatives of 
think-tanks. As a result, three (two main and one supporting) domestic groups were 
chosen. The first group is the government. The second group consists of strong domestic 
interest groups. This includes: 1) Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) operating 
and manufacturing in East Asian countries, and 2) the agricultural sector. Finally, 
preferences of other domestic groups are also briefly discussed. They are: the service 
sector which demonstrates non-manufacturing sector's views, and labour unions4• The 
study focuses on over a decade of Japan's FTA policy. Although the country signed its 
first free trade agreement in 2002, the development of FTA policy can be traced back to 
1998. This is the starting point of the analysis in Chapter 3. The end of 2010 and the 
APEC Summit in Yokohama mark the end of data collection and fieldwork research. 
Therefore, the thesis mentions developments which occurred beyond this point in time 
only when the situation has changed or an update was necessary. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 provides an introduction and an 
outline of the study. It presents the subject of the research and questions it aims to 
answer. A short literature review lists the most relevant theoretical models and their 
application for this research. This is followed by an explanation of the approach to 
examining actors' preferences and a theoretical framework for the study. The chapter 
concludes with a description of the data collection process and limitations of the 
research. Chapter 2 introduces FTAs. It explains how they relate to other forms of 
market organisation and trade liberalisation. It also discusses barriers to trade such 
treaties remove, as well as other types of provisions they include. Having provided a 
brief overview of FTAs, the chapter introduces the multilateralising bilateralism debate 
and the 'spaghetti bowl' concept. Chapter 3 presents Japan's FTA policy to date. It 
discusses the preferences of Japan's ministries and domestic interest groups for bilateral 
FTAs with East Asian countries and an agreement with ASEAN. It also includes two 
3 The debate is described in detail in Chapter 2. 
4 The rationale for choosing the three groups will be discussed further in this chapter. 
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examples of Japan's 'failed' FTA negotiations. Chapter 4 discusses Japan's domestic 
actors' preferences for a region-wide FTA. It aims to establish which of the proposed 
region-wide schemes the interviewed groups would opt for and what are their broader 
preferences for Japan's future role in regional economic integration. Chapter 5 explains 
the role of domestic actors in the policy fonnation process. It describes how the 
preferences of domestic groups are aggregated by the ministries into FTA policy. It 
analyses: 1) communication channels between various groups and the ministries that 
represent them, 2) how the ministries involved in the FTA policy fonnation process 
aggregate this infonnation and communicate with each other, 3) how the compromise 
between conflicting domestic preferences is made, and 4) how the Japanese side is 
represented during international FTA negotiations. Chapter 6 presents final conclusions. 
1.2 Rationale for the Study 
The number of free trade agreements increased rapidly in recent years. They have 
become a widely studied phenomenon and a prominent feature of the world trading 
system. Dent (2010a:50) calculates that the number of FTAs worldwide rose from 16 
agreements in force in 1990, up to about 72 in 1997 and approximately 200 FTAs in 
force in 2008. To give a different example, in 2003, out of all WTO member states, only 
Macau and Mongolia were not participants of one or more regional trade agreements 
(Ravenhill2005b:117). In 2009, Mongolia was the last country not to be a member of a 
trade agreement (Menon 2009). In June 2010, a first meeting of the Joint Study Group 
on Japan-Mongolia Economic Partnership (FTA) took place. According to WTO 
(WTOd\ in January 2012 there were 184 FTAs in force. Perhaps no other region has 
witnessed the proliferation of FTAs more than East Asia. It was a latecomer when it 
comes to FTAs: there were no free trade agreements before the financial crisis of 
1997/98. In 2000, ASEAN's FTA (AFTA) was the only FTA in force in the region 
(Ravenhill 2010: 178). In August 2010, there were 61 FTAs concluded in East Asia6, of 
which 47 were signed and in effect, and 79 further FTAs were proposed or under 
negotiations (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011a:3). Thus, as argued by Kawai and Wignaraja 
(ibidem: I), "Asia has emerged at the forefront of global free trade agreement activity". 
5 The data comes from the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, last updated in January 2012. 
Available from: http://www.wto.orglenglishltratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. 
6 This is based on FTAs signed by ASEAN member and India. 
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This has been referred to as the new East Asian regionalism (e.g. Ravenhill2010, Rajan 
2005 :217). Such agreements are "assuming more importance as a tool of commercial 
policy in Asia than ever before" (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011 a: 16). 
As discussed earlier, Japan has signed 13 FTAs. The country FTA policy is 
particularly interesting for a number of reasons. First, it takes place on three separate 
levels: bilateral, minilateral and regional. This provides an opportunity to analyse 
Japan's approach to the coexistence of different levels of FTAs and its ideas for future 
harmonisation, multilateralisation or consolidation of such agreements. In particular, 
Japan's decision to include a flexibility clause in the agreement with ASEAN provides 
an insight into the government's vision of the future shape of regional integration in 
East Asia. As such, analysing Japan's FTA policy can provide new empirical evidence in 
the multilateralising bilateralism theoretical debate which will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2. 
Second, Japan has "the strongest base of giant MNCs involved in production 
networks and supply chains throughout Asia" (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011a:4). For that 
reason, Japanese MNCs are highly interested in the progress of regional economic 
integration. The Japanese government has used FTA negotiations to provide a 
favourable business environment in East Asia. Japan's free trade treaties are on the 
crossroads between protectionist tendencies and internal and external pressure for 
higher international profile in the region. For that reason, the analysis of Japan's FTA 
policy requires including a variety of factors and actors, as well as developing suitable 
theoretical approach. 
Third, Japan has traditionally perceived itself as being in between the East and the 
West (Rozman et al. 2007:1). Its special partnership with the US has historically made it 
difficult for Japan to commit to a regional framework excluding the US7• Its foreign 
policy was called passive and reactive (e.g. Calder 1988). Nonetheless, in recent years 
Japan has simultaneously participated in regional cooperation frameworks in East Asian 
and Asia-Pacific, as well as two coexisting plans for creating a regional FTA in East 
Asia: ASEAN+ 3 and ASEAN+6. Both proposed FTAs are at an early planning stage and 
there is no certainty if and when an East Asian trade agreement will become a reality. 
However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, with the formation of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and the snowball effect this had amongst the APEC member states, Japan 
could no longer idly observe the development of regional economic integration. This 
thesis covers a particularly interesting period in Japan's regional and FTA policy: it 
7 This issue will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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focuses on the run up to the decision to participate in the TPP. It analyses how domestic 
and international factors have influenced the preferences of domestic interest groups 
and led the country to declare its participation in the TPP despite a strong opposition 
from the agricultural sector. Once negotiated, the TPP might turn out to be an agreement 
with the highest level of liberalisation Japan has signed so far. Its participation in the 
treaty might also help to sway other countries in the region by creating a momentum for 
the TPP in East Asia. 
Finally, Japan's FTA policy is at an impasse resulting from conflicting domestic 
interests and strong opposition to further liberalisation8• Japan's decision to join the TPP 
could be viewed as the first step out of this impasse. However, it was made amidst 
strong protests from the agricultural sector. This is an interesting time for Japan's FTA 
policy. In the upcoming years the country will need to deal with domestic opposition to 
the treaty and develop a clear vision for regional integration while actively participating 
in the TPP negotiations and helping to shape the future agreement. As the thesis covers 
Japan's FTA policy from its inception up to the end of 2010, it provides a good 
overview of the situation and allows us to understand the circumstances surrounding 
Japan's decision to enter the TPP negotiations. It also demonstrates how the selected 
domestic actors view Japan's role in future regional economic integration. 
1.3 Research Questions 
Based on the issues discussed in the previous section, the overarching question of the 
research is: what type of a region-wide free trade agreement do Japan's main actors 
prefer and how has the country's FTA policy to date been influenced by these 
preferences? The initial fieldwork research and literature review led to a set of 
supporting sub-questions: 
1) What kind of free trade agreements has Japan been signing so far and why? 
What preferences have shaped these agreements? 
2) How have these preferences changed over time, from the early stages of Japan's 
FTApolicy to 2010? 
3) What added value could a prospective region-wide FTA have? Does Japan need 
a region-wide FTA or perhaps the current agreements provide a sufficient 
8 This issue will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. 
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response to the country's strategic goals? 
4) Do bilateral, minilateral and region-wide FTAs fulfil the same strategic political 
and economic goals, or do they serve different purposes? 
5) What were the reasons behind a decision to include a flexibility clause in the 
AJCEP? Does the flexible approach really provide a way out of the spaghetti 
bowl syndrome? 
6) What type of factors (international, domestic, political or economic) shape actors 
preferences for FTAs? 
7) Who and how formulates Japan's FTA policy? What are the communication 
channels between the domestic interest groups and the different parts of the 
goverrunent? 
8) At what stage of the policy formation process is the domestic win-set of 
preferences formulated? 
9) What characteristics of the policy formulation process have led to the current 
FTA policy impasse? 
These questions were the basis for the research fieldwork and are discussed throughout 
the thesis. Question 1 and 2 relate to Chapter 3, while question 3 to Chapter 4. 
Questions 4 to 6 focus on more general issues and are discussed in both Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides answers to questions 7 to 9. 
1.4 Theoretical Perspective 
1.4.1 The International Political Economy Field 
The thesis takes an international political economy and therefore a multi-disciplinary 
approach to exploring the relationship between 'the state' (politics) and 'the market' 
(economics) both on the domestic and international level. One of the distinctive 
characteristics of IPE is that it considers the importance of "economic phenomena - for 
example, social classes, multinational corporations or world markets - as independent, 
intervening or dependent variables in the understanding of foreign policy, a role we also 
ascribe to 'politics'; for instance, intra-elite competition, ethnic rebellion, or the nature 
of political institutions" (Burton and Wurfel 1990: 1). In other words, IPE implies that 
"the economics of trade cannot be separated from its political aspects" (Balaam and 
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Veseth 2001: 111 cite Robert Kuttner). As a result, a strong emphasis is placed on 
economic factors and informal (non-governmental) ties between states. When it comes 
to East Asia, the IPE approach allows stressing the importance of economic 
interdependence in the region as a backdrop for the government-led regional economic 
cooperation initiatives such as a region-wide FTA. It also permits to focus on activities 
and preferences of important non-governmental or trans-national actors such as the 
agricultural lobby group and the MNCs. 
Within the IPE field, this study touches upon the open economy politics (OEP) 
which focuses on the politics of international economic exchange. Lake (2008:763) 
explains that OEP discusses interests, institutions and bargaining: 
"OEP begins with firms, sectors, or factors of production as the units of 
analysis, derives their interests over economic policy from each unit s 
position within the international economy, conceives of institutions as 
mechanisms that aggregate interests (with more or less bias) and 
condition the bargaining of competing societal interests, and, finally, 
introduces when necessary bargaining at the international level between 
states with different societally produced interests. Few theories give 
equal weight to all steps in this analysis". 
This research focuses on the first two stages: 1) how the domestic interest groups' 
preferences regarding FTA policy are shaped and communicated to the government, and 
2) how the government transforms competing domestic interests into Japan's FTA policy. 
The focus on the preferences of domestic actors places this topic within the broad frame 
of liberal IPE theory. This part of IPE researches a wide range of actors and analyses the 
interplay between them. Moravcsik (1997:516) explains that according to liberal 
international relations theory "the relationship between states and the surrounding 
domestic and trans-national society in which they are embedded critically shapes state 
behaviour by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences". This means 
that domestic situations impact states' preferences and influences the way they behave 
on the international stage. Therefore, economic integration is viewed as a bottom-to-top 
processes resulting from aggregated interests of domestic and trans-national actors: 
states' policy is influenced and shaped by these groups. Non-governmental actors, both 
individuals and groups, are considered to be important players. They "organise 
exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints 
imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence" 
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(Moravcsik 1997:516). Commercial liberalism, one of the variants of liberal theory, 
assumes that changes in the domestic distribution of profits from increased economic 
interdependence provide an incentive for domestic actors to impact state's policies. 
Moravcsik (1997:528) explains that "changes in the structure of the domestic and global 
economy alter the costs and benefits of trans-national economic exchange, creating 
pressure on domestic governments to facilitate or block such exchanges through 
appropriate foreign economic and security policies". Economic incentives from 
increased trade do not necessarily cause states to opt for trade liberalisation. Rather, 
their preferences depend on the distribution of gains from trade within the state. Positive 
or negative incentives from cross-border trade determine the preferences of domestic 
actors. Moravcsik (1997:528) concludes that "the greater the economic benefits for 
powerful private actors, the greater their incentive, other things being equal, to press 
governments to facilitate such transactions; the more costly the adjustment imposed by 
economic interchange, the more opposition is likely to arise". 
1.4.2 Regionalisation, Multilateralism and Minilateralism 
Several scholars make a clear distinction between the process of regionalism and 
regionalisation. Regionalisation is a bottom-up integration process led mainly by the 
private sector and caused by the increasing economic iI!terdependence between states 
(Beeson and Yoshimatsu 2007:230). It is an informal process whereby increasing 
economic links do not result from a formal agreement or actions of an international 
organisation. Regionalism, as opposed to regionalisation, is a formal process of state-led 
initiatives towards regional integration involving international agreements and 
organisations with structure and aims. Dent (2008a:7) defines regionalisation as "micro-
level processes that stem from regional concentration of interconnecting private or civil 
sector activities", such as increasing international trade between companies in a given 
region, and regionalism as "public policy initiatives, such as free trade agreement or 
other state-led projects of economic cooperation and integration that originate from 
inter-governmental dialogues and treaties". Hence regionalisation is a "societal-driven, 
bottom-up process" and regionalism is a "policy-driven, top-down process" (ibidem). 
Therefore, regionalisation occurs as an offset of increased economic interdependence 
between companies in the region and not as a result of a common identity or a bottom-
up strategy of regionalisation. 
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This distinction seems particularly relevant when it comes to East Asia, as it has 
often been argued that the region has undergone a market-led integration. This means 
that whilst informal economic regionalisation has taken place over the years there has 
been little development in terms of institutional regional framework. For that reason, 
some scholars speak of the difference between de facto (regionalisation) and de jure 
(regionalism) economic integration in East Asia (Hiratsuka 2007, Hiratsuka and Kimura 
2008) and the 'persistent discrepancy' in the progress of these two processes (Nicolas 
2010). The official government initiatives lag behind the market-driven integration. 
Increased regionalisation and economic interdependence between the East Asian states 
results from several factors. One of them is the formation of vertically integrated 
production networks. Vertical integration of production networks, also known as 
internationalisation of production, production fragmentation or production sharing, 
occurs when companies move their labour-intensive stages of production abroad to less 
developed countries while the capital-intensive stages are done back in the home 
country where parts or intermediate goods are further processed. Hence the 
manufacturing stage of production occurs in the most cost-efficient location. In East 
Asia, the intra-industry trade in parts and components, resulting from production 
fragmentation, has not only increased the overall volume of intraregional trade but also 
strengthen the regional interdependence. Production sharing spread in the region is due 
to "the region's wide range of development levels, strong intraregional links, and 
capacity for organisational and technological change" (ADB 2008:18). Secondly, the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 convinced the East Asian states of the need for a closer 
economic cooperation. According to a study by the Asian Development Bank (ADB 
2008:5) the crisis ~as deepened the interdependence in Asia, as well as increased the 
macroeconomic links, cooperation in trade and finance, and strengthened the emerging 
Asian regionalism. The study also points out that the growth of macroeconomic 
interdependence following the financial crisis and the deepening trade and financial ties 
have made the region more sensitive to global and regional economic shocks. As the 
former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique Strauss-
Kahn, concluded during a press conference in Tokyo the recent global economic crisis 
has proven that globalisation is not only an academic concept9• 
The thesis focuses on preferences of domestic actors and the aggregation of these 
preferences by the government and focuses on the process of regionalisation. However, 
it also discusses regionalism as analyses the policy formation process and FTAs: 
9 Press Conference at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo, 18 January 2010. 
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intergovernmental, international and state-led agreements. It can be argued that FTAs 
are a researched aspect of regionalism and increasing regionalisation is one of the 
factors behind them. In this thesis FTAs are examined in the context of regional 
economic integration and not a region-building process which exceeds the economic 
sphere and involves a region-wide identity. Hence the understanding of regionalism is 
limited here to state-led economic integration, in particular the proliferation of bilateral 
and minilateral FTAs. 
In the thesis proliferation of bilateral FTAs is also discussed in the broader context 
of multilateralism. The term multilateralism can refer to politics, international trade and 
security relations. When it comes to international trade multilateralism most often refers 
to the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
multilateral organisation primarily responsible for governing international trade. It can 
also refer to muitilateralising of bilateral agreements which means making them 
accessible to a higher number of parties or it can signify broader FTAs including several 
states. Keohane (1990:731) defines multilateralism as "practice of coordinating national 
policies in groups of three or more states". Ruggie (1993: 11) defines it as "institutional 
form that coordinates relations amongst three or more states on the basis of generalised 
principles of conduct: that is principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of 
actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic 
exigencies". A multilateral organisation is a "separate and distinct type of 
institutionalised behaviour, defined by such generalised decision-making rules as voting 
or consensus procedures" (ibidem: 14). The WTO is an example of such organisation 
and adopts a set of common rules, for example the most favoured nation (MFN) 
principle. To avoid confusion, this thesis refers to projects such as the ASEAN+ 3 or 
ASEAN+6 FTAs as region-wide FTAs and not regional multilateral agreements. For the 
same reason, the agreement between ASEAN and Japan is referred to as minilateral 
which means an FTA between a small subgroup of a larger entity, for example a 
subgroup of states within a region. This is similar to Kahler's (1993:296) explanation of 
minilateralism as "great power collaboration within multilateral institutions" and 
minilateral as meaning a subgroup within a larger group or organisation. An agreement 
between ASEAN and Japan or China could technically be called bilateral as it was 
concluded between two parties. Dent (2006:291) calls agreements between a bilateral 
state and a regional group, such as ASEAN, quasi-regional agreements lO• However, in 
this thesis minilateralism signifies an agreement between three or more members but 
10 The typology and classification ofFTAs will be further explained in Chapter 2. 
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still a subgroup of the region. It helps to differentiate these FTA from bilateral and 
region-wide treaties. 
1.4.3 Theoretical Models and Their Application to the Study 
1.4.3.1 Putnam's Two-Level Game Metaphor 
Game theory, in particular John F. Nash's (1950) equilibrium and bargaining model, was 
introduced to international relations theory by, amongst others, Albert Hirshman, Robert 
O. Keohane, and Joseph Nye (Moravcsik 1997:523). It has then been further adapted by 
Robert D. Putnam (1988). Derived from game theory, the two-level game metaphor 
(Putnam 1988) is a political science model that can be applied to international 
negotiations taking place between liberal democracies and that seeks to connect the 
international sphere of factors with the domestic one. Putnam's initial framework was 
further developed in a collaborative multiple case study project (Evans et al. 1993). It 
argues that within any international negotiations process there are two games being 
played simultaneously by the countries' governments: 1) the international negotiations 
(game one), and 2) an attempt to find consensus and support at the domestic sphere 
(game two). Therefore, the government, referred to as the central government, 
negotiates each international agreement on two fronts. The two levels or games 
mutually influence each other. The domestic groups interact with the international 
environment in two ways: 1) by influencing their government and taking part in the 
domestic policy formation process, and 2) by interacting directly with international 
actors. The second option is particularly relevant when it comes to MNCs". In order for 
negotiation to be concluded an agreement to be signed, a compromise, called a win-set, 
needs to be established on both the domestic and international fronts. A win-set is an 
acceptable result of negotiations for all actors on this level. This thesis defines Japan's 
FTA policy formation process as the domestic win-set. Therefore, the study focuses on 
level two of Putnam's game and how the conflicting preferences of domestic groups are 
transformed into a domestic consensus. The level two game might be compared to 
negotiating an agreement on the international front and then ratifying it on a domestic 
level. The US-Korea FTA can serve as an example. Although it has been signed in June 
2007, it has only been ratified by both country's legislative bodies the second half of 
II This issue will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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2011. This demonstrates the importance of domestic consensus for international 
agreements. As indicated in the following chapters of this thesis, in Japan the domestic 
win-set takes place before and during the international level of negotiations. As Putnam 
(1988:449) writes "the Japanese propensity for seeking the broadest possible domestic 
consensus before acting constricts the Japanese win-set, as contrasted with majoritarian 
political cultures". The preference for a consensus-based decision-making is deeply 
rooted in the Japanese culture and society. This is reflected in the tenn 'nemawashi' 
which refers to the importance of an internal, infonnal consensus between all involved 
parties. 
Criticising the two-level game theory, Jeffrey W. Knopf (1993) introduced a three-
and-three level game metaphor. In his opinion, the two-level theory, although 
emphasises the interactions between the domestic and international levels of factors, 
offers few new observations. The author (ibidem) expands the two levels to three in 
order to allow for a division between allies and other parties in an analysis of security 
negotiations. Knopf (1993 :600) also increased the number of the levels of domestic-
international interactions to three: trans-governmental (government with government), 
trans-national (domestic actors with domestic actors) and cross-level (government with 
domestic actors). Each of these types of interactions impacts the outcome of the 
negotiations in a different way. The novelty of this approach is that domestic groups can 
initiate international negotiations. Knopf (ibidem:608) argues that domestic actors get 
involved in trans-national or cross-level interactions as they attempt to force a 
compromise between their position and what the leaders would otherwise consider to be 
a preferred solution. 
Leonard Schoppa (1993) examines the impact of the US' pressure during the Japan-
US Structural Impediments Initiative dialogue from 1989 on Japan's domestic politics 
and the market liberalisation concessions it made. Schoppa argued that the two-level 
approach needs to include system-level variables (international) as well as domestic-
level variables as the realist, state-centric approach does not provide answers. His work 
focuses on a fragment of Putnam's model which he considers underdeveloped: 
synergistic strategies and the circumstances under which they are likely to produce 
positive results. Synergistic strategies are pursued by negotiators during international 
negotiations and are "aimed at reshaping politics in both their own and their 
counterparts' domestic arenas to make possible deals that would not have been possible 
in the absence of interaction between the two levels" (ibidem:353-354). Schoppa 
distinguishes two more synergistic strategies that have not been mentioned by Putnam: 
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participation expansion and alternative specification. Participant expansion occurs when 
the number of participants of international negotiation is increased at the domestic level. 
This can be done either by "expanding participation at the elite level or 
internationalising a previously domestic issue or by increasing the influence of the 
unorganised masses" (ibidem:374). Alternative specification strategy occurs when 
foreign pressure highlights "policy alternatives that may not be considered in absence of 
foreign involvement" (ibidem). 
1.4.3.2 Domestic Interest Groups Models 
Domestic interest groups models are of particular relevance to this thesis as such groups 
are one of the two main levels of analysis. Baldwin et al. (2007:4) explain that "the 
politically optimal structure of a bilateral FTA depends upon the comparative 
advantages of the two nations and the particular political strengths of various interest 
groups at the time the deal is signed". Interest groups politics models explain how a 
well organised small group can significantly impact state's decision-making process to 
its advantage. Gary S. Becker's (1983, 1985) work focuses on how interest groups 
compete for political influence. Becker (ibidem) applies economic modelling to the 
issue of special groups' politics and the competition between interest groups. According 
to Sutter (1995:128), there are three factors that determine how special interest groups 
impact national policies: 1) the amount of pressure the general interest generates, 2) the' 
amount of pressure the special interests generate, and 3) how the pressure generated by 
each group translates into political influence (the marginal productivity of pressure). 
Becker (1985:336) discusses the 'compensation principle' and its usefulness in 
assessing if a particular policy is beneficial for the general public. If a discussed policy 
brings more benefits to one group than losses to another group, under the condition that 
access to political influence is equal for all groups, the group that gains from the policy 
would exert more political pressure and, in effect, their preferences would prevail. The 
group that gains may then compensate the losses of other groups. According to the logic 
of collective action, special interest groups given their small size, better organisation, 
and lack of free rider issue, are able to exert stronger political pressure than the 
remaining part of society (Sutter 1995: 128). This is relevant to the analysis in Chapter 3 
and helps to understand why the Japanese agricultural sector has the ability to block 
policies that could potentially be beneficial or welfare-increasing for the rest of the 
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society. Domestic agricultural lobby groups in Japan have often been accused of 
slowing down FTA negotiations and pressuring the government to exclude sensitive 
products from market liberalisation. For example, the Japan-Australia FTA negotiations, 
which started in April 2007, have been making little progress due to the opposition of 
the Japanese agricultural sector. This body of work is particularly relevant to the 
discussion on 'failed' FTA cases in Chapter 3. Becker (1985:344 cites Olson 1982) 
writes that domestic interest groups are widely condemned for pursuing their personal 
interests and cites Olson, who claims that they are "responsible for sluggish growth and 
the eventual decline of nations". Becker (ibidem:344) further argues that "no policy that 
lowered social output would survive if all groups were equally large and skilful at 
producing political influence, for the opposition would always exert more influence 
than proponents". 
Grossman's and Helpman's (2001, 2002) model of special interest groups' politics 
explains how such groups impact the policy formation process within democratic states 
and is also of relevance in the context of this thesis. They point out that there is no 
consensus regarding the definition of special interest groups: it can range from "any 
identifiable group of voters with similar preferences on a subset of policy issues" to 
"organisations that take political actions on behalf of a group of voters" (Grossman and 
Helpman 2001: 1). In this thesis interest groups are represented by individual companies 
within the manufacturing sector, organisations representing their interests (business 
associations), and the agricultural cooperatives representing the interests of for the 
agricultural sector. Grossman and Helpman (2002: 13) write that "when the policy 
makers enter a negotiation with preferences that have been shaped by domestic interest 
groups, the outcome in each sector reflects the relative political power of the industry 
groups in the two countries". In other words, "electorally-motivated politicians ( ... ) 
seek to impose tariffs that satisfy the demands of industrial constituents while still 
generating enough welfare to gamer the votes needed for re-election" (Kapstein 2006:5). 
This approach is similar to the understanding of the domestic win-set formation process 
adopted in this thesis. The state's preferences are being shaped by the preferences of 
domestic groups which have unequal access to political power. The agricultural sector 
and the MNCs are the two strongest domestic interest groups as indicated by the 
research fieldwork and have the potential to significantly influence Japan's FTA policy. 
Pekkanen (2003) discusses sectoral lobbying in Japan. Writing about the privileged 
sectors' influence on Japan's WTO strategy, Pekkanen (2003:285) mentions the 
powerful automobile and steel sectors and points out that between 1995 and 2000 the 
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country's complaints under the WTO's dispute settlement system have been filed almost 
exclusively on behalf of these sectors. This demonstrates the importance of interest 
groups in shaping Japan's WTO strategy. Pekkanen (ibidem:289) also explains that 
domestic political influence "should also be reflected internationally, whether in a 
, 
legalised multilateral forum or not". His paper mentions the channels used by influential 
sectors in communication with the government, such as industrial and business 
associations. 
Thomas Schelling's (1960) work is a part of international bargaining literature 
which is nested within the two-level framework. Schelling conjecture l2 focuses on the 
domestic constraints of foreign policy and how it can provide states with a bargaining 
advantage in international negotiations. According to this theory, a domestic group that 
opposes a proposed agreement can improve the state's bargaining position (Hiscox 
2005 :78 cites Schelling 1960:28-9). In the context of FTA negotiations the Schelling 
conjecture means that the party which is constrained by a powerful domestic group can 
in effect obtain higher concessions and more favourable conditions than the party which 
is not. Ahmer Tarar (2001) questions the outcomes of the Schelling conjecture for the 
situation in which both sides are constrained and claims that in result of insufficient 
information both sides can end up being worst off. The Schelling conjecture might 
provide an explanation for Japan's ability to exclude an overwhelming majority of 
agricultural products from FTA negotiations. 
1.4.3.3 Economic Incentives and Domestic Distribution of Gains from Trade 
In models such as the ones presented in the previous section, preferences are closely 
linked to interests, mostly economic, resulting from changes in income or/and its 
distribution. They depend on how an FTA impacts the domestic distribution of gains and 
losses from trade. International trade changes the relative price of products the country 
exports and imports and hence impacts certain domestic groups (Krugman and Obstfeld 
1997:56). An analysis of changes in the preferences is domain of the OEP making it a 
distinct approach within the IPE (Lake 2008:764). 
David Ricardo's (1817) model assumes the existence of two states producing two 
goods and with one factor of production: labour. It argues that increased trade benefits 
all states as gains depend on comparative not absolute advantages. Therefore, even if 
12 It was named so by Milner (1997:68) (Tarar 2001 :320). 
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state A produces all goods less efficiently and therefore more expensively than state B, 
it has a bigger comparative advantage in some of these goods. Hence the assumption is 
that if state A specialises in the production of goods where it has higher comparative 
advantages, international trade can be beneficial for both states A and B. Krugman and 
Obstfeld (1997:25) used the Ricardian model to explain that free trade benefits not only 
rich states and that it does not result from low wages in less advanced economies. 
However, the neo-mercantilists critique of the comparative advantages theory touches 
upon the problem of how international trade affects employment within a country, for 
example farmers who have lost business as a result of increased competition. Balaam 
and Veseth (2001:113) write: 
"The national production structure generates goods for trade. Yet this 
structure reflects a distribution of national resources such that people are 
employed in different sectors of the economy. While comparative 
advantages are theoretically dynamic- that is, shift in a nation s resources 
and capabilities generate new opportunity costs, people employed in 
those industries are likely to resist moving into other occupations ". 
The specific factors model is a variant of the Ricardian model. It has also been called 
the Ricardo-Viner model due to Jacob Viner's (1931) work on the specific factors model 
which was published in 1931 13. The specific factors model has three factors of 
production, labour, capital/prices and land. and two types of goods: manufactured goods 
produced using labour and capital, and agricultural goods produced using labour and 
land. The Heckscher-Ohlin model, developed in the 1930s, limits the number of factors 
to two, labour and capital, both considered to be mobile within the economy. The model 
which is also referred to as factor-proportion theory "emphasises the interplay between 
the proportions in which different factors of production are available in different 
countries and the proportions in which they are used in producing different goods" 
(Krugman and Obstfeld 1997:67). The specific factors model and the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model answer the question of who gains from trade in a similar way. In the former 
"trade benefits the factor that is specific to the export sector of each country but hurts 
the factor specific to the import-competing sectors with ambiguous effects on mobile 
factors" (ibidem:56). The latter concludes that owners of countries' abundant factors 
gain from trade, but owners of scarce factor lose (ibidem:77). Similarly, according to the 
I30ther scholars who have offered substantial input are Paul Samuelson and Ronald Jones. 
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Stolper-Samuelson model, which has been derived from the Heckscher-Ohlin model by 
Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson in 1941, international trade benefits those who 
own abundant factors of production within the economy and hurts the owners of scarce 
factors. As a result, the former will support market liberalisation while the latter will 
oppose it and support protectionist policies (Hiscox 2005:53). However, Hiscox 
(ibidem) also points out that the owners of factors of production and their employees 
often lobby together and that the factors of production are not as mobile between 
various domestic industries as assumed in the model. Nonetheless, we can apply these 
general assumptions to Japan and expect that the owners of scarce factor of production, 
land, will oppose to trade liberalisation. Indeed, as explained in detail in Chapter 3 the 
agricultural sector is against further market liberalisation as it expects to encounter 
significant losses as a result of increased international competition. Liberalisation of 
trade, according to the above models, would hurt farmers, the owners of land, a factor 
specific to import-competing sector and the scarce resource within the economy. 
Krugman and Obstfeld (1997:58) offer three reasons for liberalisation despite its effects 
on income distribution. First, these effects occur not only as a result of an increased 
international trade but also under other circumstances. Second, it makes more sense to 
compensate those who lose as a result of increased trade than to limit it. And third, those 
who lose from trade are usually better organised and represented than those who gain. 
For example, the farmers protest as they risk losing as a result of trade liberalisation, 
while consumers, who would gain, remain silent. The second point refers to the 
compensation principle and the third one to the special interest groups' politics models 
both of which were mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
The above trade theory models have often been used in the IPE literature and the 
OEP in particular. For example, Peter Gourevitch's (1978) 'second image reversed' 
focuses on how the international-level factors impact the domestic sphere l4• It argues 
that knowing a company's sector and its position along the factoral lines divide 
(abundant versus scarce factors of production) it is possible to deduct its preferences 
regarding trade liberalisation (Lake 2008:764 cites Gourevitch 1986). Ronald 
Rogowski's (2008) model is a part of the 'second image reversed' literature and 
analyses the implications of the Heckscher-Ohlin model for domestic politics. 
Rogowski (ibidem:823) writes that: 
14 Putnam criticises Gourevitch's framework as it presents only a 'partial equilibrium': how international 
factors impact the domestic level, when, in fact, both levels interact with each other and can become 
mutually entangled as a result of international negotiations (1988:430). 
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"Gains and losses from trade, and hence preferences over trade, will 
divide along factoral lines in the Heckscher-Ohlin and in the specific-
factors models, abundant factors normally favouring, and scarce factors 
normally opposing, free movement of products and factors ". 
Such models point out to the fact that domestic preferences are affected by distribution 
of gains and losses from increased international trade resulting for example from 
signing of an FTA. Preferences of these groups matter for the states' trade policy. 
1.5 Theoretical Framework of the Thesis 
1.5.1 Plurality of Factors 
This thesis applies selected elements of the models discussed in the previous section in 
order to provide an in-depth understanding of Japan's FTA policy formation. It 
combines Putnam's (1988) two-level game metaphor with using preferences as the 
central concept and the inclusion of four types of factors: domestic, international, 
political, and economic. Putnam's (1988) model was used to separate the international 
and domestic levels of the policy formation process and to conceptualise the latter as 
bargaining between various groups of actors (domestic negotiations). Factors such as 
the domestic distribution of gains from trade shape the domestic actors' preferences which, 
in tum, are a tool for understanding the underlying motivation behind Japan's FTA 
policy. The formation of this policy is understood here as interplay of preferences of the 
most influential groups of actors: the thesis demonstrates how an organised group with 
sufficient political representation can impact state's policy as explained by the special 
interest groups model. 
This research assumes a plurality of domestic actors involved in the FTA policy 
formation process and the creation of a domestic win-set as well as the plurality of 
factors influencing their preferences. By their very nature FTAs are a meeting point for 
preferences of several groups of actors. For this reason, this research takes domestic and 
international, as well as economic and political factors into consideration in order to 
provide a clearer perspective on Japan's FTA policy choices. Therefore, it assumes that 
Japan's FTA policy and the motivation behind it cannot be explained solely by 
international-level analysis and trade liberalisation theories such as competitive 
liberalisation or the juggernaut effect (Baldwin 1994, 2004, 2006). The role of domestic 
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factors and actors (e.g. conflicting interests of the ministries and their constituencies) 
needs to be included. Similarly, Japan's FTA policy cannot be analysed by focusing on 
political factors alonels. Thus, the study distinguishes four levels of factors: domestic 
political, domestic economic, international political, international economic. 
Incorporating the above mentioned levels of analysis improves the existing narrative of 
Japan's FTAs policy in East Asia. The IPE approach provides a link between the 'state' 
and the 'market'. The incorporation of domestic and international variables results from 
adopting Putnam's two-level game metaphor. 
The need for including both the international- and domestic-level factors while 
analysing foreign. economic policy was advocated by several scholars. Yoshimatsu 
(2003: 111) argues: 
"The international politics approach is useful in explaining broad policy 
outcomes across time in different countries, or general trends in the 
overall international economic system. Yet, it cannot account adequately 
for why a particular type of policy was adapted in a state. For instance, 
it provides no explanation if why one sector is protected from 
international competition while simultaneously other sectors are 
willingly opening their markets. The international politics perspective 
contains several problems in explaining Japan s external relations and 
policies ". 
Angel (2001) also sees the need for both levels of factors, in particular while dealing 
with Japan's current foreign economic policy. The author (ibidem:5) comments on the 
traditional divide between the international and domestic levels of analysis: 
"Globalisation has altered the interests and positions of domestic 
political actors and accelerated the shift in power from central 
governments into the hands of private actors. The new domestic coalition, 
in turn has affected the ways in which countries behave in the 
international arena. As a result, the traditional divide between the 
international and domestic realms has become empirically less accurate 
and theoretically less useful in the study of foreign policy". 
Dieter and Higgott (2003a: 1 07) point out that "a state's foreign economic policy results 
IS More on the importance of economic factors in the next section. 
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at least as much from domestic factors as it does from international factors". Natasha 
Hamilton-Hart (2003) writes that both international and domestic factors contribute to 
the understanding of low level of regional cooperation in Asia and that neither of them 
provides a sufficient explanation. Krugman and Obstfeld (1997:6) claim that "conflicts 
of interest within nations are usually more important in determining trade policy than 
conflicts of interest between nations". Mikanagi (1996:23) argues that the study of 
Japan's trade policy should include state-level and society-level analysis. The former is 
an approach in which the state dictates the policy. The latter is an approach in which 
domestic interest groups compete for political influence and economic benefits and 
foreign policy results from the outcome of this internal struggle. Mikanagi (ibidem) 
writes that "studies on interest groups are important for understanding social input into 
policymaking, but exclusive focus on private actors will overlook important factors that 
affect the policymaking process". 
1.5.2 Plurality of Actors 
Understanding of the domestic policy formation process as bargaining or compromise 
between various domestic preferences indicates the importance of selecting the 
appropriate groups of actors. Therefore, the thesis focuses on both the governmental 
act~rs who formulate the domestic win-set according to Putnam's (1988) model and the 
influential domestic actors as indicated by the special interest groups model. Helen V. 
Milner (1997:33) writes that "when domestic actors share power over decision making 
and their policy preferences differ, treating the state as a unitary actor risks distorting 
our understanding of international relations". As mentioned in the previous section, 
Japan's current FTA policy could be construed as an end result of a dynamic process of 
consensus-building between main actors within the state. Hiscox (2005:72) explains that 
"there is really no such thing as the 'national interest' when it comes to foreign 
economic policy or, rather there is no one national interest, there are many". Moravcsik 
(1997:518) describes it in the following way: "government policy is therefore 
constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups 
(inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision 
makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences". Similarly, the unit of 
analysis of this study are actors who are perceived as bundled groups of individuals, 
such as the ministries and sectors, connected by a similar interest (Lake 2008:763). 
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The first group of actors is the government. The tenn is used loosely to indicate the 
level of analysis and not to presume that the governmental actors represent a unified 
front l6• The research assumes a plurality of actors on this level. The initial fieldwork 
indicated the importance of four main ministries in the FTA policy fonnation process: 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF). Preferences of these actors and the dynamic interplay between them 
are the main focus of analysis on this level. In her research on how the domestic 
structure of preferences impacts foreign policy Milner (1997:33) distinguishes two 
groups of actors: political actors and domestic interest groups. Political actors are 
divided into the executive and the legislative, both assumed to be unitary (ibidem:34). 
This thesis takes a slightly different approach. First, given the specific characteristics of 
the policy fonnation process the analysis focuses mainly on the four ministries and 
bureaucrats working for them. According to conducted fieldwork, preferences of other 
parts of the government, such as the Diet or the Prime Minister's Office, do not play an 
equally important role. Although the Prime Minister sets out the general course of 
action and oversees negotiations, he lacks sufficient political power to lead the 
negotiations. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Sato (2001:15) explains the 
importance of ministries in the domestic policy fonnation process in the following way: 
"As economic diplomacy had receded from the control of the MOFA and 
the prime minister, ministerial interests have prevailed over national 
interests. ( ... ) Within the jurisdiction of each ministry, policy formation 
may take the form of corporatist-style bureaucratic interest 
representation; elitist-style, bureaucratically imposed decision making, 
or the iron triangle, which includes the specialised senior LDP 
politicians (zoku) ". 
Second, the thesis does not consider the preferences of the government or the ministries 
to be homogeneous. As the ministries do not represent the same constituencies, they do 
not have common preferences 17. In addition, the Japanese ministries do not only 
represent their constituency and collect the preferences of domestic actors. They also 
shape and fonn the policy according to their own agenda and interests. This is 
16 The term 'government's preferences' is sometimes used in this thesis while referring to the overall sum 
of preferences of the governmental actors. In other words: the final domestic win-set. 
17Milner (I997:36) uses the concept of a 'divided government' to indicate that the executive and the 
legislature representing different constituencies have varying preferences. 
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strengthened by the fact that policy is traditionally fonned by bureaucrats who have an 
opportunity to develop a long-tenn policy vision and not the elected politicians. As a 
result, ministries cooperate closely with the interest groups they represent (Manger 
2005:811). At the same time, internal ministerial preferences can develop. Sato (2001) 
uses what he calls the bureaucratic politics model to explain the fonnation of Japanese 
foreign economic policy on the domestic level. The domestic policy is dominated by an 
'iron triangle', comprised of the ruling triad of politicians, mainly from the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), bureaucracy and big businesses (Sato 2001, also Carpenter 
2003:61)18. Their close cooperation, when it comes to the fonnation of Japan's policy, 
makes it difficult to implement changes in many aspects of domestic and foreign policy 
(Pempe! 2006:43). Sato (2001) traces the internal process within this triad analysing 
how this system shapes the final outcome of the policy fonnation process and uses five 
cases to detennine how it responds to foreign pressure. Sato (ibidem: 14) points out that 
in the post-war period the ruling LDP focused on general, diplomatic policies while "the 
management of Japan's economic policy was left to the hands of bureaucrats in 
economic ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI)19". Although Sato (ibidem) agrees that this situation has been 
slowly changing, this is another argument for focusing on ministries in analysing the 
FTA policy fonnation process. 
The second group of actors are the powerful domestic interest groups. On this level 
the research discusses the preferences of Japan's manufacturing sector and the 
agricultural sector. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the manufacturing sector is 
represented both by individual companies as well as business associations and industry 
associations. The agricultural sector is represented by agricultural cooperatives whose 
role will be discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 520. Soderbaum (2005:240) argues that 
several IPE theoretical approaches overemphasise the role of the state in the process of 
regional integration and that the increasing acknowledgement of the importance of non-
state actors is a recent trend within the field. Therefore, higher emphasis should be 
placed on the relationship between governments and non-state actors in order to fully 
understand the nature of processes such as regionalism or globalisation21 . This also 
corresponds with Putnam's two-level game metaphor. The thesis stresses the pivotal role 
of non-governmental actors and their impact on the state's policy. 
18 This issue will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
19 MITI was renamed to METI in 200 I. 
20 Due to difficulties with access individual farmers were not interviewed. 
21 This assumption is derived from liberal theory. 
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Focusing on the preferences of Japanese corporation, FTAs' mam clients, is 
important for two reasons. First, it implies the presence of economic-level factors in the 
analysis, the importance of which has been mentioned in the previous section. Phillips 
(2005:23) argues that the phenomenon of globalisation and the increasing market 
integration occurs beyond the political control of states. Big corporations have become 
an important player in international relations (Cohn 2003 :77). Strange (1988, 1997) 
advocates the importance of firms in the study of international relations and the 
weakness of the state-centred approach resulting from a diminution of national 
government's authority. She (1997:4) criticises the global economy models that "put 
undue emphasis on politics and on the role of governments and not enough on 
economics and the role of markets". Ravenhill (2005b: 128) writes about the changing 
balance of power between the state and the companies resulting from the increased 
economic interdependence and globalisation: 
"Potential foreign investors quickly voted with their feet when faced by 
governments that attempted to impose conditions on them: indeed, from 
the early 1980s onwards, the balance of bargaining power between 
investors and governments shifted dramatically so that investors were 
increasingly able to demand concessions from host governments on 
issues such as taxation, rather than accepting restriction on their 
activities ". 
Increased economic interdependence and market-led integration in East Asia as well as 
the internationalisation of production networks, described earlier in this chapter, have 
rendered any analysis of Japan's FTA policy that does not include the position ofMNCs 
and international-level economic factors, incomplete. Yoshimatsu (2003 :90-91) argues 
that protecting their interests, in particular in the East Asian region, is one of the main 
strategic goals of Japan's foreign economic policy. This issue will be further discussed 
in Chapter 3. As the study focuses on the formation of domestic win-set, it discusses 
only Japanese multinational companies and their preferences regarding FTAs and does 
not include foreign MNCs operating in Japan. 
Second, MNCs are by definition trans-national actors. Due to the nature of their 
operations MNCs interact with foreign domestic actors, governments, international 
organisations, and other trans-national groups. High level of vertical integration of 
Japanese production networks results in MNCs' preferences being shaped just as much 
by domestic situation as by economic developments outside the country. Therefore, 
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MNCs have an innate interest in FTA policy and actively participate in the formation of 
the domestic win-set. In addition, their position in the international markets depends on 
their relative position versus that of foreign companies in the same sector. In this 
respect, in the context of this research they provide a counterbalance to the agricultural 
sector which in turn focuses on the domestic situation and whose preferences are shaped 
predominantly by domestic factors. 
In Japan there are globally competitive sectors and those who still enjoy 
governmental protection and are threatened by the prospects of greater liberalisation. In 
general terms, the manufacturing and the agricultural sector represent a division for 
competitive (export-competing) sectors and the uncompetitive, highly protected 
(import-competing) ones. This dual structure of Japanese industry results in a tension 
when it comes to supporting or opposing a region-wide, or in fact, any FTA. The 
conducted fieldwork included in-depth research interviews with several Japanese 
multinational corporations. These were: a company in the electronics sector; two 
multinational corporation specialising, amongst others, in electronics and consumer 
products; two multinational corporations in the automobile and motorcycle sector, 
together with the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association; a multinational 
corporation in the chemical fibres and textile sector; two member companies of the 
Japan Iron and Steel Federation; a multinational company in the heavy industries and 
machinery sector; and a multinational corporation whose operations range from life 
insurance or supplying of electricity, to aircraft, automobile and motors construction. 
The companies were selected due to the fact that they have production networks in East 
Asia or export final goods to this region. They utilise Japan's FTAs or could have 
potentially utilised but declined to do so, for example due to small preference margins. 
The selected companies provide a good sample of Japan's manufacturing industry as 
they represent four different sectors: automotive, electronics, textile and chemical, and 
iron and steel. Preferences of companies regarding FTAs can differ between sectors. 
While the electronic industry has global products, automobile companies produce for a 
segmented market, meaning that products vary from market to market and the size of 
the market is a crucial factor. Furthermore, the conducted fieldwork indicated that 
preferences can differ significantly between companies in the same sector depending on 
the location of their production network. The thesis focuses on the preferences ofMNCs 
regarding Japan's past and present FTA policy and not the utilisation rates of these 
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treaties 22. It focuses on the qualitative evaluation of the existing agreements and 
attempts to establish what causes companies to take advantage of preferential tariffs 
under FTAs. Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) has done a substantial amount 
of research on the utilisation of FTAs based on the company's size and sector as well as 
difficulties in using such agreements. For example, it conducts an annual large sample 
survey of Japanese companies' international operations (JETRO 20 lOb). 
The preferences of domestic interest groups opposing FTAs also need to be taken 
into account. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, this group includes the agricultural 
sector which is one of the strongest domestic special interest group and plays a crucial 
role in Japan's FTA policy (George Mulgan 2000:1). Its position regarding trade 
liberalisation will be explained in detail throughout the thesis. The stronger the 
opposition to trade liberalisation within the country, the bigger the incentives and 
domestic support required to conclude an FTA (Lake 2008:765 cites Cowhey 1993). 
Moravcsik (1997:532) 23 points out that strong domestic groups' pressure can explain 
policies such as protectionism, subsidisation, and other types of regulations, arguing 
that: 
"Thus in the liberal view the creation and maintenance of regimes 
assuring free trade and monetary stability result not primarily from 
common threats to national security or appropriate international 
institutions, but from the ability of states to overcome domestic 
distributional conflicts in a way supportive of international 
cooperation n. 
This type of balance between the pro- and anti-liberalisation forces was demonstrated 
during FTA negotiations with Korea and Australia, the 'failed' FTA cases. This will be 
further analysed in Chapter 3. The preferences of the agricultural sector were 
represented in the fieldwork by the agricultural cooperatives. These organisations playa 
special role in domestic politics. They have the capability to distort the policy formation 
process and exert political pressure on other domestic groups. Chapter 3 provides a brief 
explanation of their particular position on the domestic stage while Chapter 5 explains 
how the change of administration to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009 
shifted the domestic balance of power. In this thesis, the preferences of farmers and 
22 Utilisation rates signify to what extend the agreement is used by companies from member states. In 
other words, how much of the trade between FTA parties takes place under preferential tariffs. 
23 For more on this issue see Keohane and Milner 1996. 
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LEEDS UNfVERSIlY U8RARY 
agricultural cooperatives representing them are often discussed together with the 
preferences of MAFF. The similarity of preferences regarding FTAs between the two 
groups is so strong that discussing them separately would lead to repetitions. The 
reasons for this similarity will also be discussed in Chapter 5. 
The third group of respondents are the representatives of other domestic interest 
groups. The service sector, mainly the banking sector, represents the preferences of the 
non-manufacturing sectors. Labour unions are a domestic group which has only recently 
became aware ofFTAs. The conducted fieldwork research included one of the two main 
national confederations of trade unions. These groups are less involved in the formation 
of FTAs policy. Their preferences on the subject are not as strong and their influence 
does not equal that of previous groups. The weak preferences regarding FTAs can be 
explained by the specific characteristics of labour unions in Japan. Together with life-
time employment and seniority-oriented wage system, in-company or enterprise-based 
labour unions formed the 'three sacred treasures' of the country's management model in 
the post-war period. Labour unions proliferated after the enforcement of the Trade 
Union Law in 1945. Initially, they represented the interests of workers and in 1946 the 
electrical sector's trade union demanded introduction of a minimal wage system based 
on the costs of living (Nishinarita 1998: 199). However, in the 1950s labour unions 
commenced a close collaboration with the corporations they were associated with. This 
was caused, amongst others, by two political cleansings conducted by the American 
occupation forces (Tsuda 1990:22). The first cleansing focused on people connected to 
the wartime regime and the second on people connected to the socialist movement. 
From the 1950s onwards labour unions were created within the corporations and united 
managers and workers of the same company. Their main function was to cooperate with 
and support the parent organisation. Bossak (1990:60) argues that this results in the low 
level of involvement of Japanese labour unions in political activity. These three groups 
were selected based on the initial fieldwork research and literature review. They provide 
a wide spectrum of interests and motivations. As will be demonstrated throughout the 
thesis, the first two groups are key players when it comes to Japan's FTA policy 
formation process. The preferences of the third group play a supporting role in this 
thesis and provide broader perspective on some of the discussed issues. 
1.5.3 Preferences 
1.5.3.1 Defining Preferences 
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Preferences of main actors are a core concept of this study. The thesis attempts to 
analyse the development of Japan's FTA policy through the prism of subjective 
preferences of the people who shape it. This has several implications, for example when 
it comes to the choice of actors and factors as well as the choice of data collection 
methods. These implications will be discussed in the following sections. What is meant 
by preferences is the optimal preferred outcome. In this thesis, the term is 
conceptualised as an overarching concept which encompasses actors' interests and 
motivation. The assumption, derived from liberal theory, that preferences of important 
domestic non-governmental players, such as interest groups, influence FTA policy 
formation process is the starting point of this research. Japan's FTA policy is hence 
viewed as an interplay between various domestic actors namely ministries influenced by 
strong lobby groups. The final outcome is a result of a consensus-building process, a 
compromise accomplished during this interplay which is referred to here as Putnam's 
domestic win-set (level two game). This consensus is then challenged by the constraints 
of the international environment and the preferences of other states (level one game). 
Milner (1997:33) defines preferences of political actors or interest groups as "their 
most preferred policy - or their 'ideal point' - is that policy choice in the issue area that 
maximises their basic interests - that is, retaining political office or maximizing 
income". According to this understanding, the term is similar to 'interests' or 
'motivation' and could to some extent be used interchangeably. However, the term 
'interests' could be confused with economic or financial interests. As Kapstein 
(2006: 12) argues that actors actions are not solely motivated by material interests: 
"Experimental research shows that in many strategic interactions, agents 
do not pursue a strategy of maximizing their own short-term payoffs, as 
both microeconomics and much of international relations theory would 
predict, but instead demonstrate an "other-regarding" concern for the 
payoffs that each player receives (Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Kurki 
2003; Orbell 2005)". 
The plurality of domestic actors causes the research to focus on preferences and not 
governmental or national FTA strategy. The thesis uses the term 'preferences' as the 
terms 'policy' or 'strategy' could be construed as only the official position of the main 
decision-making body: the government. According to this way of thinking, preferences 
precede strategy. As Milner (1997:33) puts it they are primordial. ~amuels (2007:8) 
writes that in terms of strategy and foreign policy "most states have a mixed bag of 
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preferences" and "they play defence and offense at the same time, seeking to preserve 
the status quo in some situations and upend it in others". Japan's official FTA strategy is 
only vaguely defined in MOFA's and METI's official documents. Yoshimatsu 
(2003:107) points out that "the government has not necessarily formulated cohesive and 
persistent policies towards ASEAN largely due to conflict between METI and MOFA 
over initiatives and methods of economic cooperation". Therefore, it seems more useful 
to analyse Japanese government's position in terms of the interplay of the main 
ministries' preferences than in terms of an overarching official strategy. Moreover, 
Japanese corporations with their own preferences and calculations do not necessarily 
follow the state's policy directions (Yoshimatsu 2003:107). Assuming the plurality of 
actors and focusing on preferences allows for a better understanding of motives and 
mechanisms leading to the formation of Japan's FTA policy. 
Milner (1997:33) argues that "the structure of domestic preferences holds a key to 
understanding international cooperation". Aggarwal (2006: 17) points out that "from a 
political standpoint, the motivation of actors provides a first cut into understanding the 
likelihood of pressures for change". In his paper, Moravcsik (1997:519) justifies the 
usage of term 'preferences' by an attempt to avoid confusion with national "strategies, 
tactics and policies". The author (ibidem:513) defines preferences as "the fundamental 
social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments". At each stage of 
the policy formation process domestic and international, economic and political factors 
impact the decisions and preferences of actors. They make an informed decision based 
on information obtained from these four levels of factors. At the same time, they do not 
have equal access to information and their position is also biased by personal situations 
(e.g. owners of scarce versus abundant resources within the economy) which results in 
differences of preferences. Putnam (1988:430) argues that there is a 'general 
equilibrium' between levels of factors whereby the domestic and international spheres 
interact simultaneously. The starting assumption of the research is that with the 
increased global and regional interdependence, advances in technology, and 
communication, domestic actors' preferences are influenced by the four types of factors, 
albeit unequally and not to the same degree. Following the same logic, preferences can 
change over time as a result of developments on the domestic and international fronts. 
The formulation of main actors' preferences is a dynamic process that results from the 
type of information the actors have in any given moment and the geopolitical situation 
on the international and domestic fronts. Therefore, while some preferences remain 
more or less constant, other can change over. For example, China's accession to the 
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WTO and subsequent interest in FTAs could have impacted the preferences of Japan's 
domestic actors regarding the country's regional trade policy24. This research discusses 
several levels of preferences depending on the source: 
• Preferences of main groups of actors, 
• State's preferences (a domestic win-set, a compromise of domestic preferences), 
• Preferences of the negotiating partner (only occasionally mentioned in this 
thesis), 
or on the topic: 
• Preferences regarding bilateral FTAs 
• Preferences regarding a minilateral FTA with ASEAN 
• Preferences regarding a region-wide FTA. 
There is one additional reason for the usage of the term 'preferences' in this research: it 
places the thesis in the context of the body of work on preferences of domestic groups 
and their impact on foreign policy discussed in this chapter (e.g. Milner 1997, 
Moravcsik 1997). 
1.5.3.2 Relevant Studies on Preferences in East Asia 
There have been previous studies using actors' preferences for explaining East Asian 
regional diplomacy, regional integration, and cooperation. Natasha Hamilton-Hart 
(2003) analyses constraints of regional cooperation in Asia and argues that this 
phenomenon can only be understood by including domestic level explanation and that 
the economic models, demonstrating national gains and losses from cooperation or 
trade, simply focus on the wrong questions. The author (ibidem:238) argues that "gains 
or losses need to be mapped against the interests of the groups which dominate policy". 
The same type of logic drives this thesis. Aggarwal (2006: 16) demonstrates how the 
pay-offs from the initial bilateral agreement or trade arrangement and related 
preferences of main actors lead to the creation of a new agreement or modification of 
24 This issue will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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the existing ones. According to his reasoning, the establishment of an FTA affects 
various groups within a state. There is a change in trade and investment flows. This, in 
tum, alters actors' preferences and may cause them to lobby for the modification of the 
agreement or establishing a new one. 
Krauss (2003) analyses Japan's foreign economic policy and asks whether the shift 
from bilateralism (with the US) to multilateralism (for example under APEC) and then 
to what he calls multilateralism+ (simultaneous participation in the WTO rounds and 
various FTA projects), represents a deep change in the country's strategic goals. He uses 
the strategic interaction theory (Lake and Powell 1999) which includes the strategic 
environment level (action and information variables) and the actors' level (beliefs and 
preferences variables). Separating the actors' beliefs and preferences from the changes 
in the strategic environment, Krauss (2003) uses the example of two transitions in 
Japan's foreign economic policy: 1) years 1988-89 leading to the establishment of 
APEC, and 2) years 1999-2000 when Japan adopted FTAs as a tool of foreign trade 
policy. Krauss argues that there is continuity in the foreign economic goals and that the 
country's foreign policy and FTA strategy are aimed at achieving the same strategic 
objectives. Therefore, the author (ibidem:324) concludes by arguing that "both new 
initiatives were simply rational adjustments to the new strategic environment in the 
means used to continue to attain the same preferences, given beliefs at the time about 
US and Asian neighbours, information received, and range of actions available". Japan's 
bilateral FTAs in this understanding are new means or tools for obtaining old foreign 
economic policy goals. This resembles the functional approach mentioned earlier in this 
chapter. Building upon this framework, consecutive FTAs or types of FTAs could be 
used as units of analysis: bilateral FTAs, the minilateral one and the prospective region-
wide FTA initiative. The question asked here would be what strategic objectives do 
different types of FTAs fulfil and how does a region-wide agreement fit with these 
objectives? If current FTAs fulfil similar objectives, does the proposed region-wide 
treaty serve the same purpose or are there other factors that make such agreement 
desirable? If Japan's efforts for a region-wide FTA fit with the country's strategic 
objectives behind bilateral FTAs then Krauss' 'old goals, new means' argument holds 
true. If Japan's strategic goals are constant and various forms of trade liberalisation 
arrangements are tools used to achieve them, it could be expected that the country will 
consistently demonstrate efforts for regional economic integration. 
Yoshimatsu (2003) analyses how changes in the international environment, namely 
the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, have influenced the preferences of the LDP and the 
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MOF and convinced them of a need for stronger regional integration and cooperation. 
His research adopts a domestic policy and actor-specific approach and focuses on the 
preferences and actions of state policy-makers. It does not discuss preferences and 
actions of non-governmental actors. Nonetheless, similarly to Yoshimatsu's (2003:112) 
work, this research also aims to "select specific actors and explore how and why their 
preferences and activities for East Asian affairs have evolved". 
1.5.3.3 Forming Preferences - Actors' Preferences versus Overall State's Preferences 
In his analysis of domestic sources of foreign economic policies, Hiscox (2005 :51) 
combines both the economic and political factors. The author (ibidem): 1) identifies the 
preferences of important domestic groups, and 2) determines how the domestic political 
institutions aggregate these preferences and make policy-related decisions. He also 
points out that the actors' preferences are, in tum, dependent on how the domestic 
distribution of gains is affected by the government's policies. The thesis analyses both 
of these steps. The domestic win-set is created by the ministries as a result of 
aggregation of main actors' preferences. As Moravcsik (1997:518) explains while 
defining the assumptions of liberal IR theory "states (or other political institutions) 
represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials 
define state preferences and act purposively in world politics". As such, there is a 
difference between actors' preferences and their aggregated form: state's preferences. 
Influential domestic actors, such as interest groups, communicate their preferences to 
the appropriate ministry. The government in itself plays a role of Putnam's 
'transmission belt', whereby it collects and represents preferences and interest of an 
appropriate group. As discussed earlier, the ministries do not only collect preferences 
but also shape the policy according to their own. Preferences of political actors and of 
interest groups can differ significantly. Milner (1997:60) argues that "whereas political 
actors' preferences for international cooperation are a function of electoral calculations, 
the preferences of societal groups depend on the distributional consequences of 
international agreements". They are often conflicting (e.g. protection versus 
liberalisation of tariffs), or competing (e.g. for investment in different regions). 
Furthermore, not all groups have an equal ability to exert political pressure. In the 
process of formulating state's preferences domestic preferences are distorted as a result 
of an unequal amount of representation available to particular groups. As demonstrated 
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by Becker (1985) and Grossman and Helpman (2001 and 2002), interests of a well 
organised small group can skew the state's policy in the favour of that group. Moravcsik 
(1997:530) argues that "the precise policy of governments depends on which domestic 
groups are represented" and that "policy is biased in favour of the governing coalition or 
powerful domestic groups". The subject of this research is a democratic state where a 
democratic voting system and three branches of power ensure that the society is well 
represented. Nonetheless, no government offers universal or unbiased representation 
(Moravcsik 1997:518). Group's ability to exert political influence depends on their 
relative position within society, more than on their actual size. If powerful domestic 
groups have sufficient representation they are able to lobby for solutions that benefit 
them while passing the costs onto groups that would otherwise benefit from 
liberalisation (rent-seeking). An example of such well organised interest group in Japan 
is the agricultural sector. 
As domestic interest groups attempt to influence the ministry that represents them, 
it could be argued that the final outcome is formulated through a process of dialogue or 
bargaining between the ministries representing the strongest groups (e.g. METI versus 
MOFA). This occurs in two steps: 1) communication between domestic groups and the 
ministry that represents them, and 2) communication and bargaining between the 
ministries and inter-ministerial competition or rivalry. As a result, a domestic win-set is 
formed. As indicated in Chapter 5, this can take place simultaneously to the 
international win-set which is the compromise formed during FTA negotiations between 
the domestic preferences and those of the foreign partner. Therefore, the ministries 
respond to the lobbying efforts from within an outside the country and are Putnam's 
transmission belt. 
1.5.3.4 Liberalisation and Political Effort 
IPE theory assumes that "openness is historically rare, politically problematic, and a 
phenomenon that needs to be explained" (Lake 2008:758). It attempts to determine 
under which political conditions states decide to open their markets. Similarly, in this 
research, actors' preferences for an increased market openness leading to a region-wide 
FTA could be construed as a dependent variable and economic and geopolitical factors 
as the independent, casual variables. The level of liberalisation of an FTA depends on its 
type, depth and scope of coverage. Bilateral, minilateral and regional trade agreements 
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are consecutive levels of trade liberalisation agreements in terms of membership and not 
necessarily market openness. 
There are several opinions on how the number of members influences the depth and 
scope of agreements. Wider treaties often do not include deep liberalisation issues 
which can make them easier to sign. Bilateral agreements, in particular these signed by 
Japan, often include provisions exceeding the WTO commitments. Therefore, there 
might be trade-offs between the number of members and the degree and scope of 
liberalisation. In Rajan's (2005 :217) opinion a 'new regionalism', meaning a new type 
of regional trade agreements, is occurring in East Asia since the financial crisis of 
1997/98. The author (ibidem:225) explains that "because of the depth of issue coverage, 
the new FTAs tend to be far smaller in initial membership than the older and existing 
FTAs, which had a preference for shallowness or narrowness in issue coverage but 
broadness in terms of membership". On the other hand, negotiating broader agreements 
requires political effort. Aggarwal (2006:4) writes: 
"Each of these agreement types derives its advantages and 
disadvantages from tradeoffs between political and economic efficiency. 
For example, agreements among few states develop easily, but implicitly 
involve welfare losses due to trade diversion and marginalisation of 
weaker countries. Conversely, larger agreements maximise economies of 
scale by expanding markets, promoting broad-based trade liberalisation, 
and enabling global integration, but demand more political effort to 
negotiate ". 
While negotiating a multilateral FTA, the state has far less control over the negotiation 
process. The higher the number of members, the more difficult it is to reach a 
compromise on conflicting issues and the more political effort is required on the side of 
each negotiating state. Similarly, the higher degree of liberalisation a country commits 
to, the. more political effort is required to gain domestic support for the agreement 
(domestic win-set). There has to be sufficient expected gains from the treaty to provide 
an incentive for domestic actors. Therefore, for Japan to actively participate in a region-
wide FTA there would need to be enough expected gains for the domestic actors to 
support the agreement and overcome domestic opposition. Based on an earlier 
discussion on the levels of factors and how they affect preferences, this could be 
portrayed in the following way: 
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Figure 1.1 Theoretical framework model 
International Environment 
FTAl- Benefits - G~vemmeDt;s preferences ---c> Negotiations ~ FTA2 
(expected/achieved) ~ i 
Domestic Political and Economic Factors 
Figure 1 demonstrates the theoretical framework of the thesis. According to this 
framework, the thesis argues that the effects of existing treaties and the expected 
benefits and trade-offs of a planned FTA, as well as domestic and international-level 
factors, strongly influence the actors' preferences. All these factors help to shape 
domestic preferences which are the basis of the first win-set. The expected benefits from 
a bilateral trade agreement cause certain groups of actors to support the signing of an 
FTA. This is confronted with the domestic opposition (e.g. agricultural lobby) and 
influenced by the international situation (e.g. the increasing proliferation of bilateral 
trade treaties in the region and worldwide). The aggregated preferences regarding the 
type and scope of an FTA are the domestic win-set. This is later verified in the process 
of establishing the international win-set during bilateral negotiations when the 
preferences of the other party affect the final outcome. The two-level game would be 
conceptualised in the following way. The bureaucracy and the four ministries which 
playa crucial role in terms ofFTA policy formation (METI, MOFA, MOF, and MAFF) 
correspond to Putnam's central government. On the domestic level there are several 
interest groups. However, the two most influential are the MNCs and the agricultural 
lobby group. The international and domestic levels interact and influence each other. In 
other words, both governmental and non-governmental actors communicate with 
international actors. This is similar to Knopf's (1993 :600) three levels of domestic-
international interactions discussed earlier in this chapter. The thesis assumes that 
Japan's domestic actors interact with the international environment and that these 
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interactions help them form an opinion on FTAs and regional trade liberalisation. Hence 
cross-level and trans-national interactions are understood here as international factors 
which influence main actors' preferences. The two-level game also occurs in the FTA 
partner country, however it will not be discussed in this research. 
1.6 Methodology and Limitations of the Research 
In the thesis, the preferences of the two main groups of actors, the ministries and 
powerful domestic interest groups (large corporation and agricultural lobby groups), 
were identified as the main factors behind Japan's policy formation process. Such type 
of analysis required having access to the direct accounts of how and why these 
preferences were shaped. Hence the opinions and recollections of representatives of 
selected groups of actors were the cornerstone of the data collection process. It was 
imperative to obtain access to main stakeholders of Japan's FTA policy. The data 
collection process was based on in-depth, semi structured interviews. A total of 60 
research interviews were conducted over two fieldwork trips25. The first fieldwork, 
conducted in February 2009, was an exploratory part of the data collection process and 
focused mainly on members of the academia, research think-tanks and governmental 
organisations. The second phase of interviews took place between April and December 
2010. It focused on the representatives of the three selected target groups. Each of the 
interviews lasted one hour. The respondents were chosen based on a non-probability 
(non-representative) sample. This type of sampling was selected due to the difficulties 
with access to representatives of the three groups. In some instances snowball sampling 
was used as some of the respondents offered recommendations and contact details for 
their colleagues. One of the major issues of the data collection process was to obtain 
information from members of all three groups. On the other hand, in order to be able to 
discuss the position of ministries, MNCs or other groups it was crucial to interview 
appropriate people within these organisations. Therefore, the choice of respondents was 
based on how involved they were in FTA policy or how much knowledge they had on 
the subject. The fieldwork did not aim to obtain the highest number of interviewees 
from each target group. As actors' preferences are inherently subjective. careful 
selection of respondents can help to increase validity and reliability of the study. Where 
possible, respondent were chosen from amongst people who have been personally and 
25 For a complete list of interviewees see Appendix 2. 
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directly involved in the FTA policy formation process, on the internal (within the 
organisation), domestic or international levels. This was a particularly difficult task 
when it came to the third group. As a result, only one respondent of each group was 
interviewed. Based on the theoretical framework, the thesis focuses on presenting 
subjective preferences of respondents. Therefore, it gives a substantial amount of voice 
to respondents. 
Data obtained from the interviews is supported by documents and additional 
statistical data. The preferences of the third selected group of actors (other domestic 
interest groups) provided additional information. They often played a supportive or 
illustrative role in the analysis or allowed to fill in the gaps where other types of data 
were unavailable. In addition, the thesis relied on governmental publications, political 
parties' manifestos, publications of business associations and companies, as well as 
internal documents. They were obtained from the organisations' web pages, various 
university and public libraries, and online collections. Triangulation of data sources and 
data collection methods increases reliability and validity of this research and allows for 
cross-checking of data (Yin 2003 :92). Secondary data was also used. Organisations, 
such as the WTO and JETRO, or large think-tanks, such as the Institute of Developing 
Economies (IDE) and the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), produce high 
quality research on FTAs, regional economic integration and several other topics. They 
are a good source of data, for example, on the subject of trade volume and FTA 
utilisation rates. They collect data directly from a large number of companies or 
organisations. JETRO's annual large sample survey has already been mentioned in this 
chapter. Several other JETRO's publications have also been used in this thesis. While 
JETRO and IDE were considered to be an important source of data and opinions, their 
preferences are not discussed in great detail as they do not playa direct role in the FTA 
policy formation process. They are not an independent interest group and have an 
indirect impact on the policy formation process by providing data for the government, 
companies and other groups. They are primary research-driven organisations. Therefore, 
although they are mentioned throughout the thesis, they are not discussed in Chapter 5 
as a part of the policy formation process. 
The theoretical framework of this research focuses on the main or most influential 
actors on the domestic scene and excludes other groups. The preferences of other 
ministries are not discussed. For example, the movement of people, included in FTAs 
with Indonesia and the Philippines, falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare. However, the initial fieldwork research indicated that the four 
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discussed ministries were the main political actors in the FTA policy formation process 
and due to the access limitations and time constraints the preferences of other ministries 
were excluded from the analysis. Similarly, the position of small- and medium-sized 
companies (SMEs) is not discussed in the thesis. This is caused mainly by difficulties 
with access. Preferences regarding FTAs of Japanese SMEs which export products to 
East Asian countries would have been an interesting addition to the research. However, 
the thesis presents only the preferences of multinational manufacturing corporations in 
four sectors. Other domestic groups, such as non-governmental organisation, are also 
excluded from the analysis. This is dictated by the fact that the thesis focuses on groups 
which participate in the formation of domestic win-set. As a result only the most 
influential interest groups and political actors were chosen. The literature review and the 
initial fieldwork indicated that preferences of other non-governmental organisations or 
interest groups, for example environmental organisations, have little impact on the 
domestic win-set. In short, the research does not focus on every domestic group that has 
an opinion or a preference regarding FTAs but on the most influential ones. 
1. 7 Conclusions 
This research focuses on how actors' preferences determine the country's FTA policy. It 
looks into how, perhaps, the establishment of bilateral and minilateral FTAs affected 
Japan's region-wide FTA policy. It also identifies key determinants of Japan's free trade 
agreements policy to date, as well as the actors' opinions on how successful the past 
FTAs have been in fulfilling their objectives. The thesis focuses on main actors' 
preferences in explaining Japan's FTA policy and the relationship between bilateral, 
minilateral and region-wide FTAs. It makes an original contribution on three separate 
levels. First, it develops a theoretical framework based on Putnam's (1988) two game 
model, preferences, and the inclusion of four levels of factors: domestic political, 
international political, domestic economic and international economic. This allows us to 
conceptualise Japan's FTA policy as interplay of domestic actors' preferences and as 
being shaped by the domestic decision-making and policy formation processes. Second, 
it is based on new and comprehensive empirical data. The interviewees were often 
directly involved in FTAs negotiations on the domestic or international level, 
communicated the preferences of interest groups to the relevant ministry or vice versa, 
and had an in-depth knowledge of sectoral politics. Several of the interviewed senior 
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managers were responsible for the FTA regulations within their companies and hence 
had an insight into the utilisation of Japan's trade treaties on a day-to-day basis. Third, 
the thesis provides evidence in the multilateralising bilateralism debate by analysing 
domestic actors' preferences. This level of analysis can be particularly useful in 
understanding the impasse of Japan's FTA policy as it explains the domestic conflict of 
interests which has led to the current outcome. 
This chapter introduced the subject of the thesis and its main assumptions. It 
discussed where the research fits within the broader IPE field and presented theoretical 
models that are of relevance to the subject. It also provided a clarification of main terms. 
The second part of the chapter described the theoretical framework and justified the 
choice of actors and levels of factors used in the analysis. Finally, the chapter mentioned 
the data collection process and the limitations of the research. The theoretical 
assumptions discussed in this chapter will guide the analysis in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
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Chapter 2 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and the Effects of their Recent 
Proliferation 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces terms, concepts and academic debates that will provide a base 
for the analysis of Japan's domestic actors' preferences in the following three chapters. 
First, it presents FTAs: comparison with other types of market organisation, their 
economic effects, the type of barriers to trade they remove and provisions they might 
include. Secondly, the chapter discusses reasons for the proliferation of free trade 
agreements with particular attention paid to the East Asian region. It explains concepts 
such as isolation avoidance and competitive bilateralism that are highly relevant to the 
analysis of this thesis. Finally, the chapter presents an overview of the multilateralising 
bilateralism debate which provides a broader context for the analysis of the possible 
consolidation of various levels of Japan's FTA strategy (bilateral, minilateral, and 
regional). It discusses the problem of the spaghetti bowl effect and proposed ways to 
facilitate the harmonisation of existing agreements. The main question of the 
multilateralising bilateralism debate is what type of provisions and regulations FTAs 
should include in order to allow for their multilateralisation. 
2.2 Overview of FTAs 
2.2.1 FTAs and Types of Market Integration 
. The work of Jacob Viner (1950) and Bela Balassa has laid the foundations for the 
classification of stages of market integration. They are: preferential trade agreement, 
free trade agreement, customs union, common market, monetary union and complete 
economic integration. In addition, at some point between stages five and six, countries 
can introduce a fiscal union. They can also decide to enter into a political union. 
Preferential trade agreements, also referred to as partial scope agreements, offer 
preferential market access, by reducing tariffs on trade in goods. Free trade agreements 
offer preferential access to foreign markets by removing barriers to trade between 
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members on reciprocal basis26• A member country is granted a reduction or exemption 
from the most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs offered to all trading partners. A country 
can be a member of several FTAs, as they do not establish common impo~ tariffs. Rules 
of origin (RoO) are applied in order to prevent trade deflection which occurs when 
third-parties trans-ship their goods via an FTA member state and obtain the same level 
of preferential market access without fulfilling any reciprocal obligations. RoO establish 
the origin of a given good by checking it against the criteria that must be fulfilled in 
order for the good to be considered sufficiently locally produced by a FTA country 
when exporting to the FTA partner. Custom unions (CUs) differ from FTAs in that 
signatory parties adopt common tariffs on third country imports· thus preventing 
countries becoming a member of multiple CUs. In addition to the above, a common 
market involves a free movement of labour and capital, higher level of interstate 
cooperation, and harmonisation of various regulations, procedures and policies. The last 
stage is a monetary union which implies "common currency and/or harmonisation of 
monetary, fiscal and social policies" (Ravenhill 2005b: 118). 
Free trade agreements are often referred to by other names. For example, they are 
sometimes called preferential trade agreements or PTAs (Feenstra and Taylor 2008:398). 
This, however, does not relate to preferential trade agreements as in the first stage of 
market integration discussed above. Instead, the name points to the preferential 
character of liberalisation under such treaties. Jagdish Bhagwati (2008) advocates the 
use of this term to highlight the difference between preferential trade and free trade 
resulting from multilateral or unilateral removal of tariffs. The author (ibidem:xi) 
stresses their discriminatory character and argues that they act "like termites" and "are 
eating away at the multilateral trading system relentlessly and progressively". The WTO 
uses the term regional trade agreements (RTA) as a generic name for CU's, FTAs and 
partial scope agreements. This can be explained by the fact that such treaties are within 
the jurisdiction of WTO's Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (Ravenhill 
2005b: 119i7• According to the WTO (WTOd28), in January 2012, there were 319 RTAs 
in force of which 90 percent were FTAs and partial scope agreements and ten percent 
were CUs. Although the two names are commonly used interchangeably, RTAs are not 
26FTAs are a form of reciprocal liberalisation. Other types of liberalisation are non-reciprocal 
liberalization, such as unilateral removal of tariffs and not fully reciprocal bilateral agreements e.g. 
between developed and developing countries under the Enabling Clause. 
27 Despite the fact that the Committee was established in 1996, the WTO's rules on FTAs were formulated 
in earlier decades when the majority of trade agreements were regional and not bilateral. 
28 The data comes from the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, last updated in January 2012. 
Available from: http://www.wto.orglenglishltratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. 
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identical with FTAs. The phenomenon of the proliferation of bilateral FTAs is often 
brought up in the context of increasing regionalism. However, the growing number of 
FTAs does not necessarily imply a greater level of regional integration. For example, 
Dent (2006) has argued that the proliferation of FTAs in Asia Pacific should be brought 
up in the context of increasing regional bilateralism and not regionalism. Furthermore, 
neither FTAs nor CU's have to be regional. For example, Japan has signed agreements 
with Mexico, Chile and Switzerland. 
Depending on the number of participants and their location FTAs can be classified 
in a different way. Aggarwal (2006:6) distinguishes the following modes of trade 
governance: 1) unilateral, 2) bilateral geographically concentrated (bilateral 
regionalism), 3) bilateral geographically dispersed (bilateral trans-regionalism), 4) 
minilateral geographically concentrated (regionalism), 5) minilateral geographically 
dispersed (trans-regionalism), and 6) multilateral (globalism, WTO). On the minilateral 
level he uses the examples of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTA 
(AFT A) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for geographically 
concentrated and Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), for geographically 
dispersed. According to this classification both the ASEAN-Japan FTA as well as any 
possible future wider agreement in East Asia would be referred as minilateral which in 
the context of this research might cause confusion. Therefore, in this thesis planned 
wider regional agreements will be referred to as region-wide FTAs, as explained in 
Chapter 1. Other scholars developed different typologies. Dent (2010c:21l-213) 
classifies FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region in the following way: 1) bilateral agreements 
between two states, 2) plurilateral FTAs between more than two states, 3) cross-regional 
agreements between states from different geographical regions, 4) quasi-regional FTAs 
between a state and a regional group such as ASEAN, and 5) regional or grand-regional 
agreements that include the majority of nations from one region or trans-regional 
agreements, for example an FTA between Asia-Pacific states. Ravenhill (2005b:120) 
distinguishes: 1) bilateral regional and trans-regional FTAs, 2) minilateral regional 
agreements (NAFTA), trans-regional agreements (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 
APEC) or interregional agreements (EU-MERCOUSUR), and 3) global liberalisation 
under the GATT/WTO. Aggarwal (2006:19-20) classifies the links between coexisting 
agreements and distinguishes: 
• Nested agreements where lower-level agreements conform to broader ones (e.g. 
to the Article XXIV of the GATT); for example APEC's relationship with the 
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GATT/WTO 
• Horizontal connections with a division of labour; FTAs including new issues 
exceeding the WTO's benchmark 
• Overlapping agreements which may lead to conflict in the division of labour; the 
ASEAN-Japan FTA and Japan's FTAs with ASEAN members are an example of 
an overlapping agreement in terms of membership and subject. 
• Independent agreements dealing with different issues therefore not connected. 
2.2.2 FTAs and the WTO 
The WTO allows for the creation of FTAs under conditions listed in the Article XXIV 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Article V of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). FTAs should be notified to the WTO under 
the Article XXIV of GATT for trade in goods, Article V of the GATS for trade in 
services and under the Enabling Clause for agreements including developing countries. 
An FTA that includes both trade in goods and services will be notified under both 
Articles. As a result, if an agreement liberalises both trade in goods and services, it 
needs to be notified twice which leads to double-counting of several FTAs in WTO's 
statistics (Dent 2006:3). An agreement on trade in services is listed as an Economic 
Integration Agreement (EIA). For example, China and ASEAN were linked by an EIA 
in trade in services and by a partial-scope agreement29 under the Enabling Clause in 
trade in goods before the ASEAN-China FTA entered into force in 2010. 
The Article XXIV of the GATT (WTOc 30) does not sufficiently clarify the 
relationship between the WTO and FTAs31. Although the WTO requires countries to 
notify an FTA under one of the articles, there is no mechanism in force that examines 
whether they are in fact consistent with the rules upheld by the organisation. Paragraph 
8 of the Article XXIV explains that FTAs should liberalise 'substantially all trade' 
between two or more states. Under paragraph 5, FTA member states are required to 
liberalise trade within 'a reasonable length of time'. As the term 'reasonable length of 
time' has been criticised for being too vague, during the Uruguay Round of talks a 
29 This was the Early Harvest Package of the 2002 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation. 
30 WTO website Article XXIV. Available from: 
http://www.wto.orgienglish/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articIeXXIV. Accessed December 2009. 
31 One of the aims of the Doha Declaration was the clarification of rules on FTAs (this has so far brought 
little resu Its). 
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document entitled 'Understanding on the Interpretation of Article 24 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994' (WTOe 32 ) was published. It stated that the 
'reasonable length of time' for reaching fullliberalisation is up to ten years. If this is not 
achieved, an explanation should be provided to the WTO Council on Trade in Goods. 
The term 'substantially all trade' also requires additional clarification. As paragraph 8 
does not entail any numerical quantifiers, it has been called the 'legal vacuum' of the 
Article XXIV. As Bhagwati (2008:22) writes: 
"What did it mean to say that 'substantially all trade' must be 
covered- 60 percent trade, or 80 percent, or 90 percent? Would the 
reduction, at whatever percentage, have to be uniform and across the 
board, or could entire sectors, such as agriculture or high-tech, be 
left out?" 
As a result, an FTA can exempt a substantial amount of products from liberalisation and 
still be compatible with the WTO regulations 33. Manger (2005 :811) argues that in 
. practice the Paragraph allows for an exclusion often or more percent of traded products. 
Dent (2006:39) mentions the WTO estimations which concluded that "that FTA 
coverage rarely falls below 50 percent, was usually higher than 75 percent but with 
most notified under Article XXIV having over an estimated 85 percent coverage". 
2.2.3 Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation under FTAs 
Free trade agreements have an effect on income distribution within a state and influence 
trade patterns. In simplified terms, exporting sectors profit from preferential market 
access while import-competing sectors lose in the result of higher competition 34 • 
Therefore, traditionally those who support liberalisation are the exporting companies 
who gain from increased market access and those who oppose are the import-competing 
companies who lose profit as a result of signing an FTA. Each FTA impacts a number of 
countries, such as FTA members, their trading partners and neighbours, and causes a 
complex set of results where the balance of gains, loses and trade-offs for all parties 
involved is sometimes hard to establish and foresee. In 1950, Viner (1950) published a 
32 WTO website Uruguay Round Agreement, Available from: 
http://www.wto.orglenglishldocs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXXIV. Accessed December 2009. 
33 The Japan-Singapore FTA, which excluded the majority of the agricultural sector, will be discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
34 This issue was discussed in Chapter 1. 
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book entitled 'The Customs Union Issue' introducing concepts of trade diversion and 
trade creation effects. He was the first to argue that preferential agreements may 
potentially have welfare diminishing effects both for non-members and members alike35 • 
The proportion of welfare improving and welfare diminishing effects of a bilateral or 
minilateral FTA depends greatly on the type of provisions it includes, as well as the 
depth and scope of liberalisation. Trade diversion and trade creation effects are static 
economic effects of FTAs. Trade creation (welfare improving) effects derive from the 
increases in trade amongst the member countries resulting from removing tariffs and 
other trade barriers. As a result "more efficiently produced imported goods replace less 
efficient domestically produced goods" (Rollo 2007:7) in the more open competitive 
market conditions established by the FTA. Trade diversion (welfare diminishing) effects 
occur when countries shift their supply sources from more efficient non-member 
countries' suppliers to a less efficient member country's ones as a result of the relative 
tariff preferences position now enjoyed by the latter over the former. Dynamic effects of 
FTAs include the economics of scale and increased competition and cooperation that 
occurs over the long-run, and not just from one-off 'static' tariff rate changes. 
Economies of scale result from the reduction of average costs of production which leads 
to achieving greater resource efficiency. In other words "the conditions for internal 
specialisation created within an FTA area will lead to cost efficiencies that in tum 
engender welfare gain" (Dent 2006:22). 
FTAs can liberalise trade in goods, services and factors of production. They can 
adopt the WTD's threefold division for: 1) trade in goods under the GATT 2) trade in 
services under the GATS, and 3) rules on intellectual property rights under the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). An 
increasing number of FTAs includes liberalisation of services. Apart from the treaty 
with ASEAN, all Japan's FTAs had such provisions. Just as under the WTD, the 
liberalisation of trade in services under FTAs can be applied to: 
• Mode 1 - movement of services across borders 
• Mode 2 - movement across national borders of consumerslbuyers 
• Mode 3 - commercial presence, trade in capital 
• Mode 4 - movement of natural persons 
Furthermore, depending on member' preferences FTAs can remove various types of 
barriers to trade, as well as include provisions on cooperation in several domains and 
35 This is caIled Viner's Ambiguity (Baldwin et al. 2007:2). 
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trade and investment facilitation measures. FTAs liberalise trade by removing border 
and beyond-the-border barriers to trade. Border barriers are tariffs (fiscal) and non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) to trade that a traded good, service or factor of production encounters 
on the border of a foreign state. NTBs can be defined as restrictions to trade that do not 
involve tariffs or quotas, for example custom clearance procedures or RoO (Martens 
2009). Non-tariff barriers can also occur as beyond-the-border barriers to trade, for 
example teclmical regulations, product standards and phytosanitary measures, domestic 
regulations, such as environmental regulations or export subsidies which lower the price 
of goods, making it more attractive to foreign importers 36. Trade facilitation and 
removal on non-tariff barriers has gradually become an increasingly important feature 
of many FTAs. Trade facilitation measures might include standardisation, allowing for 
an easier movement of people, and implementing e-commerce technology. For example, 
Japan's FTA with Singapore included two chapters on trade facilitation: Chapter 4 deals 
with customs procedures (for example simplification of customs procedures), and 
Chapter 5 with paperless trading (Nakagawa 2008:12). Other Japan's FTAs also include 
chapters on trade facilitation. As will be explained in Chapter 3 of this thesis, trade 
facilitation is an important part of Japanese companies' preferences for a region-wide 
FTA. Harmonisation of measures across borders under FTAs can mean provisions on 
commercial regulations and cooperation. Commercial regulations include rules on 
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, rules of origin and 
competition policy (Dent 201Oa:52). Other examples are sector-specific provisions such 
as regulations of financial services or telecommunication sector. 
Liberalisation of investment under the WTO is based on the same two principles as 
trade in goods and services: national treatment (treating one's own nationals and 
foreigners equally), and the MFN treatment (equal treatment for nationals of all trading 
partners in the WTO). Under FTAs, investment provisions can be divided into 
investment liberalisation and protection. Investment liberalisation includes pre-
establishment national treatment, pre-establishment MFN treatment and prohibition of 
performance requirements (prior to the approval of investment) (JETRO 2009:129). 
Investment protection, on the other hand, takes form of post-establishment national 
treatment, post-establishment MFN treatment, compensation for expropriation, fair and 
equitable treatment, and state-investor conflict resolution procedures in the event of 
nationalisation. The last two elements are not covered by the WTO's regulations but can 
be found in FTAs (JETRO 2009:129). Investments facilitation includes procedures for 
36 For an extensive work on how to liberalise NTBs see Baldwin et al. 2007. 
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investment and provisions on intellectual property rights. Provisions on investment 
liberalisation under FTAs can be based on a broad definition of investment, covering the 
transfer of any assets or intellectual property or a narrow definition, limited to direct 
investments only (Kumar, United Nations 2007:11). In 2009, Japan had 24 investment 
agreements, of which 15 were bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and nine investment 
chapters in FTAs (JETRO 2009:129). The investment chapters are becoming a standard 
in Japanese FTAs37. If a BIT was signed prior to FTA negotiations, it is usually 
incorporated into the agreement as an investment chapter38• 
The WTO TRIPS Agreement sets minimum standards and rules on intellectual 
property protection rights (IPR). It adopts the national treatment and the MFN principles. 
FTAs often exceed the WTO level of regulations, for example by including TRIPS-plus 
or TRIM-plus (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures). Apart from the 
Japan-Mexico FTA, Japan's agreements include a chapter on IPR, although they are 
limited to "enhancement or clarification" of TRIPS provisions (JETRO 2009: 133). One 
exception is the agreement with Switzerland which has a high-level chapter on IPR 
(ibidem: 134). Chapter 10 of the Japan-Singapore FTA includes comprehensive 
cooperation in IPR protection. Other TRIPs-plus provisions can be found in Chapter 9 
of Japan's agreements with Malaysia, Chapters 10 of the Japan-Philippines FTA and the 
Japan-Thailand FTA, and Chapter 9 of the Indonesia-Japan FTA (Nakagawa 2008:14). 
Dent (2010a:67) explains that, in comparison with the US, Japan's approach to IPR 
under FTAs can be characterised by an emphasis on including more generalised and less 
defined rules, and also on IPR cooperation. Some FTAs include provisions on 
competition policy. Such provisions can also take form of bilateral antitrust agreements. 
Most of Japan's agreements have a chapter on policy and competition law (Nakagawa 
2008: 19, JETRO 2009: 137). Japan-Switzerland FTA includes advanced competition 
policy provisions, similar to the antitrust agreements (JETRO 2009: 137). In addition, 
FTAs can promote various types of cooperation for example cooperation in labour or 
environmental issues, industrial cooperation, technology, as well as regulatory 
cooperation e.g. mutual recognition agreements. 
Lloyd (2008: 16 cites Lawrence 1996) makes a distinction between 'shallow' and 
'deep' integration under FTAs. 'Shallow' integration in that sense implies the 
elimination of tariffs and non-tariff border barriers to trade in goods, services and 
factors of production. 'Deep' integration occurs when beyond-the-border trade 
37 Interview no. 40. 
38 Interview no. 57. 
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restrictions are eliminated. 'Broadband FTAs' is a generic name for FTAs including 
comprehensive commitments to liberalisation. They are also called WTO-plus 
agreements, as they include elements exceeding subjects covered by the GATT/WTO. 
They can include provisions on elimination of technical barriers to trade, labour and 
environment, increased cooperation and harmonisation of measures across borders. 
They often include 'Singapore issues', which were named so after the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore in 1996: transparency in government procurement, trade 
facilitation, investment and competition policy. Japan signs broadband FTAs and calls 
them economic partnership agreements (EPAs). EPAs aim to widen the scope of 
integration and ensure gradual harmonisation and facilitation of regional economic 
activities and economic cooperation (Kawai and Wignaraja 2007:6). Figure 2.1 
demonstrates the wide scope of trade policy provisions under Japanese EPAs. Former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taro Aso (MOFA 2006b), defined Japan's understanding of 
the two terms in the following way: while FTAs are "instruments which take up issues 
such as the lowering of tariffs during trade in goods and the elimination of restrictions 
on foreign investment during trade in services", EPAs "are based on the premise that 
from the perspective of economics, national borders no longer exist". From the 
beginning of Japan's FTA policy, the Japanese government argued that EPAs are 
complementary to the WIO trade liberalisation process as they can provide a model in 
terms of provisions on competition or investment policies, for which WIO has no rules 
(MOFA 2006c:6 and Urata 2003:106)39. Figure 2.2 shows main elements of Japan's 
FIAs. 
39 For more on the .characteristics of EPAs see Chapter 3. 
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Figure 2.1 Scope of trade policy under Japanese EPAs 
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Figure 2.2 Main elements of Japan's EPAs 
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2.3 Reasons for the Proliferation of FTAs 
This section of the chapter presents reasons for the recent proliferation of FTAs, with a 
particular attention given to the East Asian region. The analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 will 
refer to the theoretical concepts explained in this section. 
Fiorentino et al. (2006: 15) name three main characteristics they consider to be key 
to FTAs' popularity: speed, flexibility and selectivity. FTAs are relatively quick to 
negotiate as they usually involve only a few partners. Countries have an option of 
choosing an FTA partner, are not geographically bound, and do not need to harmonise 
their external custom tariffs and trade policy as in the case of CU's. FTA members can 
also decide on the depth and scope of liberalisation. The possibility of excluding a 
group of products from negotiations provides an opportunity to avoid problematic or 
'sensitive' issues. Kawai and Wignaraja (2007:7) list three main reasons behind the 
proliferation of FTAs in East Asia: 1) deepening of market-driven economic integration, 
2) deepening of the European and North American economic integration, and 3) the 
experience of the East Asian financial crisis. Dent (2003 :25) argues that for many Asian 
countries bilateral trade agreements may have the first and foremost strategic purposes. 
They can benefit a specific sector, provide access to natural resources, open a significant 
market or be a defensive or reactive FTA aiming to diminish the negative impact of 
other countries' FTAs. 
2.3.1 Domestic Political Factors 
Domestic political concerns play an important part in governments' FTA policy. Despite 
the fact that multilateral liberalisation can potentially bring more profits, Dieter and 
Higgott (2003b:445) argue that "good economic theory is often bad politics" and does 
not necessarily translate into political constituency. Governments may choose to pursue 
bilateral FTAs as they bring quick, visible and prestigious results - signing an 
international trade treaty. Bhagwati (2002: 117) argues that states pursue their individual 
interests despite the fact that a coordinated multilateral solution would be better for all 
sides. Bilateral preferential trade agreements are easier to conclude than multilateral 
ones. As it was explained in Chapter 1, the higher the number of members, the more 
difficult it is to reach a compromise on conflicting issues and the more political effort is 
required on each side. This is partly due to the fact that the bargaining sides need to 
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overcome the opposition of various domestic groups. As John Ravenhill (2005b:142) 
puts it: 
"The political significance is that free trade agreements that provide 
partial liberalisation can provide exporters with what they want 
(access to foreign markets) while enabling governments to avoid 
tackling the problem of inefficient domestic industries. The result is a 
process of 'liberalisation without political pain". 
Dieter and Higgott (2003b:446) argue that bilateral FTAs create an 'illusion of control' 
over the process of market liberalisation and result from the "fear of being shut out of 
agreements in times of low trust in the multilateral trading system". They find this 
motivation particularly important when it comes to the East Asian region where FTAs 
are 'statements of sovereignty' creating a counterbalance to the limited control over the 
WTO negotiation process. Furthermore, FTAs are said to support and 'lock in' domestic 
economic reforms (Manger 2005:807). Bilateral trade agreements may be a way of 
directing foreign pressure (gaiatsu) in order to overcome domestic opposition to 
economic reforms, restructuring and market liberalisation. Dent (2006:51) argues that 
this is in particular relevant for countries such as Japan and Korea. By opening the 
economy to competition from other countries FTAs enhance the restructuring of 
uncompetitive sectors. In this respect they can be more effective than multilateral trade 
agreements, which according to some scholars is an important motivation behind 
governments' pursuit of FTAs (Urata 2003:98). This was also confirmed by Prime 
Minister Aso (MOFA 2006b). Urata (ibidem) points out that previously Japan was 
reforming its domestic structures using the US's pressure and international frameworks 
such as the WTO/GATT. This ceased to be the case in the middle of the 1990s due to the 
problems with the WTO/GATT negotiations as well as decreased pressure from the US 
to open up the Japanese market. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, without a strong 
political leadership, it is difficult to sign an FTA with a level of liberalisation sufficient 
to support domestic reforms. 
2.3.2 International Political Factors 
One of the most commonly mentioned reason for the proliferation of bilateral FTAs is 
the lack of substantial progress of the multilateralliberalisation process with the stalling 
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of the Uruguay Round due to the disagreements over agriculture, failure of the WTO 
ministerial meetings in Seattle in 1999 and Cancun in 2003, and finally, problems with 
the successful finalisation of the Doha Round. Similarly, multilateral liberalisation 
under APEC and the 'open regionalism' it advocated did not bring expected results. The 
Bogor Goals from 1994 and the Osaka Action Agenda from 1995 have made little 
progress over the years. The Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation, launched in 1997, 
has failed. Additionally, the fact that areas such as the Singapore issues are excluded 
from multilateral talks made FTAs a more attractive option for countries that consider 
these elements important (Fiorentino et al. 2006:26). For example, Japan and the EU 
insisted that issues of investment agreements, competition policy, transparency and 
trade facilitation (Singapore issues) be included in the Doha Development Agenda 
(Bhagwati 2005a:4). The lack of confidence in the multilateral trade liberalisation and 
global and regional institutions that govern it has led many states which have 
traditionally supported multilateralism to shift towards what is now being called a 
'multi-track' approach. This means that while still participating in the WTO rounds they 
also pursue bilateral solutions. Dent (2006:41), referring in particular to the Asia-Pacific 
region, calls this a 'trade policy paradigm shift' from mercantilism, or neo-mercantilism, 
to liberalism. Bhagwati (2008:81) argues that this process, which he in tum calls 
'second regionalism', started when the US decided to pursue bilateral agreements as 
opposed to the previous purely multilateral approach of the early 1980s. As he 
(Bhagwati 2008:81) explains, this was later called the 'competitive liberalisation' theory 
whereby FTAs were believed to help the multilateral trade liberalisation: the United 
States' pursuit of bilateral FTA would cause other states to seek similar agreements with 
the US and support liberalisation under the WT040. Lack of progress of the multilateral 
liberalisation process and the US's and EU's pursuit of FTAs caused states, such as 
Japan, which for a long time have been adherent to the global, multilateralliberalisation 
under the WTO, to adopt a 'multi-track' approach. Ravenhill (2005b:131) in tum 
attributes the change in the United States' approach to bilateral FTAs in the 1980s to the 
impact of the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy as well as the slow 
progress of multilateral, globalliberalisation. 
Dent (2006:51) lists cooperative diplomacy as another reason for FTAs' popularity. 
It is a way in which states cooperate to manage increasing economic interdependence in 
4°This resulted more in the 'tit-for-tat' agreements especially in East Asia. Bhagwati (2008:86) disagrees 
with this reasoning and argues against Fred Bergsten's notion that FTAs can help advance the WTO 
negotiations. This will be discussed in detail later in the chapter together with the multilateralising 
bilateralism debate. 
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the region. Ravenhill (2005b: 120) argues that regionalism (here regional bilateral or 
minilateral FTAs) can serve the purpose of "economic cooperation and confidence 
building" and that "in international relationships that have a history of conflict or where 
no tradition of partnership exists, cooperation on economic matters can be a core 
element in a process of confidence building". Furthermore, Ravenhill (ibidem) explains 
that both the European Union and ASEAN are examples of FTAs signed with a partial 
motivation of preventing possible future warfare (in the second case a war between 
Indonesia -Malaysia 1963-66). Secondly, Dent (2006:51) points out the importance of 
security considerations in Asia-Pacific and calls this type of factors security alliance 
diplomacy: the US-Australia FTA is an example of a treaty signed with such motivation. 
Terada (2006:6) stresses the strategic objectives and gives an example of Singapore, the 
first country in East Asia to have signed an FTA and one of the region's most active 
states in this respect. The author (ibidem cites Leifer 2000:26) argues that bilateral FTAs 
were a way to counterbalance the state's "innate vulnerability arising from its 
geopolitical circumstances wedged between big Islamic countries like Malaysia and 
Indonesia". Bilateral FTAs provided Singapore with a sense of economic and political 
security and stabilisation. Other types of security alliance diplomacy might include 
supporting one's allies (Manger 2005:806 cites Gowa and Mansfield 1993, Gowa 1995). 
This type of motivation can also include the 'new security agenda', meaning non-
traditional security threats, such as environmental damage, illegal migration, organised 
crime, drug smuggling, and international t.errorism (Ravenhill 2005b: 122). FTAs can be 
a way of introducing regulations in this field. 
Bilateral FTAs can be perceived as an insurance policy against trade disputes in the 
uncertain international environment (Manger 2005:807 cites Mansfield and Reinhardt 
2003). In East Asia the financial crisis of 1997/98 provided an additional push in this 
direction. It convinced the East Asian states of a need for regional, economic security 
measures and led them to increase efforts in the field of financial integration, e.g. the 
Chiang Mai Initiative of bilateral currency swaps arrangements. It also caused them to 
seek an alternative to multilateral trade liberalisation. Unlike in Europe or North 
America, there were no free trade agreements in East Asia before the financial crisis. 
Dent (2006:50) argues that FTA 'catch up' was an important factor behind the 
popularity of bilateral trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region. This is connected to 
another two factors he (ibidem:52) mentions: isolation avoidance and competitive 
bilateralism. Both of them were strongly reflected in the fieldwork research findings. 
Isolation avoidance means that states sign their own bilateral FTAs in order to avoid 
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being 'left out' as a result of other countries' pursuit of such agreements. Several 
scholars wrote about this phenomenon under different names. Bhagwati (2008:45) calls 
this type of FTAs 'tit-for-tat' retaliatory agreements. Bilateral FTAs are understood here 
as 'defensive' or 'retaliatory' tools of trade policy. Bhagwati (2008:45) gives an 
example of regional FTA initiatives in East Asia, such as the ASEAN+ 1, ASEAN+ 3 or 
ASEAN+6, which excluded the US and were created after the US signed NAFTA and 
considered the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas excluding Asia. Terada (2006:25) 
provides another example of isolation avoidance in East Asia by arguing that Japan's 
FTA with Singapore and planned agreement with Korea has caused China to negotiate a 
free trade agreement with ASEAN. This, in turn, has led Japan's Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi, to propose a similar FTA to ASEAN. According to Terada (2008:8), 
who quotes Katsuhiko Umehara former Director of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry, Japan's agreement with Singapore convinced Malaysia and Indonesia, which 
were reluctant to join the FTA race, to reconsider their policy. While Japan was 
negotiating with Singapore, Malaysia spoke openly against such treaties. According to 
the former Malaysian Trade Minister, Rafidah Aziz (Terada 2006: 11 cit Straits Times, 
15 March 2001), Malaysia was "not interested in having bilateral FTAs with anybody". 
However, since then, the country has concluded agreements with, amongst others, Japan, 
Pakistan and Chile. 
Competitive bilateralism rationale for the proliferation of FTAs is closely related to 
isolation avoidance. In this understanding FTAs "are a function of inter-state 
competition for economic and political influence" (Dent 2006:41). Bilateral or 
minilateral FTAs can change the regional balance of power, serve as bargaining tools or 
provide leverage in multilateral negotiations. Political competition can be explained as 
an awareness of regional balance of power and position vis-a-vis other countries and an 
idea of not being 'left behind'. Economic competition, discussed in detail in the next 
section, is related to the relative position of multinational companies (MNCs) on 
international markets and their response to foreign companies obtaining preferential 
market access under third-party FTAs. Ravenhill (2005c:3) points out that when APEC 
was established member states attempted to use the organisation to pressure the EU to 
compromise during the Uruguay Round of GATT. Ravenhill (2005b:129) calls this 
phenomenon bandwagoning or balancing and explains it as "the possibility that 
regionalism in one part of the world triggers regionalism elsewhere through 
'demonstration', 'emulation', or 'contagion' effects". These two factors correspond to 
the neorealist approach which perceives regionalism as an extension of states' 
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continuous struggle for power on the international stage. For example, it can occur 
when countries form alliances in order to counterbalance the position of other states and 
regional groupings, or when a "hegemon or 'stabiliser' state can stimulate the 
emergence of regional cooperation and regional institutions in a variety of ways, and 
indeed is necessary for this to happen" (Soderbaum 5002:224 cites Hurrell 1995:51-3, 
Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1987; Buzan 1991). Understanding of FTAs as defensive tools for 
offsetting the negative effects of economic integration between third parties is 
significant in the context of this thesis. According to research fieldwork, both isolation 
avoidance and competitive bilateralism playa pivotal role in Japan's FTA policy as will 
be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
2.3.3 Domestic Economic Factors 
Dieter and Higgott (2003b:446) point out that the average level of tariffs and NTBs was 
successfully reduced by the GATT/WTO process and hence removal of traditional 
barriers to trade under FTAs does not offer as many gains as it used to. Richard Baldwin 
(2006:1474) explains proliferation ofFTAs despite the falling MFN tariffs by the 'home 
market magnification' effect which means that "small advantages created by tariffs 
matter more when the overall level of protection is low". Baldwin's 'home market 
magnification' effect and the economies of scale are the basic economic reason for 
signing bilateral FTAs. Such agreements can also help to attract inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI). This can be an important motivation, particularly for smaller and less 
developed economies (Hufbauer and Schott 2007:25). Ravenhill (2005c:4) gives an 
example of a substantial increase of FDI in Mexico after the country has signed NAFTA 
in 1994. By contrast, Manger (2005:3) argues that FDI provide incentive for bilateral 
trade treaties: having invested abroad, MNCs want to secure their advantage in the local 
market. Hence the intemationalisation of production networks can cause firms to opt for 
bilateral treaties. As developed countries usually have low tariffs on manufacturing parts 
and components, vertically integrated companies can import back intermediate goods 
quite cheaply from the countries that host labour-intensive stages of production. For 
Japan, these tariffs are often close to zero. However, exporting materials from the home 
country abroad can be more expensive as developing states often maintain high MFN 
tariffs (Manger 2005:810). Therefore, Manger (2005:810) argues that FTAs can be used 
as "commercial policy instruments to further the competitiveness of multinational 
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firms". This understanding accentuates the restrictive and protective character of FTAs. 
From the perspective of foreign MNCs, it is desirable to sign a similar agreement to 
offset negative effects resulting from FTA members trading under preferential tariffs. 
MNCs are interested in the liberalisation of trade with countries where they manufacture 
goods or which are their target markets. Companies with vertically integrated 
production network are also deeply interested in provisions on investment, commercial 
regulation, movement of capital and labour, national treatment principle and 
administrative procedures, as FTAs including such elements facilitate operations within 
the network. 
This type of motivation corresponds to functionalist school within the neoliberal 
approach to regionalism (Soderbaum 2005:226). It conceptualises regionalism as a tool 
for fulfilling certain functions. It can be defined as "technical and basic functional 
programmes and projects within clearly defined sectors, without challenging national 
sovereignty or disturbing existing power structures within each country" (ibidem). The 
notion of regionalism and FTAs in particular being pragmatic and functional is widely 
reflected in the thesis. The 'functional approach' as explained in Chapters 3 and 4, is a 
cornerstone of Japan's FTA policy and is expressed by signing agreements designed to 
correspond to specific interests of the manufacturing industry. 
2.3.4 International Economic Factors 
The economic equivalent of the 'tit-for-tat' motivation and isolation avoidance is 
Baldwin's (1993) 'domino effect' theory which is also closely related to the MNCs' 
point of view described in the previous section. One of the most obvious reasons for 
signing free trade agreements is to increase the trade creation effect and offset the trade 
diversion effect caused by third-party trade treaties. Proliferation of FTAs causes states 
which do not want to be left behind to sign treaties of their own to offset those signed by 
their competitors. Baldwin (1993, 2004) named this the 'domino effect'. Domino effect 
occurs when, as a result of country A signing an FTA, country B enters into FTA 
negotiations to offset the effects of the first agreement. Signing of an FTA is an 
'idiosyncratic shock' for non-members: it changes the domestic, political equilibrium 
and the balance of pro- and anti-liberalisation forces and preferences within a country 
(Baldwin 2004:6). This means that the creation of one FTA promotes the formation of 
another by increasing the pro-liberalisation forces in a non-member state faster than the 
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anti-liberalisation ones. In other words: FTAs beget further FTAs. Fearing 
discrimination, non-member state exporters express a greater support for preferential 
liberalisation. Recently, Baldwin and Jaimovich (2010) conducted a study based on the 
FTA database developed by Hufbauer and Schott in 2009. Their work provides new 
empirical evidence for the domino mechanism behind FTAs. They (ibidem) write that 
"the domino theory is not a 'primitive' explanation of why regionalism is spreading, but 
it explains how a few exogenous shocks could produce a cascade of political economy 
effects that makes it look like regionalism is spreading like a wildfire". On the other 
hand, Ravenhill (2010) rejects the notion that the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia 
results from an economic domino effects and points out that such agreements bring little 
economic gains to member states. This is caused by many factors, for example: 
excluding politically sensitive sectors, signing FTAs with relatively minor trading 
partners, and low preferential margins. According to the author (ibidem: 196), low 
utilisation rates of the region's FTAs provide evidence against the economic domino 
effect. However, a recent Asian Development Bank Institute firm survey report (Kawai 
and Wignaraja 2011 b:34) demonstrates that the utilisation rates of East Asian FTAs are 
higher than previously believed41 • Similarly, Ravenhill (2010:179) argues against the 
notion that economic interdependence has caused the proliferation of trade treaties in 
the region after the financial crisis and explains that "rather than domestic economic 
actors being the primary driving force behind the new East Asian regionalism, my 
argument is that it has been a state led process, in which non-state actors were often 
marginalised". This means that, while increasing economic interdependence is 
undisputable, it did not, in his opinion, lead to the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia. 
Instead, Ravenhill (2010:199) argues that such agreements were "driven by a 'political 
domino effect', with governments' primary concern being their potential exclusion from 
a new dimension of regional economic diplomacy". 
4\ According to the survey, 28 percent of 835 firms responding to the question on use of FTAs stated that 
they used preferences under free trade treaties. Dent (2010a:60 cites ADB 2008) mentions an earlier 
Asian Development Bank study which demonstrated that FTA utilisation rates across East Asia were 
around 10 percent. 
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2.4 Multilateralising Bilateralism Debate 
2.4.1 Multilateralising the Spaghetti Bowl 
This section presents an overview of the multilateralising bilateralism debate also 
referred to as multilateralising regionalism debate (e.g. Baldwin 2006)42. The question 
asked here is: in what way can bilateral agreements be harmonised into multilateral 
ones? Dent (201Oa:50) points out that FTAs are heterogeneous in nature as they are 
formed from the politico-economic interactions of involved states. FTAs differ greatly 
in the types of barriers to trade they remove, implementation modalities and the range of 
other provisions and regulations they include. Such differences are at the heart of the 
multilateralising bilateralism debate as they make it difficult to harmonise and 
multilateralise FTAs. As Baldwin (2006:1451) puts it "global duty-free trade will 
require a multilateralisation of the world's existing and emerging regionalism". This 
section asks what type of provisions FTAs should include in order to maximise positive 
effects and allow for easier harmonisation. The debate is highly relevant in the context 
of this thesis. As Japan has already signed several bilateral FTAs and an agreement with 
ASEAN, any prospective regional FTA, whether in the Asia-Pacific or the East Asia 
region, will need to coexist and be harmonised with the existing treaties. 
One of the principal drawbacks of the proliferation of FTAs is that it creates a 
spaghetti bowl effect or a 'maze of regulatory regimes' (Pauwelyn 2007:3). Both terms 
reflect the difficulties of coping with a multiple sets of trade rules which occur when 
one country is a party to several FTAs. With the proliferation of FTAs a dense network 
of agreements, tariffs, and rules is created. For companies this means increased costs 
and time spent on complying with different regulations and for the government: 
additional administrative costs of receiving and issuing certificates of origin. The 
multilateralising bilateralism debate can be derived from the spaghetti bowl debate, also 
known as the 'stumbling blocks versus building blocks' (stepping stones) debate. Both 
terms were coined by Bhagwati (1995) who named the regulatory maze of overlapping 
bilateral FTAs the spaghetti bowl effect and during Harry Johnson Lecture in London in 
the 1990 asked a question whether "FTA as stumbling blocks or building blocks" 
(Bhagwati 2002: 118). The President of the Asian Development Bank, Haruhiko Kuroda, 
renamed the spaghetti bowl in the Asian region to the noodle bowl in 2006 (Kawai and 
42 See also papers presented at the 'Multilateralising Regionalism' conference, WTD, 10·12 September 
2007, Geneva. Available from: 
http://www.wto.org!english/tratop_e/region_e/conference_sept07_e.htm. 
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Wignaraja 2009:2). The main question of the spaghetti bowl debate is whether FTAs can 
lead to multilateralliberalisation. What is meant here is both 1) whether bilateral FTAs 
help regional economic integration, and 2) whether regional integration helps global 
trade liberalisation under the WTO. The first question is of relevance for this thesis as it 
asks how bilateral FTAs impact domestic actors' preferences for a region-wide 
agreement. Hence this section focuses on the first part of the question. 
There is a disagreement in the subject literature regarding the impact of 
proliferating bilateral FTAs on the regional or global multilateral trade liberalisation. 
The stepping stone argument can be summarised in two points. First, FTAs provide 
incentives for other countries to seek liberalisation. This would respond to the 
competitive liberalisation theory which was discussed earlier in this chapter (Bergsten 
1994, Baldwin 2004:5). This means that the proliferation of FTAs in one region causes 
other countries to sign further trade agreements to off-set the trade diversion effect of 
those already in existence. However, this can be done under bilateral arrangements and 
hence not further the regional or globalliberalisation. The second argument is that these 
treaties support the multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO. According to the 
WTO (2005b), the popularity of deep integration elements in FTAs can lead to the 
inclusion of these elements in the multilateral trade negotiations. Therefore, FTAs can 
promote WTO-plus provisions and be stepping stones towards further regional or global 
liberalisation. This argument is supported by Brown and Stem (2011). In order for the 
WTO to adopt rules on deep liberalisation and regulatory cooperation there should be a 
"consensus on what the rules should be" resulting from "an extensive exchange of 
information, on analysis and on discussion among specialised national agencies" 
(ibidem:352). FTAs can facilitate such exchange of information and can help to develop 
a best practice model for this type of rules. Ravenhill (2005b: 141) adds two further 
arguments supporting the stepping stone approach: FTAs help to prepare industries for 
global liberalisation by introducing increased competition and they increase profits of 
exporting sectors which are then in a better position to lobby for further liberalisation. 
Baldwin (2004:4) points out that states which have pushed for multilateralliberalisation 
since the II World War are also those who have pursued preferential, mainly regional, 
agreements. This viewpoint is conceptualised by the juggernaut mechanism theory 
(Baldwin 1994, 2004, 2006)43. The initial impulse for the juggernaut mechanism is 
bilateral or multilateral reciprocal tariff cutting which is supported by country's 
43 The concept of juggernaut mechanism is related to the domino effect theory described earlier in the 
chapter. 
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exporters who seek increased market access. Tariff liberalisation is implemented under 
FTA's phase-in schedules. During this time, exporting sectors in FTA-member countries, 
which expect to gain from tariff cuts, are upsized. The import-competing sectors are 
downsized. In Baldwin's opinion (ibidem), this strengthens the pro-liberalisation forces 
within nations and weakens anti-liberalisation ones. In this respect FTAs and the WTO 
are parts of the same liberalisation process. Furthermore, Baldwin et al. (2007:1) also 
argue that the internationalisation of production networks, which they refer to as 
production unbundling, creates incentives for the multilateralisation of FTAs. Multiple 
tariffs and RoO complicate operations of companies with vast international supply and 
production networks and create economic inefficiencies. This has "brought the spaghetti 
bowl effect to the point where it is no longer easy to manage and have increased support 
for multilateralisation of FTA network" (ibidem). Recently, Saggi and Yildiz (2011) 
used Nash's (1950) two game model to discuss the possible effects of the increasing 
number of bilateral FTAs on the multilateral trade Iiberalisation. They offer evidence in 
support of the stepping stone model and argue that under certain circumstances the mere 
possibility of signing an FTA by another state can provide an incentive to participate in 
multilateral trade liberalisation. As non-member states are discriminated against under 
bilateral FTAs, which is not the case under a multilateral agreement, "bilateralism can 
actually provide an impetus to multilateral trade liberalisation" (Saggi and Yildiz 
2010:34). Li (2009:159) used gravity estimations to demonstrate that FTAs between 
countries with established vertical trade links have strong effects on these links. The 
author argues that "the deeper the integration between countries the larger the FTA 
impact on them" (ibidem: 159). Vertical trade between countries previously engaged in 
production sharing is intensified as a result of a bilateral FTA. This provides an 
incentive for deeper integration on a broader level. Therefore, FTAs between countries 
with vertical specialisation can help to promote multilateralliberalisation. 
Robert Z. Lawrence (1995:407) argues that regional trade agreements will be 
building blocks for global liberalisation through supporting countries' economic 
development and providing an incentive for further liberalisation by "creating demands 
for greater access to the block". In addition, he suggests that FTA member countries 
remain dependent on trade with non-members and hence such treaties cannot be viewed 
as protectionist stumbling blocks. In his article published in 1995, Lawrence 
(ibidem:408) mentioned contemporary concerns regarding the stumbling block effect of 
free trade agreements: 
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"A second concern is that Japan will spearhead a Southeast Asian 
bloc, principally by moving its manufacturing industry offshore. (.'; 
As Japanese investment rises in other Southeast Asian countries, so 
goes this argument, Japan will obtain control over these rapidly 
growing markets, erecting invisible barriers that will make it difficult 
for other countries to penetrate. And acting though MIT/, Japan 
supposedly will try to manage international specialisation in a 
manner which inhibits the free entry of firms and products from 
outside the region ". 
In reality, despite the intemationalisation of production networks, Japan does not lead a 
closed regional block and Japanese companies are faced with several NTB in Southeast 
Asia, as will be further explained in Chapter 5. Instead, ASEAN has been playing an 
increasingly visible role in regional integration. The organisation developed the 
ASEAN+ 1 network of FTAs and has been actively participating in trans-regional 
activities, for example through the Asia-Europe Meeting. 
On the other hand, Viner (1950), Bhagwati (2004) and Limao (2006) make a clear 
distinction between FTAs and free trade and mostly stress the negative effects of 
bilateral arrangements such as trade diversion. According to Bhagwati (2008:xi), FTAs 
are in fact stumbling blocks for global trade liberalisation as they are inherently 
discriminatory. The stumbling block argument points to the negative sides ofFTAs: they 
divert political attention away from liberalisation under the WTO and cause countries to 
be less interested in multilateral rounds (Levy 1994). Preferential agreements are 
contrary to the MFN principle 44 and non-discriminatory spirit of the WTD. The 
stumbling block argument could be further explained by preferences of exporting 
industries. MNCs lobby for FTAs under which they obtain an advantage, a margin of 
preference, vis-a.-vis their foreign competitors. Kapstein (2006:6) explains that "this is 
because industrial sectors make lumpy investments that are profitable only under given 
tariff schedules and will therefore organise and lobby to retain them". Rollo (2007: 15) 
points out that those who gain from preferential agreements will oppose the reduction of 
MFN tariffs as this will limit their profits. In this way, FTAs create incentives for MNCs 
to resist greater multilateral or unilateralliberalisation. Limao (2006: 157) points out that 
smaller reductions in MFN tariffs during the GATT/WTD rounds are a way of retaining 
44MFN is one of four main principles on which the WTO is based. The other three being: the national 
treatment principle, transparency in trade policy and reciprocal Iiberalisation during multilateral 
negotiation rounds (Hutbauer 1990:67). 
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a higher preference margin under FTAs. Such tactics make other countries reluctant to 
cut their own tariffs and thus slows down the multilateral trade liberalisation. Similarly, 
Dent (2006), deploying his 'lattice regionalism' hypothesis, argues that proliferating 
bilateral FTAs do not help regional community-building process in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Analysing two counter-perspectives of 'region-convergent' and 'region-divergent' 
bilateralism the author (ibidem:255) discusses issues such as the noodle bowl, RoO 
regimes, competitive liberalisation, hubs, spokes, and contesting FTA models and 
argues that "the new bilateral FTA trend will mostly work against regional community-
building in the Asia-Pacific through undermining the coherence and viability of existing 
regional organisations, intensifying inter-state rivalries, reinforcing power asymmetries 
and exacerbating the development divide in the region". 
The main question of the multilateralising bilateralism debate is how to harmonise 
and multilateralise existing FTAs into broader treaties. Okamoto (2003: 12) sees two 
general ways in which FTAs can be multilateralised. This could be done by increasing 
their membership and/or by making them less discriminatory for third parties and 
gradually applying FTA provisions to non-members. He (ibidem) points out that this can 
occur on three levels: 1) through international organisations, for example the WTO, 2) 
within a particular FTA, for example by including special clauses, and 3) on a unilateral 
level if states decide to apply same provisions to third parties. In Okamoto's (ibidem: 14) 
opinion, the best results would be achieved by combining actions on all three levels. 
Hoekman and Winters (2007:4) see three ways of multilateralising bilateralism: 1) 
hegemonic multilateralisation where one country imposes its model on others, 2) 
convergence where the importance of harmonising regulations becomes visible as the 
traditional barriers to trade disappear, and 3) shifting of the political support for 
liberalisation as a result of third-party FTAs and a changing economic situation. Another 
way would be to include the non-partner MFN clause for trade in goods, similar to the 
one found in service agreements. It requires countries to automatically extend any 
further liberalisation to already existing FTA partners (Fink and Jansen 2007:2). 
Agreements on services are easier to harmonise as existing regulations are much less 
discriminatory than tariffs for manufactured goods. Origin is often determined by the 
location of production instead of ownership. A similar MNF clause exists in WTO's 
TRIPS Agreement and Pauwelyn (2007:31) mentions that using it for trade in goods 
under FTAs would be "a major boost to multilateralising regionalism". Unilateral 
liberalisation could be another solution to the spaghetti bowl problem if the concessions 
made in preferential agreement would be unilaterally extended to the multilateral level 
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(Fiorentino et al. 2006:26). Baldwin (2006: 1471) points out that there are recent 
examples of unilateral tariff reduction, for example in East Asia, and refers to this 
phenomenon as the 'race-to-the bottom' unilateralism. Companies with vertically 
integrated production networks might support unilateralliberalisation of tariffs in order 
to facilitate import of intermediates and finished goods from manufacturing facilities 
located abroad. 
On the other hand, Coming (2009) uses the example of overlapping FTAs between 
ASEAN members and Japan to explain the possible reconciliation of bilateralism and 
multilateralism which falls under the multilateralising bilateralism debate. He does this 
by comparing the technical aspects of the two types of agreements: tariff reductions, 
rules of origin and the WTO-plus provisions. Coming (2009:661) concludes that "the 
choices made in negotiating AJCEP suggest how difficult it will be in the short-term for 
economic regionalism in East Asia to move beyond functional cooperation" and points 
out that harmonising of the six ASEAN+ 1 FTAs would be an even more difficult task. 
Another way to facilitate multilateralisation of bilateral FTAs is to include high-level, 
'deep liberalisation' provisions. Hongshik and Innwon (2007:783) argue that, as tariffs 
for manufacturing goods are already quite low, liberalisation based solely on tariff cuts 
will not bring enough benefits to start Baldwin's domino effect that would lead to the 
multilateralisation of trade liberalisation. On the other hand, according to the authors, 
comprehensive broadband FTAs do not aggravate the negative effects of the spaghetti 
bow145. Hongshik and Innwon (2007:875) stress the importance of trade facilitation 
provisions and argue that in order to avoid the negative effects of the spaghetti bowl and 
to be stepping stones for multilateral liberalisation FTAs should: 1) be concluded 
between countries that have the highest potential for trade creation, 2) include provision 
or clauses on complying with the existing multilateral liberalisation initiatives, and 3) 
include 'deeper integration' elements. Gains obtained as a result of trade facilitation 
provisions allow states to trade more with non-FTA members and hence to minimalise 
the trade diversion effect (ibidem). Trade facilitation reduces trade costs which in tum 
increases gains from trade and attracts more FDI (ibidem:787 cites DEeD 2005). In 
other words, FTAs involving WTO-plus elements are more welfare enhancing and are 
easier to multilateralise. Jong-Wha Lee and Innwon Park (2005:40) have also argued 
that including trade facilitation provisions in FTAs would help to reduce the spaghetti 
bowl effect in Asia while keeping with the spirit of APEC's guiding principle of open 
regionalism. This argument is strongly reflected in the findings of the fieldwork 
45 Ahn and Cheong (2007) also argue that the negative effects of the spaghetti bowl can be lessened. 
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research and the discussion on Japanese companies' preferences for FTAs described in 
Chapter 4. 
Menon (2009: 1395) assesses the four mam solutions for dealing with the 
proliferation of bilateral FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region46• As discussed, these are: 1) 
consolidation into broader regional agreements, 2) multilateralisation of provisions 
under the existing FTAs, 3) hannonisation of MFN tariffs by bringing them down but 
not removing completely, and 4) Iiberalisation of RoO and dilution of their restrictive 
effects by introducing cumulation 47. Multilateralisation, meaning offering the 
preferential treatment negotiated under FTAs to non-members, is considered to be the 
optimal solution (Menon 2009:1405). This would however need to be done on unilateral 
basis, which is a weak point of this proposal. Menon (2009: 1396 and 1405) argues that 
consolidation is the least desirable option for two reasons: it is impractical and it does 
not· remove the incentive of signing further bilateral treaties. It is possible that the 
existing FTAs would be kept after signing of an overlapping regional agreement, as was 
the case when Japan signed an FTA with ASEAN. Therefore, a consolidation of bilateral 
FTAs could aggravate the problem by creating of an additional level of regulations. 
Dent (201 Oc:240) discuses the reasons why convergence and harmonisation of bilateral 
FTAs in the Asia-Pacific will be difficult to achieve and argues that such agreements 
have made little contributions to a "more comprehensive regionalized integration and 
regional community-building processes". In his opinion, Asia-Pacific agreements may 
in time transformation into 'FTA-plus' agreements and focus on WTO-plus issues. 
2.4.2 Multilateralising Rules of Origin 
As they guard the discriminatory character of FTAs, rules of origin are one of the main 
elements of the spaghetti bowl and a major hindrance to the hannonisation and 
multilateralisation of agreements. If RoO are weak and non-discriminatory 
multilateralisation occurs almost automatically as this allows for the trans-shipment of 
goods (Baldwin et al. 2007:9). Gasiorek et al. (2007:3) identify two main negative 
effects of RoO: 1) they can be used as protectionist measures, as they create non-tariff 
barriers to trade, and 2) they strengthen the spaghetti bowl effect as each FTA uses a 
specific and complex set of RoO. Therefore Bhagwati (2008:66) claims that FTAs "they 
46 The author defines Asia-Pacific as comprising of member states of ASEAN, APEC and South Asia. 
47 This concept will be explained in the following section. 
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take away with one hand what they give with the other". 
RoO are negotiated separately for every FTA depending on circumstances and 
preferences of agreeing parties and are attached to the main agreement in the form of a 
protocol. FTAs use RoO based on the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding 
System (HS) of tariffs, an international classification system under the World Customs 
Organisation. The system was initially adopted by the Customs Cooperation Council in 
1983. HS codes are composed of six digits that can be extended up to ten digits. The 
first two digits are called a chapter; the first four are called a heading; six digits are a 
subheading; and all eight or ten digits are called an item. FTAs use two levels of 
preferential RoO: product-specific (how RoO are applied to a given product) and 
sectoral (how they work in a broader context) (Estevadeordal et at. 2007:58). Product-
specific rules have two categories: 1) wholly obtained, where the good is produced 
entirely in one country, and 2) substantial transformation, where the good needs to 
undergo a certain process in order to be considered originating from a given country. 
Substantial transformation may be of three types: I) change in tariff classification 
(CTC) (change in the HS heading level), 2) minimum local value-added content (Ve), 
and 3) required specific production process (SP) (Kawai and Wignaraja 2007:15). SP 
can be applied to a particular stage of production or a component. As for sectoral RoO 
there are two rules. that need to be mentioned: de minimis and cumulation 
(Estevadeordal et at. 2007:59). De minimis rule allows for the maximum amount of 
materials from abroad to be used without affecting the local origin of the good. The 
second rule is cumulation. Cumulation means cumulating the added value of 
components from several countries while establishing the origin of a given good. It is a 
way of harmonising and relaxing RoO and lessening their negative impact on trade 
flows. Thanks to cumulation "products imported from other signatory nations and used 
in the manufacture of a finished product are considered to be products of the nation in 
which the finished product is manufactured" (JETRO 2009: 1 08). It facilitates the 
movement of parts and components between factories of a vertically integrated 
company. Bilateral cumulation is used in all bilateral agreements and allows 
intermediates and materials originating from one country to be treated as local in the 
other country. Diagonal cumulation is used in multilateral FTAs where all partners are 
linked by the same type of RoO and allows cumulation of added value in all member 
countries while determining the origin of a given product (Gasiorek et at. 2007:9). The 
product does not change origin once it enters the FTA. Full cumulation can also be used 
in multilateral FTAs. It offers more flexibility as any transformation of a product not 
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originating in an FTA member country that takes place within an FTA counts towards 
the domestic added value of that good (ibidem). 
As one of the NTBs, RoO can have a negative effect on FTA members and third-
parties. RoO were called 'tools of discrimination' by a senior US Treasury official 
during the NAFTA negotiations (Hufbauer and Schott 2007:37). They affect trade flows 
and increase the trade diversion effect. RoO can also indirectly determine which source 
of intermediate inputs the company uses. If, before an FTA was signed, a company used 
an international supplier the finished good might not comply with the RoO when the 
agreement is in force. In this case, the company can either continue to use the same 
supplier, not take advantage of preferential tariffs and pay custom duties while 
exporting to other FTA members, or change its source and increase its costs in order to 
be eligible for preferential treatment. Whether the company decides to opt for the 
preferential tariff or not depends on the' difference between the costs of complying with 
RoO and the gains from the preferential margin of the new tariff. 
The trade distorting nature of RoO can be offset by allowing a more flexible 
approach, such as cumulation or de minimis rule. Both diagonal and full cumulation are 
possible only when all FTA members use the same type of RoO as it was done in the 
case of the Pan-European Cumulation System (PECS)48 introduced in 1997. When 
PECS was established all participating countries agreed on the same set of RoO. 
Allowing this type of diagonal cumulation in multilateral FTAs creates a sort of 'RoO 
custom union' with common external RoO (Baldwin ef al. 2007:4). It reduces trade 
distortion within the FTA territory. Gasiorek ef al. (2007:23) argue that for cumulation 
to be applied, even if FTA members retain different rules of origin, all existing RoO 
would need to be changed into the VC rule. Full cumulation with value-added tariffs 
could then be implemented. Value-added tariffs were introduced by Lloyd (Gasiorek et 
al. 2007:24 cites Lloyd 1993) and denote tariffs applied in direct proportion to the 
amount of intermediates originating in a non-member country. In other words, countries 
would pay tariffs depending on the proportion of non-member states' inputs to the price 
of the final good: if that proportion was 40 percent, 40 percent tariff would be applied. 
Baldwin et al. (2007:6) argue that setting MFN tariffs at zero for all countries is an 
alternative solution and would solve the problem of trade distortion caused by FTAs. 
This was done, for example, under the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) from 
1997. The agreement signed by 29 information technology (IT) exporters lowered MFN 
tariffs on technological products to zero and made RoO unnecessary (Baldwin 
48 This was recently extended to the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation zone. 
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2006:1510). Brown and Stem (2011) point out that since the World War II developed 
countries have significantly lowered tariffs on a unilateral basis. As a result, the MFN 
tariff for many products is already at zero. If this trend persists, the maze of preferential 
tariffs and rules of origin will slowly become less important. Additionally, as RoO 
protect FTA members with higher MFN tariffs from products trans-shipped from 
members with lower MFN tariffs, RoO should only be applied in this direction: RoO do 
not need to be applied for importing products from an FTA member with a higher MFN 
(Gasiorek et al.2007:22). Estevadeordal et al. (2007:44-46) list possible future scenarios 
regarding RoO: 
• Status quo with bipolarisation of RoO as the stronger economies or FTA hubs 
impose one RoO system 
• Multilateralisation achieved by establishing RoO best practice or benchmark 
within the WTO framework 
• Convergence, meaning the "unification of multiple overlapping existing FTAs 
into a single cumulation zone with a new, single list of rules of origin" (ibidem) 
• Synchronised multilateralisation and convergence which the authors consider the 
optimal solution. It would allow for a formation of larger cumulation zones. 
Both processes would need to occur simultaneously as without simultaneous 
globalliberalisation large cumulation zones tend to adopt more restrictive RoO. 
They conclude that the formation of a large cumulation zones with strict RoO is the 
most likely scenario for the future 49. Kawai and Wignaraja (2011a) consider 
rationalisation of RoO and facilitation of related administrative procedures to be one of 
the ways to lessen the negative effects of the spaghetti bowl. They argue that 
harmonisation of RoO, cumulation, and possibility to choose between the CTC and VA 
rules (referred to as co-equal ruleso) can bring many benefits. Additionally, Kawai and 
Wignaraja (ibidem:9) advocate introducing best practices of RoO administration, such 
as the possibility of self-certification, training and assisting small- and medium-sized 
companies in applying for the certificate of origin, and computerising the application 
process. Conducted fieldwork research has confirmed these findings. Chapter 3 
demonstrates that above-mentioned suggestions are the preferred solution for the 
Japanese industries. 
49 Chapter 3 discusses ways to hannonise RoO preferred by the Japanese MNCs. 
so The co-equal rule will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
78 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to provide a broader definition of FTAs: comparison with other 
types of market organisation, possible differences in depth and scope, and the 
relationship with the global multilateral trade liberalisation process under the WTO. It 
also presented an overview of the reasons for FTAs recent proliferation and terms which 
will be used to identify and explain preferences for bilateral, minilateral and region-
wide FTAs in the folloWing chapters. Finally, the chapter explained the spaghetti bowl 
concept and outlined the multilateral ising bilateralism debate. Understanding the 
various types of barriers to trade FTAs remove, the advantages of such treaties, 
problems with their harmonisation, and the complexity of rules of origin, provides a 
necessary context for answering the research questions. In particular, the chapter offers 
a basis for discussion on two pivotal issues: 1) what would be the difficulties in 
harmonising various levels of FTAs in East Asia from Japan's perspective?; 2) how do 
those difficulties and the existing complex network of preferences and RoO influence 
domestic groups' preferences for a region-wide agreement? These questions will be 
answered in Chapters 3 and 4. Each of the proposed region-wide FTAs in the East Asian 
or the Asia-Pacific region coexists with a number of already functioning treaties. 
Japan's FTAs with ASEAN members coexist with an overarching ASEAN-Japan FTA. 
This provides a precedent that can serve as a possible solution in dealing with similar 
situations in the future. In order to sign broader agreements Japan must decide how to 
deal with the regulatory maze of overlapping treaties. Chapter 4 analyses the country's 
approach to coexisting agreements. 
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Chapter 3 
Preferences Regarding Japan's Bilateral and Minilateral FTAs 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses Japan's bilateral FTA policy, as well as the ASEAN-Japan 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP). First, it provides a short and general 
overview of the post-war Japanese economic development, with particular attention 
given to the establishment of the international production networks of Japanese 
corporations and agricultural cooperatives as the main domestic interest groups 
involved in FTA policy. It discusses the circumstances under which the key industrial 
sectors developed. These are: the electronics and automotive sectors, the iron and steel 
sector, as well as the textile and chemical sector. The FTA preferences of these four 
sectors are discussed throughout the thesis. Secondly, the chapter analyses the factors 
behind Japan's interest in bilateral trade agreements and the initial stages of FTA policy 
formation. It presents governmental and industrial preferences regarding bilateral trade 
agreements, as well as the role played by competition with Korea and China. Thirdly, 
the 'failed' FTA negotiations with Korea and Australia illustrate the constraints of 
Japan's FTA policy. Fourthly, current issues of bilateral policy, such as Japan's interest 
in negotiations with the EU, are discussed. The chapter concludes with an analysis of 
domestic preferences regarding a minilateral FTA with Association of the Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its usefulness for Japanese industries. The analysis 
presented in the following parts of the thesis will draw heavily on the conclusions of 
this chapter. 
3.2 A Short Overview of Japan's Post-1945 Economic Development 
Following the peace treaty signed in San Francisco in 1951, the Yoshida Doctrine 
allowed Japan to focus its efforts on industrialisation and economic recovery, while 
relying on the US for military protection (Jansen 2000:703). Faced with the threat of 
communism in the region, the US promoted Japan's economic recovery (ibidem:727). 
Japan enjoyed access to the American market, as well as its technology and know~how, 
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mainly in the electronics and machinery sectors (Bossak 1990:58). In addition, the civil 
war in Korea (1950-53) helped to boost the Japanese economy as the US purchased 
Japanese machinery and equipment (Beasley 1995:226). Those favourable external 
conditions were coupled with domestic policies. In 1949 the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI hereafter referred to as the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry, METI)51 was established. It played a crucial role in Japan's post-war economic 
development. Until the 1970s it oversaw the realisation of the main national goal- rapid 
economic recovery and industrial growth (Mikanagi 1996:22). The economic recovery 
was to a great extent state-led and based on comprehensive national economic plans 
(Sheridan 1993:147). In 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was created. Until 
the 2009 election, the party enjoyed over half a century of almost uninterrupted power 
in government, which provided favourable conditions for long-term economic planning. 
In the 1950s, Japan entered a period of fast economic growth, which reached a rate 
of 13.2 percent in 1960, causing the following decade to be frequently referred to as the 
'economic miracle' (Bossak 1990:28). Throughout the 1960s, Japan's economy grew on 
average over 10 percent per year 52 . The LDP's government directed a substantial 
amount of Japan's budget toward investment (ibidem:29). During the 1960s and 1970s 
the domestic economic policy focused on "public works and public works' spending, 
which was 'the driving force of growth'" (DPJ 2010b:1). This was accompanied by 
various forms of government participation in economic activities. The high growth level 
was achieved by increasing exports, as well as the modernisation and the increasing 
competitiveness of the Japanese economy (Bliski 2003:5). The government started to 
promote exports in the 1950s. Since 1953, Japan has implemented special tax 
exemptions for large companies, which was supposed to facilitate economic expansion 
(Bossak 1990: 1 05). Emerging and developing companies received support and 
protection against foreign companies from METI (Beasley 1995:247). In addition, 
special regulations and funding was available for companies in so called 'key 
industries'- the sectors which the government considered strategic. They were supported 
by a wide array of "industrial policies including subsidies, policy finance and active 
technology infusion from the western countries" (Yoshimatsu 2003 :87). The 
government aimed to increase the productivity of these sectors by large-scale 
investment and modern technologies (Sheridan 1993: 133). It offered subsidies and tax 
51 In 2001 MIT! was reorganised into MET I. 
52 Data taken from the Statistics Bureau's web page, Chapter 3 Economy, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, Available from: http://www.stat.go.jp/englishidataihandbook/c03cont.htm. Accessed 
January 2012. 
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encouragements for increasing the use of competitive technologies in order to promote 
competitiveness (Jansen 2000:729). In the first post-war decade, the government 
directed the majority of funds to the coal and steel industries in order to increase 
production (Sheridan 1993: 13 7). In 1960, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda's National 
Income Doubling Plan was implemented. It aimed to double the national income within 
ten years by, amongst other things, the promotion of exports, the control of imports, and 
support for the development of heavy industries and the chemical sector (Tsuda 
1990:22). These sectors had "capital-intensive production methods which were 
dependent on modern technology" (Sheridan 1993: 149). Other industries considered 
strategic were synthetic fibre manufacturing and textiles, the chemical sector including 
. fertilisers, as well as petroleum refining, petrochemicals, industrial machinery, and the 
electrics and electrical machinery sectors (Sheridan 1993:133). Large-scale plants, 
producing high-grade steel, amongst other things, were established on the coasts of 
Japan and the country became the leader in shipbuilding (Jansen 2000:728). Increasing 
productivity was supported by the control of imports. While the Japanese economy 
expanded, first through exports and then from the 1970s onwards through the 
liberalisation of outward foreign direct investment (FDI), the domestic market was 
heavily protected, initially by tariffs and then increasingly by non-tariff barriers. 
Japanese importers supported domestic production and did not import products, which 
would compete with local ones (Jansen 2000:729). With the government's support, the 
financial sector, the banks in particular provided funds for certain companies despite 
their weak performance (Kima et al. 2004:7). Such "uncompetitive industries, i.e. 
domestic market orientated manufacturing and service industries, were allowed to 
survive by protection and subsidy" (Gyohten 2003). Pohl (2005: 1 cites Katz 2002) 
mentions Katz's reference to the Japanese 'dual economy', with some sectors enjoying a 
high level of protectionism and regulation and at the same time little competition. The 
bubble economy is considered to have begun in 1986 (Bossak 1990:30). In the early 
1990s the asset-price bubble burst commencing over a decade of economic slow-down, 
often referred to as the' lost decade' . 
In the post-war period, a close cooperation between Japanese corporations, the LDP 
and bureaucracy supported economic development. This is often referred to as the 'iron 
triangle' or 'the ruling triad' (Carpenter 2003:61). Such strong links between the private 
sector and the government date back to the Meiji era and the zaibatsu - family-run 
corporations centred on private banks (Tsuda 1990: 19). They were dissolved after the 
World War II by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). Soon they re-
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emerged as keiretsu - groups of companies organised around banks, such as Mitsubishi, 
Mitsui, and Sumitomo. The keiretsu were first formed as a close connection between a 
business, a bank and other companies of a similar profile. These were horizontal 
keirestsu. In the late 1950s, such companies started to establish a network of suppliers 
and contractors and formed vertical keiretsu (Bossak 1990:25): for example, Toyota's 
cooperates with two companies manufacturing auto parts, Denso and Koito, which sell 
100 percent of their products to Toyota regardless of price competitiveness (Bliski 
2003:6). Such close connections were supported by cross-shareholding amongst big 
companies and banks, which approximated 70 percent in the 1990s (Drifte 1996:43). 
Keiretsu helped to control the quality of the products. The close links between the ruling 
triad were further strengthened by the practice of amakudari (descent from heaven). 
Upon retirement bureaucrats took up positions on companies' governing boards. 
Businesses gained access to information and preferential treatment in government 
contracts, while the ministries obtained some level of influence over the private sector. 
The bureaucrats also often ran for political positions. Mikuni (1998) argues that those 
links made it hard for Japan to reform its economy against the will of one of those 
parties. He explains that the financial system in Japan benefited well-connected 
companies, which enjoyed privileged tax rates. Mikanagi (1996:22) refers to the 'elitist 
model', where the power is concentrated within the ruling triad. In this model the 
bureaucrats, mainly from MET!, made decisions on economic policies in consensus 
with and supported by the other two groups. Mikuni (1998) stresses that the Diet of 
Japan and politicians are not the source of the country's policy - their role is to 
"formalise what is decided by the bureaucracy". Chalmers Johnson (1995) calls this 
system the 'developmental state'. He particularly stresses the role played by METI 
bureaucrats and how they designed industrial policy to promote fast economic growth. 
The 'iron triangle' and the links between MET! and corporations were reinforced by the 
system of 'administrative guidance'. In the 1960s, the Ministry used this informal 
practice as one of the main tools for implementing industrial policy. Under 
'administrative guidance' the Ministry had the authority to issue directives, requests and 
suggestions to companies under its jurisdiction. Schaede (1995:301) explains that under 
the system "administrative agency acts within its scope of jurisdiction in order to induce 
specific behaviour with the aim of realizing an administrative goal through industry 
cooperation". Such communicates where not legally binding but relied on the 
"government-business relationship established since the 1930's, respect for the 
bureaucracy, the ministries' claim that they speak for the national interest, and various 
83 
informal pressures that the ministries can bring to bear" (Johnson 1982:266). The 
companies which did not comply. with METI's directions could expect to face 
retaliation (Schaede 1995, Johnson 1982). According to Johnson (1982:265) "the 
institution of administrative guidance has done more than any other Japanese practice to 
spread the belief around the world that the Japanese government-business relationship is 
based upon some underlying, possibly culturally derived, national mores that have no 
parallels in other countries". The example of 'administrative guidance' demonstrates the 
importance of unofficial and informal communication channels between corporations 
and the government. This subject will be explored further in Chapter 5. 
Due to decreasing production costs and increasing productiveness, as well as a 
favourable exchange rate, in the years from 1955 to 1974 Japanese products became 
competitive in terms of price (Bossak 1990:37). This caused a persistent trade surplus. 
This surplus and Japan's particular industrial policy, which protected and supported 
companies in industries considered strategic, caused trade disputes with other countries, 
for example the US and the EU (Beasley 1995 :265 and Bossak 1990:37). Throughout· 
the 1960s and 1970s, the structure of Japanese exports changed. Textile and textile-
related products, which gained competitiveness through the improvement of the 
production of synthetic materials, no longer dominated exports. In the 1970s they were 
"matched, and then far exceeded by the products of heavy industry, of which 
automobiles were an important part" (Jansen 2000:731). In this period Japan started to 
develop knowledge-intensive industries. Imuta (1994:585) points out that during the 
1970s Japan's car output doubled and the country was the world's largest automobile 
producer. At the same time, it became a leading manufacturer of several knowledge-
intensive electronic products such as TV s. The focus on high-tech industries was 
strengthened by the Plaza Accord of September 1985 and the realignment of the Yen 
(JPY) to the US dollar (USD). The dollar depreciated against the appreciating JPY, 
making Japanese products expensive in the American market. Companies in the labour-
intensive industries were not able to enhance their productivity and hence lost 
competitiveness (lmuta 1994:583). As a result, technological development became a 
new source of competitiveness in international markets. Imuta (1994:584) writes that in 
"knowledge-intensive advanced technology industries (oo.) vigorous R&D and large-
scale investment in state-of-the-art equipment raised labour productivity". In addition, 
after 1985, manufacturing goods in Japan was no longer profitable for many, especially 
labour-intensive industries. FDI, tightly regulated in post-war Japan, was gradually 
liberalised and Japanese companies started to move their production networks to other 
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countries in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, in what was known as the second 
economic miracle after the fast economic growth of 1960s, the number of FDI increased 
rapidly (Beasley 1995:252). 
Although Japanese companies, even today, prefer to manufacture core parts and 
components within Japan, they have continued to move their production base outside 
the country. Thus, they established vertically integrated production networks, through 
"breaking up the production process into various sub-processes and locating each 
process in a country or a region where the sub-process is conducted most efficiently 
through active foreign direct investment" (Urata 2008a:9). To do so, Japan initially 
targeted the newly industrialised economies (NIEs) - Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan and then the selected ASEAN countries. Until 1993 Malaysia, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Thailand constituted two-thirds of all Japanese affiliates in Asia (Ernst 
2000:83). Japanese companies have had many links with the rest of Asia and a strong 
presence in the region since the late 19th century. However, the great majority of 
Japanese FDI to Asia was not in the manufacturing sector: according to Mason 
(1996:19) there were nine manufacturing FDI projects in East Asia, of which four 
located in Thailand. The Japanese production networks established in the ASEAN 
countries were then extended to China in the late 1990s. The core of this network 
shifted from the NIEs to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in the following years. A 
large number of those companies were in the electronic and electrical appliance sectors, 
or the machinery and the automotive sectors. As these networks developed, Japanese 
companies became interested in improving the business infrastructure in host states, and 
the strengthening of ASEAN's economic integration, which would facilitate trading 
within the Associations3• Balboa (2010:3) from the Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies explains that "the establishment of regional production networks and supply 
chains by multinational corporations (MNCs) ( ... ) became known as 'Factory Asia' 
(Soesastro 2006)". A triangular trade has developed in several sectors: parts from Japan 
and newly industrialised economies (NIEs) are exported to China and ASEAN countries, 
from where, after assembly, they are exported to the US and Europe (Utara 2008:7). 
In the rural areas the situation was different. The Japanese Central Union of 
Agricultural Cooperatives, Nokyo, also known as the JA-Zenchu (Japan Agricultural 
Cooperatives) emerged as one of the most powerful lobby groups in Japan (Kawagoe 
1995:220). JA-Zenchu was established in the post-war era, during the US' occupation. 
Today, it has local branches in most villages and towns. The JA -Zenchu s Deputy-
S3 Interview no. 8. 
85 
General Manager explains that agricultural cooperatives are a specific domestic interest 
group, mainly because they do not only represent farmers but also own various 
businesses54. Aurelia George Mulgan (2001 :2) explains that although the JA-Zenchu is 
not the only organisation that speaks for the farmers it "is the dominant farmers' group, 
with an almost universal farm membership and an all-encompassing role in the 
economic, social and political lives of farmers". In the rural areas the JA-Zenchu 
performs various types of services including banking and funeral services. Most farmers 
depend on these services. Cooperatives are exempt from Japanese anti-trust laws. For 
example, the share of fertilisers sold by JA-Zenchu amounts to almost 80 percent of the 
total fertilisers sold in Japan, making them the largest provider in the country55. After 
the Great Depression in 1929-39, the agricultural areas suffered an economic crisis. The 
Japanese government asked the Ministry of Agriculture to establish an agricultural 
cooperative in each town to sell products on behalf of the farmers but also, for example, 
to purchase fertilisers and machinery, lend money or keep money deposits56. 
Under the Food Control Law from 1942, local cooperatives were used to collect 
rice from farmers. Rice was distributed evenly to customers in order to control and 
protect prices. At the time, Japan suffered from a food shortage and the government 
wanted to prevent a situation where food would be sold on the black market at 
extremely high prices, available only to the rich 57. In the post-1945 period, the 
agricultural cooperatives continued to gain privileges. As the majority of farmers grew 
rice, their operations were focused around its gathering and selling. In 1961, the 
Agricultural Basic Law was passed. It aimed to reduce the income gap between farmers 
and industry (Yamashita 2004). The food shortage was no longer an issue and the 
agricultural cooperatives asked the government to increase the price of rice. In the 
1960s, the price of rice was artificially increased by 9 percent annually (Yamashita 
2009:623), making it cheaper to produce rice part-time than to purchase it at a market 
price. The farmers' price was increased, while the consumers' price was maintained at a 
rate lower than the purchasing price. The difference was paid by taxpayers. The 
agricultural cooperatives profited from the increased price of rice. In the post-war era 
JA-Zenchu handled 95 percent of all rice transactions and set the prices for rice (Bullock 
1997). Hence they were able to obtain higher margins in transactions and to sell 
fertilisers or machines at a higher price. 
~4 Interview no. 23. 




According to Bullock (1997), JA-Zenchu functions as a quasi-state keiretsu, with its 
own trading company, Zenno (National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative 
Associations), bank (Norin Chukin), and local branches. In 1991, Zenno's total sales 
"would put it about fifteenth on the Fortune 500 list, second in Japan only to Toyota and 
equal to Hitachi" (ibidem). There are around 2.6 million farmers in Japan, and a high 
percentage of them (about two-thirds) are 60-65 years old. According to a February 
2010 survey (Japan Press Weekly 2010) the average age of those farmers is 65.8 years 
old. Over the last 40 years, the share of agriculture in Japan's overall GDP dropped from 
9 to 1 percent, while food self-sufficiency dropped from 79 to 39 percent (Yamashita 
2009:622). At the same time, the number of part-time farmers (households) rose from 
30 to 70 percent and the number of farmers over 65 years old rose from 10 to 60 percent 
(ibidem). In the rice sector, in particular, many of the farmers work part-time. The 
number of farmers impacted the level of political pressure that cooperatives could 
exercise on the government. The links between the LDP and the rural areas are rooted in 
history. Dent (2006:83-84) explains that they originate from "an alliance formed with 
the daimyos, rural-based magnates who dominated much of the country from about the 
11 th to the 19th Century" and continued throughout the 20th Century. This results in a 
strong "sense of political obligation to the farmers" (ibidem). Therefore, the rural areas 
were the political support base behind the LDP. Part-time farmers were additional voters 
that agricultural cooperatives could offer to the LDP politicians to persuade them to 
influence the government to raise the prices or offer them bail-out money in the case of 
financial difficulties. In addition, due to the specific electoral system rural areas were 
overrepresented in the Diet as the "rapid industrialisation brought with it very large 
migration from countryside to city, and the reallocation of Diet seats lagged far behind 
the facts of demographic distribution" (Jansen 2000:721). The agriculture, fishery and 
forestry sectors, as well as smaller industries such as the footwear and leather products 
sectors are traditionally considered to be the most sensitive and are thus strongly 
protected (MOFA 2005:6). To protect these products Japan uses price support or border 
protection measures, such as import quotas. Kawagoe points out that trade in those 
products is controlled by semi-governmental monopolies (1995:220). 
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3.3 Japanese's Ministries Preferences for Bilateral FTAs 
3.3.1 Japan's Shift from a Multilateral Trade Policy to a Multi-layered One 
Japan was a latecomer when it came to FTAs. In the 1970s and 1980s Japan's foreign 
trade policy was focused around investment and exports to developed countries and 
trade imbalance frictions, mainly with the US. It escaped from this situation by 
embracing the newly established World Trade Organisation (WTO). In the 1990s, 
Japan's trade policy was concentrated around the organisation and the idea that rules on 
trade should be decided and implemented multilaterally 58 • Japan believed that "the 
renunciation of unilateral trade measures in the WTO Dispute Settlement is one of the 
most important rules of the WTO" (WTO 1999:273). This is because Japan suffered 
from other states' unilateral actions. For example, the US threatened to impose sanctions 
on Japan under Section 301 of the 1974 US Trade Act59• Section 301 allows the US to 
declare a country's trade practices unfair and to undertake unilateral action to retaliate 
against them. In the opinion of METI's Director, as the number of members increased 
Japan found it increasingly difficult to negotiate with the US under the WTO and 
endorse or pass new, favourable regulations within the organisation60• Nonetheless, by 
the mid-1990s, Japan still saw the open regionalism and trade liberalisation under the 
WTO or another forum based on the most favoured nation principles as an optimal 
solution (Terada 2007: 11). 
The Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO 2009: 108) assesses that Japan's 
FTA strategy can be traced back to the second half of 2000. A former advisor of Japan's 
permanent delegation to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) who is also a former Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) employee explains 
that the shift towards a multi-layered policy started in the late 1990S61 • METI's former 
Vice-Minister for International Affairs, Hidehiro Konno (2009:21), quotes Kaoru 
Yosano, the Minister of International Trade and Industry, who in a speech entitled 'The 
Prospects and Challenges oj Japanese Economy' at the Yomiuri Conference on 
November 11, 1998, said: 
"There are things called free trade agreements (FTAs), which are 
S8 Interview no. 2. 
S9 Interview no. 3. 
60 Ibidem. 
61 Interview no. 46. 
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adopted by many countries except Japan. It is great that the WTO was 
established but it will take some time to accomplish the global free trade. 
In the meantime I think Japan as an internationalised nation should come 
to grips with FTAs". 
According to Konno (ibidem), this was the first official statement regarding FTAs by a 
Japanese government official and the beginning of a shift in foreign trade policy. He 
explains that there had been an internal debate on the subject of FTAs within METI in 
the second half of 1998. It included an "intensive study on the history, politics, and 
economics of the ongoing FTAs in Europe and North America, as well as in other 
developed and developing nations" in the summer of 1998 (Konno 2009:23). This is 
confirmed by Dent (2006:77) who points out that METI's (1998) 'While Paper on 
International Trade' published in the first half of 1998 spoke of the dangers and 
negative effects of FTAs, for example the discrimination of non-members through non-
tariff barriers such as rules of origin. Dent (ibidem) then explains that as a result of 
internal discussion later that year METI Trade Policy Bureau proposed to explore the 
idea of FTAs. Konno (2009:24) also recalls that it was METI, and in particular the 
Trade Policy Bureau, which, due to "internal research and self-reflection in the trade 
bureaucracy" initiated the policy shift. This is an important conclusion as, from then on, 
the Bureau continued to drive forward Japan's FTA policy. METI's (1999 Chapter 3:2) 
1999 'White Paper on International Trade' stressed the possible positive aspects of 
liberalisation under free trade agreements. Dent (2006:78) comments that this "marked 
an important turning point in Japan's trade policy". The country turned towards a two-
track approach to trade liberalisation, known also as a multi-layered foreign trade policy, 
whereby it supported the progress of the WTO's Doha Round and pursued bilateral 
solutions at the same time. 
In a document entitled 'Challenges for the Upcoming WTO Negotiations and 
Agenda for Future Japanese Trade Policy' (1999:section 3) the Japan Business 
Federation (Nippon Keidanren hereafter Keidanren) reaffirmed the need to strengthen 
efforts for concluding bilateral agreements. The organisation (ibidem) considered FTAs 
important "in terms of the foreign business activities of Japanese companies" and, 
amongst others, their "potential to strengthen Japan's negotiating power in, for example, 
the upcoming WTO negotiations". According to Nakagawa (2008:8) this convinced 
METI that FTAs could be a beneficial supplement to liberalisation under the WTO. 
However, Keidanren's document was published a year after Minister Kaoru Yosano's 
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speech and the debate within METI. The Ministry's 'White Paper on International 
Trade' (2000a) mentioned the economic impact of FTAs in North America (NAFTA), 
Europe (EFTA and the EU), as well as ASEAN's FTA (AFTA) and the EU-Mexico 
bilateral FTA. Finally, the Ministry published 'The Economic Foundations of Japanese 
Trade Policy - Promoting a Multi-Layered Trade Policy' (2000b). The document 
concluded that "regional integration involving Japan is in line with economic realities, 
while progress in other regions and economic analyses suggest that it would also offer 
economic profit" (ibidem Chapter 3:15). It listed concluded bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) (8 in 2000) and bilateral FTAs, considered or under study (with Korea, Singapore, 
Mexico and Chile), as examples of such 'regional integration' in addition to Japan's 
participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Therefore, the 
document advocated the establishment of a three-track trade liberalisation policy: 1) the 
WTO, multilateral layer; 2) regionalism, for example APEC; and 3) bilateral relations 
with the US, the EU and East Asia62• The Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade 
Policy Bureau believes that the shift was a gradual process resulting from observations 
of developments outside Japan63• He explains that since 2000 the Japanese government 
has increased the number of staff working on FTAs at the expense of those working on 
the WTO. In 2002, MOFA established an economic partnership agreement unit to deal 
with the increasing number of studied and planned FTAs (Toh 2007:1). In those early 
years, there was a slight difference of opinion between MOFA and METI regarding 
trade liberalisation policy. A Managing Director of the Japan Association of Corporate 
Executives (Keizai Doyukai64) explains that MOFA supported participation in the WTO 
rounds as the cornerstone of Japan's trade policy65. METI, on the other hand, wanted to 
explore the bilateral route. In time, MOFA changed its position due to the continuing 
lack of progress of the WTO process and the constant pressure from METI66, Konno 
(2009:24) recalls that METI was convinced that Japan should change its policy, which 
he described as being "passive bilaterally, regionally, as well as multilaterally" and start 
showing initiative in the FTA process. 
In 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002) published its first official document 
regarding FTA policy, entitled 'Japan s FTA Strategy '. It was drafted as a result of 
MOFA's internal discussion. Although representatives from the Ministry of Finance 
62Kawai and Wignaraja (2007:6) refer to a three-track approach to liberalisation involving: 1) the WTO 
and trans-regional solutions such as APEC, 2) regional fora and 3) bilateral treaties. 
63 Interview no. 3. 
64 The organisation will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
65 Interview no. 23. 
66 Ibidem. 
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attended the meeting, no consultations with other ministries have taken place. For that 
reason, the document has been referred to by some governmental officials and scholars 
as 'MOFA's FTA policy' 67 or even 'MOFA's agitating paper,68. It acknowledges the 
importance of strengthening the economic partnership with ASEAN and establishing 
FTAs with Association members. The document clearly explains why East Asia was the 
main focus of Japan's FTA policy: it was "the region where Japanese products account 
for the highest percentage of trade", which also "has the highest tariffs" (ibidem). 
Another MOFA document, 'Basic Policy towards Further Promotion of Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs)' (2004), was approved by the Council of Ministers on 
the Promotion of Economic Partnership. Drafted two months after the signing of Japan's 
second FTA, an agreement with Mexico, it aimed to formulate a general policy and 
principles for prospective trade agreements. According to the Director of MOFA's 
EPNFTA Policy Division the purpose of this document was to explain the ideological 
premises behind Japan's FTAs69. However, the document merely outlined the direction 
of the strategy. Until November 2010, when the current government, the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) published 'Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economic 
Partnerships' (20 lOa), the 2004 document was the government's only official document 
on FTA strategy70. This has caused some Japanese scholars to argue that the LOP party 
did not have clear preferences in relation to FTA strategy71. 
The initial evolution of Japan's FTA policy can be observed in the terminology used 
in official documents. METI's document promoting multi-layered policy (2000b), as 
well as MOFA's 'Japan's FTA Strategy' (2002) spoke of FTAs. Later documents, such 
as the MOFA (2004) document, used the term Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). 
This change denotes a forming commitment to a comprehensive approach to FTAs that 
exceeds trade liberalisation issues. As explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis, EPAs 
include WTO-plus elements and go beyond tariff elimination. This approach is 
consistent with Japan's efforts to include broad liberalisation issues in the WTO's 
negotiations 72. 
The fieldwork indicates another important reason behind Japan's choice to name its 
FTAs as EPAs. In 2002, Japan's most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs on industrial goods 
67 Interview no. 60. 
68 Interview no. 12. 
69 Interview no. 9. 
70 The 20 I 0 document will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
71 Interview no. 50. 
72 For example, Japan opted for an establishment of "a comprehensive agreement on investment" and 
considered the outcome of the round, the TRIMs Agreement, "to be inadequate" (Brooks et al. 2003 16-
18). 
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were on average four percent and 41 percent of tariff lines were brought down to zero 
(Baldwin 2006:1457). As the manufacturing sector was already quite liberalised, the 
government was conscious of the fact that it had little to offer in terms of market 
access 73. Instead, in exchange for lowering tariffs, Japan offered provisions on 
economic cooperation, support for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), official 
development assistance (ODA), technical capacity building, and other kinds of 
assistance. It could be argued that Japan has been signing EPAs as way of increasing its 
bargaining power and attractiveness as an FTA partner - including comprehensive 
liberalisation provisions - to give the country more leverage in negotiations 74. At the 
same time, bound tariff rates 75 for textiles and clothing were almost twice as high and 
for agricultural products almost seven times higher (Baldwin 2006: 1457). They were 
considered to be sensitive sectors. MOFA's Director of the EPA/FTA Policy Division 
explains that from the beginning the government anticipated that Japan's FTAs would 
achieve a low level of liberalisation and that sensitive issues would not be included76• It 
considered making compromises in exceptional cases, for example to conclude 
negotiations at the final stage if a product was a deal-breaker. Yet, in the Director's view, . 
Japan did not expect FTAs to cause a massive overhaul of its domestic policy. This is 
another important conclusion as, until 2010 when Japan considered joining the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), the country had indeed not experienced such an overhaul. 
The Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau explains that the 
government decided to sign EPAs before the agreement with Singapore was concluded77• 
According to his recollection, this was done for two reasons. First, it was caused by the 
anticipated inability to offer concessions in the agricultural sector. More importantly, the 
comprehensive scope of Japan's prospective FTAs was needed to improve the business 
environment in East Asian countries, which would be beneficial for Japanese companies. 
In METI's understanding, Japanese corporations would profit from trade agreements 
exceeding tariff liberalisation. Based on the concluded research (METI 2000b) the 
Ministry expected that provisions on the liberalisation of trade in services and 
investment would provide additional benefits. The document refers to a computable 
general equilibrium model analysis, which examined the economic effects of tariff 
reductions, the liberalisation of trade in services, as well as investment liberalisation and 
73 Interview no. 46 and 60. 
74 Interview no. 28. 
7S This is the maximum rate allowed by the WTD. 
76 Interview no. 9. 
77 Interview no. 3. 
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its impact. The comprehensive approach including all of the above aspects was found to 
bring vast economic benefits if applied by the WTO. The Ministry believed that the 
same would be true for FTAs. Having invested in East Asian countries, companies 
required an ability to transfer technology and their personnel, a stable investment 
environment and a strong intellectual property rights' (IPR) protection. According to 
METI's Director-General for International Trade Policy the government decided to call 
free trade agreements EPAs in order to stress their positive aspects, such as cooperation, 
rather than the liberalisation of tariffs, which might have caused protests from certain 
domestic groups 78. From the Ministry of Finance's perspective, BITs were of more 
significance than FTAs 79. Nonetheless, the Ministry supported taking a broader 
approach to FTAs. Japan's EPAs deal with investment protection and customs issues, 
both of which are of interest to the Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
The four types of factors which help to explain the proliferation of FTAs in East 
Asia were described in detail in Chapter 2. Free trade agreements can promote bilateral 
trade, improve the FDI environment, or support domestic reforms (Urata 201Oc). 
Arguably, competition with other states, both in terms of political influence and 
competitive advantage in foreign markets (international economic factors), was the 
driving force behind Japan's initial interest in FTAs and, as demonstrated in the 
. following chapters, continues to impact the country's FTA policy. Chapter 2 referred to 
such inter-state politically or economically driven competition as isolation avoidance, 
retaliation, competitive liberalisation, and the domino effect. With the WTO's Doha 
Round making little progress, Japan's other option to keep up with global trends was to 
join the FTA trend. Isolation avoidance and the tit-for-tat factor, meaning signing of 
retaliatory agreements, were crucial in Japan's shift towards FTA policy. Keizai 
Doyukai s Managing Director explains that a series of meetings and discussions 
undertaken between 2000 and 2003 led the government to conclude that Japan should 
attempt to 'catch up' with the general FTA trend and take advantage of the opportunities 
the agreements presented 80. The aforementioned 1998 speech by Kaoru Yosano (Konno 
2009:21) hinted that other states' interest in FTAs is the reason that Japan should sign 
them as well. Both METI's 'The Economic Foundations of Japanese Trade Policy' 
(2000b) document and MOFA's 'Japan s FTA Strategy' (2002) clearly tied in the start of 
the multi-layered policy with the stalling of the WTO negotiations since the 1999 
78 Interview no. 6. 
79 Interview no. 12. 
80 Ibidem. 
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Ministerial Conference in Seattle and the proliferation of FTAs worldwide. The former 
document mentions the mushrooming of preferential agreements, including the 
formation of the EU in 1991 when the Maastricht Treaty was drafted, and the change of 
the US' trade policy to a multi-track approach with the establishment ofNAFTA in 1994 
(METI 2000b, Chapters 1 and 3). The government had become increasingly aware of 
the growing number ofFTAs worldwide at this time and Japan's looming isolation. The 
financial crisis of 1997/98 demonstrated the interdependence between countries in the 
region. 
At the same time, China started to play a more prominent role both in the region 
and globally, which, amongst others, caused Japan to rethink its foreign trade policy81. 
In 2000, Japan, China and Korea were amongst a small group of countries to had not 
signed an FTA82. Terada (2006:19 cites Straits Times 26 October 2000) cites Hisamitsu 
Arai, a METI Vice-Minister, who said that "if Japan were to rely only on the WTO, we 
will not be able to liberalise for the next few years until the next global round of trade 
talks; Japan will be left behind in terms of competitiveness". METl's Director-General 
for International Trade Policy confirms that the government realised that relying solely 
on multilateral solutions was insufficient and decided to sign FTAs due to the 
proliferation of such agreements in the region and worldwide83. According to Gilson 
(2004:88), Japan engaged in its first FTA due to a "growing trend towards establishing 
FTAs, rather than from a unilaterally developed decision that Japan needed such an 
arrangement with Singapore or any other state". The aforementioned METI (2000b) and 
MOFA (2002) documents clearly tie in the start of multi-layered policy with the pursuit 
of FTAs by the EU and the US. Research fieldwork for this thesis has indicated that, at 
the initial stages of Japan's FTA strategy, the industries did not lobby the government to 
sign free trade agreements to offset the negative effects of other states' FTAs. This is 
demonstrated throughout this chapter. A Consulting Fellow at the Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) , Yoichi Sekizawa (2009) argues that the 
industries "put very little pressure on government to hit the FTA trail". On the contrary, 
he attributes the shift to China's interest in FTAs, as well as the growing number of such 
agreements worldwide, including Mexico's FTAs with the US and the EU. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the initial factor for Japan's interest in FTAs was competitive 
bilateralism and more importantly - isolation avoidance. This type of domino effect 
81 Interview no. 46. 
82 At this point Korea had already stared FTA negotiations with Chile. The first round of negotiations took 
place in December 1999. 
83 Interview no. 6. 
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(political or economic) seems evident in East Asia. The Japan-Thailand agreement was 
signed only a week after the Chile-Japan agreement, which in turn was concluded one 
day after the US-Korea treaty. One of the reasons behind the Japan-Chile FTA was the 
fact that Korea had already signed a similar agreement84• These are only a few examples 
from a long list of 'cause and effect' FTAs in the region. 
3.3.2 Government's Preferences during the Negotiations of the First Two FTAs: 
with Singapore and Mexico 
This section aims to outline the government's preferences at the initial stages of Japan's 
FTA policy. It focuses on certain issues that emerged during the negotiations of the first 
two agreements that have strongly impacted Japan's bilateral, minilateral, as well as 
region-wide FTA strategy. First, it continues the argument that the initial impulse for 
signing FTAs with Singapore and Mexico came from the government and not from the 
private sector. This is in accordance with the point made earlier that at the initial stages 
of Japan's FTA policy it was isolation avoidance and not economic competition which 
influenced the government's actions. Secondly, this section argues that it very quickly 
became evident that the agricultural sector's opposition to liberalisation is the main 
problem of Japan's FTA policy. As it was mentioned in the previous section, the 
government never intended to substantially reduce tariffs on sensitive products under 
free trade agreements. This issue remains unresolved and is just as crucial for Japan's 
participation in a region-wide FTA as it was in terms of bilateral agreements. 
The two first FTAs, both formally announced at the September 1999 APEC Summit 
in Auckland, were preceded by discussions within the government85• According to the 
Executive Director at the Department of International Affairs at the Asia University, in 
June 1998 Noboru Hatakeyama, the then-Chairman and CEO of Japan External Trade 
Organisation (JETRO) and a former Vice-Minister for International Affairs met with· 
Herminio Blanco Mendoza, at the time the Mexican Secretary of Trade and Industrial 
Development and a chief negotiator of NAFTA 86. He explains that Secretary Blanco 
proposed a study of the Japan-Mexico FTA. Chairman Hatakeyama brought this 
proposal back to Kaoru Yosano, Vice-Minister for International Affairs at METI (1998-
84 Interview no. 7. 
8S Interview no. 6. 
86 Interview no. 50. 
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99). This is confinned by Konno (2009:25). In the same year Vice-Minister Yosano 
gave a speech at Yomiuri Conference, as discussed earlier. The feasibility study was 
initiated but was soon disrupted by a "disagreement over the Japanese proposal to 
exclude agriculture entirely from the negotiations" (Solis and Katada 2007:280). Also in 
1998, Korea's newly elected president, Kim Dae Jung, approached Japan and suggested 
the establishment of new diplomatic relations between the two countries. The signing of 
an FTA was one of the ideas discussed under the 'Joint Declaration of the New Japan-
ROK Partnership for the 21st Century' (MOFA 2003:5) signed during a meeting 
between Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and Korea's President, Kim Dae Jung, in 
October 1998 in Tokyo. Private-led studies conducted by the Institute of Developing 
Economies and its Korean counterpart, the Korea Institute for International Economic 
Policy (KIEP), started in 1998, and in 2002 a Joint Study Group was established87 • 
Hence although the Mexican FTA proposal came earlier, the first feasibility study was 
the one with Korea. The Korea-Japan study was a private-led one, while the feasibility 
study for the Japan-Mexico FTA was conducted between JETRO and the Mexican 
Ministry of Economy (Secretary of Economy) 88. In 1999, Singapore's government 
proposed to start a feasibility study for the Japan-Singapore FTA. In this case, the 
private-level study was omitted and the countries proceeded straight to the joint 
governmental studl9• Singapore was chosen as the first FTA partner due to the lack of 
sensitive issues involved and complications in the Japan-Korea FTA discussions9o• The 
country's market was already substantially liberalised, with around 99.9 percent of 
tariffs at zero rate. It is important to note that the Japan-Singapore FTA did not result 
from the industries' request or lobby efforts. In fact, out of 3,000 Japanese companies 
operating in Singapore, only six utilised preferential tariffs under JSEPA (Terada 
2008:13 cites Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 25 June 2007). 
METI's Director-General for Manufacturing Industries Policy argues that, from 
METI's perspective, Japan's FTAs can be divided into Manufacturing Industries 
Bureau-driven and Trade Policy Bureau-driven agreements91 • METI's Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau is responsible for coordinating the preferences of the Japanese 
industries. The Bureau had a strong interest in signing agreements with other countries 
where Japanese companies had invested or were in a disadvantaged position due to 
87 The Japan-Korea FTA negotiations will be covered later in the chapter. 
88 Interview no. 50. 
89 Ibidem. 
90 Interview no. 6. 
91 Interview no. 7. 
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other states' FTAs. Hence, the Director-General explains that the agreement with 
Mexico, Korea, and later on with Chile and ASEAN's members, were all Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau-driven FTAs. On the other hand, the Trade Policy Bureau is 
responsible for Japan's overall trade policy and it wanted to build and expand the 
country's FTA network. In the Director's opinion, the Bureau was interested in 
increasing the overall number of Japan's FTA, in particular with developed economies 
and important markets. This has been confirmed by the Trade Policy Bureau's former 
Director for FTA Affairs92. The agreements with Singapore, Australia and Switzerland 
are examples of Trade Policy Bureau-driven FTAs in which the Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau had little interest. Therefore, Japan's FTAs can be divided into those 
supported by both Bureaus and those supported mainly by the Trade Policy Bureau, 
which does not directly represent Japanese industries and hence generally endorses all 
prospective FTAs93. The implications of this division for Japan's FTA policy formation 
process are further discussed throughout this chapter and in Chapter 5. 
According to Konno (2009:25), at the initial stages of its FTA strategy, Japan faced 
two main problems. They were: an attachment to a multilateral framework and the 
agricultural sector's opposition to liberalisation. The latter issue is still a hindrance in 
Japan's current FTA negotiations, for example with Australia. In Konno's opinion, this 
was noticed by the Ambassador of Singapore to Tokyo, who as a result, in the middle of 
1999, attempted to convince the Japanese side that Singapore was not interested in the 
liberalisation of the agricultural market. According to Terada (2008: 12 cites Munakata, 
the senior METI official involved in the talks with Singapore), Singapore's officials 
visited the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) in November 1999 
to confirm that agriculture would not be included in FTA negotiations. During meetings 
with other ministries, they assured the Japanese side that the bilateral FTA would 
complement WTO activities, thus reassuring Japan on both problematic issues. The 
Ministry of Agriculture did not object to the agreement94• As long as the FTA did not 
require further concessions on agricultural goods, MAFF did not have strong 
preferences on the subject. Similarly, the agriculture lobby group, represented by JA-
Zenchu did not oppose the agreement, as Singapore was not an agricultural exporter9S. 
The organisation's Deputy-General Manager recalls that from the beginning MAFF 
intended to exclude the whole agricultural sector from tariff liberalisation. Due to the 
92 Interview no. 4. 
93 Interview no. 7. 
94 Interview no. 10. 
9~ Interview no. 29. 
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low amount of initial trade in agricultural products between the two countries, the 
agreement was compatible with Article XXIV of the GATT. In practice, the agricultural 
sector was not excluded from the Japan-Singapore agreement but did not involve any 
additional concessions. Tariffs on products covered by the agreement were already zero 
percent. . 
The negotiations with Mexico were prompted by trade diversion concerns and 
Japanese companies' disadvantaged position in the Mexican market after the country 
had signed an FTA with the EU and joined NAFTA96• It was Japan's first FTA brought 
about by specific economic considerations, where the two sides often had conflicting 
interests and which demanded a substantial compromise on Japan's part. In the opinion 
of a former advisor of Japan's Permanent Delegation to the OECD and a former MOFA 
employee, negotiations with Mexico were the first 'real' test of Japan's FTA pOlicy97. It 
was also the first Manufacturing Industries Bureau-driven agreement. Mexico applied 
high tariffs on many items. In 2001 the country's average tariff was 16.5 percent (Solis 
and Katada 2007:285). Manger (2005) argues that it was the private sector, especially 
Keidanren, who urged the Japanese government to start negotiations with Mexico. In 
his opinion, the automotive sector demonstrated its losses and asked the government to 
sign an FTA. According to Shujiro Urata (2008b: 18), an FTA specialist and a former 
World Bank economist, Japanese companies pressured the government to sign an FTA 
with Mexico. However, the impression of one of the auto companies interviewed during 
research fieldwork was that the industry started to lobby for the agreement once the 
plans to start negotiations had been announced98• According to a senior manager in a 
multinational electronics corporation, during the initial stages of Japan's FTA strategy 
the government was unsure how to incorporate the industries' voice in the decision-
making process 99. For that reason, the companies did not actively express their 
preferences to the government. Hence despite the trade diversion effect and the 
deteriorating position of Japanese companies in the Mexican market, research fieldwork 
indicates that this agreement also resulted from the government's initiative and not the 
industries' lobby efforts which took place once it has been announced 100. Over time 
business associations, such as the Japan Electronics and Information Technology 
Industries Association, Keidanren, and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
96 Interview no. 49. 
97 Interview no. 46. 
98 Interview no. 20. 
99 Interview no. 19. 
100 This was confinned during interview no. 14. 
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started to partly fulfil this function. The Executive Director of the Department of 
International Affairs at Asia University also believes that at the initial stage of the FTA 
process with Mexico there were no lobbying activities from the private sector lOI • The 
agreement was initiated by the Mexican side and it took some time for any companies to 
become involved. According to a former advisor of Japan's Permanent Delegation to the 
OEeD and a former MOFA employee the agreement with Mexico, similar to the one 
with Singapore, was a METI-Ied initiative 102. At the time, the interviewee was a 
member of a trade policy committee at Keidanren and recalls that METI officials had 
asked the organisation to endorse the plan to start negotiations with Mexico, despite the 
fact that the committee members believed liberalisation under the WTO to be the right 
course of action. He argues that Keidanren started to support the agreement after 
JETRO initiated its feasibility study. Ravenhill (2009: 14) confirms this finding. He 
points out that Keidanren published a document supporting such agreement only after 
the negotiations started. He lists further evidence (ibidem: 15), which supports the idea 
that Japanese industries were not the driving force behind this FTA: 
"First, the initiative for the PTA came not from Japan but from Mexico. 
Second, the initial response of the Japanese government was not to 
pursue a PTA but to offer the counter-proposal of bilateral investment 
treaty. Third, a JETRO survey concluded among Japanese subsidiaries in 
Mexico in the second half of 1999, after the initiative had been launched 
(Ogita 2003:244), found no company stating that it required a PTA to 
sustain its Mexican operations. Fourth. even though the public position 
adopted by Keidanren favoured a PTA, the business sector in Japan was 
by no means unified on the issue ". 
In the opinion of the Managing Director of Keizai Doyukai, it is impossible to conclude 
that the government agreed to start negotiations with Mexico because of the companies' 
lobbying activities103• Overall, it took time for the industries to recognise the importance 
of lobbying the government regarding FTAs. In the early 2000s, when MET! realised 
that Japan had been slow to get on the FTA bandwagon, it cooperated with MOFA to 
develop the framework for a multi-layered trade policy. During the negotiation process 
101 Interview no. 50. 
102 Interview no. 46. 
103 Interview no. 23. 
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of this first agreement the industries acknowledged the potential benefits of FTAsI04. 
Therefore, although they did not initiate the agreement, it can be argued that it was 
signed with the Japanese companies' support. 
The agreement with Mexico lowered tariffs on 600 Japanese forestry, fishery and 
agricultural products (Munakata 2006b: 120). The country, with its big agricultural 
sector, was a difficult partner for Japan \05. The chief negotiator of the Japan-Mexican 
FTA explains that for Mexico, which lacked a strong manufacturing sector, the opening 
up of Japan's agricultural market was the main motivation for negotiating the agreement, 
as the sector was a source of competitive advantage when it came to bilateral trade 106. 
He estimates that agricultural products accounted for 20 percent of Mexico's exports to 
Japan, of which half was pork. The successful finalisation of the Japan-Mexico 
agreement proved to the private sector that Japan could sign FTAs even with agriculture 
exporting countries. This, amongst other factors, prompted the idea to start negotiations 
with Thailand and Malaysia. However, during the negotiations with Mexico, the 
Ministry of Agriculture recognised the potential significance of FTAs and started to pay 
attention to developments in this field. Similarly to METI and MOFA, the Ministry of 
Agriculture initially had a very limited understanding of FTAs and consecutive 
negotiations were a learning process l07. The FTA with Singapore was concluded without 
additional concessions on agricultural products. The agreement with Mexico 
demonstrated that this was an exceptional case. Following discussions on JMEPA, 
MAFF strongly opposed trade liberalisation in the agricultural sector under this and all 
prospective FTAs\08. Disagreement over trade in agricultural products, in particular pork 
but also beef, chicken, oranges, and orange juice, disrupted the FTA talks in October 
2003 (Solis and Katada 2007:280). Finally, Japan's Prime Minister decided to proceed 
despite the agricultural sector's concerns and additional concessions were made on beef, 
pork, chicken, oranges, and orange juice 109. Japan's cross-ministry conflict and 
bargaining during negotiations with Mexico is described in more detail in Chapter 5. 
The events leading to the signing of the Japan-Mexico FTA have caused other ministries 
and business circles to strongly criticise the agricultural lobby groups and have helped 
to build an image of the sector as being a stumbling block for Japan's FTA policyllo. 
104 Interview no. 46. 
lOS Interview no. 10. 
106 Interview no. 57. 
107 Interview no. 50. 
108 Interview no. 46. 
109 Interview no. 10. 
110 Interview no. 4. 
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3.3.3 Bilateral FTAs with ASEAN Members 
Japan proceeded to sign bilateral treaties with ASEAN member economies. In this case, 
the fieldwork indicates that the main motivation behind the METI's interest in 
negotiating FTAs was private sector preference. In the opinion of the Keizai Doyukai s 
Managing Director despite the industries' support for bilateral FTAs with ASEAN 
members, the Japanese private sector remained far less active than its American 
counterpart, and its lobbying efforts were limited 111. Nonetheless, as previously 
discussed, during the negotiations with Mexico, both METI and the Japanese MNCs 
gained experience in and an understanding of the FTA process. As a result, the 
companies became more active in expressing their preferences, using various 
communication channels, to the government. The agricultural sector continued to be the 
main hindrance in negotiating FTAs with ASEAN countries. Japan found a way to avoid 
a significant liberalisation of that sector and instead offered ASEAN members various 
provisions on cooperation. This was consistent with the initial assumption of the EPA 
approach that FTAs would not lead to a significant overhaul of Japan's domestic policy. 
The Japanese government, in particular METI, had a clear idea of what it wanted to 
achieve in order to support Japanese multinationals' operations in East Asia: FTAs with 
other ASEAN countries. During the Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in 
December 2003, discussions were held regarding bilateral FTAs between Japan and 
Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, with which the country had particularly strong 
economic relations112• 'The Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action' (2003:2), signed during the 
Summit, also spoke of accelerating the FTA process between Japan and ASEAN 
members. Between 2005 and 2008 Japan signed bilateral agreements with a further six 
members of the Associationl13• The driving force behind the FTA with Singapore was 
the Trade Policy Bureau 114. Agreements with other ASEAN members states· were 
motivated by a mixture of political and economic factors and were supported by both 
METI Bureaus 115. While the Trade Policy Bureau has generally been in favour of 
signing as many FTAs as possible, the Manufacturing Industries Bureau, in particular, 
had vested interests in negotiating with ASEAN members. This is because such 
agreements were of great importance for Japanese MNCs, as will be demonstrated in 
this chapter. The Director-General of METI's Trade Policy Bureau explains that METI's 
III Interview no. 23. 
112 Interview no. 57. 
113 This were: Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, Indonesia and Viet Nam. 
114 Interview no. 7. 
lIS Interview no. 46. 
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main intention behind FTAs with those countries was to secure supply chains in East 
Asia and thus ensure the functioning ofMNC's production networks I 16. In his view, for 
the Trade Policy Bureau FTAs with ASEAN members were part of a regional 
integration process in addition to expanding Japan's FTA network. The interest and 
support of both Bureaus has facilitated the conclusion of agreements with ASEAN 
members, despite several difficulties and sensitive issues ll7• Nonetheless, the Director 
for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau explains that during the negotiations of 
the first bilateral FTAs with ASEAN countries, the Ministry did not fully understand the 
implications of free trade agreements 118. The day-to-day utilisation of FTAs by the 
private sector gave the Ministry a deeper understanding of the issue. It also showed the 
importance of non-tariff provisions, such as favourable rules of origin (RoO). As a 
result, over time, through communication with the private sector, the METI became 
aware of the growing need for including provisions for the harmonisation of procedures, 
regulations, and implementation modalities l\9. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, 
this is one of the most important issues when it comes to the industries' preferences 
regarding a region-wide FTA. 
In the opinion of a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Developing 
Economies (IDE) there were three main reasons behind bilateral FTAs with ASEAN 
members 120. First, this was further strengthened by competition with China, which had 
. signed an FTA with ASEAN and was extending its influence in the region. Secondly, the 
goverrunent was aiming to tighten its links with what it considered its 'backyard 
countries', where. Japanese companies have invested extensively. Finally, the 
goverrunent wanted to limit liberalisation in the agricultural sector and believed this 
would be easier to achieve under bilateral agreements compared to an FTA with 
ASEAN. As tariffs on industrial goods were already low, Japan offered various forms of 
cooperation in exchange for tariff liberalisation on FTA partners' products. MOFA's 
Director of EPAIFTA Policy Division argues that the country did not want to offer 
concessions in the agricultural sector and believed that including provisions on 
cooperation would allow concessions to be kept within each sector, i.e. concessions in 
the manufacturing sector in exchange for cooperation in the manufacturing sectorl21 • 
Although in the Director's recollection, this was METI's and MOFA's preference, it was 
116 Interview no. 6. 
117 Interview no. 7. 
118 Interview no. 2. 
119 Interview no. 4. 
120 Interview no. 42. 
121 Interview no. 9. 
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not always possible. The Philippines argued that its concessions in the industrial sector 
were greater than the Japanese offer and requested additional concessions which would 
balance out the agreement. Hence they requested Japan to open parts of its labour 
market in which the Philippines had a competitive advantage. The country was asked to 
accept Philippine nurses and caregivers. MOFA's director explains that, although Japan 
was not ready to open up its labour market, it decided to accept the request in order to 
reach an agreement. The country, in particular the Manufacturing Industries Bureau, had 
a great interest in obtaining concessions in the automobile sector, which would allow 
Japanese companies to achieve a strong position in the local marketplace 122• This is an 
example of cross-sector or cross-ministry bargaining, which is further described in 
Chapter 5. 
According to MAFF's Director of the International Economic Affairs Division and 
a former official of the Agricultural and Development Economics Division of the UN 
the Ministry of Agriculture did not support but also did not oppose FTAs, as long as 
Japanese farmers did not lose their profits as a result of additional tariff reductions I23• 
However, as in the case of Japan's first two FTAs, during the negotiations with ASEAN 
members, agriculture was the underlying cause of disputes between the negotiating 
sides. In the opinion of Keidanren s Deputy Director, opposition from the sector has 
created an impasse of policy and continues to hinder Japan's FTA network expansionl24• 
MAFF's Director explains that this is because, from the Ministry'S perspective, there are 
no possible benefits from FTAs12S. In his view, the domestic market is sufficient for 
Japanese farmers and they have little interest in exporting abroad. In Japan, for instance, 
the price competitiveness of agricultural products is not an important factor. Production 
stability, food safety and high quality play a much more important role. Consumers 
prefer to buy more expensive products made in Japan as they fulfil safety standards. 
Hence Japanese agricultural products are competitive in terms of Japanese consumers' 
needs. Products, which Japan sells to China and Hong Kong, are characterised by high 
quality and high prices. As a result, export tariffs do not impede expansion into foreign 
markets. Some Japanese products such as eggs or poultry, are produced using 
inexpensive feed imported from the US and could compete in international markets. 
However, they are destined for a domestic market and despite competitive prices Japan 
122 Ibidem. 
123 Interview no. 10. 
124 Interview no. 24. 
125 Interview no. 10. 
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is not interested in exporting large quantities of those products 126. As MAFF's Director 
of the International Economic Affairs Division argues, the Ministry believes that overall 
the foreign market for Japanese agricultural products abroad is not big enough to justify 
the abolition of tariffs in this sector 127. At the same time, tariffs protect domestic 
producers from Chinese competitors. 
For the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), the agreement 
with Thailand posed the biggest problem. The country is the world's largest rice 
exporter and Japan was reluctant to start negotiations without a mutual agreement to 
exclude this product from negotiations 128. In addition, the country wanted to export 
other agricultural products, such as sugar and chicken. The JA -Zenchu s Deputy-General 
Manager recalls that during joint study group meetings, the organisation suggested 
offering provisions on development and cooperation to Thailand if it showed sufficient 
consideration for Japan's concerns regarding food security and sensitive products129• He 
explains that the organisation joined MAFF in lobbing the Thai Cabinet directly. As a 
result, Thailand agreed to exclude rice from the agreement and to provide special 
treatment for other sensitive products, such as sugar and starch. The agreement 
increased imports of agricultural products to Japan. However, this example 
demonstrates the strength of the Japanese agricultural groups and the special treatment 
they were able to secure in subsequent FTAsI30. In comparison, Thailand did not sign 
the ASEAN-Korea FTA in 2006 with the other members of the Association mainly due 
to the lack of sufficient concessions on rice. In exchange for the exclusion of sensitive 
products, Japan offered Thailand provisions on agricultural cooperation and help in the 
industrialisation of its agricultural production. In addition, in the final stages of 
negotiations, Japan abandoned its request for the liberalisation of the Thai automobile 
market, while Thailand retracted its demands in the field of agriculture. JA-Zenchu s 
Deputy-General Manager explains that the organisation regarded Japan's FTA with 
Thailand as a model agreement for FTAs with other Asian countries 131. He argues that 
Japan tried to replicate this model during negotiations with other Asian states, for 
example the Philippines and Indonesia. In each case, sensitive products were discussed. 
For example, the Philippines is a major exporter of pineapples. According to JA-
Zenchu s Manager, in Japan, although the overall quantity of pineapples produced is 
126 Ibidem. 
127 Ibidem. 
128 Interview no. 41. At the time Japan's import tariff on rice was 490 percent. 
129 Interview no. 29. 
130 Interview no. 10. 
131 Interview no. 29. 
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small, the production is concentrated in Okinawa, causing the tariffs on this fruit to be a 
politically and socially sensitive issue132. Figure 3.1 shows the share of duty-free trade 
volume under Japan's FTAs. The percentage of liberalised tariffs is quite high. However, 
when taking into account the agricultural sector, it is evident that Japan's free trade 
agreements do not fully open up the country's market. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the . share 
of duty-free tariff lines under Japan's FTA. It can be observed that the number of 
liberalised tariff lines oscillates around 85 percent in general and around 50 percent in 
the agricultural sector. These numbers indicate a firm commitment to excluding 
agriculture from tariff liberalisation. 
132 Ibidem. 
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Figure 3.1 Share of duty-free trade volume under Japan's FTAs 
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Figure 3.2 Share of duty-free tariff lines under Japan's FTA 
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3.4 The Japanese Manufacturing; Industry's Preferences for Bilateral FTAs 
3.4.1 Situation Prior to Japan's First FTA 
This section demonstrates how the manufacturing industry's preferences have shaped 
bilateral FTA policy. Multinational companies are the main clients of Japanese FTAs. A 
company decides to trade under preferential tariffs if: a) exported products meet the 
rules of origin of a given FTA; b) this product is not manufactured by the company 
locally; and c) if the MFN tariff for the product is significantly higher than the 
preferential tariff under the free trade treaty. In addition, companies use FTAs whenever 
the importer requests it. If the above conditions are not fulfilled, the company will not 
profit from a trade agreement. For that reason, preferences for bilateral FTAs can often 
vary between companies in the same sector, depending on the location of various stages 
of the manufacturing process, for example parts procurement and assembly. According 
to the Director-General for Manufacturing Industries Policy at METI's Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau, it is difficult to describe preferences of the private sector for bilateral 
agreements and both METI and MNCs have approached them on a case-by-case basis133• 
Nonetheless, certain generalisations can be made across the sectors. 
Figure 3.3 presents the situation in East Asia before 1992, from the perspective of a 
Japanese MNC with a vertically integrated production network. A Japanese company, 
with a parts production facility (0) and an assembly site in ASEAN, had to pay the 
MFN tariff while exporting parts and components from Japan to its subsidiary in East 
Asia. Similarly, MFN tariffs needed to be paid while exporting parts from a Japanese 
parts and components supplier (0) to the assembly site located in another ASEAN 
member country, procuring parts and components from ASEAN suppliers located in 
another country (I) and while exporting the final goods to ASEAN markets (G). In the 
Figure, the dotted lines represent parts, components and intermediates while the solid 
lines represent the finished product. 
133 Interview no. 7. 
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Figure 3.3 Japan's production networks in ASEAN before AFTA 
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Figure 3.4 demonstrates how the signing of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) 
affected Japanese MNCs' production networks. AFTA allowed a Japanese assembly site, 
located in ASEAN, to import parts and components from other ASEAN member states 
without having to pay tariffs (I). As AFTA set a 40 percent minimum local content rule 
of origin, any product exported from a parts production facility (D) and assembly site 
which exceeded this amount was exported under the MFN tariff. AFTA has been highly 
utilised by Japanese companies in several sectors, for example the automotive and 
electronics sectors, since it was enacted. They have exported and imported finished 
goods and parts from production facilities in one ASEAN country to assembly sites or 
sales facilities located in another134. According to the Chief Economist at the Economic 
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), AFTA has brought tangible results 
in the Japanese private sector 13S , Interviewed companies in the electronics sector, in 
particular, were trading under AFTA long before Japan started negotiating its first 
FTA 136, Even after the bilateral and minilateral FTAs with ASEAN members were 
concluded, Japanese companies continue to use AFTA to obtain parts and distribute 
final goods within ASEAN, According to two recent surveys (Kawai and Wignaraja 
2009 and Hiratsuka et al. 2008a) 137, AFTA is the third most utilised agreement for 
Japanese companies. Other third-party FTAs, such as NAFTA and the EU or EU's 
agreements with the Eastern European nations, were also utilised before 2002. A 
company in the automobile sector recalls using NAFTA and the EU 138• An interviewed 
MNC in the electronics sector started using other states' FTAs in the early 1990s139, It 
used NAFTA for exporting goods from its Mexican factories to the US. A global 
corporation in the electronics sector had several manufacturing facilities in Mexico, 
from which it was selling goods to the North American market l40, At the time, the US 
had a 5 percent MFN duty on TVs. 
134 Interview no. 16 and 19. 
m Interview no. 54. 
136 Interview no. 19, 15 and 17. 
137 The first study is based on a survey of 609 manufacturing companies from Japan, Singapore, Korea, 
Thailand and the Philippines. The questionnaires were conducted between 2007 and 2008, with the 
help of, amongst others, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan External Trade Organisation 
(JETRO). The second study comprises JETRO's 2006 large sample survey, with responses from 729 
JETRO members, and a 2007 survey, with replies from 733 companies. 
138 Interview no. 20. 
139 Interview no. 16. 
140 Interview no. 19. 
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3.4.3 FTAs with Singapore and Mexico 
As previously mentioned, Singapore's tariffs on the majority of products were already 
low; hence JSEPA did not bring many benefits for Japanese companies. The utilisation 
rate of the agreement was lowl41 . According to the Japan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry official, after the signing of the JSEPA, the Japanese media stressed the low 
number of issued certificates of origin 142. It was suspected that restrictions had 
prevented Japanese companies from trading under preferential rates. In reality, only a 
handful of products required a certificate of origin and only a few Japanese companies 
exported them to Singapore. For example, the country imposed tariffs on alcohol and 
beverage companies were amongst the ones which benefited from the agreement l43 . 
Although the agreement did not include additional concessions on agricultural products, 
it did include textile and apparel goods as well as chemical and petroleum products 
(Munakata 2006b: 119). 
The first FTA that sparked the interest of Japanese manufacturing industry was the 
agreement with Mexico. Its signing was strongly supported by the Japanese private 
sector. Following the implementation ofNAFTA and the signing of the Mexico-EU free 
trade agreement, Japanese manufacturers found themselves at a disadvantage in the 
Mexican market. Moreover, losses from increased foreign competition were 
concentrated in specific sectors, mainly the automobile industry. Therefore, the Japan-
Mexico FTA supported the international operations of companies in particular sectors. 
While their American and European counterparts enjoyed preferential market access, 
Japanese MNCs, amongst the OECD members, were the only ones to pay MFN tariffs 
on automobiles in Mexico. At the time, Mexico's tariffs averaged 16 percent and tariffs 
on automobiles were 50 percent (Ravenhill 2005b:130)144. NAFTA members exported 
automobiles to Mexico duty-free, while the EU countries paid a tariff of 10 percent. The 
'big three' Japanese automakers, Toyota, Nissan and Honda, had operations in Mexico 
and enjoyed a free quota of imports 145. This was because the Mexican government 
allowed foreign companies to import finished vehicles for up to 10 percent of the 
amount of their local production (Solis and Katada 2007:287). The three companies had 
an advantage over other Japanese manufacturers, such as Suzuki and Mazda, which had 
to pay high tariffs in order to penetrate the Mexican market. Hence, the 'big three's 
141 Interview no. 50. 
142 Interview no. 25. 
143 Interview no. 40. 
144 Solis and Katada (2007:287) quote 20-30 percent tariffs on finished vehicles. 
14' Interview no. 7. 
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motivation to support the Japan-Mexico FTA was weak. The Japanese Automobile 
Manufacturing Association was divided. At the time, a representative of one of the 'big 
three' was the Chairman of the Mexico bilateral committee within Keidanren l46 • As 
such, according to the company's Manager, it was under pressure to support the 
agreement. It had local manufacturing facilities in the US and Canada and exported 
goods from those locations to Mexico under NAFTA. Nonetheless, the company 
benefited from the Japan-Mexico FTA, although not to the same extent as the 
corporations which did not have production facilities in NAFTA countries l47. Despite 
their different interests, the companies that made up the auto industry managed to find a 
common ground. A division responsible for the automobile industry within METI's 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau coordinated the conflicting preferences of companies 
in the sectorl4S• In the words of METI's Director-General for Manufacturing Industries 
Policy: "some companies were strongly supporting the agreement, while others were 
just agreeing with the idea"149. A similar situation occurred during negotiations with 
Malaysia. The country implemented high tariffs on cars and supported its domestic auto 
industry with governmental subsidies. Perodua was one of the two main Malaysian 
producers. The Japanese automobile company, Daihatsu Motor, established a joint 
venture with Perodual5o• Daihatsu provided a substantial amount of technology and sent 
staff members to Malaysia. The company enjoyed tariff protection and hence was rather 
against the Japan-Malaysia FTA. In India, Suzuki produces automobiles for the local 
market through Maruti Suzuki, a joint venture where Suzuki holds over 50 percent of 
stakes. Suzuki's cars dominate the Indian market l5l • As India imposes high tariffs on 
cars, the implementation of the India-Japan FTA will have a negative impact on 
Suzuki's position in the Indian market. 
The steel industry was also involved in discussions on the Japan-Mexico FTA, as 
companies in this sector were exporting components for automobiles and electronic 
products to Mexico. However, they were using Mexico's sectoral duty exemption 
scheme for automobile and electronic parts l52• Another group of companies that had a 
vested interest in this FTA were companies interested in producing goods for 
146 Interview no. 20. 
147 Ibidem . 
. 148 The subject of METI's decision-making process and solving conflicts of interests will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
149 Interview no. 7. 
ISO Ibidem. 
lSI Ibidem. 
IS2 Interview no. 31. 
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government procurement 153. In 1996, the WTO's Agreement on Government 
Procurement went into effect. It regulated government procurement and introduced 
national treatment, transparent regulations, complaint procedures, and removed the local 
content requirement (JETRO 2009:130). Japan was one of the signatory parties. Mexico, 
on the other hand, did not enter the treaty and granted preferential status in government 
procurement deals to its FTA partners (Kotera 2003). These prevented Japanese 
companies from exporting, for example, power generation equipment and hospital 
medical equipment. X-ray medical equipment exported to Mexico was subjected to a 40 
percent customs duty l54. Overall, companies in various sectors supported the agreement 
with Mexico. Although the gains from the first two FTAs were smaller than expected, 
they allowed the Japanese companies to gradually recognise the benefits of such 
arrangements and to urge the government to formulate an FTA strategylSS. 
3.4.4 Industry's Preferences for Bilateral Agreements with ASEAN Countries 
Japanese companies were highly interested in signing FTAs with ASEAN member 
economies. Figure 3.5 illustrates the impact of tariff reductions under bilateral FTAs 
with ASEAN economies. Companies with vertically integrated production networks 
were able to import parts and intermediates from Japan to parts factories (0) and 
assembly sites with no tariffs (in some cases preferential tariffs). However, they still 
needed to pay the MFN tariffs on goods, which did not fulfil AFTA's 40 percent local 
content requirement. 
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Figure 3.5 Impact of bilateral FTAs on MNCs ' production networks 
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Japanese companIes utilise FTAs for the sales of finished goods, but also, more 
importantly, for procuring parts and components from production facilities in various 
countries 156. In this respect, foreign direct investment and vertically integrated 
production networks determine MNCs' preferences for bilateral FTAs. Blechinger and 
Legewie (2000:297) write that "regional cooperation was mainly promoted by 
multinational firms interested in building up a horizontal division of labour with 
regional production and sales networks to connect their various overseas activities on a 
more efficient regional scale". A research fellow at the Japan Institute of International 
Affairs (JIIA) confirms that Japan's FTA preferences have been, to a large extent, 
determined by economic factors and the agreements benefit Japanese companies 
operating in the East Asian region 157• Lord (2010:23) argues that in order to facilitate 
Japanese MNCs' operation, the country chose FTA partners "based on the production 
networks to which they belonged". Manger (2005:805) argues that "Japanese firms with 
vertically integrated operations in the host country emerge as key supporters of FTAs, in 
particular when their profits are under threat from FTAs signed by other countries". The 
m Interview no. 60. 
IS7 Interview no. 44. 
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previous section mentioned isolation avoidance and tit-for-tat FTAs as important factors 
behind the Japanese government's preferences for bilateral FTAs. It can be argued that 
economic domino effect, presented in the previous chapter, is an important factor behind 
the MNCs' support of bilateral FTAs with ASEAN members. The companies started 
supporting FTAs due to the increasing competition in the Asian markets and the 
possibility that those treaties could strengthen their position in the region (Manger 
2005:822). ASEAN countries applied high tariffs on several products. Thailand's 
average MFN tariff was 8.2 percent, which made importing finished goods, as well as 
parts and components, expensive for Japanese companiesl58. In the case of Malaysia, 
the tariff on automobiles was up to 300 percent. Furthermore, ASEAN members, except 
for Singapore, have not signed the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement. 
This was an additional factor behind several companies' interest in bilateral treaties with 
ASEAN members. 
Trade in steel, chemicals, electronics, automobiles, and parts and components 
constitute a majority of the trade between Japan and the ASEAN countries l59. These 
industries were particularly interested in deepening the economic integration with 
ASEAN and negotiating FTAsI60. As previously mentioned, Japan's FTAs with ASEAN 
members were Manufacturing Industries Bureau-driven. According to its Director-
General the automobile, steel and electronics industries are strongly represented within 
the Bureau and their preferences have a strong impact on decisions made 161 • 
Furthermore, the CEO of Keidanren is usually chosen from amongst the major 
companies in the steel and iron, electronics and automobile industriesl62. 
The Japanese machinery sector, which includes the automobile and electronics 
industries, invested heavily in ASEAN and profited greatly from economic integration 
in the regionl63. The electronics sector, in particular, is inclined to use FTAs for trade in 
parts. Urata (2008a:7) points out that in this sector "approximately 80 percent of East 
Asia's exports take the form of parts and the remaining 20 percent of finished products 
regardless of their export destinations", due to the type of goods it produces, such as 
white goods (major appliances), which "may be attributable to high shipping cost, as 
white goods, a large portion of traded electrical appliances, are bulky and heavy". 
Economies of scale cause Japanese companies in this sector to assemble products in one 
IS8 This was the rate applied in 2007 according to World Tariff Profiles (Kawai and Wignaraja 2009:5). 
IS9 Interview no. 7. 
160 Interview no. 8. 
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ASEAN state and to distribute them to others. Parts and components are often procured 
from various ASEAN states. As a result, the East Asian region has witnessed a 
significant increase of trade in parts and components over the past decades. The 
machinery and electronics sectors have significantly contributed to this increase. In East 
Asia (ASEAN+ 3) import shares of parts and components rose from 7.2 percent in 1980 
to 32.2 percent in 2003 (Lim and Kimura 201 0: 1). Figure 3.6 demonstrates the trade 
patterns within East Asia. A sharp increase in trade in parts and components can be 
observed between 1980 and 2004. 
Figure 3.6 Increase in parts and components trade within East Asia 
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However, the internationalisation of production networks in these sectors makes it 
difficult for Japanese companies to profit from the country's bilateral FTAs. The 
Director of the Liaison Department of an interviewed company in the electronics sector 
explains that it exports only two products from Japan that can be traded under FTAs in 
ASEAN (they must meet the RoO and not be locally produced)16\ solar cell modules 
164 Interview no. 16. 
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and parts for liquid crystal TV s (liquid-crystal display televisions, also known as LCD 
TVs)165. Tariffs on solar cell modules were removed under the 1996 WTO Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA). Hence parts for LCD TVs are the only products exported 
from Japan which are eligible for preferential trade. They are exported from Japan to 
Malaysia, where the company has an LCD TV manufacturing facility. The TV sets 
assembled in Malaysia are then exported to other ASEAN countries under the MFN 
tariff as they do not fulfil AFTA's ROOI66. Likewise, another Japanese multinational 
corporation in the electronics sector locates many of its Asian manufacturing facilities in 
Malaysia and was interested in an FTA with this countryl67. This is in accordance with 
observation by Lim and Kimura (2010:15) regarding the clustering of the electronics 
industry in Malaysia. However, when the Japanese government asked the company 
about its FTA preferences, it explained that it is difficult to foresee, as it does not know 
where its products will be manufactured in the future l68. 
Japan is one of the world's leading producers of automobiles. Due to high tariffs on 
finished products and local content requirements in ASEAN countries, Japanese 
companies in this sector localised their production, sales, and parts and components 
procurement, for example, by investing in steel plants producing steel components for 
automobiles. Suzuki is a large Japanese manufacturer whose products include cars, 
motorcycles, and outboard motors. In 2008, the company's overseas sales were over two 
times higher than its sales in Japan, and Asia was the largest destination market (Suzuki 
2009). However, models sold in the Asian market are often produced using locally 
procured parts, through Suzuki's manufacturing companies, mostly joint ventures, in 
ASEAN countries. An interviewed Japanese MNC in the automobile industry is another 
example I 69. It has two main production segments: motorcycles and automobiles. The 
company procures around 80 percent of parts and components locally. 
1M Ibidem. 
166 This was the case prior to signing of the AJCEP. More on this issue further in this chapter. 
167 Interview no. 19. 
168 Ibidem. 
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Figure 3,7 2009 automobile sales and production 
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Figure 3.7 demonstrates the company's automobile production and sales patterns in Asia, 
in 2009. The first (lighter) column represents production and the second (darker) one 
sales. It is clear that the majority of automobiles produced are sold locally. The surplus 
from Japan is exported to other markets, mainly the US, Canada, and Europe. The 
surplus produced in Thailand is exported mainly to Australia, under the Thailand-
Australia FTA. Figure 3.8 shows the company's motorcycle production and sales 
patterns in Asia, in 2009. Here, the numbers are even more balanced as almost all 
motorcycles produced in Asian countries are sold locally. This situation has persisted for 
years and hence the company has little interest in using FTAs for finished goods. 
Therefore, although it supports and uses FTAs, the Manager of its General Affairs 
Division believes that the automobile sector has far less interests in trade agreements 
with ASEAN members than the electronics sector. Since 2007, the top destinations for 
Japan's vehicles and vehicle parts were the US, China, and Australia (Global Trade 
Atlas Navigator Database). Therefore, the major destinations are countries with which 
Japan does not have a free trade agreement. The companies produce vehicles locally, 
export them under third-party FTAs, or, in exceptional cases, under MFN tariffs. 
In the first half of the 2000s, essential parts for automobiles and motorcycles, such 
as engines, could not be produced in Indonesia, Thailand or Malaysia l7O• Companies in 
this sector still needed to import crucial parts and components from Japan. In this 
respect, the automotive industry profited from bilateral FTAs with ASEAN members. 
One of the interviewed companies uses bilateral FTAs mainly for exporting parts from 
Japan to Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, where it has manufacturing 
facilities17l. Parts exported from Japan are mass produced, which helps to lower costs. 
According to the company's manager it is facing competition from other manufacturers, 
such as Nissan, which produce cars at a very low cost 172. For example, the Indian 
company Tata Motors introduced Nano, one of the cheapest automobiles in the world 
(around 165,000 JPY). In February 2011, Toyota Motor Corporation and Daihatsu 
Motor, which is 51.2 percent-owned by Toyota, announced their plan to produce low-
cost automobiles in Indonesia (Reuters 2011). In 2010, Toyota launched the low-cost 
Etios model in India. These factors have caused the interviewed company to consider 
possible cost reductions, for instance mass producing the parts locally in one of the 
ASEAN countries I73• As a result, the company would increase its utilisation of FTAs. 
170 Interview no. 8. 




For companies in the automotive sector, the agreement with Malaysia offers the most 
favourable conditions for the shipment of parts and components 174. Parts for 
automobiles are exported in sets. One set is composed of all of the parts necessary for 
car manufacture. In order to obtain the certificate of origin for a set under the Japan-
Malaysia FTA, the manufacturer needs to prove the origin and cost of only one part. 
Although the interviewed company asked the government to include similar provisions 
in all prospective agreements, it remains an exceptional case 175. Under the Japan-
Thailand FTA, the producer needs to prove the origin of all parts in a set. This also 
increases the administration fee, which needs to be paid for issuing the certificate. 
Pekkanen (2003:300) named the steel industry "the most politically powerful 
manufacturing sector in Japan". He writes that between 1965 and 1995 the steel sector 
was in first or second place in terms of the number of ex-METI officials who obtained 
positions on steel companies' governing boards (amakudari). This ensured that the steel 
companies' interests were represented in the ministry (Suzuki 2002:4 cites Murofushi, 
1983). The sector gained a reputation for being one of the most protected in Japan. A 
manager at the Japan Iron and Steel Federation explains that in the 1960s, 1970s, and 
early 1980s, Japanese steel companies were focused on producing for the domestic 
market and hence were opposed to tariff liberalisation 176. However, he argues, their 
position changed over time, due to the shrinking domestic market and increasing export 
opportunities (e.g. the Chinese market), and duties on steel and iron products were 
liberalised together with other industrial tariffs. The amount of investment needed to 
establish a steel plant abroad is much greater than in the automotive or electronics 
sectors. In addition, the success of steel and iron production depends heavily on 
experience and the technology that is employed. For that reason, companies have not 
localised their production and mainly export from Japan. Raw materials are imported 
from Brazil and Australia. These two countries are Japanese companies' preferred 
source of high quality materials. In addition, small amounts of low quality materials 
from India, Korea, Taiwan, and China are used for low-grade steel and iron products 
used mainly for construction purposes. Japan exports high value added steel products to 
Asia. Korea was the largest export destination in 2009, followed by China, Taiwan and 
Thailand (The Steel Industry of Japan 2010:2). 
174 Ibidem. 
175 Ibidem. 
176 Interview no. 32. 
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Figure 3.9 Japan's steel exports in 2009 (in tons) 
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Figure 3.9 shows Japan's steel exports to selected East Asian countries in 2009. Japan 's 
first two FTAs, with Singapore and Mexico, were moderately significant for the steel 
and iron industry. Thailand is the largest export market in East Asia, in terms of the 
number of exported tons of steel. It is followed by Vietnam and Malaysia. Malaysia 
implemented a 25 percent MFN tariff on steel products, while Indonesia 's and 
Vietnam's tariffs ranged from zero to 15 percent 177. For companies in the steel and iron 
sector bilateral agreements with ASEAN countries, in particular with Thai land, were of 
great interest. 
The textile industry was also highly interested in bilateral FTAs with ASEAN 
countries, in particular Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, and strongly urged the 
government to conclude such agreements 178. Companies in this sector use FTAs for all 
177 Interview no. 31. 
178 Interview no. 36. 
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operations between Japan and ASEAN members 179. In order to do that, they need to 
comply with a two-step rule of origin, known also as double transformation. The two 
steps are two separate production processes needed to manufacture a final product or 
garment: the weaving of fabric from a yarn and the cutting and sewing of a garment 
from fabric. The double transformation rule requires that both processes are done in , or 
from materials originating in an FTA member country. For example, Thai garments need 
to be made from Thai fabric, or from Japanese fabric exported to Thailand, in order to 
be traded under the Japan-Thailand FTA. 
Figure 3.10 Utilisation of bilateral FTAs by textile companies 
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Figure 3.10 demonstrates the utilisation of bilateral FTAs and intra-company 
specialisation in this sector. The interviewed Japanese company in the fibre, textile, 
chemicals and plastics sector specialises in high-tech fibre material , which is exported 
to its subsidiaries in Thailand or Malaysia 180 . They use the special fibre to produce yarn 
179 Interview no. 22. 
180 Ibidem. 
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or fabric which is then exported back to Japan. This type of intra-company, cross-over 
material procurement between Japan and each ASEAN country allows for a substantive 
reduction of costs. Sewing, the final stage of making a garment, is the most labour-
consuming part of production. Companies prefer to locate it in countries which have 
low labour costs. For that reason, the final stages of production are often located in 
China. The textile sector is to a great extent dependent on production in Chinal81 • Due 
to the country's increasing labour costs, textile producers try to increase imports and 
exports to ASEAN countries, for example Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar. However, 
apart from Vietnam, Japan does not have bilateral agreements with those countries. For 
that reason, companies in this sector were also highly interested in ASEAN-Japan FTA. 
In addition to tariff reduction, the private sector also profited from provisions 
resulting from an EPA character of Japan's agreements. Improving the business 
environment in partner countries, often by influencing the East Asian states to introduce 
necessary reforms, is an important motivation for Japan I 82. Therefore, they have focused 
on elements to achieve this goal, such as: trade facilitation, investment protection or 
facilitation, economic cooperation and international financial policy cooperation. The 
extent to which these agreements are designed to serve this purpose can be 
demonstrated by the functioning of bilateral committees on the improvement of the 
business environment under Japanese FTAs. Such committees are established after the 
agreement is signed. For example, Article XIV of the Japan-Malaysia Economic 
Partnership Agreement (JMEPA) speaks of establishing a 'Sub-Committee on 
Improvement of Business Environment'. Japanese companies located in Malaysia can 
voice their concerns to liaison offices of the Sub-Committee. The complaints are then 
passed to the Joint Committee under the JMEPA and, if needed, forwarded to the 
relevant ministry to ensure a better functioning of the agreement. The companies treat 
the Sub-Committee as a platform for expressing their concerns or requests and for 
influencing national policies and procedures l83• 
181 Interview no. 36. 
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3.4.5 FTAs Utilisation Rates and the Importance of Third-party FTAs 
Recent studies (Kawai and Wignaraja 2009, Hiratsuka el at. 2008a) have pointed out 
that the utilisation rates of Japanese FTAs are quite low. During the ADBI Annual 
Conference on the Political Economy of Asian Regionalism, See Seng Tan (2010) [Tom 
the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore pointed out that FTA utilisation 
rates in Asia, in general, approximate 20 percent but differ depending on sources. 
Utilisation rates below 50 percent are considered low according to European standards 
(Terada 2008: 10 cites Baldwin 2007: 12). Although the number of certificate of origin 
issued each year is confidential, the Chamber of Commerce confirms that utilisation 
rates have increased 184. The results of MOFA's research on utili sation rates are presented 
in Figure 3.11. 
Figure 3.11 Number of issued certificates of origin 
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This chapter argues that FTAs with ASEAN members were strongly supported by the 
184 Interview no. 25. 
124 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau and the Japanese industries themselves. The fieldwork 
indicates that the low utilisation rates of Japan's FTAs point to the shortcomings of the 
agreements, such as the low preferences margins or the time-consuming procedures for 
obtaining the certificate of origin rather than the Japanese industries' lack of interest. 
There are several reasons for companies not using FTAs. If the margin of preference is 
negligible, companies prefer to trade under the MFN tariff. Ravenhill (2009:23 cites 
Estevadeordal et al. 2007) writes that generally under FTAs "the cost of complying with 
RoO is estimated to vary from four to eight percent of the overall cost of a 
consignment". Hiratsuka et al. (2008b:415) calculate that the "average preferential tariff 
margin at which Japanese finns will make use of FTAs is 5.3 percent". The margin of 
preference can change substantially over time if a country decides to lower its MFN 
tariffs after an FTA is implemented. For example, under the AJCEP Thailand's tariff on 
wire of iron or non-alloy steel (Harmonised System code 7217.10.10) is twice as high as 
the MFN tariff. This kind of FTA inefficiency resulting from falling MFN rates, can 
affect FTAs utilisation rates. For example, Ravenhill (2009:22 cites Ando 2007:7-8) 
quotes a study by Ando that demonstrates that in January 2007 around half of Mexico's 
MFN tariffs on manufacturing and mining products were lower than the rates under the 
JMEPA. In such cases, one option is to renegotiate FTAs, in order to provide 
preferential treatment. The Japan-Singapore agreement was renegotiated and amended 
in 2007 and the renegotiating of the Japan-Mexico agreement started in 2010 185• Other 
bilateral FTAs will be revised from 2011 onwards. 
Other types of preferential schemes, such as export-free zones, government 
incentive programmes or sectoral trade arrangements also lower FTAs' utilisation rates. 
One example is the aforementioned ITA, signed in December 1996. In the electronics 
sector, the majority of finished goods and many parts still manufactured in Japan are 
• 
traded duty free under the ITA. With no products to export and no customs duty to pay, 
the impact of an FTA is limited at best. For that reason, the utilisation of bilateral FTAs 
with ASEAN members is low for the electronics industry, despite the fact that the 
industry was keen to sign the treaties and the sector stands to gain from trade 
liberalisationl86• Companies in the automobile, iron and steel, and textile and apparel 
sectors still manufacture goods in Japan and therefore, can potentially benefit from the 
country's bilateral FTAs. Malaysia has a tariff exemption scheme for certain types of 
185 Interview no. 7. 
186 Interview no. 14. 
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steel, for example parts used in the automotive industryl87. Tariffs under this scheme are 
almost the same as under the Japan-Malaysia FTA, where it does not require a 
certificate of origin. Companies in the steel and iron sector prefer to use such schemes if 
possible. 
Another issue, which can affect the utilisation rates of Japan's FTAs, is the 
importance of third-party agreements for the country's MNCs. Given the location of 
their production networks, FTAs between third parties often playa crucial role. This is 
particularly true for the electronics sector, where the majority of the products are 
manufactured in East Asia, there are few finished goods exported from Japan and parts 
and components are traded between production facilities located in various countries. 
Companies in this sector use third-party FTAs to export parts and components as well as 
finished goods. The automobile industry also uses third-party FTAs, mainly to sell 
finished cars to markets protected by high tariffs or to trade parts and components. One 
of Japan's leading multinational corporations in the electronics sector produces many of 
its goods in Thailand, to which it imports parts from other ASEAN countries under 
AFTAI88. A few parts are imported from Japan under the Japan-Thailand FTA (JTEPA) 
or from China and Korea under their respective FTAs with ASEAN. Finished goods are 
exported from Thailand to other ASEAN countries under AFTA and to third parties, for 
example to India under the ASEAN-India FTA. Hence Japanese companies use many 
FTAs, of which Japan is not necessarily a member. The importance of AFTA has already 
been mentioned in this chapter. According to JETRO's 2008 survey (2009: Ill) of 
Japanese companies in 13 Asia-Pacific countries 189, AFTA is the most utilised 
agreement. It is followed by the ASEAN-China and India-Thailand FTAs. According to 
an interviewed company in the automobile sector, AFTA and Japan's bilateral 
agreements are equally important for its operations 190. In February 2011, India and 
Japan signed an Economic Partnership Agreement. However, for Japanese companies in 
the electronics sector it might be easier to fulfil the RoO requirements while trading 
under the ASEAN-India agreement than under the India-Japan FTA 191. 
Third-party FTAs have a direct effect on the supply and production chains of 
Japanese companies. After the signing of the Australia-Thailand agreement, automobile 
companies shifted their exports to Australia from Japan to Thailand. The same situation 
187 Interview no. 3 1. 
188 Interview no. 14. 
189 This were: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Myanmar (ASEAN7), 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Australia and New Zealand. 
190 Interview no. 20. 
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occurred in the case of the India-Thailand FTA. The automobile compantes 
concentrated their production partly in Thailand and partly in India, in order to profit 
from existing arrangements l92 • MOFA has used JETRO 's annual survey to demonstrate 
the impact of the India-Thailand FTA. 
Figure 3.12 Impact of the India-Thailand FTA on Japanese companies' production 
networks 
Questionnaire: How are you using (How has business 
changed since the conclusion of) the Thailand-India FTA? 
Company A Closure of TV factory in India; switch to export from factory in 
Thailand; growth of TV sales in India 
Company B Start exporting from Thailand to India of high-end 
refrigerators and washing machines 
Company C Joint-venture air-conditioner factory switched converted to 
sales company; currently exporting from Thailand to India 
Company D Start exporting TV components from Thailand to India 
Company E Export of auto parts/components (transmission etc) to 
Thailand; Export of automobiles (finished) to India 
Company F Export of polycarbonates to India 
Source: MOFA, 2010, Japan's FTAIEPA Current Status and Main Issues, p.12. Obtained during interview 
no. 9 
The Figure shows how the implementation of the agreement affected companies in 
different sectors: electronics and machinery (A-D), automobile (E) and chemical (F). It 
is evident that, as a result of this FTA, Japanese companies changed their supply 
networks for both trade in parts and components and finished goods. India and Australia 
are important markets for Japanese car manufacturers. The increase in the volume of 
automobile exports from Thailand to Australia, after the implementation of the 
Australia-Thailand FTA, is largely related to the exports of Japanese companies, such as 
Honda and Toyota l93 . Similarly, the India-Thailand FTA is used by Japanese companies 
in the electronics and automobile sectors. The Thailand-India FTA is often used fo r 
exporting goods in the electronics sector, such as TVs and air conditioners, while the 
Thailand-Australia agreement is used mostly for exporting automobiles (JETRO 
2009:112). The importance of third party FTAs is illustrated by the following example. 
Representatives of the Japanese private sector located in Thailand expressed their 
192 Interview no. 4. 
193 Interview no. 38. 
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preferences regarding a free trade agreement with India to the Thai govemment l94: as a 
result, the 82 products selected for the Early Harvest Programme included TV parts, air 
conditioners and gear boxes - goods produced by Japanese companies in Thailandl9s. 
3.5 Preferences of Other Interest Groups 
3.5.1 Service and Finance Sectors 
According to Lim and Kimura (2010: 16) despite increasing the liberalisation of trade in 
goods in East Asia, the liberalisation of trade in services has not progressed at the same 
pace and economic integration remains 'shallow'. JETRO's 2009 White Paper on 
International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (2009: 184) points out that "Japan's 
service sector has been in chronic deficit in balance of payments and is therefore said to 
be weak in competitiveness". Japanese companies in the service sector are expanding to 
Asian markets through FDI taking the form of mergers and acquisitions (mode 3 of 
trade in services}196. For example, in March 2009, a Japanese communications services 
company, NTT DoCoMo Inc, acquired an Indian company, Tata Teleservices Ltd, while 
in September 2008, Japanese companies in the energy services industry, Marubeni, 
Kansai Electric Power and others, acquired an electric power services company, Senoko 
Power from Singapore (ibidem:85). The service sector is interested in FTAs, although to 
a much lesser extent than the manufacturing sector. According to JETRO's 2009 White 
Paper (ibidem: 187) based on the large sample survey 53.6 percent of companies in this 
sector replied that "they currently sell overseas and there are plans/percentage to expand 
business", compared to 81.5 percent of companies in the manufacturing sector. The 
percentage of companies in the service sector which consider there to be 
"plans/potential for future sales, although they are not currently engaged in it" was 14.9 
percent, compared to 11.3 percent in the manufacturing sector. Companies which plan to 
sell their products abroad in the future are mainly in the information and 
telecommunications, professional services (legal, accounting and consultancy), 
construction, retail and transportation service sectors. Out of the 14.9 percent of 
companies planning to sell their products overseas, 64.9 percent plan to enter the 
194 Interview no. 40. 
195 Interview no. 39. 
196 As discussed in Chapter 2, the WTO allows for the preferential trade in services between FTA member 
states under conditions listed in the Article V of GATS. 
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Chinese market, and 42.1 percent wish to penetrate the American market. China is of 
particular importance for the information and telecommunications sector, as it has the 
largest market for mobile phones and individual internet access. JETRO's White Paper 
(ibidem: 187) concludes that in East Asia, the information and telecommunications 
sector is particularly interested in expanding its operation to Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand, while companies in the construction sector wish to expand into Vietnam, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. The financial and insurance sectors, 
specialising in high value added services, plan to sell their products in the Thai market 
(ibidem). However, the overall percentage of companies in the service sector which 
have operations in East Asia is much lower than for the manufacturing sector. For that 
reason, their interest in FTAs is also weaker. 
The service sectors' position on bilateral FTAs is illustrated by an example of an 
interviewed service provider in the banking sectorl97• Companies in this sector export 
several types of services, for instance financial consulting services, life and non-life 
insurance, and brokerage services. There are many channels for exporting services: 
establishing branches and internet banking (mode one or cross-border). Japanese banks 
export to China and Korea under the WTO rules. The financial services sector does not 
have a strong position on FTAs, although it is generally supportive of trade 
liberalisation and has benefited from the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) negotiated during the Uruguay Round \98. Nonetheless, companies in 
this sector are facing various limitations while trading in ASEAN countries, for example 
rules on foreign participation in the banking sector. They had hoped that the situation 
would improve under bilateral FTAs. Singapore, Japan's first FTA partner, had a strong 
service market and expectations amongst companies in the financial sector were quite 
high. According to a series of interviews conducted by the interviewed company's 
research and consulting institute amongst Japanese banks, JSEPA increased 
transparency of rules, but the actual benefit of the agreement remains unknownl99• In 
the opinion of company's Senior Analyst, this caused the sector's enthusiasm for FTAs 
to wane. The financial services sector is interested in the WTO-plus and investment 
provisions under FTAs and would benefit from more transparent rules on trade in 
services and investment. However, few East Asian FTAs include such provisions on a 
level that could bring profits to companies in this sector 200 • According to Ishido 
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(2010:2), the Director of the APEC Study Centre at Chiba University, provisions on 
service liberalisation will be a major focus of future FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region. 
3.5.2 Movement of People under Japan's FTAs and Preferences of Labour Unions 
A Project Leader from the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry remarks that, 
while for the Japanese companies in the service sector the liberalisation of Mode 3 of 
trade in services is a primary concern, Japan's FTA partners are mostly interested in the 
liberalisation of Mode 4201 • The Japanese government is reluctant to open up its labour 
market, despite the shortage of workers caused by the ageing population. According to 
the Director of the International Bureau at the National Confederation of Trade Unions 
(Zenroren), one of the two main confederations of trade unions, Japanese labour 
organisations for a long time had little knowledge about FTAs and their potential 
impact202• In his opinion, trade unions' awareness of preferential trade liberalisation was 
much lower than in countries such as Korea, the UK, and France. This changed during 
the 2008 08 Hokkaido Summit, after which the national-level confederations started to 
pay attention to FTAs. The conducted fieldwork indicates that Japanese trade unions do 
not have a strong position on bilateral FTAs, although in the opinion of Zenroren s 
Director, Japan's FTAs are designed to support the operations of multinational 
corporations203• In the same year as the Hokkaido Summit, bilateral agreements with 
Indonesia and the Philippines were implemented. Under the bilateral agreements with 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, Japan committed itself to accepting skilled 
workers from those countries. These were Thai chefs (with over ten years of experience), 
and Indonesian and Philippine nurses and caregivers. For example, the JPEPA allowed 
400 Filipino nurses to work in Japan for more than five years, provided that they obtain 
a Japanese license: this number was increased from an earlier 100. However, it was still 
below the Philippines' expectations. Japan also accepted 600 Filipino caregivers. 
Opportunities for nurses and caregivers are restricted by requirements, such as passing 
on-the-job training, working under the supervision of a Japanese manager and having no 
employee rights for up to three years (Jimenez 2007). Subsequently, they need to obtain 
a Japanese license, as well as pass a Japanese-language exam. Filipino nurses are also 
required to hold a university degree despite the fact that Japanese nationals do not need 
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a similar qualification for the same position (ibidem). Additionally, the JPEPA adds a 
quota system that limits the number of nurses and caregivers that are allowed to reside 
and work in Japan at any given time to 1,000 for the first two years (ibidem). Zenroren 
believes that the Philippine government wanted to open the Japanese labour market and 
hence, it agreed to the unequal treatment of the Filipino nurses in Japan204. Similarly, 
under the agreement with Indonesia, 1,000 nurses and caregivers are allowed to work in 
Japan. Indonesian skilled workers need to obtain a Japanese certificate, pass a six-
months-long period of training that includes a test of both nursing and linguistic skills 
and undergo a two-year trial period (Fukada 2008). Indonesian nurses are also expected 
to have a degree or a nursing school diploma. The DP J's 'The New Growth Strategy -
Blueprint for Revitalising Japan' (201Ob:56) mentions increasing the numbers of 
accepted qualified nurses and caregivers under FTAs. 2010 was the third year in which 
Japan accepted foreign nurses and caregivers under FTAs. However, the number of 
Japanese institutions which hire and train Filipino and Indonesian nurses has decreased. 
The Director of the International Bureau at Zenroren explains that this is caused by the 
internal problems of the Japanese job market205. About one third of trained, licensed 
Japanese nurses find it difficult to continue working after marriage and childbirth and 
decide to stay at home. Because of the low wages that they are paid, few nurses decide 
to come back to work. Nurses are paid less than Japan's average national wage 
(Bernardino 2007). In Zenroren s view, such domestic problems should be dealt with 
before inviting foreign workers into the country206. Labour unions and national-level 
confederations are not the only organisation to carefully monitor labour under FTAs. 
The Japan Federation of Medical Workers' Union (Nihon Iroren) is a national federation 
and the largest medical organisation uniting over 100,000 nurses and hospital 
employees. Just as in the case of Zenroren, the Federation has only recently become 
aware of the potential benefits and risks ofFTAs. Bilateral free trade agreements trigger 
nation-wide discussions on the deregulation of the labour market and immigration. 
Zenroren S position is one of caution, although the organisation recognises the potential 
future benefits of labour market liberalisation207. So far, FTAs have had a limited impact 
on the Japanese labour market. Trade unions and national-level confederations are much 
more concerned about another governmental initiative, the foreign trainee programme 






organised by the Japan International Training Cooperation Organisation (JITCO). In 
theory, trainees arrive in Japan to obtain technical skills and learn a trade. In reality, 
however, this controversial programme has provided Japanese businesses with cheap 
labour from Asian countries. Under this programme, more than 300,000 young people, 
mainly from Indonesia, China and Vietnam, come to Japan annually and are each given 
a three-year contract. 
3.6 FTA Competition with China and Korea 
3.6.1 Competition with China 
The first part of the chapter argued that isolation avoidance was the main factor behind 
Japan's first FTAs. This section takes a closer look at how competition with China and 
Korea impacted Japan's FTA strategy. One of the main arguments of this chapter, and 
the entire thesis, is that while China was the main competitor in the early stages of 
Japan's FTA policy, this role is now played by Korea. Korea's FTA strategy has 
implications for Japan's bilateral, minilateral and regional FTA strategy as demonstrated 
in Chapters 4 and 5. 
In 2010, China overtook Japan as the second largest economy in nominal GDP 
terms. China's role in Japan's shift towards a multi-layered trade policy was previously 
discussed in this chapter. The rise of China shifted the balance of power in the region 
and Japan needed to respond to a changing situation with a new policy. In the opinion of 
JETRO's Deputy Director of the International Economic Research Division, China's 
FTA proposal to ASEAN gave rise to Japan's interest in such agreements208• According 
to another member of the same Division, Japan has been competing with China in terms 
of FTA policy in East Asia209• Japan did not initiate the process of negotiating FTAs 
with Singapore, Korea and Mexico, nor actively propose an FTA until 2002, one day 
after China signed the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation, when it proposed a treaty to ASEAN (Urata 2003:103). Urata 
(201Oc) has concluded that Japan and China have both been striving to gain the position 
of regional leader by attempting to strengthen relations with Korea and ASEAN. In 
2005, Takashi Inoguchi (2005), a professor at the University of Tokyo, wrote that 
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China's growing interest in ASEAN and in establishing an FTA with the Association, 
had caused Japan, historically ambivalent about its regional identity, to become aware of 
the prospect of Chinese dominance in the region and to strike back by entering into 
negotiations for a similar FTA. Several scholars shared this opinion on the country's 
competitive diplomacy. In 2004, Ippei Yamazawa (2004), a fonner President of the 
International University of Japan and the Institute of Developing Economies, as well as 
a fonner coordinator of the Japan-Korea FTA study group, wrote that "the mass media 
often reports that China is taking the initiative while Japan is lagging behind in pursuing 
FTAs and further integration in East Asia". China's FTA policy has been described as 
'aggressive' by Shujiro Urata (2003:102). The country has not only signed several 
bilateral agreements but also practised unilateral liberalisation and opened up the 
extremely sensitive agricultural sector. The Early Harvest programmes are an example 
of China's liberalisation efforts. They allowed prospective FTA partners, for example 
ASEAN and Pakistan, to benefit from increased market access before a free trade 
agreement was fully implemented. In 2006, The Financial Times (Beattie 2006) voiced 
the opinion that China has done more to open up markets in the region than other 
countries under bilateral or minilateral treaties. In this respect, it has been more 
successful than Japan. In 2005, Aggarwal and Koo (2005:205) commented that Japan's 
declared interest in a prospective broader East Asian agreement may be explained by a 
desire to counterbalance China's growing influence. Masaki (2007: 19) shares this 
opinion and argues that "beneath the recently accelerated FTA strategy lies an 
intensifying rivalry with China over energy resources, as well as for political and 
economic influence in Asia". 
The concluded fieldwork indicates that China no longer plays a pivotal role in 
detennining Japan's FTA policy. Keizai Doyukai's Managing Director confinned the 
strong impact of China's foreign economic policy towards Southeast Asian countries for 
the fonnation of Japan's early FTA strategy210. According to a professor of Economics 
at Tokyo Denki University and a fonner Economic Planning Agency member, the 
'China factor' is important for Japan in tenns of economic competition, but also as a 
long-tenn geopolitical factor211 . However, the respondents do not consider China's FTA 
strategy to be a major factor behind Japan's current policy. Furthennore, it can be 
argued that at the initial stages of Japan's FTA policy, countries in East Asia mutually 
influenced each other, causing the proliferation of FTAs. Manger (2005:822) points out 
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that the shift of Japan's trade policy towards bilateral solutions took place long before 
China's 2002 proposal, when Japan entered into negotiations with Singapore. FTA 
specialist, Takashi Terada (2009: 16) wrote that, from a broader perspective, "Japan has 
at various turns become a follower or a reactive player to China's strategic moves that 
caused the structural changes in East Asia". Nonetheless, Terada (2006:25) argues that it 
was signing of the Japan-Singapore FTA and the possibility of an agreement between 
Japan and Korea that motivated China to propose an FTA to ASEAN. China did not 
want to be left behind in the FTA race, which in tum caused Japan to seek a similar 
agreement. In Munakata's opinion (2006b: 115) China's proposal to ASEAN was a result 
of its competition with Japan and Korea. China was trying to "break up the encirclement 
of Japan's FTA strategy" (Yang 2008:11 cites Liu, Changli 2005). The Director-General 
of METI's International Trade Policy Bureau confirms this, explaining that Japan's shift 
towards a multi-layered policy caused China to accelerate its FTA policy 212 • He 
concludes that China, Korea and Japan have been competing with each other in terms of 
FTA strategy. Korea's initial interest in FTAs was further strengthened by the increasing 
proliferation of such treaties, in particular the Japan-Singapore agreement and the 
ASEAN-China FTA proposal (Koo 2008:8). This had further implications for a broader 
East Asian region. Urata (2008b: 18) writes that competition for market access and 
political leadership amongst East Asian countries, in particular between China and 
Japan, is the main reason behind the proliferation of FTAs in the region and accelerated 
the FTA strategies of other states. 
The importance of competition with Korea in Japan's FTA policy is further proof 
that the domino effect, or isolation avoidance, has caused East Asian states to sign FTAs 
in response to other countries' agreements. In Japan's case this also reflects the notion 
that the county has traditionally only implemented major changes as a result of outside 
pressure, referred to as 'gaiatsu,213, and the 'reactive state' view of Japan's foreign 
policy introduced by Kent Calder (1988). As Hirata (1998: 1) explains, according to this 
view, "Japan is portrayed as passive, risk-avoiding, and ineffective in conducting 
foreign policy" and is able to change its diplomatic course only when faced with foreign 
pressure. Competition with other countries can be viewed as outside pressure causing 
Japan to sign subsequent FTAs. 
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3.6.2 Competition with Korea 
According to the conducted fieldwork, in recent years competition with Korea has 
become the single most important external factor behind Japan's FTA policy. This 
section argues that over the last few years, Japan's rivalry with China has been replaced 
by concerns over Korea's growing influence. The 'China factor' remains one of the 
long-term geopolitical factors which will continue to influence the region in the future. 
At the moment, however, it is Korea's FTA policy that incites Japan to seek new 
solutions and re-evaluate foreign trade strategy. Korea has been more successful than 
Japan not only in signing high-level treaties with important partners but also in dealing 
with domestic opposition. A Senior Research Fellow from the Institute of Developing 
Economies explains that up until 200712008, Japan was mainly reacting to China's FTA 
policy in the region214 • Since then, however, Japan has been closely observing the 
emergence of a new regional competitor: Korea. Korea announced the start of FTA 
negotiations with Chile and feasibility studies with countries such as the US, Japan, 
New Zealand and Thailand in November 1998 (Koo 2008:9). It signed an FTA with 
Chile in 2003. In 2004, it signed an agreement with Singapore and a year later with the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)2Is. The Korea-ASEAN FTA on trade in goods 
was signed in August 2006, between Korea and nine members of ASEAN (without 
Thailand). The negotiations of FTAs with other countries, for example Canada, Mexico 
and Australia, were still ongoing at the end of 2011. Agreements with, amongst others, 
China and Russia are under consideration. Korea started FTA negotiations with the US 
in 2006 and with the EU in 2007. They were signed in June 2007 and October 2010 
respectively. By the end of 2011 the Korea-US FTA was approved by the US Congress 
and the Korean National Assembly. The EU-Korea FTA has been provisionally applied 
since July 2011. 
The strong global performance of brands such as Samsung, Korea's increasing 
economic and political significance and accelerating FTA policy have raised the 
concerns of Japan's government officials, as well as the private sector. All of the 60 
interviewees mentioned Korea as a major factor behind Japan's FTA strategy, as well as 
growing pressure to compete with the country. In the words of the Deputy Executive ' 
Director of the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), Japan sees Korea as 
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"running just behind us and ready to overtake US,,216. In particular, Korea's agreement 
with the European Union is problematic for Japanese industries. As Japan's and Korea's 
trade structure is similar, the country's agreement with the EU could potentially be very 
harmful for Japanese industries, in particular the automobile and electronics sectors 
(JETRO 2009: 1 09). The EU imposes a 10 percent tariff on cars and commercial 
vehicles. It also applies high tariffs, with a maximum tariff of 14 percent, on electrical 
appliances (JETRO 2008:3). Tariffs on liquid-crystal panels (liquid-crystal display 
panels, also known as LCD) are around 15 percent, which will make Korean LCD TVs 
more competitive in the European market 217 . A Japanese global corporation in the 
electronics sector admits that it did not welcome the EU-Korea FTA218. The company 
has only a small manufacturing facility in Korea; hence it cannot use Korea's agreement 
to export products to the EU. From the company's perspective, Korea's FTAs are a 
serious concern. The steel and iron industry is also concerned about losing c1ients219• At 
the moment, Japanese exports of steel products to the EU are stable due to their high 
quality. However, increasing imports from Korea might eventually pose a problem. The 
competitiveness of Korean automotive companies might increase as a result of the 
agreement. Their manufacturing facilities located in the EU might choose to import 
materials from Korea, which would directly impact the Japanese steel industry. The 
competitive advantage the Korean companies will enjoy on the European market once 
the agreement is enacted has caused Japanese MNCs to lobby the government to sign a 
similar treaty with the EU. When expressing its preferences on prospective FTAs to 
METI, the company requested provisions similar to the ones found in the country's 
treaties. Sugawara (2010:18) points out that faced with Korean competition, Japanese 
companies might need to move even more production bases overseas, which, in turn, 
will cause a loss of jobs in the country. Japan's agreement with Chile is an example of 
how competition with Korea influences the preferences of Japanese industries. Chile 
had signed a trade treaty with Korea. A small number of Japanese automobile 
companies invested in Chile. They did not establish local assembly facilities and 
exported finished products from Japan. After the signing of the Chile-Korea FTA, 
Korean companies, such as Hyundai, could export their cars under a preferential rate, 
which made it important for Japanese companies to make similar arrangements 220 • 
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Despite low levels of exports, the Japanese companies were at a disadvantage compared 
to their Korean counterparts and requested a similar agreement 221 • Korea has also 
negotiated an agreement with the US. However, a company in the automotive sector 
explains that this FTA does not cause so much concern222• This is because the company 
focuses mostly on compact cars and its main competitors are companies like 
Volkswagen and Fiat. A proposed agreement between Korea and China has been subject 
to an official feasibility study since 2006 and would not be in the interest of Japanese 
companies. For this reason, the Japanese industry supports negotiations with the EU, the 
US, and possibly China223• The differences between Japan and Korea in terms of FTA 
policy fonnation process and dealing with the opposition will be analysed in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
3.7 'Failed' FTA Negotiations 
3.7.1 Korea 
In some instances, negotiating a bilateral agreement proves to be problematic or even 
impossible. The negotiations might be delayed, stalled or stopped due to the parties' 
inability to reach a compromise. This occurred during Japan's negotiations with Korea 
and Australia. Looking at these two 'failed' cases helps to understand what factors are 
necessary for the success of an FTA project on the Japanese side and how domestic 
groups' preferences influence the country's FTA policy. In both examples, internal 
domestic factors such as the distribution of benefits and costs detennined Japan's 
position in the negotiations. First, the expected benefits for the industries were not 
sufficient to cause them to strongly lobby the government to sign the agreement. The 
second factor was the negotiating partner's finn position and unwillingness to retract its 
requests, in particular in the agricultural sector. It can be argued that, in these two cases, 
without a sufficient outside pressure, either from an international community or from 
the industries, the Japanese government, and the Trade Policy Bureau in particular, was 
unable to overcome the resistance of the agricultural sector. In this respect, the two 
examples illustrate Japan's impasse in FTA policy, which prevents it from taking a more 
active role in regional economic integration and from signing bilateral FTAs with big 
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markets such as the EU or the US. In his speech from 15 November 2009, Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama (2009) announced that Japan will accelerate FTA negotiations 
with both Korea and Australia. During the APEC Summit in Yokohama, Japan (7-14 
November 2010), Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced his intention to increase efforts 
for trade and investment liberalisation, for concluding FTA negotiations with Australia 
and for resuming FTA talks with Korea (Foster and Hosaka 2010). 
The FTA negotiations between Japan and Korea were adjourned in November 2004. 
From the Korean perspective, the official reason was Japan's unwillingness to open its 
agricultural market, for example to lower duties on seaweed. According to a former 
advisor of Japan's Permanent Delegation to the OECD and a former MOFA employee, 
this was only a partial reason224• Another issue was the trade imbalance between the two 
countries. Korea had a trade deficit with Japan and the signing of an FTA could 
potentially widen this gap. Hence the Korean SMEs and labour unions strongly opposed 
the agreement with Japan. In Korea, the labour unions' position is equal to or stronger 
than that of the agricultural lobby groups 225. Korean electronics and machinery 
companies were worried about Japanese competitors entering their market. The 
Japanese side was not willing to lower tariffs on Korean fishery and agricultural 
products like seaweed, which were much cheaper than their Japanese equivalents. JA-
Zenchu s Deputy-General explains that the organisation was surprised to hear that the 
Japanese agricultural sector and the level of its liberalisation ambitions were blamed for 
the stalling of negotiations with Korea226• The Deputy-General explains that at the joint 
study level both sides agreed that the negotiations would be conducted based on the 
recognition of the special place the agricultural sector has in both countries' economies. 
It was understood that Japan and Korea have a very similar agricultural model. JA-
Zenchu S Deputy-General recalls that the strategy from the beginning was to exclude 
sensitive products from negotiations. This view was confirmed by the 'Japan-Korea 
Free Trade Agreement Joint Study Group Report' (2003). The chapter on tariff 
liberalisation and facilitation (2003:24) states that the Japan-Korea agreement "should 
address the sensitive sectors of each country and come up with appropriate measures to 
resolve the issue, while exercising flexibility". It explains that during the joint study 
research "both sides found that the two countries share similarities in many aspects, 
including the small scale of production and low rate of self-sufficiency" (ibidem:24). 
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However, at a later point, the Korean government changed its approach and JA-Zenchu s 




Recently, the Japanese government has been actively working towards the 
resumption of negotiations with Korea; throughout 2008, meetings were held to this 
effect228• During the trilateral summit meeting between China, Japan and Korea that was 
held on 29 and 30 May 2010 in Korean Jeju Island, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama 
met with the Korean president, Lee Myung-bak. Hatoyama confirmed that Japan was 
ready to make further concessions229• Both Hatoyama's and Kan's administrations have 
increasingly attempted to reassume negotiations with Korea, including a consultation on 
the Director-General level in October 201023°. At a press conference in August 2010, 
Katsuya Okada (2010), Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, said that MOFA was 
making efforts to resume negotiations with Korea, as both countries share an 
understanding of market economics, democracy, and the political situation in the region. 
In addition, he considered it necessary for the two countries to increase their 
cooperation owing to China's FTA with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Korea is Japan's close 
political ally in Northeast Asia231 • An FTA could strengthen relations between the two 
states. According to the Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau the 
Korean government is aiming to obtain. concessions in several fields besides the 
agricultural sector232• He explains that one of the issues is non-tariff measures which 
prevent Korean companies from successfully competing in the Japanese market, rules 
on government procurement, and insufficient provisions on industrial cooperation. 
METI's Director confirms that the Japanese side has made a continuous effort to satisfy 
these demands. Gradually, however, the effort has lessened, due to the number of 
requests from the Korean side. For example, Korea would like Japanese companies to 
organise a 'reversed exhibition' in Korea, whereby instead of a seller demonstrating 
offered goods or services, Japanese buyers would need to organise an exhibition and 
invite Korean sellers233 • Member of the Korean industries, in particular automotive 
companies such as Hyundai, are still concerned about Japanese competitors entering 
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their market without the protection offered by tari ffs 234 . Being a small country, the 
Korean economy is strongly dependent on exports23S. 
When Japan and Korea first entered into a joint FTA study, neither of them had 
signed FTAs. It was considered appropriate to sign the first agreement with a 
neighbouring country 236 . Since then, many things have changed. Korea has signed 
several agreements with countries such as the US and the EU. Although both 
agreements were ratified only in the second half of 2011, they achieved almost 100 
percent liberalisation and the level of expectations for Korean FTAs has risen237. Japan 
might not be able to fulfil such expectations. Katz (2010), the Editor-in-Chief of The 
Oriental Economist', points out that Japan's FTAs typically remove tariffs on about 50-
60 percent of agricultural products aside from rice, while under the KORUS and the 
EU-Korea FTA about 99 percent of non-rice trade was liberalised within five to ten 
years. At the same time, although Japanese companies initially supported the agreement 
with Korea, an important trade partner, it is a relatively small market and industry 
interest has lessened over time. Several companies would still like to see an agreement 
with Korea realised, for example an interviewed company in the automobile sector as it 
does not have production facilities in the country238. Korean tariffs on automobiles and 
some electrical goods are high. For that reason, companies in the electronics sector 
often export to Korea using the ASEAN-Korea agreement239. The liquor industry is a 
good example of how Japanese companies' preferences for the agreement differ. 
Companies in this sector generally do not oppose the treaty, but they do not strongly 
support it either4o. Sake producers would like to see an agreement with Korea realised. 
Japanese sake is highly competitive and well known in international markets. However, 
shochu producers are concerned about the negative impacts of such agreement. Their 
products would compete with the more popular and cheaper Korean version, soju. The 
Korean soju company, Jimo, is already exporting its products to Japan. 
According to METI's Director-General for International Trade Policy, negotiations 
with Korea have not been successful due to a lack of strong interest in the agreement on 
both sides of the table241 . Japanese industries are not particularly interested in an FTA 
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with Korea242. In addition, the trilateral FTA project between China, Japan and Korea 
(CJK) appears to be a plausible alternative. The official trilateral study was launched in 
early 2010. Scheduled to conclude by mid-20 12, the inter-governmental study group 
completed three meetings in 20 I O. So far, due to a wide range of issues covered, the 
discussion has been limited to a unilateral airing of opinions and there has been no 
convergence of views. The final joint study group meeting on the feasibility of the CJK 
FTA took place in December 2011. In a way, the trilateral FTA project has increased the 
pressure on the Japanese government to sign an agreement with Korea, in particular as 
Korea and China are conducting an FTA feasibility study and in January 2012 
announced their intention to negotiate a bilateral FTA. At the same time, it has further 
weakened corporate interest in a bilateral agreement. In the opinion of the Director-
General for Manufacturing Industries Policy at METI's Manufacturing Industries 
Bureau, parts of the manufacturing industry have a strong interest in the CJK FTA243. 
From the industries' perspective, a trilateral FTA might be a better solution than a 
bilateral one as it provides more options. Concerns over Japan's agricultural sector, non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) and government procurement regulations have also been raised by 
the EU, with which Japan is currently discussing the possibility of a free trade 
agreement, as described later in this chapter. The Union also does not demonstrate a 
strong interest in an FTA with Japan. European companies have little to gain as Japan's 
MFN tariffs on manufacturing products are already quite low. The difference between 
Korea and the EU is that Japanese companies strongly support the agreement with the 
EU244. It is a much bigger trading partner and Japan is more likely to be persuaded to 
make concessions. Korea's 48 million population market might not prove to be a 
sufficient incentive for Japan. 
3.7.2 Australia 
The first round of negotiations between Australia and Japan took place in April 2007. In 
January 2011, the 12th round of negotiations took place in Tokyo. Agriculture is the key 
issue prolonging the talks. The country requested a high level of liberalisation in this 
sector and an immediate abolition of tariffs, which Japan is not prepared to accept24S. 
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Australia is a major agricultural exporter. The opening up of the agricultural market is 
the key reason behind FTA negotiations with Japan246, The Australian side would like to 
lower Japan's tariffs on rice, wheat, barley, sugar, butter, skimmed milk, cheese and 
beef: all of which are sensitive products247, Without a substantial structural reform of the 
sector, it will be difficult for Japan to conclude the agreement. Additionally, the US is 
also interested in eliminating tariffs on Japanese rice, wheat, barley, and beef and if 
Japan opens up its agricultural markets for Australian products there is a possibility that 
it will demand similar concessions248, FTA negotiations with Australia started despite 
strong opposition from the Ministry of Agriculture and agricultural organisations. JA-
Zenchu argues that they should never have begun249, The organisation is aware that, in 
order to comply with the WTO regulations, each FTA should reach a 90 percent 
liberalisation level. According to its Deputy-General Manager, it is impossible to reach 
this level with Australia while excluding all sensitive products. Prior to the first round of 
negotiations, JA-Zenchu s representatives spoke to Australian delegations visiting 
Japan 250. They explained that, from the agricultural sector's perspective, it is not 
possible to conclude the agreement. Rural areas are dependent on the agricultural sector 
and MAFF cannot ignore their position, Without a clear political decision on FTA 
strategy it is difficult to overcome this opposition, This is one of the main reasons 
behind Japan's impasse in FTApolicy, 
The Director for Economic Partnership (EPNFTA) at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, 
who is responsible for FTA negotiations with India and Australia, explains that Japanese 
companies have a very limited interest in an agreement with Australia251 , He believes 
that the Japanese industries would benefit less from such an FTA than from a similar 
agreement with, for example, China. The Director-General at METl's Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau, which assessed the preferences of companies in various sectors, 
confirms that profits from such an agreement would be limited 252, The automobile 
industry is just such an example. According to a policy analyst from the Foreign 
Investment and Trade Policy Division of the Australian Treasury Department the 
domestic automobile sector is dominated by foreign investors 253, The two main 
companies are GM Holden and Toyota, both of whom have been producing automobiles 
246 Interview no. 3. 
247 Interview no. II. 
248 Ibidem. 
249 Interview no. 29. 
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in Australia for a long time. Toyota has a large manufacturing base in the country and 
enjoys tariff protection. The local government offers support for Toyota's production of 
hybrid cars. Two of the interviewed companies in the automobile sector stated that they 
have little interest in investing and producing in Australia due to Toyota's competition 
and strong position in the market254.This preference is strengthened by the fact that 
although the investment environment in Australia is stable and regulations are 
transparent, manufacturing costs are high. Wages are much higher than in China or in 
ASEAN countries. METI's Director-General for Manufacturing Industries Policy 
explains that even with no tariff protection, it would be difficult for Japanese 
automobile companies to penetrate the market, given the large distances and related 
transport costs255• In addition, in order to sell their products in Australia, companies 
would need to establish a large sales network. This would engender further costs. For 
example, Mitsubishi used to manufacture in Australia but left the country in 2008 due to 
low levels of sales and small profit. Australia's MFN tariff on automobiles is 5 
percent256• Therefore, foreign companies prefer to export automobiles to Australia than 
to manufacture locally 257. Korean companies Hyundai Motor Company and GM 
Daewoo export finished vehicles to Australia, and China exports low-priced cars. 
Japanese automobile companies export mainly through Thailand and the Australia-
Thailand FTA, which was mentioned earlier in this chapter258• An interviewed company 
explains that it switched parts of its production from Japan to Thailand in order to 
export to Australia259• Therefore, although the company does not have a manufacturing 
facility in Australia, it does not require an FTA with this country. Of course, an FTA 
with Australia could increase Japanese automakers' flexibility and allow them to export 
products directly from Japan. 
Japan imports steel, natural gas, and other resources from Australia. However, the 
steel and iron industry does not have a strong preference regarding an agreement with 
Australia. It has been investing in the natural resources sector in Australia for many 
years, for example in the mining industry. Trade relations between Australian and 
Japanese companies in this sector are well established. In order to develop an 
254 Interview no. 20 and 21. 
255 Interview no. 7. 
256 This is according to the Global Trade Atlas Navigator Database. Accessed October 20 I 0, JETRO 
Business Library, Tokyo. 
257 Interview no. 35. 
258 Interview no. 7. 
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internationally competitive mining industry, large investments are required 260 . 
According to the Japan Iron and Steel Federation, companies are concerned about 
securing their supplies of high quality steef61. To that end, they make arrangements to 
provide a safety net for Japanese importers. Large companies, such as Nippon Steel, 
secure imports by private business agreements with their suppliers. Therefore, the 
Federation explains, there is no need to repeat this under an FTA. 
The agreement with Australia is another example of a Trade Policy Bureau-driven 
FTA. The Manufacturing Industries Bureau has little interest in concluding the 
agreement 262. The Trade Policy Bureau, on the other hand, strongly supports the 
agreement from a broad, strategic point of view. Australia is a member of ASEAN+6 
and APEC and is an important political ally in East Asia. In the opinion of METI's 
Trade Policy Bureau, Japan should aim to sign an agreement with Australia as, although 
negotiations can be challenging, agreements with developed economies or allies are 
considered from a political perspective to be easier263. The Bureau considers Australia 
to be a very important potential FTA partner. According to its Director for FTA Affairs, 
Australia is one of the key countries as it not only has an FTA with ASEAN but also 
with the US264. In his opinion, an agreement with Australia would be a milestone for 
Japanese trade policy. The two countries have traditionally been allies and have worked 
together towards the establishment of APEC, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Nonetheless, the Bureau does not want to enter into an open confrontation on the 
subject with the agricultural sector and the Australian side is determined to persuade 
Japan to lower its tariffs on agricultural goods. The domestic opposition to the 
agreement with Australia is very strong. The interest of the domestic sectors is weak, as 
has been demonstrated in this section. 
3.8 Recent Bilateral FTA Policy 
Just as for the ministries, for the private sector Japan's consecutive FTAs were a 
learning process. At the early stages of Japan's FTA policy, companies were mainly 
interested in tariff reductions and not, for example, in the liberalisation of investment or 
260 Interview no. 35. 
261 Interview no. 32. 
262 Interview no. 7. 
263 Ibidem. 
264 Interview no. 3. 
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trade in services265. This might be explained by the fact that tariffs in the ASEAN region 
were initially quite high. In time, after Japanese companies started using AFTA and 
other FTAs, tariffs were no longer the main problem. Due to the increasing economic 
integration in East Asia and tariff liberalisation achieved under unilateral or reciprocal 
schemes, provisions on non-tariff barriers started playing a much bigger role in 
determining the benefits of an FTA. Tariff reduction is still important, despite the falling 
MFN rates, but a strong focus is also placed on how FTAs can further improve MNCs' 
operations and business environment or secure Japanese investments in East Asian. 
Japanese businesses, although often divided by different preferences, are also 
increasingly interested in the standardisation of rules and regulations under bilateral 
FTAs266. There is a strong parallel between this tendency and the industries' preferences 
regarding a region-wide FTA, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. Securing access to 
natural resources is an example of a non-tariff issue that has become increasingly 
important in Japan's bilateral FTA policy267. In May 2006, MET! published the 'New 
National Energy Strategy' (2006). The document spoke of securing access to oil, gas, 
and other resources by deepening the economic relations with resource-rich countries, 
for example by concluding FTAs. The Indonesia-Japan FTA, signed in 2007, was the 
first free trade agreement used for this purpose. A similar clause was included in the 
Brunei-Japan agreement, also signed in 2007 (Masaki 2007: 19). Both of those countries 
are oil and natural gas producers and Indonesia is Japan's biggest supplier of liquefied 
natural gas, providing over 40 percent of imports. Apart from Australia, the country is 
also negotiating bilateral FTAs with another important natural resources provider, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. In addition, Japan is conducting a joint FTA study with 
Mongolia, which would be this country's first free trade agreement. Mongolia has 
extensive natural resources, including new coal fields. So far, there has been no mention 
of an energy clause in this FTA, but according to the Director for FTA Affairs at METI's 
Trade Policy Bureau the Japanese government believes that even without it an 
agreement with Mongolia will help to secure stable imports of resources268. 
The increasing competition with Korea, amongst other factors, has caused Japan to 
consider signing high-level FTAs with important trade partners or big markets such as 
the EU, China and the US. This has been confirmed by the Director of MOFA's 
265 Interview no. 39. 
266 Interview no. 23. 
267 Interview no. 3. 
268 Ibidem. 
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EPAIFTA Policy Division269• There is a strong interest from the Japanese industries in 
such treaties, although, as in the case of agreements with ASEAN countries, preferences 
vary between companies. Of the three mentioned groups, Japan is currently discussing 
prospects for a free trade agreement with the EU. Such an FTA would replace the 2001 
Japan-EU Ten Year Action Plan, which expires in 2011 (Midford 2010). There is a 
common conviction in Japan that the EU has little interest in negotiating an agreement 
with them as the country's tariffs are already low27o• Because of this, the benefits for the 
EU would be limited (Sugawara 2010:7). For example, the EU imposes a 10 percent 
tariff on automobiles, while Japan's rate is zero (Sekizawa 2009). Ravenhill (2009:30) 
confirms that the EU does not have much incentive to sign an FTA with Japan. In 
November 2010 a meeting took place between Prime Minister Naoto Kan and the EU 
leaders. While the former expressed interest in starting an official joint FTA study in the 
spring of 2011, the European side opted for prolonging the initial talks and holding 
meetings on the ministerial level (The Japan Times online 13 November 2010). 
According to Andra Koke (2010), Head of Trade and Development Unit at the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for Trade, the EU is concerned about Japan's NTBs. 
This was also confirmed during the November meeting, when European Commission 
President Jose Manuel Barroso asked the Japanese side to make a strong commitment to 
liberalising non-tariff barriers and accelerating deregulation in government procurement 
and other trade areas (The Japan Times online 2010). During the panel discussion on the 
future of Asia-Europe relations at the Asian Development Bank Institute, British 
Ambassador to Japan David Warren (2010) also stressed the importance of non-tariffs 
barriers for the European side. 
The Japanese industries are highly interested in signing such an FTA, which would 
not only provide them with an access to the European market but also eliminate their 
disadvantage compared with Korean companies. Although an agreement with the EU is 
a long-term project, in 2009 Japan signed its first FTA with a European country: 
Switzerland. This was an important development, as Japan's FTA with Switzerland 
bears a resemblance to the country's first FTA with Singapore. The trade volume 
between the two countries is low, which caused the interviewed companies to question 
the usefulness of this agreement. However, it has a strategic and diplomatic significance. 
Just like the agreement with Singapore, this was clearly a Trade Industry Bureau-driven 
269 Interview no. 9. 
270 Interview no. 8. 
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FTA271. From the government's perspective, Switzerland was an important partner for 
several reasons. This is Japan's first FTA with a European country and its first 
European-style FTA272. Although not a member of the European Union, it can be argued 
that Switzerland is for Europe what Singapore has been for East Asia - a gateway and a 
'test FTA'. The agreement could benefit the private sector, as Switzerland has signed an 
FTA with the EU. Despite the low trade volume between Japan and Switzerland, the 
agreement included several sensitive issues. For example, Switzerland is a strong 
exporter of cheese and was determined to open Japan's markets for this product273 . 
Cheese production in Japan is concentrated in Hokkaido and the large dairy farms were 
a source of strong support for the local LOP politicians274. The agricultural sector and 
MAFF oppose the proposed agreement with the EU, although the protests are not as 
strong as in the case of the Australia-Japan FTA. MAFF's Director for APEC and 
European Affairs explains that the Ministry understands that it is important for the 
manufacturing companies in the automotive and electronics sectors to maintain their 
competitiveness275. However, he argues the Korean company Samsung dominated the 
European flat-TV market, even before the EU-Korea FTA has been signed, and both 
countries paid a 14 percent tariff on flat TV s. MAFF's Director points out that even 
under those circumstances Japanese brands failed to capture a significant market share 
and tariffs are not the only factor determining market share. This illustrates the domestic 
debate between the two Ministries. As there are valid arguments on both sides, it is 
difficult to reach a compromise. 
In 2011, Japan has signed two other FTAs: with India in February and with Peru in 
May. The agreement with India was of great importance for the manufacturing industry. 
As discussed in this chapter, the automobile industry was particularly interested in this 
agreement due India's high tariffs on automobiles. Therefore, the FTA with India is one 
of the Manufacturing Industries Bureau-driven ones. 
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3.9 Preferences for the AJCEP 
3.9.1 The AJCEP 
The ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP) was 
signed in April 2008 and came into effect in December 2008. The origins of this FTA 
date back to 2002. In his Singapore speech, delivered in January 2002, Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi (2002) proposed an "Initiative for ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership". A Joint Declaration (ASEAN-Japan Summit 2002), drafted 
during the November 2002 ASEAN-Japan Summit held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 
spoke of implementing "measures for the realisation of a Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (CEP), including elements of a possible Free Trade Area, which should be 
completed as soon as possible within ten years, and to establish a Committee to consider 
and draft a framework for the realisation of the CEP between Japan and ASEAN". As a 
result, the 'Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partnership between Japan and 
the Association of South East Asian Nations' was signed in October 2003 and 
negotiations started in April 2005. The AJCEP was negotiated and signed parallel to 
FTA negotiations with respective ASEAN economies. The Japan-Vietnam FTA was 
signed after the AJCEP was implemented, and the agreement with the Philippines, 
although signed in 2006, went into effect ten days after the treaty with ASEAN. In a 
way, Japan's bilateral FTAs with ASEAN and the AJCEP are two parts of Japan's 
overall trade policy towards the Association. This part of the chapter analyses the 
government and industries' preferences regarding the AJCEP. It questions the value 
added by the agreement in comparison to bilateral treaties? In particular, Japan's 
solution to the coexistence of the two types of FTAs helps to demonstrate Japan's 
pragmatic approach to regional trade liberalisation and to draw inferences regarding 
preferences for a prospective region-wide FTA and its harmonisation with existing 
agreements. The analysis of this issue in Chapter 4 draws heavily on the AJCEP's case. 
Furthermore, Japanese companies have formed their preferences on the usefulness and 
scope of the prospective region-wide treaty based partially on the AJCEP's example. 
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3.9.2 The Preferences of the Japanese Ministries 
The objectives of the two types of FTAs were somewhat different. Bilateral agreements, 
above all, serve the interests of Japanese industries and improve the business 
environment in East Asian countries. The AJCEP has an additional political dimension. 
ASEAN countries have strong economic ties with Japan through vast investment, 
financial aid, and official development assistance (ODA). Before the start of 
negotiations in 2005, ASEAN countries were concerned that Japan's bilateral approach 
might cause a division within the Association and the less developed members would be 
left behind (Terada 2008:11). Therefore, it was politically important to have an 
agreement covering all ASEAN countries276• The AJCEP includes Laos, Cambodia, and 
Myanmar. This was one of the reasons behind MOFA's and METI's Trade Policy 
Bureau's support for the agreement277• 
Instead of signing a minilateral agreement with ASEAN first as China and Korea 
had done278, Japan decided to start with bilateral treaties. There are several explanations 
for this two-track strategy towards ASEAN. The Director for FTA Affairs at METI's 
Trade Policy Bureau explains that the idea for AJCEP was not fully formed when Japan 
started negotiating bilateral agreements279• Terada (2009: 1 0) mentions that Japan did not 
consider signing an agreement with ASEAN as a whole until China's proposal and 
instead, preferred to negotiate bilateral agreements with member countries with which it 
had strong, long-standing economic ties, for example based on ODA. According to a 
Deputy Director at JETRO's International Economic Research Division, developed 
economies, like the US and Japan, prefer to negotiate bilaterally, as in this way, they can 
obtain higher concessions28o• On the other hand, a former METI Director-General for 
International Trade Policy and a negotiator of the Japan-Philippines and Japan-Malaysia 
FTAs, recalls that, in 2004, the interest of ASEAN countries in an FTA with Japan 
varied significantly281. Therefore, Japan started signing bilateral agreements with the 
countries which were most interested. Furthermore, there were differences in opinion 
within the Japanese government. A Deputy Director at JETRO's International Economic 
Research Division points out that in MOFA's understanding the minilateral agreement 
276 Interview no. 2, 8, and 50. 
277 Interview no. 3 and 9. 
278 Korea signed and FTA with Singapore two years prior to ASEAN-Korea FTA and China signed an 
FTA with Singapore in 2008, four years after the ASEAN-China FTA was signed. The countries do not 
have any other FTAs with ASEAN member economies. 
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was premature282• In tum, MOFA's Director of EPAIFTA Policy Division explains that 
MET! wanted to sign the AJCEP first, due to the internationalisation of production 
networks and the de facto presence of Japanese companies in ASEAN283• He considers 
MOFA's approach at the time to be more pragmatic. The ministry preferred to 
commence with bilateral treaties. In addition, he explains, MOFA was cautious about 
engaging in minilateral, semi-regional FTA negotiations, as it was concerned about the 
effect this might have on Japan's relationship with the US284• The decision was made to 
negotiate bilateral agreements first, due to the anticipated complexity of a minilateral 
FTA. In the end, since 2005 the negotiations have progressed simultaneously. 
Terada (2008:11) recalls that before the start of negotiations with the Association, 
there was a possibility that the ASEAN-Japan FTA might be established by 
consolidating existing agreements. In the end, a separate agreement was negotiated and 
added on top of the existing ones. In order to solve the issue of the coexistence of the 
two types of agreements, a flexible clause was included, allowing users to choose the 
FTA that provided the most advantageous conditions. The bilateral agreements and the 
AJCEP coexist side by side, raising questions on the possible aggravation of the noodle 
bowl effect. In practice this means that countries such as Japan and Singapore are 
connected by two separate FTAs. As of January 2009, there were 44 FTAs concluded in 
East Asia, of which 37 were signed and in effect and the remaining seven were signed 
(Kawai and Wignaraja 2009:2). Most of the bilateral, minilateral and planned regional 
FTAs in East Asia coexist with other treaties. Therefore, one product is often subjected 
to several tariff rates and phase-in schedules under different agreements. The signing of 
the AJCEP raised questions on the complications that might entail in terms of additional 
regulations and administrative requirements. The former Director for FTA Affairs at 
METI's Trade Policy Bureau argues that the government has no intention of 
harmonising or consolidating these agreements, as companies use both the bilateral and 
the AJCEP, especially as the former often offer higher concessions285 • Furthermore, 
interviewed Japanese MNCs in various sectors do not regard the coexistence of the 
AJCEP with bilateral agreements to be a major problem. According to a representative 
of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the idea that overlapping agreements 
cause the noodle bowl syndrome is an exaggeration in the opinion of Japan's private 
282 Interview no. 39. 
283 Interview no. 9. 
284 Ibidem. 
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sector286• He explains that most companies trade few products and the majority of East 
Asian FTAs use similar RoO. Even if the company is exporting to several countries, the 
one thing it needs to control, in order to be able to comply with the RoO in different 
FTAs, is the percentage of local content 287. Nippon Keidanren s Deputy Director 
believes that the problem does not lie in the overlapping rules of origin, but in the 
quality and access to information on them288• In the Director's opinion, even if JETRO's 
branch in Thailand has good information on the implementation schedules, RoO and 
local procedures, it is not necessarily accessible to smaller Japanese companies located 
in Tokyo. 
There are two levels on which the AJCEP coexists with other provisions. First, as 
was already mentioned, the AJCEP includes a flexibility clause. Japanese companies are 
free to export under the treaty that offers better conditions and tariffs for their products: 
they can choose the FTA they want to use. An exporter wishing to sell a product to 
Thailand compares tariff rates for it between the MFN, Japan-Thailand and ASEAN-
Japan preferential tariffs and simply chooses the lowest one. The flexibility clause is the 
solution to the overlapping agreements between Japan and ASEAN members. Before 
the provision was implemented, it was discussed at a meeting between the government 
officials, industry representatives and scholars 289. During this meeting, companies 
explained the narrowness of their area of operations. The MNCs are used to trading 
under particular provisions of bilateral treaties with ASEAN members and would not 
like to see them replaced with a new treaty. They argued that the coexistence of 
overlapping agreements does not pose a problem for the private sector. A Senior 
Researcher at JETRO's Overseas Research Department argues that companies only need 
to compare three sets of rules of origin29o• He bases this opinion on several research 
interviews with representatives of small and big businesses conducted by JETRO all 
over Japan. In addition, the former chief negotiator of the Japan-Mexico FTA explains 
that several members of the government share an opinion that the possibility of choice 
between the overlapping FTAs reduces the negative impacts of coexisting agreements291 • 
In order to facilitate the comparison of tariffs between the MFN, bilateral agreements 
and the AJCEP, JETRO has compiled a free database, developed by FedEx. It provides 
information on duties, liberalisation schedules and rules of origin. It also allows for the 
286 Interview no. 25. 
287 Interview no. 14. 
288 Interview no. 24. 
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comparison of tariff rates over several years, based on products' Harmonised System 
(HS) 8-digit code. New information is added with each signed agreement. The Deputy 
Director of JETRO's Overseas Research Department explains that the utilisation rates of 
Japan's FTAs have risen since the database was introduced292 . The FedEx database 
might be especially useful for smaller companies, which find it difficult to utilise a 
complex tariff reduction system under several separate FTAs. However, a representative 
of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry points out that the database is not 
ideal for quick and easy comparisons of tariffs293. The user can compare rates of only up 
to three countries. For example, Singapore's Ministry of Trade and Industry database 
calculates the best preferential tariff rate 294. For importing products to Japan, the 
Ministry of Finance has a one-stop website, where an importer can check tariffs295 . 
There is no equivalent for exporting from Japan. 
The second level, on which the AJCEP requires the coexistence of various 
provisions, is within the actual agreement. Before the start of negotiations with ASEAN, 
the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry presented its preferences to the 
government. The Chamber explained that it would like the AJCEP to have same rules of 
origin as in bilateral agreements and one implementation schedule within the minilateral 
treaty296. The AJCEP incorporated rules and implementation schedules from bilateral 
agreements with particular ASEAN members. In other words, the majority of 
concessions under bilateral agreements were extended to the AJCEP. This means that 
the agreement does not have a common implementation schedule. In fact, the ASEAN· 
Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement has ten separate liberalisation 
schedules, plus the one under AFTA (Lim and Kimura 2010:16). If under JTEPA, 
Thailand committed to liberalising a tariff over ten years, under the minilateral 
agreement phase-in schedules were, in most cases, set for the same amount of time. 
However, in the case of Malaysia and Singapore bilateral agreements went into effect in 
2006, two years before the AJCEP. For Thailand this gap is one year. 
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Figure 3.13 illustrates the difference in tariffs for an LCD TV for Malaysia, under AFTA, 
the AJCEP, bilateral agreements with Japan (JMEPA), the ASEAN-Korea FTA 
(AKFTA), and the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA). It can be seen that tariffs under the 
bilateral treaties and the AJCEP correspond to each other with a delay of two years. In 
addition, each agreement introduces different, overlapping product-specific and sector-
wide rules of origin and lists of sensitive items (Lim and Kimura 2010: 16). According 
to the former Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, varying 
implementation schedules are a result of a compromise of interests within each 
industry297. The former Director expects that a gradual shift will take place and the 
companies will start using the AJCEP more often, especially when tariffs under both 
types of agreements converge. In reality, however, the private sector has very little 
interest in trading under the AJCEP, as will be demonstrated in the next section. 
297 Interview no. 4. 
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3.9.3 Preferences of Japanese Industries 
From the private sector's perspective, the AJCEP had two important features: it included 
a flexible type of rules of origin and allowed for cumulation. The agreement simplified 
the RoO by allowing companies to choose between value-added content (V C) and a 
change in the tariff classification (CTC) rule. This type of provision is known as the co-
equal rule of origin. According to recent studies (Kawai, and Wignaraja 4009 and 
Hiratsuka et al. 2008a) on the impact of multiple rules of origin on Japanese companies, 
it is the preferred solution for most industries. Kawai (2009) argues that there is little 
evidence that rules of origin have harmed the private sector over the past eight years. 
However, with the increasing number of FTAs, there is room for improvement. 
According to the study by Kawai and Wignaraja (2009), 31 percent of respondents in 
Japan confirmed that multiple RoO add to business costs. As much as 41.2 percent of 
those were giant companies, who are most likely to use multiple FTAs, 20 percent were 
large companies and only 14.3 percent SMEs. Harmonising RoO, including an option of 
using the VC or CTC rule was the preferred solution for 51 percent of respondents in all 
selected countries. According to the second study (Hiratsuka et al. 2008a) 27.8 percent 
of companies stated that multiple RoO add to business costs. For 33 percent of 
respondents this was not a problem at present but might be in the future. The study 
argues that the co-equal rule of origin is the preferred solution. This has also been 
confirmed in a more recent article (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011 a). The co-equal rule of 
origin is popular within the East Asian region. First, Japan introduced it for several 
product lines in the ASEAN-Japan agreement and bilateral FTAs, for example, the one 
with Malaysia and the one with Thailand 298. Then, the ASEAN-Korea 299 and the 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand (AANZFTA) FTAs and AFTA introduced that 
system300• AANZFTA uses the co-equal RoO on approximately 83 percent of all tariff 
sub-headings (Primer on Rules of Origin 2009:5). Extending the co-equal rule across 
the region could off-set the negative aspects of overlapping agreements and allow for 
the harmonisation of RoO in the future. There are additional reasons for implementing 
the rule. For industries using a specific production process and technology, such as the 
chemical industry, the CTC rule of origin is often impossible to apply. On the other 
hand, rules of origin based solely on the VC can be restrictive and difficult to comply 
with. An automobile is comprised of around 30,000 parts and components, purchased 
298 This was done for the CTC on the sub-heading level, HS 6 digits. 
299 This was done for the CTC on the heading level. 
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from several to several hundred vendors and local suppliers, which makes applying the 
local content rule of origin difficult30I • When all FTA members use the same types of 
rules of origin, diagonal cumulation is possible, as explained in Chapter 2. This 
provision was particularly important for the textile sector. 
Figure 3.14 Impact of the AJCEP 
Cumulation of RoO. 
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Source: MOFA, 2010, Japan's FTAIEPA Current Status and Main Issues, p.? Obtained during interview 
no.9 
Figure 3.14 presents the impact of cumulation and RoO under the AJCEP on trade 
in goods. A company with a vertically integrated production network is now able to 
trade both intermediates and finished goods within ASEAN under zero tariffs. It can 
now produce in Thailand, using Korean parts under the ASEAN-Thailand FTA, and 
export the finished product to another ASEAN country duty-free under the AJCEP, even 
if Korean parts constitute more than 40 percent of the finished good302 . This is further 
illustrated by Figure 3.15, which presents the same scenario. For Japanese industries the 
co-equal rule of origin and cumulation were the main advantage of the AJCEP. The 
agreement has been referred to as the 'lowest common denominator' type of FTA303 . 
MOFA's 'FTA Strategy' (2002) spoke of the planned agreement with ASEAN. Point 
four of the document, 'The type of free trade agreement Japan is aiming for (what to 
negotiate) , (ibidem), states that "in order to ensure that such partnership be comparable 
to economic integration in other regions, it should offer the greatest possible 
liberalisation in a broad range of areas". Nonetheless, the agreement covers trade in 
goods only. It achieved a limited scope of liberalisation and had little value added in 
302 Interview no. 15. 
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tenns of tariff concessions. The Japan-ASEAN FTA had little meaning in tenns of tariff 
reduction for trade in goods. For the most part, it incorporated tariffs of individual 
bilateral agreements, with a delay in implementation304• Therefore, for a company in a 
given sector, the usefulness of the AJCEP, to a great extent, depended on the structure 
and localisation of its operations. As it was already explained, the co-equal rule is 
particularly beneficial for MNCs with vertically integrated production networks in the 
ASEAN member economies which export key parts from Japan. For that reason the 
AJCEP was supported by Japan's MNCs, mainly in the electronics and machinery 
sectors, as well as by METI's Manufacturing Industries Bureau and Keidanren, where 
these sectors are well represented 305. However, as the Director-General of the 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau explains, many companies, even in those sectors, do 
not need to use cumulation and hence the AJCEp 306 • For them, the coexistence of 
bilateral and minilateral FTAs do not offer additional benefits. They continue using 
bilateral FTAs whenever possible. Therefore, overall the agreement was not strongly 
supported by the industries307• 
The electronics sector is a good example of how an FTA with ASEAN is of 
significance for Japanese companies. As explained earlier, the production base of 
corporations in this sector is located mostly outside Japan and they often manufacture 
only a handful of products in Japan. For example, one of the interviewed corporations 
manufactures only camcorders in Japan308• The introduction of the co-equal rule was 
particularly important to Japanese manufacturers of the LCD panels and televisions. 
Those high value added parts for liquid crystal TV s are only manufactured in certain 
countries in the region, for instance, Japan and Korea (JETRO 2009: 111). A company 
producing LCD TVs in ASEAN imports the panel, which by itself constitutes 60 or 70 
percent of the final product's price. As the part exceeds AFTA's 40 percent VC rule it is 
not eligible for preferential tariffs. Having only bilateral agreements with ASEAN 
members, Japanese companies could import the panel to ASEAN duty free under ITA 
and sell the finished product locally under bilateral FTAs. However, the MFN tariff 
needs to be paid when exporting to other ASEAN countries. When Korea signed an FTA 
with ASEAN, Korean LCD panels could be exported from one ASEAN country to 
another. Therefore, LCD panels produced in Japan lost their competitive advantage. 
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Japanese companies in the electronics sector strongly advised the government to sign a 
similar agreement to retain their competitive advantage in panels and other high value 
added parts and components. The AJCEP offers much lower tariffs on LCD TVs and 
LCD panels than the ASEAN-Korea FTA309. This further confirms the argument that 
competition, and in particularly competition with Korea, shapes the Japanese 
companies' preferences for FTAs. 
For the textile and apparel sector, the AJCEP was of interest as it included the least 
developed members of the Association, with which Japan did not have bilateral 
agreements31 0 . Several companies in the textile and apparel sector have established 
production facilities in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos311 • They find cumulation under 
the AJCEP useful while complying with the double transformation rule of origin. The 
textile and apparel industry needs to comply with the two-step rule of origin (double 
transformation). Under bilateral FTAs with ASEAN members companies in this sector 
were not able to import a garment from Thailand if it was not made from fabric 
originating in Thailand, but, for example, in Cambodia: cumulation under the AJCEP 
allows them to do that. 
309 Interview no. 15. 
310 Interview no. 8. 
311 Interview no. 46. 
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Figure 3.16 Utilisation of the AJCEP by textile companies 
Utilization of FTAs with ASEAN<AJCEP> 
Building the most competitive supply chain by 
the partnership with user companies under the 
ASEAN accumulation rule of origins. 
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Figure 3.16 demonstrates how the AJCEP improves the operations of Japanese 
companies in the textile industry. They can now use fabric from Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia to produce garments in Vietnam. As discussed earlier in the chapter, sewing, 
the final stage of making a garment, is the most labour-intensive part of the production. 
Therefore, companies prefer to locate it in countries which have low labour costs, for 
example Vietnam. An interviewed company in the textile and chemical fibres sector 
explains that a lot of its final production takes place in Vietnam, which has a garment 
sector but not a fabric sector312 . Under a bilateral FTA with Vietnam it would be 
impossible to produce in the country and fulfil the double transformation rule of origin. 
JETRO (201 Ob: 19) confirms that the AJCEP is used mostly by the textile and clothing, 
as well as the ceramics and earth and stones, sectors. 
The automotive sector was one of the sectors which had little interest in an 
agreement with the Association. As explained earlier, many companies produce and sell 
most of their products locally313. According to a manager of the interviewed automotive 
company it exports and imports between ASEAN countries using AFTA and hence does 
312lntervie~ no. 22. 
313 Interview no. 20. 
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not benefit from the ASEAN-Japan treatl 14• Therefore, during the initial consultations 
with the private sector, the company informed the government that the AJCEP was not 
of interest unless it provided lower tariffs than bilateral agreements. Similarly, the steel 
and iron sector did not have a strong preference regarding this FTA31S • They purchase 
materials from different countries, which makes it difficult to calculate the local content 
of the final steel or iron product once all the ingredients are combined. The AJCEP 
agreement sets a 40 percent VC rule of origin for several products in Chapter 72 (iron 
and steel), for example semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel (tariff item 
number 72.07 of the HS code), or bars and rods of iron and non-alloy steel (items 72.13 
to 72.15 of the HS code). Furthermore, the AJCEP sets the same VC type of rule for a 
great majority of items in HS Chapter 73 (articles of iron or steel), for example railway 
or tramway track construction material of iron or steel (73.02) or tubes and pipes (73.03 
to 73.05). Hence the AJCEP is of little value for companies in this sector. Amongst 
companies in the service sector, interest in the AJCEP is even lower. For companies in 
the service industry, cumulation is not relevane 16• Not many companies use FTAs and 
those that do use only Japan's bilateral treaties. A Senior Analyst at the Mitsubishi UFJ 
Research and Consulting who is also a former official of the MOFA responsible for 
services explains that the few WTO plus provisions in Japan's bilateral FTAs with 
ASEAN members are not aimed at the service or financial sectors3l7• 
In 2010, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) consolidated the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(AFTA) provisions, in force since 1992. Amongst other revisions, it introduced the co-
equal rule of origin. This rendered the AJCEP unnecessary for many companies. The 
usefulness of the agreement was already questionable. After the ATIGA went into force, 
the beneficial effects of the AJCEP were significantly reduced. Japanese companies tend 
to use bilateral FTAs, offering deeper concessions and WTO provisions, for exporting 
parts and components from Japan to assembling facilities in ASEAN countries or for 
exporting final goodS31S • For example, a Japanese company may export parts to an 
assembly facility in Thailand using the Japan-Thailand FTA. Then, the final product in 
distributed to Malaysia, where it is sold. This can be done either under the AJCEP or 
under the ATIGA. The automotive and electronics industries have long-standing 
314 Ibidem. 
3IS Interview no. 32. 
316 Interview no. 45. 
317 Ibidem. 
318 Interview no. 28. 
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experience with the AFTA. The utilisation rates of the AFTA have already been 
mentioned. They are familiar with the agreement as many of them have been using this 
treaty since its inception319. The number of companies using the AJCEP is very 10~2o. 
This was confinned during the fieldwork. One of the interviewed companies in the 
electronics sector states that it utilises the ATIGA and not the AJCEP, as there is no 
added value in this treaty321. Similarly another company in the electronics sector has 
profited greatly from the cumulation of the RoO under the AJCEp322. However, since 
the ATIGA was introduced it utilises this treaty instead of the AJCEPT. For companies 
in the textile industry, for which the main advantage of the AJCEP lay in cumulation, 
the agreement continues to offer benefits323. 
3.10 Conclusions 
The aspects of Japan's FTA policy discussed in this chapter are relevant for further 
analysis of this policy on a minilateral or regional level. This chapter has discussed the 
Japanese government's and industries' preferences for bilateral FTAs over a time span 
of over a decade and for the AJCEP. First, it presented the preferences of the Ministries, 
companies, and the agricultural sector for Japan's first bilateral FTAs as well as treaties 
with ASEAN members. Second, it discussed the role of isolation avoidance and 
competitive bilateralism for the initial shift to a multi-track approach and competition 
with China and more recently Korea. The chapter analysed two 'failed' FTA cases and 
aimed to identify the reasons behind the lack of substantial progress in negotiations. 
Last, it discussed the preferences regarding the agreement with ASEAN. 
As demonstrated in this chapter, a decision to attempt to exclude the agricultural 
sector from trade liberalisation was made early on - an expected low level of 
liberalisation was part of the government's motivation for naming its FTAs Economic 
Partnership Agreements. This indicates that even during the initial discussions in the 
early 2000s, METI and MOFA did not expect FTAs to cause a dramatic overhaul of 
domestic policies. This could be explained by the government's experience in trade 
liberalisation negotiations under the WTO, where Japan was on the defence regarding 
319 Interview no. 46. 
320 Interview no. 25. 
32\ Interview no. 15. 
321 Interview no. 16. 
m Interview no. 22. 
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the liberalisation of agriculture. MAFF was determined to exclude the agricultural 
sector from trade liberalisation and made continuous efforts to avoid tariff reductions in 
all subsequent FTAs. The Ministry was able to secure special treatment for Japan's 
agricultural products in all bilateral FTAs. For that reason, MOFA's Director of the 
EPAIFTA Policy Division argues that Japan's free trade agreements are quasi-FTAs or 
'part economic cooperation' agreements and that the Ministry would like to sign high-
level treaties324• Lincoln (2004) goes as far as saying that Japan's EPAs are 'so-called 
free trade areas' and calls the country's position on agriculture 'unyielding'. The 
agricultural sector's opposition to trade liberalisation has further implications. The 
increasing competition with Korea has caused Japan to rethink and attempt to re-invent 
its bilateral FTA strategy. Sugawara (2010) writes that putting into force the AJCEP 
marked an end of what he calls the first phase of Japan's FTA strategy, centred on 
ASEAN and its members. 
Japan has already signed all the 'easy' trade agreements where it could proceed 
without conducting substantial domestic reforms or liberalising sensitive products. 
Prospective FTAs with important trade partners and big markets such as the EU, the US, 
or even Australia are bound to require substantial concessions in this field. Unable to 
resolve its domestic problems with the sensitive sectors, Japan is unable to conclude 
high-level FTAs or agreements with important trade partners and hence formulate a 
clear vision for its FTA strategy. Japan needs to resolve the issue of the agricultural 
sector's opposition to lowering tariffs and low levels of trade Iiberalisation in its FTAs. 
In short, in order to proceed and successfully compete with Korea, Japan will need to 
sign FTAs, causing a significant overhaul of its domestic policy. This contradicts initial 
plans for the country's strategy. Japan faces the same problems when it comes to 
prospective region-wide agreement. What constrains its FTA policy is a political 
impasse, which is analysed in detail in Chapter 5. According to the Deputy Director of 
JETRO's International Economic Research Division, as a result the country's policy is 
reactive to external factors325• This supports the proposition that international factors, 
such as competition and isolation avoidance, are driving Japan's bilateral FTA strategy. 
For example, JETRO's 2009 White Paper (2009: 1 09) stresses the importance of 
accelerating FTA negotiations in light of other countries' FTA strategies. The country's 
FTA policy seems to have stalled and to be in need of a breakthrough. It was hoped that 
such a breakthrough might have been achieved after the change of administration in 
324 Interview no. 9. 
325 Interview no. 39, the view'of Japan as a 'reactive state' has already been mentioned in this Chapter. 
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2009. Although no immediate breakthrough was achieved, the DPJ (201Oa) changed the 
domestic decision-making process, published a new FTA strategy document and 
announced Japan's intention to join the TPP negotiations326• Nonetheless, the change of 
administration to the DPJ provided an opportunity to rethink the approach to FTAs. 
According to the Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, the stalling 
of the Doha Round, coupled with Korea's FTA policy and other international 
developments, such as the progress of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, 
created a momentum for Japan's involvement in FTA negotiations327• He points out that 
over the past two or three years there have been discussions within the Japanese 
government on ways to conduct the necessary reforms. 
The chapter has stressed the importance of METI's Trade Policy Bureau in Japan's 
shift towards a multi-track approach and expansion of the FTA network328• Furthermore, 
it has described the Manufacturing Industries Bureau's role in representing the interests 
of the private sector, particularly at the initial stages of Japan's FTA strategy, when the 
companies themselves have not yet undertaken lobbying efforts. Companies' 
preferences have strongly influenced the Bureau's position and involvement in 
subsequent agreements. It was demonstrated that FTAs, which gained the support of 
both METI's Bureaus, were easier to negotiate despite the opposition from the 
agricultural sector. Agreements, which were not supported by the Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau, were at times difficult to conclude, especially if the other party made 
requests for concessions in the agricultural or another sensitive sector. The two 'failed' 
FTA cases demonstrate that without the support of Japanese industries and the 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau, the Trade Policy Bureau was unable to overcome the 
opposition from the agricultural sector. With a low level of interest and mounting 
difficulties the 'costs' outweighed the 'benefits' and the negotiations were stopped or 
stalled. The FTAs with Singapore and Switzerland are examples of Trade Policy 
Bureau-driven treaties in which the private sector and the second Bureau had little 
interest. They were successfully concluded due to a comparative lack of disagreement 
between the parties. 
It could be argued that while the agricultural sector's opposition to trade 
liberalisation is constant, what has changed on the domestic front are the preferences of 
the Japanese industries represented by the Manufacturing Industries Bureau. The AJCEP 
326 Chapter 5 discusses these two points in detail. 
327 Interview no. 3. 
328 This is confirmed in the subject literature, for example Lord 20 I 0:22. 
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is an example of an FTA initially supported by both METI's Bureaus. The 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau supported the agreement as it offered benefits to 
specific sectors. However, overall Japanese industries did not strongly endorse the 
agreement. The lack of interest in the AJCEP is mainly due to the fact that the 
agreement brings little additional benefits. It does not offer substantial additional 
liberalisation of tariffs, or deep liberalisation provisions. Being an agreement on trade in 
goods only, it offers no provisions on trade in services or investment. It is a 'lowest 
common denominator' agreement, connecting Japan and all ASEAN countries. The 
change in circumstances, resulting from the revision of AFTA and the introduction of 
ATIGA, rendered the agreement unnecessary for many industries, with the exception of 
companies in the textile and apparel sector. 
Finally, the chapter stressed the pivotal role of isolation avoidance, the domino 
effect and competition with China and Korea for the development of Japan's bilateral 
FTA strategy. The fieldwork indicates that these are the main factors behind Japan's 
interest in bilateral FTAs. As demonstrated, a notion of 'not being left behind' and 
'catching up' with global trends has been present in the domestic discussions on FTA 
policy since Kaoru Yosano's speech in 1998. DPJ's 'Basic Policy on Comprehensive 
Economic Partnerships' (20IOa) mentions the fact that Japan aims to sign agreements 
with major trading partners, which "will withstand comparison with the trend of other 
such relationships". This can be seen as a response to recent developments in East Asia, 
in particular Korea's FTAs with the EU and the US. All of the 60 interviewees point to 
Korea as the driving force behind Japan's recent bilateral strategy. The government and 
corporations consider this to be a major threat. Furthermore, the importance of isolation 
avoidance and economic competition is illustrated by another part of the document. It 
concludes that "if Japan's trade and investment environment becomes less attractive 
than the environment in other countries, there is a possibility that future employment 
opportunities will be lost" (DPJ 2010a:l). For Japanese industries, which are heavily 
dependent on foreign exports, FTAs are inherently competitive. The financial benefits 
from preferential tariffs are felt by importers and consumers, as they purchase the goods 
at lower prices. The exporter benefits from FTAs vis-A-vis a foreign company329. For 
example, if Korean products are cheaper than Japanese products in the EU, due to the 
implementation of the EU-Korea FTA, consumers might prefer to buy Korean goods. 
Hence an FTA with the EU gives Korean companies an advantage over Japanese 
companies. From the industries' point of view, the main reason for signing FTAs is to 
329 Interview no. 15. 
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level the playing field and offset trade diversion or other negative results of foreign 
states' agreements. For that reason, Korea's expanding FTA strategy is worrying 
Japanese companies. 
The discussions surrounding Japan's minilateral FTA highlights the question which 
will need to be addressed in the context of a regional treaty: how to harmonise wider 
FTAs with the existing bilateral ones? The solution offered by the AJCEP is far from 
perfect and its application to a region-wide FTA is questionable. The following chapter 
demonstrates that both the government and the private sector draw heavily on the 
experience of the AJCEP, while forming their preferences regarding a region-wide treaty. 
Keizai Doyukai s Managing Director explains that from the government's perspective 
the AJCEP is finalised and working330• However, the industries would like to see the 
liberalisation under the AJCEP deepened. Nonetheless, the AJCEP provided the 
Japanese government with an opportunity to introduce a flexible clause and cumulation. 
Since then, both the government and the business circles have been considering the 
application of those provisions in a wider context. The coexistence of bilateral treaties 
with the AJCEP raises questions and speculations regarding a region-wide FTA. Such an 
agreement would need to be either harmonised with existing treaties or added as an 
overlapping layer. This issue is further explored in the next chapter. 
330 Interview no. 23. 
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Chapter 4 
A Region-wide FTA: Japan's Options and Preferences 
4.1 Introduction 
Building on the analysis of the previous chapter, Chapter 4 discusses the preferences of 
the Japanese government and the country's industry for a region-wide FTA. 
Furthermore, it analyses the lead-up to the country's statement on joining the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) during the November 2010 Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Summit. It argues that the same problems which constrain Japan's 
bilateral and minilateral FTA policy are relevant for a discussion on the prospective 
broader agreement in the East Asian or Asia-Pacific region. In short, Japan's behaviour 
during the APEC Summit might be explained by the same factors which prevent the 
country from signing high-level bilateral FTAs with major trading partners: they have 
been referred to in this thesis as an FTA policy impasse. With developments in the 
region such as the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations + 1 
(ASEAN+ 1) FTA network, competition with Korea and an acceleration of the TPP 
process, a prospective region-wide FTA has become an important topic. The election of 
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009 provided an opportunity to commence a 
domestic debate on the subject. 
The conducted fieldwork asked a series of questions in regard to the prospective 
broader agreement. First, it asked which forum would be a suitable base for such an 
agreement from the perspective of various domestic groups. Secondly, it asked what 
kind of agreement this should be; specifically, what type of solutions and provisions it 
should include. Finally, it asked how to harmonise the existing agreements with the 
future region-wide FTA. This chapter does not attempt to provide a detailed account of 
the development of integration in Asia or regional frameworks. Instead, it focuses on the 
preferences of domestic actors and Japan's involvement in regional economic 
integration frameworks as a part of the country's overall FTA strategy. As final 
decisions regarding Japan's participation in a region-wide FTA have not been made and 
the coexisting frameworks continue to be under study, the preferences of the Japanese 
government and the country's industry will be discussed in terms of general issues and 
themes. 
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4.2 A Short Overview of Japan's Involvement in Region-wide FTA Frameworks to 
Date 
Japan is currently participating in three coexisting frameworks with a regional, 
economic integration agenda that includes the fostering of a regional FTA: ASEAN+3 
(China, Japan, and Korea, also known as APT), ASEAN+6 (China, Japan, Korea, India, 
Australia, and New Zealand), and APEC. It is also considering joining the TPP. Figure 
4.1 shows the membership of ASEAN, ASEAN+ 3, ASEAN+6, APEC, and the TPP 
groupings. 
Figure 4.1 Frameworks for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region 
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Source: Watanabe, Y., 20 I 0, Japan 's Economic Partnership Agreement and Regional Integration in East 
Asia - Japan 's Economic Diplomacy in Asia-Pacific, presentation during Asian Development Bank FTA 
seminar in Phnom Penh, Cambodia 27-30 April 20 I O. Obtained from the author - modified 
The ' Basic Policy towards further promotion of Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs), (MOFA 2004) states that "EPAs contribute to the creation of international 
environment further beneficial to our country from the politically and diplomatically 
strategic points through, among others, fostering the establishment of an East Asian 
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community". The idea of a region-wide economic community including an FTA has 
been present in East Asia for decades under different names. The Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad's proposal for the East Asian Economic Group (later 
renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus) in 1990, was the first conceptual framework 
for East Asian regionalism (Terada 2007: 15). It was based on what is today's the 
ASEAN+ 3 membership. Japan did not endorse the proposal. This was partially caused 
by APEC's strategic role in the country's foreign trade policy and partially by the US' 
concerns that such a framework would divide APEC members by excluding the US and 
undermine the organisation's trade and investment liberalisation initiatives (Kawai 
2005:38). Japan's Vice-Minister of Finance for International Affairs, Eisuke Sakakibara, 
proposed the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund in September 1997, however the 
proposal was rejected mainly due to opposition from the US and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), for which it was supposed to be a regional alternative (ibidem: 16). In 2005, 
India made a proposal for an Asian economic community, which would "stretch from 
Christchurch to the Himalayas, as an arc of advantage, peace and shared prosperity" 
(Kumar 2010:8). The 'Asia Pacific Community' introduced by former Australian Prime. 
Minister Kevin Rudd and the 'East Asian community' introduced by Japanese Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama, are two further examples of region-wide initiatives 
(Penghing 2010:4). Prime Minister Rudd's proposal included several Asian states but 
also stressed the importance of the US' involvement. Prime Minister Hatoyama's (2009) 
proposal was introduced during his 'Singapore Address I speech. As the event took place 
a couple of months after the DPJ formed a new government, the speech was seen as an 
expression of the administration's policy toward Asia. Hatoyama's East Asian 
community envisioned 'open regional cooperation' in various fields. It included 
ASEAN+6 countries, in agreement with a course taken earlier by Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi and Japan's overall preference for the ASEAN+6 over the ASEAN+3 
framework. Although the proposal excluded the US, the speech declared the country's 
increased efforts for achieving an APEC-based agreement. According to Sugawara 
(20 1 0:2) such an East Asian community does not extend beyond these visions from 
1990s and what was advocated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government and 
prime Minister Koizumi. Sugawara (2010:13) comments that this was a 'community' 
(with a small 'c') and not a 'Community' with a large 'C' such as the European 
community. Prime Minister Koizumi's speech (2002) in January 2002 mentioned a 
community with ASEAN, Japan, China, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand as members, 
based on open regionalism principle. In addition, he stressed the importance of 
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cooperation with South Asia, including India, as well as the vaguely defined 
'indispensable' role ofthe United States. At the Hua Hin Summit, Japan made additional 
comments on the prospective East Asian community, proposing to base it on the 
"principle of openness, transparency and inclusiveness and functional cooperation" 
(APT 2009)33\. At a press conference in January 2010 the Minister of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, Masayuki Naoshima, stressed that the East Asian community proposal was 
a long-term project, so far only vaguely defined, that would not be realised in the 
foreseeable future and should be preceded by a deeper economic integration332• 
The idea for a region-wide FTA in East Asia has been gaining momentum since the 
establishment of the ASEAN+ 1 network. By the end of 2010, all five ASEAN+ 1 FTAs 
were in effect. However, the region-wide FTA project remains conceptual and little 
progress has been made towards its realisation. Study groups have been organised to 
produce reports on the feasibility of proposed FTAs. The study group for APT continues 
to produce a report every two years333. An ASEAN+3 FTA, known as the East Asian 
Free Trade Area (EAFTA), was first advocated by China and supported by Malaysia. In 
1998, the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) was created. Its aim was to research the 
prospects of an East Asian Community and to consider an ASEAN+3 FTA. The EAVG's 
(2001) recommendations included the establishment of the EAFTA and the 
transformation of the ASEAN+3 framework into the East Asian Summit. EAVG's report 
led to the creation of the East Asian Study Group (EASG), made up of government 
officials, in 2001. Its aim was to research the feasibility of the proposal. EASG 
published its final report during the ASEAN+ 3 Summit in Phnom Penh in 2002. It 
concluded that the APT forum is best suited for the furthering of regional cooperation 
and recommended the establishment of the EAFTA (Corning 2009:43). It also spoke of 
transforming the ASEAN+ 3 into the East Asian Summit (EAS). 
Ultimately, the EAS was based on the ASEAN+6 framework. In 2004, the 
ASEAN+3 Economic Ministers' Meeting set up an Expert Group, which was accepted 
by the 8th ASEAN+ 3 Summit in Vientiane, Laos. The group presented its findings to 
the ministers in 2006 and recommended starting an East Asian FTA process (Urata 
2008a: 18). This was not implemented and the Expert Group conducted a second study, 
submitted in 2009. The Phase II Study Report (Lee 2009) conducted by the Joint Expert 
Group, recommended that the EAFTA should be a high-level, comprehensive agreement 
331 At the same time, the Philippines and Australia made additional proposals. For details see Kumar 
(2001 :8). 
332 Press Conferences at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ), 15 January 20 I 0, Tokyo. 
333 The study group on the feasibility of CEPEA produces a report once a year. 
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on trade in goods, services and investment. It should include WTD-plus provisions, 
trade and investment facilitation measures and economic cooperation, as well as full 
cumulation of rules of origin (RoO) (ibidem:4). The group suggested a gradual 
consolidation of the AFTA and the ASEAN+ 1 FTAs through the harmonisation of RoO 
and tariff concessions. The final EAFTA should also have one implementation schedule. 
The report recommended starting negotiations by 2012 at the latest (ibidem:23). The 
2009 ASEAN+ 3 Summit in Hua Hin (APT 2009) concluded that APT is the "main 
vehicle towards the long-term goal of building an East Asian community with ASEAN 
as the driving force". In the meantime, ASEAN+ 3 has been working well as a forum for 
economic regional integration and has been making progress in terms of financial 
cooperation. For example, it accomplished a multilateral currency swap arrangement, 
known as the Chiang Mai Initiative, and the APT Regional Foreign Exchange Reserve 
Pool. 
In April 2006, Japan proposed an ASEAN+6 FTA, as part of the Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) (Shigematsu 2006:21, Terada 2009: 11 )334. 
This was preceded by the aforementioned speech by Prime Minister Koizumi (2002), in 
which he proposed an East Asian community with Australia and New Zealand as core 
members. Similarly to EAFTA, the feasibility of CEPEA is still under review. The first 
CEPEA study report was submitted in 2008. During the ASEAN Summit at Hua Hin, in 
October 2009, a second CEPEA study was submitted. The Phase II Report (Nezu 2009) 
conducted by the Track Two Study Group Report chaired by Risaburo Nezu, 
recommended that CEPEA should be a high-level, comprehensive agreement including 
WTO-plus provisions and based on three pillars of economic cooperation, trade and 
investment facilitation, and trade and investment liberalisation. The report mentioned 
institutional development under the CEPEA, for example through using existing 
ASEAN working groups and including representatives from an additional six countries 
to discuss regional issues (ibidem:59). It concluded that the ASEAN+6 leaders should 
confirm the objectives and structure of the future CEPEA in order to establish a 
common understanding and start concrete discussions on the steps needed to achieve the 
agreement (ibidem:61). As the Summit did not reach a conclusion on which FTA it 
should advance, further study groups were appointed to conduct research on EAFTA 
and CEPEA (Chia 2010:20). During the EAS in Hanoi in 2010, these groups were asked 
334 A similar proposal was made by India during an ABAC Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 2005. The Pan-
Asia Free Trade Area would resemble NAFTA and include ASEAN+ 6 countries. For details see 
Si/iconlndia News 2005. 
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to provide a timeline for regional integration (Kumar 20 I 0). A Joint Expert Group 
EAFTA report mentions the lack ofFTA between China, Japan and Korea as one of the 
obstacles for establishing a region-wide agreement, in particular as the biggest trade 
flows in the region take place between these three countries (Lee 2009:4). This is also 
true in the context of CEPEA. There is still much work that needs to be done between 
the six spokes of ASEAN+6. In addition, Terada (2008:20 cites former Singapore Trade 
Minister George Yeo) argues that ASEAN members have little interest in a region-wide 
FTA, as they are concerned about being sidelined in an agreement including China, 
Japan and Korea: countries which account for nearly 90 percent of the East Asian 
economy. Asked in August 2008 if ASEAN would initiate the consolidation of the 
ASEAN+ 1 agreements into a region-wide one, the ASEAN Secretariat replied that the 
organisation would not be undertaking such a difficult job33s • Ravenhill336 points out 
that since Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's proposal for the East Asian 
Economic Caucus the great majority of initiatives in the ASEAN+ 3 and ASEAN+6 
frameworks originated in the +3 and +6 countries respectively. In the meantime, 
ASEAN+6 is also a forum for discussions on other, not necessarily economic topics and 
furthers the so-called 'new cooperation issues' such as: the environment, natural 
disasters, and disease prevention. During the 2005 ASEAN Summits in Kuala Lumpur 
(ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6), ASEAN+6 A was transformed into an East Asian 
Summit, with Australia, New Zealand and India as members. 
At the same time, since its creation in 1989 APEC has been actively promoting 
economic integration and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan has played a 
pivotal role in the creation of APEC. In 1988, the country proposed that the economic 
ministers have regional meetings and the Australian government showed interest in the 
proposal. This cooperation between two countries resulted in the formation of APEC 
(Terada 2007:7). The Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) idea emerged during 
the 2004 APEC Summit in Santiago, Chile, and was proposed by APEC's Business 
Advisory Council (ABAC) (Penghing 2010:6). The Council recommended a feasibility 
study of FTAAP, which was finally accepted during the 2006 APEC Summit in Vietnam. 
At that time, the proposal found little support from some of APEC's key members, 
namely Japan, China, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Dent 2006:245). 
The origins of the FTAAP to some extent date back to the 1960s and the Pacific 
335 Interview no. 58. 
336 Views expressed during the 'Asia-Pacific, Regionalism and Global Governance' conference, 
University of Leeds, 12-13 May 2011. 
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Free Trade Area (PAFTA) idea. A Japanese economist from the Japan Economic 
Research Centre (JERC), Kiyoshi Kojima, proposed an FTA between Japan, the US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand with the region's developing countries as associate 
members (Dent 2007:449). The proposal was based on a concept of 'regionalism 
without discrimination' (Terada 2005:8). In 1968, the Pacific Trade and Development 
Forum (PAFTAD) discussed the feasibility of PAFTA: however, the agreement failed to 
gain sufficient support. Nonetheless, with MOFA's support Kojima's idea helped to 
develop a "new dialogue networks on trade-related issues", which provided a 
foundation for the development of the Asia-Pacific framework and the creation of 
APEC in 1989 (Dent 2007:449). 
Ippei Yamazawa (20 lOb: Chapter 6), the former coordinator of the Japan-Korea FTA 
Study Group, points out that APEC, with its traditional voluntarism and consensus-
based decision-making procedures, has not yet made a transition to binding trade 
liberalisation, which makes a binding FTAAP difficult to imagine. He comments that 
"the current studies of FTAAP have not gone into (the) concrete procedures of 
achieving it" (ibidem). Since 2006, APEC has conducted further feasibility studies of 
FTAAP, including "streamlining the ROOs among existing FTAs to minimise the 
noodle bowl effect, reducing compliance costs and increasing FTA utilisation rates, and 
docking-merging-enlarging some of the e~isting FTAs so that they form a larger 
regional FTA over time" (Chia 2010:23)337. JETRO (2009:112) points out that "FTAAP 
was put on the agenda for research as a long-term project at the 2006 APEC Leaders 
Summit". The DPJ's 'The New Growth Strategy - Blueprint for Revitalising Japan' 
(20 lOb), set a target of creating the FTAAP by 2020. It is worth noting that the 
document refers to FTAAP as part of the efforts for establishing an East Asian 
Community. The November 2010, APEC Summit in Yokohama reaffirmed the target 
date for the conclusion of the FTAAP as 2020 (The Straits TImes 15 November 2010). 
For Japan, from a purely economic perspective, an APEC-based community is 
desirable: it accommodates the US and Russia, although not India338. Still, an APEC-
wide FTA is hard to imagine, despite the enthusiasm of the project's supporters339. 
APEC includes the US, Russia, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as countries 
with diverse economic models, making an APEC-wide FTA politically, ideologically 
and culturally almost impossible at present due to large diversity. 
337 Since 2009 another study has commissioned. 
338 Interview no. 48. 
339 See, for example, C. Fred Bergsten 2007. 
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Recently, a new development has changed the dynamic of the regional integration 
process. The establishment of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement (TPSEPA, also known as the P4) had a snowball effect amongst APEC 
members. The TPSEPA between Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile was announced 
during the 2005 APEC Summit in Busan, Korea. Brunei joined later that year and the 
FTA came into force in 2006. Brunei's accession to the agreement was said to 
"demonstrate the potential of the Trans-Pacific SEPA to grow into a larger strategic 
agreement for trade liberalisation" (Singapore FTA Network 2010). In March 2008, the 
US joined P4 talks on financial services and investment agreements (JETRO 2009: 113). 
The US' decision was immediately seen as a stepping stone towards an APEC-wide FTA 
(Palmer 2008). Those predictions were not without reason, as the Bush administration 
had announced its interest in the agreement in February 2008 and in September 2008 
had declared its intention to join the treaty (Agence France Pre sse 2008). In a speech in 
Tokyo on November 2009, President Barak Obama (2009) confirmed the US' interest in 
engaging in the agreement. In 2009, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Japan also expressed an 
interest in the scheme. 
The extended agreement became known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The first 
round of negotiations with the US, planned for March 2009, was delayed in February 
2009 due to, amongst other factors, the change of administration in the US (JETRO 
2009:113). The first round of negotiations finally took place in March 2010 in Australia 
and the second in June 2010 in the US (The Trans-Pacific Partnership Digest 2010). 
Australia, Peru, and Vietnam (the latter with an observer status) joined discussions 
during the APEC leaders meeting in November 2009. Malaysia joined in October 2010. 
A further four countries, the Philippines, Canada, Taiwan, and Thailand, expressed their 
interest in the agreement during the November 2010 APEC Summit in Yokohama340• 
During the Yokohama APEC Summit, Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced that Japan 
would start consultations with nine negotiating TPP countries and reach a decision on 
whether Japan should join the agreement, by June 2011 (Foster and Hosaka 2010). 
Japan also joined the first summit of the nine negotiating TPP countries, held on 13 
November in Yokohama, with an observer status341 • Although the participants did not 
agree on the final scope and depth of the agreement during the conducted rounds of 
talks, including the sixth round between 28 March and 1 April 2011, the TPP was 
340 The US, Australia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Peru were already negotiating at this point. Vietnam became 
a full member during the 20 I 0 Summit. 
341 The March II 2011 earthquake in Japan is likely to delay the country's decision on the framework 
(Bloomberg 20 II and Nanto e/ ai, 20 II). 
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initially expected to be a high-level, comprehensive FTA, similar to the original P4 and 
to include the liberalisation of trade in goods, services and investment, as well as 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and other non-tariffprovisions342. Under the 
P4 agreement, members were required to remove tariffs on all products within ten years 
(Urata 2011). However, some observers are sceptical when it comes to the prospective 
TPP agreement. Ravenhill343 has expressed the opinion that the US aims to establish 
separate bilateral schedules under the TPP as the country has little to gain from the 
agreement having bilateral FTAs with the majority of negotiating countries. Capling and 
Ravenhill (2011 :572) argue that while the TPP "might achieve advances on some 
dimensions, e.g. services and non-tariff measures, it will fall short of aspirations for 
multilateralisation on others, particularly if it comprises multiple layers of bilateral 
treaties rather than being a single regional agreement". 
4.3 Japanese Governmental Preferences for a Region-wide FTA 
4.3.1 ASEAN+3 J1!rsus ASEAN+6 
The Japanese government was initially supportive of the ASEAN+ 3 grouping. In 1999, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) embraced the concept of the forum and spoke 
of ASEAN+ 3 meetings as "an East Asian summit in a practical sense" (Terada 2007: 16). 
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has also been supportive of the 
framework. In 2002, it proposed the 'East Asia Free Business Zone Initiative' based on 
ASEAN+3. However, it then formulated the ASEAN+6 idea and has been a strong 
supporter of the project ever since. MOFA, on the other hand, has only recently been 
converted to the idea, having supported the APT framework for many years344. Under 
LDP's administration, METI bureaucrats supported the ASEAN+6 framework while 
MOFA was leaning toward ASEAN+3 345. Terada (2009) points out that METI's and 
MOFA's policies have often been mistaken or misrepresented as Japan's national policy, 
despite the fact that they have not been discussed with the second ministry or other 
political actors. He gives an example of METI's support for the creation of APEC in 
1989, when "MOFA, having previously opposed the new organisation, only involved 
342 Interview no. 38. 
343Yiews expressed during the 'Asia-Pacific, Regionalism and Global Governance' conference, University 
of Leeds, 12-13 May 2011. 
344 Interview no. 53. 
345 Interview no. 46. 
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itself at the stage of the Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) held directly before the 
meeting of APEC members" (Terada 2009:8). Similarly, Terada (2009:8 cites Asahi 
Shimbun, 28 July 2006) notes that METI did not consult MOFA before it announced the 
ASEAN+6 proposal, despite the fact that foreign policy is within MOFA's jurisdiction. 
The Ministry's approach was to create CEPEA by combining existing ASEAN+ 1 
agreements (Terada 2009:13). In time, however, the views of the ministries converged 
and ASEAN+6 became the main strategy for a regional FTA. Terada (ibidem) argues 
that further differences between METI and MOFA lie in how the ministries perceive the 
purpose of regional frameworks. While METI perceives ASEAN+6 as a basis for a 
region-wide FTA aiming to establish a single market, whereas it is arguable that MOFA 
views it as a strategic and political framework and intends to support preferential trade 
liberalisation through bilateral agreements. 
There are strong geopolitical and economic reasons for Japan to favour CEPEA346• 
The inclusion of India, Australia, and New Zealand in the regional FTA project is in 
compliance with Japan's political and strategic preferences in two ways. First, as 
ASEAN+ 3 is a smaller grouping, Japan could find itself in confrontation with China 
over several issues. An Associate Professor of International Economics at Chiba 
University argues that China favours the ASEAN+3 framework as it will allow them to 
exert more political influence 347 • According to JETRO's Senior Researcher at the 
International Economic Research Division, the country prefers the EAFTA over the 
CEPEA as the latter includes democratic countries and Western values 348. Dent 
(2010b:27) explains that China initially expressed concerns over EAS membership due 
to the fact that a larger number of involved countries may negatively influence the 
coherence of the prospective East Asian community. Whilst China and Malaysia opted 
for East Asian Summit membership based on the APT, Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore 
supported a broader framework based on the ASEAN+6 (Penghing 2010:13). In 
particular, China was against regional integration based on the ASEAN+6 and supported 
ASEAN+3 as the main framework (Terada 2009:13). Despite the success of Japan's 
diplomacy and conversion of the ASEAN+6 forum into the EAS, there was no formal 
decision to base a region-wide free trade agreement on the EAS framework (Rozman 
2007:266). From Japan's perspective, the presence of big economies, such as Australia 
and India, prevents China's dominance in the East Asian Summit. Hence one 
346 Ibidem. 
347 Interview no. 48. 
348 Interview no. 38. 
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explanation is that by expanding the number to plus six, Japan dilutes regional 
implications and avoids potential conflicts with China349. Dent (2010b:27) points out 
that Japan's preference for a broader East Asian forum dates back to the middle of the 
1990s and the country's efforts to include Australia and New Zealand in the Asia-
Europe Meeting (AS EM) framework. Nonetheless, China's position had an impact on 
Japan's preferences. In the words of a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of 
Developing Economies in Tokyo: "if China wants ASEAN+3, we need to say 
ASEAN+6,,35o. In his opinion, competing for regional influence with China is a crucial 
factor behind Japan's preference for CEPEA over EAFTA 351. According to Terada 
(2009:9-10), it was China's proposal to conclude a feasibility study of an ASEAN-China 
FTA352, and the desire to counterbalance China's rise, that caused Japan to consider 
including Australia in the regional framework. He argues that Hitoshi Tanaka, MOFA's 
Vice-Minister, who drafted Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's 2002 Singapore speech, 
supported the strengthening of relations with Australia. This corresponds to an argument 
made in Chapter 3 of this thesis that in the early stages of Japan's bilateral FTA policy, 
competition with China had an impact on Japan's preferences, while over the last couple 
of years competition with Korea has become more significant. This is also true when it 
comes to region-wide FTA preferences. 
Secondly, including Australia, US' second most important ally in East Asia, would 
help to balance Japan's regional interests with the strategic goal of maintaining the 
special partnership with the US (Beeson and Yoshimatsu 2007:244). Japan and Australia 
have a long-standing tradition of regional cooperation and community-building, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter353. According to Terada (2007: 18), 
Prime Minister Koizumi wanted to include Australia in order to strengthen the strategic 
partnership in the face of China's emergence. Australia, New Zealand and India are also 
democratic countries. In 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe advocated the need to 
strengthen relations with Australia and India as those countries share Japan's democratic 
values, such as freedom, democracy, and human rights (Terada 2007: 18). The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs expressed concern that the interests of developed economies would 
349 Interview no. 53. 
350 Interview no. 42. 
351 While, as discussed in Chapter 3, Japan competes with Korea in terms of FTA network and access to 
major markets, competition with China in terms of regional influence was relevant for the formation 
of ASEAN+6 framework. Furthermore, prior to 2006, when Japan proposed the ASEAN+6 framework, 
Korea's FTA network was in the early stages of development: the country has signed FTAs only with 
Chile, Singapore and EFTA. 
m This was proposed during the Fourth ASEAN- China Summit, 2000, Singapore. 
353 For more see, for example, Terada 2005. 
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be sidelined in an ASEAN+3 framework where the majority of members are developing 
countries (Terada 2009:9 cites MOFA representative, personal interview). In CEPEA, 
Australia and New Zealand represent developed economies. Hence a Senior Research 
Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies argues that of the three aforementioned 
schemes, ASEAN+6 would best serve Japan's political interests354 • Recently, a new 
variation of the ASEAN+6 framework has emerged: ASEAN+8 with Russia and the US, 
which in November 2011 became the expanded East Asian Summit. The US and Russia 
are members of APEC but not of ASEAN+6, while India is a member of ASEAN+6 but 
notofAPEC. 
There is also a strong business reality behind the CEPEA project that causes METI 
to favour this framework35s• As explained in Chapter 3, both India and Australia are 
important markets for Japanese products and trading partners. Economic 
interdependence in East Asia is a daily reality and, from this perspective, it is only 
natural that India should be included in a region-wide FTA project. CEPEA seems to be 
the best solution for Japanese companies, which is why METI came to believe that 
ASEAN+6 and EAS is a suitable base for a region-wide FTA. A former Director for 
FTA Affairs at METl's Trade Policy Bureau confirms that the framework is a better 
option for Japanese companies with vertically integrated production networks356 • As 
Terada (2009: 18) concludes: 
"While MOFA considered and supported the involvement of Australia as 
well as India by taking into account the US concern about the rise of 
China and the nature of ASEAN+ 3, a process where undemocratic or 
developing economies dominate and the views of developed or 
democratic nations would not be easily reflected, MET! s interest in the 
framework was based on India s and Australia s economic role as the 
fastest growing largest economy and stable energy resource supplier, 
respectively". 
354 Interview no. 42. 
m Interview no. 7. 
356 Interview no. 4. 
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4.3.2 Japan's Relations with the US and the TPP 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's 'Singapore Address' (2009) confirmed that the new 
administration continues to regard the Japan-US alliance as the linchpin of Japan's 
foreign policy. In contrast to the market-led, functional integration in East Asia, the 
special partnership with the US plays a strategic, central role in Japan's foreign policy. 
Rozman et al. (2007:1) write that "for the past 150 years one of its greatest foreign 
policy dilemmas has been how to balance the West, coming from afar and representing 
modernity, and Asian neighbours, long behind in the pursuit of modernisation and 
power but temptingly close at hand". Japan's approach to regionalism is still strongly 
influenced by the US foreign policy. Rozman et al. (2007:4) argue that Japan's strategy 
toward the US has been much more consistent, focused on long-term objectives and 
planned to a much greater extent than the strategy toward East Asia. In these scholars' 
opinion, the country's lack of a clear regional strategy is partly caused by the difficulty 
of balancing its policy towards the two regions (ibidem:245). According to Beeson and 
Yoshimatsu (2007:238) Japan hoped that APEC would strengthen the US' economic ties 
with the East Asian region and at the same time promote economic growth that would 
be less dependent on the US. Japan's interest in APEC has been somewhat lessened by 
the formation of the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 forums. 
Whilst Japan's regional cooperation efforts were initially centred on the Asia-
Pacific option, which it has supported since the 1960s and which led to the creation of 
APEC, it has been leaning towards the East Asian alternative357 : nonetheless, some 
analysts stress that Japan's shift towards Asia was focused on economic interests and 
had a functional dimension358• This is reminiscent of the academic debate from the early 
2000s regarding Japan's 'shift towards Asia' and whether or not it represents a genuine 
turn in foreign or economic policy. Hund (2003:394) writes that Japan is neither intent 
on nor willing to transform ASEAN+3, or any other East Asian grouping, into an FTA 
or a unified economic bloc. He quotes Blechinger (ibidem:400 cites 2001 :88) who has 
predicted that Japan's foreign policy will not drastically change direction and that, given 
the geopolitical situation, Japan is more likely to opt for the Asia-Pacific framework 
than the purely East Asian one. Japan's involvement in East Asia can be seen as 
superficial and focused on securing economic gains rather than as a genuine shift 
towards regional integration from its traditional pro-US policy (I-lund 2003:394, Krauss 
3S7 For more on Japan's support for the Asia-Pacific framework see Beeson and Yoshimatsu 2007:237. 
3S8 Interview no. 58. 
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2003:325). 
Japan has maintained the special partnership whilst participating in economic 
integration in East Asia. Narine (2004:423) argues that Japan has found "non-
institutional ways to promote their regional interests". Green (2003) calls this shift the 
'Asianisation' of Japan's foreign policy, believing that it should not be overstated as 
Japan continues to rely on the US for military defence and US-led financial institutions. 
Since then, however, the economic and strategic factors discussed in Chapter 3 have tied 
Japan's interests to the region. The 1997/98 East Asian financial crisis has created an 
opportunity to discuss regional economic integration without the US359• At the time of 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's proposal for the East Asian Economic 
Caucus, the US strongly opposed the concept of an East Asian FTA without its 
participation. After the financial crisis the ASEAN+ 3 Summit met every year to discuss 
economic stability, without any objection from the US360• On the other hand, the US' 
engagement in the TPP framework has caused this project to be of great interest to 
Japan. It is now the most plausible Asia-Pacific alternative to the East Asian FTA 
(ASEAN+ 3 or ASEAN+6). Yamazawa (201 Oa) expresses a concern that the TPP, in its 
current fonn, excludes several East Asian economies and that "the TPP is Trans-Pacific, 
but it should not divide Asia from the Pacific". In his view the creation of a seamless 
business environment in the East Asian and Asia-Pacific region should be the goal of 
the TPP. 
The problems that Japan is facing during discussions on its participation in the TPP 
negotiations are the same as those which constrain the country's bilateral FTA policy. 
The proposed agreement has had a snowball effect in the Asia-Pacific region, whereby 
many states have started to show interest in the process. In particular, the involvement 
of the US has caused Japan to worry about being 'left out'. This is yet another example 
of how isolation avoidance has affected the country's FTA policy. At the same time, just 
as in the case of the bilateral treaties, the agricultural sector's opposition poses a serious 
obstacle to Japan's participation in the framework. Since 2008, the country's politicians 
and scholars have observed the progress of the US's involvement in the project with a 
growing concern. This was reinforced by expectations that the US might urge Malaysia 
and Thailand to join the TPP, as it has been negotiating bilateral agreements with those 
countries 361. In December 2010, Malaysia has started negotiations with the TPP 
359 Interview no. 40. 
360 The US-ASEAN Summit took place for the first time in the summer of20 I 0 (JETRO 2009). 
361 Interview no. 39. 
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members, while Thailand expressed its interest during the 2010 APEC Summit. The 
more important trading partners. in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region join the TPP, 
the greater the pressure on Japan, which also increases the likelihood that it will wish to 
join in order to avoid isolation. Japan's chairmanship of the APEC 2010 Summit has 
intensified discussions on the country's participation in the project. It was expected that 
Japan would use this opportunity to make a declaration regarding the initiative or try to 
further economic integration within the APEC forum. Japan's government was urged to 
join the TPP by observers and scholars within the country (e.g. Terada), as well as 
voices from abroad. Yamazawa (20IOa) repeats Prime Minister Naoto Kan's statement 
that Japan's accession to the TPP would be a necessary "second country opening" (after 
the Meiji era) and considers it to be a good reason for joining the TPP negotiations362• 
During his keynote speech at the 'APEC Japan 2010 Symposium', Dr. C. Fred Bergsten 
(2009), Director of the Paterson Institute for International Economics, expressed his 
opinion that Japan should join the agreement, as "this would provide a critical mass to 
the whole exercise, make it very important in trade and economic terms, establish 
Japan's leadership in the entire APEC process, and put a whole additional cast on the 
TPP initiative and what it will mean". He (ibidem) also stated that Japan and the US 
should "work closely together to move the process forward in 2010, and perhaps bring it 
to a successful conclusion (oo.) at the Honolulu summit in the fall of 2011". In addition, 
he said that he considers Japan's participation in the TPP to be a stepping stone towards 
realising the FTAAP proposal. The desire to avoid isolation that is behind Japan's 
interest in the TPP. is reinforced by other considerations. As the negotiations begun in 
2010, even if the country had decided to join in June 2011, it would have been well 
behind in them. Ito (2010) quotes Shujiro Urata, who comments that "there are seven or 
eight months until June and most of the negotiations will be over by then (oo.) the TPP 
negotiations are trying to create new rules and a new system not only for trade but for 
the economy in the Asia-Pacific region (oo.) and without participating, Japan's views will 
not be reflected at all". In case the agreement is negotiated, Japan does not want to be 
excluded from discussions and decisions on its future shape. It can be seen that in order 
not to be 'left behind' Japan not only needs to participate in the framework but should 
also participate early enough to be able to influence the decision-making process. 
The preferences of certain domestic groups to join the TPP are constrained by the 
362 During the World Economic Forum in Davos in 20 II Naoto Kan mentioned that Japan is undergoing 
its third economic opening up, after the Meiji Restoration and economic reforms after the World War 
II (BBC News 2011). 
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agricultural sector's opposition. The high degree of liberalisation involved in the 
discussed TPP agreement makes it impossible for Japan to join while retaining its usual 
levels of protection. For that reason, as late as in February 2010, the future of Japan's 
participation in the scheme was uncertain and many observers claimed that the country 
was not ready to join the negotiations and the necessary domestic reforms would take a 
long time363• The DPJ's 'The New Growth Strategy - Blueprint for Revitalising Japan' 
(2010b) in June 2010 did not mention the TPP initiative. However, in a speech on 1 
October 2010, Prime Minister Naoto Kan (201 Oa) announced that Japan would consider 
participating in the TPP agreement. This statement met with protests from the 
opposition, as well as from members of the DP J party. According to Kyodo News (21 
October 2010), 110 of the ruling party's policymakers (from both chambers of the Diet), 
including the former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, asked Prime Minister Naoto Kan 
to take the agricultural sector's interests into consideration and to be 'cautious' in 
expressing an interest in the TPP. The news agency wrote that "the lawmakers are 
concerned that Japanese farmers could suffer 'a critical blow' if the country joins the 
TPP as the agreement in principle requires members to eliminate all tariffs to zero" 
(ibidem). Prime Minister Naoto Kan's announcement regarding Japan's participation in 
the TPP at the 2010 APEC Summit has caused strong protests from the agricultural 
sector and agricultural cooperatives, which organised a demonstration in the vicinity of 
MOFA's and METI's offices in Tokyo. It can be argued that such a reaction is one of the 
main reasons behind a lack of a decisive commitment to the framework. The decision to 
avoid a more serious declaration might be seen as a compromise towards the 
agricultural lobby. However, a poll by Yomiuri Shinbun (Katz 2010), a Japanese 
newspaper, from autumn 2010, showed that 61 percent of respondents supported then 
Prime Minister Naoto Kan's announcement and would like to see Japan join the 
agreement despite the high level of liberalisation involved. Until the June 2011 deadline, 
Japan was supposed to consider implementing necessary reforms (e.g. agricultural 
subsidies) and dealing with domestic opposition groups. Chapter 6 provides an update 
on Japan's TPP policy in 2011. Finally, on 11 November 2011, Prime Minister 
Yoshihiko Noda announced that Japan will join the TPP negotiations. 
To participate in any region-wide agreement, not only the TPP, Japan will need to 
decide how to approach the agricultural sector's opposition. Farming households 
constitute between 1 and 2 percent of the Japanese society364. MAFF's position towards 
363 Interview no. 26 and Terada (2009: 18). 
364 Interview no. 42. 
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a region-wide FTA d.oes not ditTer significantly from its position on prevIous 
agreements: if Japan can participate without harm to the agricultural sector, the Ministry 
will not oppose it; however, if it requires further liberalisation Japan should not 
participate. In practice, MAFF is against any FTA which would include the US, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and China36s . These countries are not only big agricultural 
exporters, but also export products that are regarded as sensitive for Japan. The TPP 
initiative involves Australia, with which Japan has had difficulties negotiating a bilateral 
agreement, as described in Chapter 3. Hence the Ministry does not support the TPp366. 
JA-Zenchu (Japan's Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives) takes a stronger stand: 
they believe that an APEC-based region-wide agreement including the agricultural 
sector is almost impossible367. One of the reasons for this is the existence of several 
ditTerent agriculture models within APEC, for example the Japanese small-scale family 
fanners' model 368. JA-Zenchu s Deputy-General Manager argues that while the 
manufacturing sector has strong ties with the US and considers it natural to strengthen 
the relationship with them, the agricultural sector does not have similar ties. In March 
2010, Sugawara (2010), fonner advisor of Japan's pennanent delegation to the OECD, 
wrote that Japan is not ready to be a part of the TPP. According to METI's Director-
General for International Trade Policy, who was in charge of preparing the Ministry for 
the 2010 APEC Meeting, to consider participating in the TPP Japan needs to overcome 
the same type of issues that prevent it from successfully negotiating an agreement with 
Australia, namely the liberalisation of agriculture369. Bloomberg (2011) quotes Gerald 
Curtis, a professor of Japanese politics at Columbia University, as saying: "you can't 
have a TPP or a US-Japan FTA unless you bite the bullet on agricultural reform, and 
they're not even close to doing that". Nagata (201 Oa) estimates that participation in the 
TPP would require Japan to immediately abolish 80 percent of all its taritTs and make 
further liberalisation of ten percent of taritTs within the next ten years. 
Prior to the APEC Summit, at the end of October 2010, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries published its calculations of the impact of the immediate removal 
of taritTs on 19 major agricultural products. According to MAFF, such liberalisation 
would limit domestic agricultural production by 4.1 trillion JPY (currently eight trillion 
365 Interview no. 10. 
366 Ibidem. 
367 Interview no. 29. 
368 For more information on Asian farmers' models see the Joint Statement of the Asian Farmer's Group 
for Cooperation (AFGC 2010). 
369 Interview no. 6. 
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JPy)370. The food self-sufficiency rate on caloric basis would fall from 40 to 14 percent. 
In addition, the immediate removal of agricultural tariffs would cut national real gross 
domestic product by 7.9 trillion JPY and 3.4 million people would be unemployed. One 
of the main issues that Japan would need to address is the elimination of tariffs on rice, 
which is currently subsidised by the government and subject to a 778 percent import 
tariff. The Japan Times' article (Nagata 201 Oa) quotes a Japan Research Institute (JRI) 
representative who estimates that without the government's support domestic rice 
production would fall from 8.8 million tons to two million annually within ten years, 
while if the government was to implement a compensation scheme of "23,000 JPY in 
compensation per 10 acres to rice farmers whose paddies measure more than 2 hectares, 
Japan would manage to produce about 5 million to 6 million tons of rice in 2020,,371. 
Another article in the same newspaper (Ito 2010) mentions MAFF's predictions that 90 
percent of domestic rice production would be replaced by imports in case of tariff 
reductions. The discussion on the government's efforts to refonn the agricultural sector 
is continued in Chapter 5. 
4.3.3 Japan's Pragmatic Approach to the Coexistence of the Three Regional 
Frameworks 
Japan has not experienced any great difficulty during its participation in the three 
regional economic integration schemes. Ippei Yamazawa comments that there was no 
conflict of interest between them372. At the same time, Japan would like to be part of a 
high level, ambitious FTA network and the Asia-Pacific forum and hence is attempting 
to join the TPp373. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Masayuki Naoshima, 
confinned that the government does not want to choose between coexisting region-wide 
integration schemes 374. Instead, it prefers to use all three initiatives to promote 
economic growth. The country continues to follow all three frameworks as each of them 
has a business reality. For example, the APT and the ASEAN+6 fora have a slightly 
different agenda. While the fonner focuses more on economic issues, the latter includes 
'new cooperation issues'. ASEAN+l, ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 meetings often take 
370 These figures obtained during interview no. 29. 
371 The agricultural cooperatives oppose joining the TPP, fearing that cheap rice imports and direct 
compensation schemes for farmers will weaken their position. More on this issue in Chapter 5. 
372 Interview no. 58. 
373 Interview no. 2. 
374 Press conferences at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ), January 15 20 I 0, Tokyo. 
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place at the same time and in the same venue and therefore, it is easy to simultaneously 
participate in them. At the same time, participation in the APEC process ensures the 
existence of a regional forum that does not exclude the US. Japan will probably 
continue to support all of the frameworks. It can be argued that the country's approach 
to FTAs is pragmatic, as it uses bilateral agreements and region-wide FTA framework 
initiatives in order to secure certain economic interests. When negotiating bilateral trade 
treaties, Japan places a high importance on the elements that further the country's 
strategic objectives and profit its interest groups, such as the multinational corporations, 
as shown in Chapter 3. This type of approach is not unique to Japan. Based on an Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) study, Capannelli (2010) argues that practical, gradual 
regional economic integration is typica~ for East Asia. Capannelli and Seng (2010) 
argue that regionalism in Asia is informal, flexible, and based on a consensus dccision-
making style. 
Another ADB (2010) study mentions a bottom-up and pragmatic style of regional 
cooperation. Capannelli and Filippini (2009:3) write that "Asia's pragmatic and flexible 
approach to regionalism is partly dictated by history". They describe it as: market-
driven, focused on economic issues, and dealing with differences in culture and 
development. Yoshimatsu (2008) has coined the term 'pragmatic functionalism' to 
describe the style of cooperation in East Asia. He stresses the fact that East Asian states 
"have little interest in formal organisations that would exert binding power on them but 
rather enhance mutual benefits through cooperation that does not affect state 
sovereignty" (ibidem: 15). References to pragmatism and flexibility can also be found in 
descriptions of ASEAN's integration and the 'ASEAN way'. which is based, amongst 
others, on consensus-building decision-making. The former Secretary-General of 
ASEAN, Rodolfo Severino (2001) described the Association as a "group of sovereign 
nations operating on the basis of ad hoc understandings and informal procedures rather 
than within the framework of binding agreements arrived at through formal processes". 
Cockerham (2009:25), writing about ASEAN's integration process, argued that "in (a) 
region that has a great deal of variety among ethnicities, political systems, and 
economic development, functional cooperation with significant constraints on 
supranational ism would be in the best interests of its members". In 2001 a Chinese 
scholar (Penghong 2001: 13), explaining the country's interest in agreements which help 
to secure markets for its products and investments wrote that "functional and pragmatic 
cooperation is in the first priority of China's external cooperation". Due to the 
pragmatic approach to regional integration, Capannelli (2010) recommends maintaining 
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several regional frameworks and using them for different purposes37S. For example, the 
EAS forum might be useful for regional environmental cooperation or disaster 
prevention, the APT for financial cooperation, and the APEC for trade facilitation (Urata 
2010b, 201Oc). Such a division of labour would facilitate gradual, multi-track regional 
economic integration. 
4.3.4 The Sequencing of Regional Frameworks and Technical Aspects of' Docking 
and Merging' FTAs 
The fieldwork indicates that both Japan's scholars and its government officials consider 
a region-wide FTA to be the final goal. A former Ministry of Finance (MOF) Customs 
and Tariff Bureau representative argues that the region-wide FTA would be the best 
solution, but will be difficult to achieve due to a high number of players376• There are 
additional, non-economic matters which further complicate the process. For example, 
relations with China are aggravated by unresolved historical issues. Although most 
observers, analysts and government officials agree that, in theory, the bigger the FTA, 
the more economic gains it will bring, all of the proposed schemes have their pros and 
cons. As a result, the fieldwork research demonstrated that despite Japan's official 
support for the ASEAN+6 framework as a basis for a future region-wide FTA, the issue 
of which multilateral agreement Japan should attempt to join first remains a question of 
personal judgement and preference. Within the same ministry there are those who 
support the pro-US option and the idea of joining the TPP and those of an Asia-centric 
orientation who believe in deepening economic integration with ASEAN through the 
ASEAN+ 3 or ASEAN+6 frameworks. 
According to a Chief Economist at the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN 
and East Asia (ERIA), a region-wide agreement should be based on the ASEAN+6 
grouping, preferably opened for accession, and have consolidated rules of origin 
(RoO)377. Urata, a member of the CEPEA and EAFTA feasibility study groups, argues 
that a region-wide FTA should be established in East Asia (20 lOb). He classifies both of 
the agreements as medium-level, while the TPP is a high-level FTA. Therefore, he 
argues that Japan should lead the CEPEA process and join the TPP. According to a 
m A similar opinion was expressed during interview no. 58. 
376 Interview no. 12. 
377 Interview no. 54. 
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fonner Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, the final region-wide 
FTA should cover all aspects of trade and include cumulative R00378. In his opinion, 
wider membership would bring more benefits and limit the spaghetti bowl effect, while 
the cumulation of rules of origin and the convergence of procedures and standards 
would increase the impact of such an agreement. A fonner member of Prime Minister 
Koizumi's Economic Planning Agency also agrees that a region-wide FTA or a customs 
union with hannonised rules of origin and procedures is the final goa1379. In his opinion, 
Japan should aim to achieve that in an ASEAN-centric structure. ASEAN and Japan 
share similar strategic objectives, for example counterbalancing China's influence. In 
the same way, opinions vary when it comes to sequencing the realisation of region-wide 
frameworks. For the Director for Economic Partnership (EPAIFTA) at METI's Trade 
Policy Bureau, a region-wide FTA should be build on the basis of smaller regional FTAs, 
such as ASEAN+ 1 agreements380. However, another METI official, a fonner Director 
for FTA Affairs at the same Bureau argues that CEPEA and EAFTA negotiations should 
start at the same time381 . An Associate Professor of International Economics at Chiba 
, 
University and a member of FTA Study Meeting at the Institute for International Trade 
and Investment believes that political considerations should determine the sequencing 
of regional frameworks382. For example, Japan should join the TPP after the creation of 
CEPEA as the fonner Prime Minister, Hatoyama, has already committed to this 
initiative. 
In general terms, there are two options: one approach is to start bilateral 
negotiations first, another is to jump straight into multilateral negotiations. In practice, 
there is usually a reason why particular countries have not yet established an FTA. For 
example, as previously discussed, in 2010 all five ASEAN+ 1 agreements were in force. 
However, there is no FTA between the Northeast Asian countries. This agreement would 
be a stepping stone towards a successful implementation of any region-wide 
arrangement. The conclusion of the China-Japan-Korea FTA (CJK) would facilitate the 
negotiations of CEPEA and EAFTA383. A Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of 
International Affairs (JIIA) agrees that the trilateral FTA between China, Japan and 
Korea should come before a region-wide agreemene84. A member of the CEPEA and 
378 Interview no. 4. 
319 Interview no. 60. 
380 Interview no. 5. 
381 Interview no. 4. 
382 Interview no. 48. 
383 Interview no. 54. 
384 Interview no. 44. 
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EAFTA study groups and a fonner World Bank economist, Shujiro Urata, has published 
widely on numerous topics related to the multilateralising of free trade agreements in 
East Asia. In one of his papers (2010a:17), he lists two alternatives for creating a region-
wide FTA in the region. One of them is to consolidate existing FTAs into a broader 
agreement. This option is easier when agreements contain similar content. Urata 
(ibidem: 17) gives an example of an attempt to consolidate Japan's agreements with 
ASEAN members. In this case, the consolidation turned out to be impossible, due to the 
differences in the contents of the bilateral agreements. As a result, Japan and ASEAN 
created a new agreement and added it 'on top' of pre-existing bilateral ones. Hence the 
attempt to multilateralise FTAs has failed. The second option is to enlarge existing 
agreements. This approach, referred to by Urata as 'merging or docking' can be 
illustrated by the European Union and its subsequent enlargements. This concept has 
already been mentioned in the context of FTAAP. The Deputy Director of MOFA's EPA 
Division explains that the 'docking and merging' of existing FTAs is a tenn used by 
MOFA, for example, in reference to future APEC-wide trade negotiations, where 
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are not members of APEC but are part of ASEAN and 
India is also not a member of APEC but is an important regional economy38S. In Urata's 
(201 Oa: 17) opinion, the initial FTA, which other countries join, is usually a high-level 
type of trade agreement. He considers the TPP initiative to be a good example of an 
FTA which has a potential to grow into a region-wide agreement. In another 2010 paper, 
Urata (201Oc) distinguishes five ways to 'dock and merge' FTAs in order to create a 
region-wide agreement in East Asia: 1) by consolidating five ASEAN+l agreements 
into CEPEA; 2) by establishing ASEAN+3 FTA and expanding it gradually to CEPEA 
and then to FTAAp386; 3) by establishing a CJK FTA and expanding it in the same order 
as in point two; 4) by starting with CEPEA and transfonning it into FTAAP; or 5) by 
expanding TPP membership and transfonning it into FTAAP. According to the Director 
for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, the direction currently advocated by 
MET! is similar to the third point: to negotiate a trilateral FTA and then proceed with a 
. I t387 reglOna agreemen . 
Another question is how to approach the final goal of fonning a region-wide FTA 
from a practical point of view. The merger of existing agreements would require a 
substantial political effort, due to the vast differences between them. One option is to 
38S Email correspondence with the author, September 2010. 
386 This is also advocated by Kawai and Wignaraja (2011a:1): ASEAN+3 FTA should be followed by 
CEPEA which in tum should be "followed by connections with North America and Europe". 
387 Interview no. 4. 
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develop a 'best practice' model. According to the former Director for FTA Affairs at 
METI's Trade Policy Bureau, with each signed FTA the users (Japanese corporations) 
are drawing conclusions about what they consider to be best practice provisions and 
request the inclusion of such provisions in prospective agreements or revised versions 
of existing ones388 • Hence in his opinion, a gradual convergence of Japan's FTA is 
taking place. As explained in Chapter 3, one example is the spread of the co-equal rule 
of origin. METI's Director sees the potential for further convergence, especially in the 
field of procedures and regulations. According to Asia University's Department of 
International Affairs' Executive Director, by the year 2015 most of FTAs in the region 
should be completed and many of them will be using the co-equal rule389• If this is the 
case, it would be possible to then transform existing treaties into a region-wide 
agreement by 'docking and merging'. Another option is to sign FTAs one by one. 
According to the Chief Economist at ERIA, the best solution would be to start with 
bilateral or minilateral FTAs and harmonise them as much as possible39o• Even if the 
implementation of full cumulation is not possible, any improvement which simplifies 
procedures or rules of origin is desirable. Furthermore, he stresses this would help to 
sustain the political momentum for a region-wide FTA. Once functioning bilateral 
solutions are in place, harmonisation could be accomplished by introducing a flexible 
solution, as was the case with the AJCEP. As explained in the previous chapter, initially 
METI wanted to start negotiations of the AJCEP while MOFA preferred to establish 
bilateral agreements first. In retrospect, a Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade 
Policy Bureau recognises that it was beneficial to start with bilateral agreements, as they 
included a higher level of liberalisation and WTO-plus provisions 391. Bilateral 
negotiations made it easier to establish the AJCEP, which is a less ambitious FTA. He 
explains that the Ministry's approach to a region-wide FTA is similar. Despite the 
EAFTA and CEPEA study groups' recommendations there is an expectation that the 
region-wide FTA would be a 'lowest common denominator' type of agreement. 
Similarly, a former Ministry of Finance representative expects that CEPEA and EAFTA 
would be low-quality FTAs392. Therefore, MET! would first like to realise a minimal 
standard and achieve deeper liberalisation in the region through bilateral agreements or 
388 Ibidem. 
389 Interview no. 50. 
390 Interview no. 54. 
391 Interview no. 4. 
392 Interview no. 12. 
188 
the trilateral FTA393. Urata (201Oa:9), comments that the proposed FTAs in East Asia, 
including EAFTA and CEPEA, have two distinctive features: the inclusion of economic 
cooperation, and a low level of trade liberalisation. This has important implications for 
the industries' preferences for a region-wide agreement, as explained in section 4.4. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Japan has a flexible approach to rules of 
origin when it comes to overlapping FTAs with ASEAN members. This flexible 
approach indicates a preference to avoid committing to one particular set of regulations 
and leaving the option of choice that permits applying solutions which, in the given 
moment, better suit industry interests. This way of thinking is portrayed by METI 
officials and certain economists as an answer to the 'multilateralising bilateralism' 
debate and a way to lessen the effects of the noodle bowl syndrome, or eliminate them 
entirely394. According to this approach, the coexistence of different types of FTAs is a 
solution in itself and part of a multi-layered foreign trade policy. In the opinion of a 
Deputy Director at JETRO's International Economic Research Division, the Japanese 
government perceives the flexible and gradual option, of which the sequencing of FTAs 
with ASEAN countries is an example, as a way to reach a region-wide FTA39S. First, 
Japan signed bilateral agreements with the most likely partners. Then the AJCEP was 
signed and tariffs were gradually reduced. The next step would be to harmonise rules of 
origin, for example by implementing the co-equal rule. This would gradually lead 
towards a region-wide FTA. Similar views were expressed by the interviewed METI 
officials. According to a former Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, 
a flexible clause, similar to the one used in the AJCEP, might be initially implemented 
in a region-wide agreement 396 . This would facilitate a transition to a full-fledged 
regional FTA. This opinion is shared by METI's Director-General for International 
Trade POlicy397. In his view, such an approach could help to foster a prospective region-
wide agreement by increasing the flexibility and allowing for a gradual harmonisation 
of existing agreements. Once an initial region-wide FTA has been signed and 
implemented it can gradually be improved and simplified. Similarly, according to 
METI's Director for Economic Partnership (EPNFTA), who is responsible for FTA 
negotiations with India and Australia, as well as a joint trilateral FTA Study Group, the 
ideal solution would be to coordinate all of the rules of origin and to harmonise the 
393 Interview no. 4. 
394 Interview no. 46. 
395 Interview no. 40. 
396 Interview no. 4. 
397 Interview no. 6. 
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existing agreements398. As this would be extremely difficult to achieve an alternative, 
and a second-best, option is to let the users choose. 
Despite these opinions, MET! is not officially promoting the use of a flexible 
approach in the prospective region-wide FTA399. In the view of the aforementioned 
Director for Economic Partnership (EPAlFTA) this is a de facto way of thinking40o. 
When negotiating a new agreement, MET! tries to take into account the existing FTAs 
and their rules of origin and coordinate agreements as much as possible. Amongst 
Japanese scholars and FTA specialists, opinions are divided on the application of the 
flexible approach to a region-wide FTA. According to a Chief Economist at ERIA, it 
would be possible to have another layer of overlapping agreements, as it is easier to 
conduct separate negotiations than to consolidate existing FTAs401. A member of an FTA 
Study Meeting Group at the Institute for International Trade, from Asia University, 
believes that the flexible option might not be a solution and some sort of coordination 
process will be necessary to conciliate three levels of FTAs402. Another member of the 
Study Meeting confirms that the flexible option might not be possible in the case of a 
region-wide FTA as a triplication of structures might prove to be too complex403 . Even 
if, from the private sector's perspective, the coexistence of different levels of FTAs is 
admissible, from a diplomatic point of view it is a complex situation. Hence the 
aforementioned Study Meeting Group member predicts that 'dock and merge' efforts 
will be initiated by the government and not the private sector. In his view, countries 
which are members of APEC as well as the ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6 frameworks might 
be particularly supportive of the 'docking and merging' of existing and planned FTAs. 
The concept of flexible provision is not only cited in the context of East Asian FTAs. 
The TPP agreement also faces the issue of overlapping with bilateral FTAs, i.e. between 
the US and Australia, Singapore or Chile. According to a former advisor of Japan's 
Permanent Delegation to the OECD there is a discussion within the framework on how 
to coordinate coexisting agreements 404. So far, the TPP has not recognised the 
coexistence of overlapping agreements as a plausible solution. 
398 Interview no. 5. 
399 Interview no. 3. 
400 Interview no. 5. 
401 Interview no. 54. 
402 Interview no. 50. 
403 Interview no. 48. 
404 Interview no. 46. 
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4.4 Industry Preferences for Further Trade Liberalisation 
4.4.1 The Importance of Non-tariff Issues 
This part of the chapter discusses how the FTAs' main clients, the Japanese 
multinational corporations, perceive the prospect of a region-wide agreement. Is there a 
need for a broader trade treaty? The fieldwork research asked two questions. First, what 
type of provisions would Japanese companies like to see included in future FTAs and 
why? Secondly, are they interested in a region-wide agreement and if so, what form 
should it take? Based on the fieldwork research, this section demonstrates that Japanese 
MNCs have low expectations and as a result, show little interest in the CEPEA and 
EAFTA projects. On the other hand, they are highly interested in the TPP due to the 
economic domino effect; increasing competition with Korea; and interest in export 
expansion to markets which have so far been protected by high tariffs, such as the US. 
Japanese business federations have their own preferences for a region-wide 
agreement. In the opinion of the Deputy Director of the Japan Business Federation 
(Keidanren), Japan's FTA policy is based on the premise that liberalisation under the 
WTO is the optimal solution and the final goal4os• Hence a region-wide FTA should not 
be a politically formed community like the EU, but an open agreement preferably based 
on the APEC block. According to Keidanren s representative, excluding Pacific 
countries from regional economic integration is not a good idea as the East Asian 
economy is still heavily dependent on the US market406• In his opinion, Japan should 
opt for an APEC-wide FTA which would be open for accession by countries like India. 
A Managing Director of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai 
Doyukai) explains that as the Japanese domestic market is not expanding, Japanese 
companies should take advantage of the Southeast Asian and Chinese markets407• In his 
view, Japan's economy has reached a level where regional or bilateral FTAs are a 
necessity for economic growth. 
Despite the fact that Japanese companies in several sectors can agree on what type 
of provisions they would like to see included in FTAs, it is difficult to determine which 
forum would be best suited for a region-wide agreement from the industries' point of 
view. As in the case of bilateral agreements, the answer depends on the mix of products 
a given company sells and the locations it uses for production. If a company is involved 
405 Interview no. 24. 
406/bidem, 
407 Interview no. 23. 
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in business activities in the US, it is much more likely to opt for the APEC-wide treaty 
or the TPP. If, on the other hand, the company is investing in ASEAN, it is likely to 
prefer an ASEAN-based agreement. Although industry interests were an important 
factor behind METI's preference for the CEPEA project, in the view of METI's 
Director-General for Manufacturing Industries Policy, from the manufacturing 
companies' point of view there is little difference between a regional agreement realised 
under the ASEAN+3 framework and one realised under the ASEAN+6 framework408 • 
This is because most companies pay attention to tariff reductions and implementation 
schedules between individual countries, depending on where they locate their 
production. In addition, as explained in Chapter 3, tariffs in East Asia were significantly 
lowered by various forms of liberalisation. Although they remain high on some products, 
average tariffs in East Asia have fallen. This can be observed in Figure 4.2, which 
demonstrates tariff liberalisation in selected East Asian economies. Furthermore, after 
the signing of the ASEAN-Japan FTA, companies were able to profit from the 
cumulation of rules of origin between their sales or manufacturing facilities in member 
countries and their headquarters in Japan. The country's extensive FTA network has 
helped to limit the impact of tariffs, while third-party agreements offered companies 
indirect access to other foreign markets. As a result, the problem of tariffs in East Asia 
has been significantly reduced409• Elimination of tariffs on goods is still desirable from 
the manufacturing sector's perspective as with no tariffs there will be nothing to 
calculate at the border. However, companies export final products mostly from ASEAN 
or China, rather than Japan and hence not under Japanese FTAs. Tariffs are still an 
important barrier when it comes to the North American or European markets. 
Companies trading or investing in those markets would like to see import duties 
lowered. 
408 Interview no. 7. 
409 There are other matters that are currently of importance for Japanese industries in East Asia, for 
example: access to the Chinese market and the inclusion of Taiwan in the FTA network. 
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Figure 4.2 Average tariff rates in selected East Asian states (in percentages) 
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Chapter 3 suggested that with tariffs no longer the primary concern in East Asia, 
other types of barriers are now posing a much bigger problem when it comes to bilateral 
FTAs. The same issues are discussed in the context of a region-wide FTA. For Japanese 
companies investment liberalisation and trade facilitation is becoming an increasingly 
important aspect of regional economic integration4lo . They are equally interested in 
improving the business environment and the harmonisation of regulations and standards. 
In terms of FTAs this means including deep liberalisation or WTO-plus provisions and 
especially provisions on trade facilitation. Keidanren s Deputy Director confirms that 
Japanese industries would like to see further integration with ASEAN exceed tariff 
reduction and include such provisions411 • Under current FTAs, the East Asian countries 
have not achieved a seamless market (Kumar 2010). Several barriers to trade and 
problems with infrastructure remain. Furthermore, trade facilitation and the 
harmonisation of provisions would allow small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to play 
a greater part in the intemationalisation of production networks. Lim and Kimura 
(2010:20) write that "the proliferation of bilateral and sub-regional FTAs has created 
duplication and overlapping of RoO and other trade and investment rules and 
regulations that would increase the transaction cost of doing business in the region, 
affecting SMEs adversely". In the Asia-Pacific region, where high tariffs still pose a 
considerable difficulty, the liberalisation of non-tariff barriers to trade is also becoming 
increasingly important for Japan's MNCs. This is evidenced by their efforts to lobby the 
government through the APEC Business Advisory COlmcil Japan (ABAC-Japan) to 
410 Interview no. 12, 16 and 32. 
411 Interview no. 24. 
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include such issues in APEC's agenda 412. The increasing importance of non-tariff 
provisions was recently cited by Dent (20IOa), who argued that commercial regulatory 
provisions under FTAs are becoming a predominant feature of FTAs and international 
trade relations in general, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. He also noted that 
Japan uses its FTA model to influence the commercial regulatory environment of other 
countries, although nowhere near to the same extent as the United States (ibidem:76). 
Trade facilitation is also part of the Doha Round413• Nakagawa (2008:10) points out that 
"trade facilitation, sometimes called simplification of customs clearance procedure, is 
the only survivor of the so-called 'Singapore issues' of the DOA". Trade facilitation, 
together with other trade-related measures, is a key issue for understanding Japanese 
industries' preferences for a region-wide FTA. 
4.4.2 Reducing Lead Time 
WTO-plus provisions and trade facilitation are an important part of Japan's 
comprehensive EPA approach. Vrata (2008a:20) points out that "Japan emphasises the 
importance of (the) liberalisation and facilitation of investment and service trade, as 
such measures would provide (a) free, transparent and stable business environment for 
Japanese firms, which have invested heavily in East Asia". For example, as mentioned 
in Chapter 3, within existing FTAs Japan usually sets up bilateral committees on the 
improvement of the business environment. The goal of such committees is to harmonise 
trade and investment regulations. The DPJ's (2010b:26) 'The New Growth Strategy-
Blueprint for Revitalising Japan' spoke of forming a seamless Asian market which 
would include trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation, as well as IPR414• One 
of significant aspects of trade facilitation is the reduction of lead time. Lead time refers 
to the time from when the decision to start the production is made to when the 
manufacture of the final product is completed and it has arrived at its destination. It 
includes elements such as ordering the product, parts procurement, assembly, 
transportation, customs clearance, and safety checks. Lead time can equate to a number 
of days, depending on the type of product. As described in Chapter 3, under vertical 
keiretsu Japanese companies had a well-established pyramid structure of suppliers. As 
412 Interview no. 27. 
413 Interview no. 12. 
414 In terms of domestic reforms for creating a seamless Asian market the DPJ's (20IOa:26) text 
mentioned strengthening the exchange of finance, transportation and other services between the 
country and the region. 
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this type of arrangement continued for many years, companies knew what to expect and 
lead time was kept short. However, this changed when parts of the production networks 
were moved abroad. As a result, MNCs started to pay more attention to issues of supply 
chains logistics and efficiency. Toyota's 'just-in-time' manufacturing system, a part of 
the 'lean production' system, is one example41S • A company using such a system needs 
to be able to quickly transport goods from one place to another, as it does not stock 
items in each factory. The reduction of lead time is an important issue for many 
Japanese companies in the East Asian region 416. In fact, all of the interviewed 
corporations have admitted that currently it is their key concern. Reducing lead time 
makes the production process more flexible and adaptable. It is important for companies 
in the electronics and machinery sectors; it is also key for those in the automobile sector, 
although to a lesser extent due to the high amount of locally procured parts. For 
Japanese companies in the steel industry, as well as the textile sector, reducing lead time 
is also of interest. 
Figure 4.3 An example of lead time in a global company in the electronics sector 
Total Lead Planning and Parts 
Transport to 
Checks the assembly Manufacturing 
Time ordering procurement 
site 
Existing: 88 20 30-60 2 1 5 
-----. 
Desired: 46.5 10 30 0.5 I 5 
----- ------_. 
Source: Obtained during interview no. 15 
Figure 4.3 shows that a Japanese global manufacturing company in the electronics 
sector has a lead time of about 88 days for producing a certain model for a given 
market417, That means that if it wants to sell the final product in December, it needs to 
make a decision and start ordering in October. If during this time the company or the 
customer wants to change or cancel the order, it would be difficult to make the 
necessary adjustments. If goods are no longer required they need to be stored, which 
415 For details see, for example, Toyota 2011. 
416 Interview no. 28. 
417 Interview no. 15. 
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implies additional costs. In this example, production takes only five of the 88 days. 
Lead time depends on many factors; however, parts procurement is the most time-
consuming stage. The company has little control over this process, as it includes 
transportation and border clearance. If it uses suppliers located in several countries, their 
delivery times usually differ. The final lead time depends on the last delivery date. As 
those external factors are not directly related to the quality of the finished product, this 
is the stage that MNCs would like to see shortened. Other stages, such as safety checks 
and testing, cannot be shortened. For that reason, according to the conducted fieldwork, 
the industries would like a region-wide FTA to include provisions facilitating parts 
procurement. The ability of FTAs to reduce lead times has become the key interest for 
many companies. Figure 4.4 presents the components of trade facilitation and their 
evaluation for ASEAN states. It can be observed that for ASEAN economies cross-
border trading, which is directly related to parts procurement, is both expensive and 
time-consuming 418. 
Figure 4.4 Components of the ease of doing business and their evaluation for ASEAN 
economies in 2010 
Table 2.2 Compon~nts ofell5e of doing business and lheir evaluation for ASRAN economies. 2010 
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Trading Across Borders Documents for export (number) 6 11 S 9 7 II 4 4 6 
Time for export (dIlYs) 28 22 21 SO III 16 S 14 22 
Cost to export (US$ per container) 630 732 704 11160 450 816 456 625 756 
Documents for import (number) 6 II 6 10 7 8 4 3 II 
Time for imporl (days) 19 30 27 SO 14 16 3 J3 21 
Cost to im[!ort (US$ ~r container} 70R R72 660 2040 450 819 439 795 940 . 
Closing a Rusines~ Time (years) 3 6 2 6 I 3 5 
Cost ('Yo of estate) 4 18 IS 38 36 IS 
Recovery rate ( cent~ on the dollar} 47 0 14 0 39 4 91 42 111 
Source: Urata 20 I Od 
418 The table also indicates that the time and cost of direct investment in ASEAN countries varies 
significantly. 
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Parts procurement can be further divided into preparation of documents, customs 
clearance and control, port and terminal handling, and inland transport, both in the 
exporting as well as the importing country. Japanese companies experience many 
difficulties with customs procedures and would welcome harmonisation in this field. 
According to Waller (2010), Director of the Australian APEC Study Centre and 
Melbourne APEC Finance Centre at RMIT University, 60 percent of APEC's trade 
transaction costs come from ports and terminal handling (customs clearance) and inland 
transport. In addition, the customs clearance and inland transport stages cannot be 
accurately calculated beforehand as they often depend on customs officers and other 
external conditions. Traffic in a port might hold up a vessel for a number of days. If a 
customs officer is not sure whether exported parts require duties, or the description of 
the shipped product is unclear, the border clearance procedure can easily be extended to 
several days419. The producer might need to provide additional, detailed information. 
One of Japan's MNCs from the heavy industry and machinery sector explains that while 
exporting medium technology products and parts, even the way the product is named on 
the invoice and the packing list may influence the duration of customs procedures42o. 
Japanese companies would welcome provisions which would shorten the time required 
for customs procedures. An interviewed global company in the electronics sector 
explains that it would like to -see the harmonisation and simplification of customs 
procedures421 . Two companies in the electronics and automotive sectors mentioned the 
simplification of procedures related to obtaining the certificate of origin422. A basic fee 
for a certificate is 2,000 JPY with an additional 500 JPY per each part423 . While this is 
an important source of revenue for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, if the 
company exports low cost parts the administrative fee can exceed the benefits of trading 
under preferential tariffs. Transparent and easy administrative procedures for obtaining 
the certificate of origin or customs clearance and the harmonisation of the rules of origin 
were also mentioned as important by companies in the steel and iron sector424. This 
would prevent unnecessary delays in lead time, for example caused by the product being 
held at the border. One of the country's leading global companies in the electronics 
sector recalls having problems. with customs procedures under the Japan-Malaysia 
419 Interview no. 17. 
420 Ibidem. 
421 Interview no. 19. 
422 Interview no. 16 and 20. 
423 Interview no. 20. 
424 Interview no. 31. 
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agreement (JMEPA)425. Since it was signed in 2005, the FTA was written in an older 
(2002) version of the Harmonised System (HS) tariff codes. The company uses the 
newer (2007) tariff codes, under which descriptions of several lines' and products' tariff 
codes have changed426. At customs, the company was required to explain the difference 
between the FTA rules and the new codes it was using. In addition, some of the products 
listed under the agreement were no longer being traded, while new products were not 
included in the JMEPA. According to the interviewed corporation's senior manager, 
each time it introduces a new product there is the possibility of a delay at customs if it is 
not listed or does not fit the HS descriptions of goods eligible for preferential 
treatment 427. JETRO's document (2008:4) 'How to enjoy preferential tariff rales 
through EPAslFTAs (when importing from Japan)' acknowledges this problem. FTAs 
with Singapore, Mexico, Malaysia, Chile, Thailand, and Indonesia were all signed 
before the 2007 HS codes were introduced. This may lead to a difference between an 
HS code in an import declaration (10) and the one in a certificate of origin428. Such 
administrative problems need to be eliminated. For example, there were initial 
difficulties with using the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)429. Over 
time, both the Japanese companies and customs officers have learned how to deal with 
these issues. 
Apart from customs clearance, the transportation of parts is another stage in the 
process where a region-wide FTA could help Japanese companies to reduce lead time. 
An interviewed company in the electronics sector explains that under the existing FTAs 
in East Asia, spare parts can be imported duty free if they are shipped on the same 
vessel as the finished product43o. If shipped separately, every part requires a certificate 
of origin. This is caused by the fact that the spare parts business is profitable and 
importers wish to control it. Therefore, they lobby the government to introduce 
appropriate provisions. If spare parts are sold by an authorised service parts distributor 
or service point, the profit is kept within the company. Unaffiliated parts vendors reduce 
companies' profit. On the other hand, such procedures lengthen lead time. Therefore, 
some big companies oppose this rule. A senior staff member of an interviewed 
electronics company explains that even if parts are sold by authorised service centres, 
42S Interview no. 19. 
426 The newest amended version of the HS went into force on I January 2007. The amendments were 
accepted in June 2004 by the World Customs Organisation. 
427 Interview no. 19. 
428 For Singapore and Mexico this problem has been solved through renegotiations of bilateral FTAs. See 
Chapter 3 for details. 
429 Interview no. 19. 
430 Interview no. 15. 
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the company uses mainly small local service points and does not make a substantial 
profit from selling spare parts431 • The company would like to be able to make a list of 
pre-registered parts which it would be able to freely export. At the moment, the change 
in the tariff classification (CTC) rule of origin is applied to spare parts. The interviewed 
company would prefer a 40 percent value content (VC) or the eliminations of duties for 
parts in this sector432• Although specific preferences might differ between companies in 
different sectors, the need for simpler rules of origin for parts procurement has been 
acknowledged by APEC. The latter's 'Model Measures for RTAsIFTAs' (2007a:7) 
adopted during the 19th APEC Ministerial Meeting in Sydney addresses the issue of 
accessories, spare parts, and tools. It states that "good's standard accessories, spare parts, 
or tools delivered with the good are treated as originating if the good is an originating 
good" (ibidem:7). 
Standards and certifications are part of the technical barriers to trade (TBT) which 
can be liberalised under high-level FTAs, for example by including provisions on the 
harmonisation of domestic and international standards and the mutual recognition of 
conformity assessments. Export documents, as well as safety standards, for example for 
electrical appliances, can differ greatly even between ASEAN members (Terada 
2008:16). These kind of trade-related measures are an important issue for Japanese 
industries, as they can significantly lengthen lead time. Due to the global financial crisis, 
several, in particular the developing, countries, have started to apply restrictive 
regulations on the standards and certifications of steel and iron products. In 2008, such 
compulsory compliance was introduced by India for six, and by Malaysia for 57, iron 
and steel products (JETRO 2009:99). India additionally implemented an import 
government licensing requirement for several steel and iron products (e.g. automobile 
parts, such as gearboxes) (ibidem: 100). Indonesia followed its lead in 2009. According 
to JETRO's survey (ibidem), this has resulted in increased costs for Japanese steel and 
iron companies. A manager of the Japan Iron and Steel Federation explains that further 
trade facilitation is needed in this area433• Similar restrictions have been implemented in 
other sectors in the wake of the financial crisis. In 2009, Indonesia introduced an 
importer registration requirement and pre-shipment testing on 505 products in various 
sectors, including electrical and electronic products 434 (JETRO 2009: 100). 
431 Ibidem. 
432 Ibidem. 
433 Interview no. 31. 
434 Requiring registering of importers and manufactures, inspection of products prior to shipment and 
regular reports. 
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Environmental standards can also constitute non-tariff barriers to trade. One of Japan's 
leading companies in the automobile sector estimates it would benefit greatly from the 
hannonisation of environmental standards across the East Asian countries435 • Japanese 
companies would welcome improvements in regard to several other issues in the region 
which. JETRO's survey (2009) ranked business risks and issues in selected Asian 
countries for Japanese companies in all industries. Inadequate infrastructure was 
considered an important issue. IPR, forex risk, labour costs, and legal problems were all 
major obstacles to trade for Japanese companies in 2009. Lim and Kimura (2010:20) 
conclude that "it is necessary to create a conducive business environment through the 
provision of standardisation of products and services, rules and regulations and a 
seamless market infrastructure in the region". 
Several of the above issues have been addressed by APEC or other regional 
organisations and frameworks, which shows that they are of growing importance to 
MNCs. APEC has been intensifying its efforts to promote paperless trade, e-customs 
procedures and a general simplification and standardisation of customs regulations. 
APEC's Trade Facilitation Action Plan I (TFAP), was adopted in 2002, and TFAPII in 
2007; both aimed to reduce trade transaction costs in the region by 5 percent within five 
years. TF APII focuses on four trade-related measures: standard and conformance, 
customs procedures, business mobility, and electronic commerce. By July 2010 the 
results of TFAPII were still inconclusive and the final assessment had not been 
conducted. The development of infrastructure is another important aspect of trade 
facilitation that can help to reduce trade costs. The Asian Development Bank 
(Bhattacharyay 2010) has been advocating a 'Seamless Asia' concept, defined as "an 
integrated region, connected by world-class efficient environment-friendly energy, 
transport, telecommunications infrastructure pan-Asia network". Improving 
infrastructure would help to deepen the liberalisations and expand production networks 
(Lim and Kimura 2010: 16). In Japan, MOF's International Bureau is also making efforts 
to hannonise the regulations for finance and investment in the region436• 
435 Interview no. 20. 
436 Interview no. 12. 
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4.4.3 Investment Liberalisation and Protection 
Another issue that many Japanese companies would like to see improved under bilateral 
or regional FTAs is investment liberalisation and protection437• Investment liberalisation 
achieved under an FTA brings many benefits. Nonetheless, for many, especially the 
developing countries, it is a sensitive area. Therefore, only a few countries include high 
level investment liberalisation provisions in FTAs or BITs. The Japan-Korea bilateral 
investment treaty is an example of such an agreement. The Japan-Singapore FTA 
includes TRIMs and TRIMs-plus provisions, for example a number of provisions 
prohibiting various performance requirements for investments by FTA members (Kumar, 
United Nations 2007:14). The conducted fieldwork indicates that trade and investment 
facilitation in East Asian or APEC regions is of great importance for Japanese 
companies. A deeper integration of ASEAN countries, in terms of investment 
facilitation, would help to improve the operations of Japanese production networks. In 
particular, elements such as deregulation or the removal of limitations on foreign 
investment, for example allowing FTA members' investors to engage in joint ventures, 
would help to improve the business environment438, This could be achieved under a re-
negotiation and improvement of existing FTAs or by negotiating a high-level 
comprehensive agreement. Based on an annual survey by the Japan Machinery Centre 
for Trade and Investment (JMC), Urata (2010a) identifies the barriers to foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which Japanese companies experienced in 2009 while trading in 
ASEAN countries. As shown in Figure 4.6, FDI facilitation, an element of high-level 
FTA investment provisions, approximates 80 percent of incidents, showing the 
importance of further improvement and harmonisation in this field. 
437 Interview no. 7. 
438 Interview no. 27. 
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Figure 4.5 Investment climate in ASEAN 10 economies in 2009: the number of 
incidents by category and country 
Table 4.2 Investment climate in ASEAN10 economies in 2009: Ihe number of Incidents by 
category and counlry 
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For example, one Japanese corporation in the electronics sector recalls having a 
problem with investment regulations in Thailand, who had a complicated procedure for 
setting up service centres439• The Japanese company needed to apply for permission to a 
local office and the procedure took several months. When it wanted to set up another 
office, it needed to repeat the entire process. One of the company's senior managers 
recalls that it took over a year to set up an after-service office in Thailand44o• The MNC 
used the bilateral committee under the Japan-Thailand FTA to resolve this problem. 
Companies in the automotive sector would also welcome additional investment 
liberalisation, for example, the limitation of remittance441 • As was previously explained, 
due to local content requirements, the Japanese auto industry localised its means of 
production several decades ago. Nonetheless, a significant part of R&D is still 
439 Interview no. 19. 
440 Ibidem. 
441 Interview no. 20. 
202 
conducted in Japan (JETRO 201Ob:4). Limitations on remittance make it difficult for 
Japanese automobile companies producing locally to recover the costs of R&D 
undertaken in Japan. This cannot be done through sales and as remittance is not 
considered to be a direct cost a company often has to pay a double tax on it442. This 
problem is not limited to ASEAN countries. The interviewed automotive company's 
manager explains that he would like to see the improvement of the business 
environment in China, where regulations on the remittance of money and IP rights are 
not sufficiently transparent443. Such issues could be solved by including provisions on 
the free flow of money in bilateral FTAs, the WTO negotiations, or any other type of 
agreement. 
Recently, Japanese companies became increasingly aware of another type of 
investment provision - investment protection. The Deputy Director of the Overseas 
Research Department at JETRO points out that until recently Japanese companies were 
not familiar with provisions on investment protection, such as expropriation or investor-
to-state disputes and did not ask the government to include them in FTAs or BITs444. 
This changed as a result of several incidents445 . One of the most well-known is the 
Saluka versus the Czech Republic case. In the late 1990s, a Japanese company, Nomura 
Security, set up a shell company in the Netherlands, Saluka Investments (Permanent 
Court of Arbitration 2006:5). It then purchased Investicnf a Po~tovnf Banka a.s. (IPB), a 
commercial bank in the Czech Republic, in March 1998. The Czech government put 
IPB under forced administration and sold it to another Czech bank, CSOB. This caused 
Nomura to file a complaint to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2001, based on the 
1991 'Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic '. Nomura 
won the case in 2006 and received a large compensation from the Czech government. 
According to the Deputy Director of JETRO's Overseas Research Department, Japanese 
companies have been paying an increasing amount of attention to the investment 
protection offered by FTAs and BITs and would like to see such provisions in 
prospective treaties446. Furthermore, Japan is expanding its BIT network, in particular 
with countries with which it has not signed an FTA, such as Egypt, Pakistan, China, and 
Korea. Japan signed a BIT with China in 1998 and with Korea in 2002. The trilateral 
442 Ibidem. 
443 Ibidem. 
444 Interview no. 40. 
44S Interview no. 3. 
446 Interview no. 39. 
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investment treaty between China, Japan, and Korea was initially expected to be signed 
in May 2011. This deadline was then moved to the end of December 2011. However, by 
January 2012, the agreement was still not concluded. 
4.4.4 Industry Interest in a Region-wide FTA 
According to a former Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, a 
region-wide agreement would have three main benefits for Japanese industry: 1) 
cumulative rules of origin; 2) convergence in procedures and rules; and 3) encouraging 
negotiations of the bilateral FTAs which are not currently in effect, in particular 
between China, Japan, and Korea447. As explained earlier in the chapter, the last point 
results from METI's understanding that a region-wide FTA will achieve a lower level of 
liberalisation than bilateral agreements. METI's Director-General for Manufacturing 
Industries Policy points out that a wider FTA would have its advantages, such as the 
promotion of harmonised standards and rules (e.g. non-discrimination) even if the level 
of liberalisation is low and respective schedules are negotiated separately448. Similarly, 
all of the interviewed companies expect that a region-wide agreement, whether APEC-
based or ASEAN-based, will be a low-level, 'lowest common denominator' type of FTA 
which deals mainly with market access and does not include WTD-plus provisions on 
investment and IPR, nor the harmonisation of regulations and standards or other 
provisions focusing on trade facilitation. They assume it will playa role similar to the 
AJCEP by linking a large number of countries. Despite EAFTA and CEPEA study group 
reports, based on their communication with METI and other parts of the government the 
interviewed companies consider it unlikely that an East Asian FTA would include deep 
.liberalisation provisions and hence prove useful449. 
In the opinion of a global company in the electronics sector, any effort made 
towards the harmonisation of regulations and standards in the region would be 
welcomed. However, the private sector does not expect an East Asian FTA to be more 
useful than the AJCEp45o. The industries anticipate that, similarly to the AJCEP, a 
multilateral, regional FTA, if implemented, would include individual tariff schedules 
and lists of sensitive products. Therefore, it will not provide a seamless East Asian 
447 Interview no. 4. 
448 Interview no. 7. 
449 Interview no. 14, 15, 16,17,19,20. 
450 Interview no. 19. 
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market. For all of the above reasons, Japanese industries have a low level of interest in a 
prospective region-wide FTA. Dee (2010:4) argues that empirical studies show that 
domestic regulatory reforms conducted by Asian countries would bring stronger results 
than a wide regional FTA based on the ASEAN+6 forum45I 452. Expectations for an 
Asia-Pacific FTA are even lower due to the larger number of involved economies and 
their diversity. This is similar to the aforementioned view of Keidanren on the APEC-
based FTA as being open and focusing primarily on harmonisation. 
The conducted fieldwork clearly indicates that Japanese companies not only have 
not lobbied the government to sign a region-wide FTA but also have little interest in 
such an agreement. A company in the electronics manufacturing sector points out that 
the usefulness of a region-wide FTA is highly dependent on the combination of products 
traded in a given market and the main type of barriers it uses45J. For example, in some 
East Asian countries, technical barriers and standards are the main obstacle and focusing 
on lowering tariffs in those countries would be futile. Companies in the automotive 
industry have also expressed a weak interest in a region-wide FTA. A manager from an 
interviewed company in this sector explains that "in the electronics sector many parts 
are produced in various countries making FTAs more beneficial" while for automobile 
companies with a high degree of local production and parts procurement a region-wide 
agreement is not particularly attractive454. Similarly, a manager from the Japan Iron and 
Steel Federation argues that a region-wide FTA in East Asia would only be desirable ifit 
brings a single market45S . He explains that "if the region-wide agreement includes 
countries who are currently not interested in promoting FTAs, or takes leadership in 
promoting trade facilitation, it might be beneficial" 456 . As explained in Chapter 3, 
companies in this sector export around 90 percent of products to East Asia. They 
consider a region-wide FTA to be an important step, but improving existing bilateral 
agreements is more of a priority. Figure 4.7 demonstrates the steel and iron sector's 
official stand on a region-wide FTA. According to the industry's Federation, bilateral 
FTAs are much faster to conclude than a multilateral agreement, as the negotiations for 
the latter take time. Hence improving existing bilateral agreements would provide 
quicker results. In fact, the interviewed companies in all of the sectors confirmed that 
4S1 Her study combined econometric evidence with computable general equilibrium modelling. 
4S2 Simulations based on a computer general equilibrium (CGE) model confirm that a region-wide 
agreement including trade Iiberalisation, facilitation and economic cooperation would have a bigger 
impact on the GDP of involved countries. For more see Urata (2008b:20) and Ando and Urata (2007). 
4S3 Interview no. 19. 
4S4 Interview no. 20. 
4SS Interview no. 31. 
4S6 Interview no. 32. 
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they would like to see an improvement and a deepening of Japan's existing FTAs and 
that this would bring more benefits than an AJCEP-type region-wide agreement. 
Figure 4.6 Steel and iron sector's preferences for prospective region-wide FTA 
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As explained in Chapter 3, FTAs are inherently competitive for Japanese companies. 
For that reason, the emergence of the TPP had a significant impact on industry 
preferences and made it crucial for Japan to join the agreement. Keidanren encouraged 
the government to use the November APEC Summit meeting in Yokohama to announce 
Japan's intention to participate in the TPp457. The organisation's Deputy Director argues 
that if Japan fails to get involved in the agreement, it will be left behind and hence 
should conduct the necessary structural reforms in the agricultural sector458. According 
to Kyodo News (2010), the chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
has also expressed his support for Japan's participation in TPP. If concluded, the 
agreement will not only eliminate the majority of tariffs but also include deep 
liberalisation provisions, as well as, for example regulations on government 
procurement. Participation in the agreement would provide market access for Japanese 
457 Interview no_ 24. 
458 Ibidem. 
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corporations and prevent a situation where they are excluded from decision-making 
about regulations and standards in the Asia-Pacific region. Companies trading on or 
investing in APEC's member markets, in particular the North American market, are 
naturally more interested in joining the TPP. The US' tariffs are still very high in several 
sectors, making them a barrier for Japanese companies. 
Bloomberg (2011) cites Jesper Koll, the head of equity research at lP Morgan in 
Tokyo, who commented that "corporate Japan is really pushing, as they know Japan's 
failure to enter the TPP would be a further step towards second- or third rate nationhood 
on the global stage". The article also quotes Keidanren, which in a report from 
December 2010 commented that Japan should join the TPP "in order to restore Japan" 
(ibidem). This demonstrates not only the industries' support of Japan's participation in 
the TPP negotiations but also the strong isolation avoidance and economic domino 
effect motivation behind this support. It can be argued that isolation avoidance is a 
motivation that is mutually reinforced by the government and the industries. During an 
APEC chief executive officer (CEO) Summit in Yokohama, then Prime Minister Naoto 
Kan spoke to the business leaders about Japan 'being left behind' while other countries 
in the region successfully conclude FTAs (Sakamaki 2010). Being left behind can be 
argued to refer to two different aspects. On one hand, as was mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, Japan's interest in the TPP has to a large extent been motivated by the actions 
of the US. This is related to isolation avoidance but also to taking part in the decision-
making process on the shape and regulatory aspects of the future agreement. On the 
other hand, similarly to bilateral FTA policy, competition with Korea plays a crucial role 
here. The previous chapter spoke of Korea's FTA policy as the main 'threat' for Japan. 
According to the Director for Economic Partnership (EPAIFTA) at METI's Trade 
Policy Bureau responsible for FTA negotiations with India and Australia as well as the 
joint trilateral FTA Study Group, it was competing with Korea in the European and 
North American markets that led the Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan to look 
towards the TPp459. In the Director's experience, the DPJ has been paying an increasing 
amount of attention to Korea's FTA strategy, in particular how the country has dealt 
with domestic opposition to liberalisation. Competition between Japan and Korea has 
become severe in some parts of the electronics and automobile industries46o. This has 
reinforced the MNCs' interest in the TPP, especially as Korea has signed an agreement 
with the US. The possibility of Japan joining the TPP negotiations in turn is a cause for 
459 Interview no. 5. 
460 Interview no. 15 and 16. 
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concern for Korean companies. The President of the Centre for International Public 
Policy Studies, recalling his discussions with Korean scholars, explains that if Japan 
joins the TPP, there will be a major change in the business environment in the region for 
Korean industries, as Japanese companies, including those in the finance and services 
sectors, will penetrate the North American market461 . 
4.5 Preferences of Other Interest Groups and Sectors 
4.5.1 The Labour Unions 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, since the 2008 08 Hokkaido Summit the labour unions 
have been increasingly aware of the ongoing discussions on globalisation, both under 
the WTO and preferential liberalisation initiatives. According to a Director of the 
International Bureau at the National Confederation of Trade Unions (Zenroren) the trade 
unions are not against globalisation as the "capitalist economy is global in nature,,462. 
Hence the organisation admits that Japan might need to respond to outside events by 
joining some kind of bilateral or regional preferential agreement. In his opinion, Japan's 
trade unions are not against FTAs per se, but they are concerned about trade agreements 
serving mainly the interest of employers and MNCs463 . For that reason, Zenroren is 
promoting the idea of an FTA social clause, a special clause within the agreement 
designed to protect workers' rights. For example, prospective FTAs should include an 
obligation from both sides to observe labour standards and International Labour 
Organisation (lLO) conventions. This would prevent nation states from competing for 
FDI at the expense of domestic workforces. The social clause should also involve some 
sort of standard concerning immigrant workers. There is an ongoing discussion on 
adopting a points system for the acceptance of highly skilled workers (Sugawara 
2010:15). Japan's labour markets are officially open only to skilled workers. However, 
there are several exceptions, such as second or third generation Latino workers, many of 
whom work in the manufacturing industry or several million descendants of Koreans 
who came to Japan during the country's colonisation of Korea. The latter issue has been 
causing a heated political debate. There are ongoing discussions on granting voting 
rights, at least for local government elections, to ethnic Koreans living in Japan. Second 
461 Interview no. 47. 
462 Interview no. 33. 
463 Ibidem. 
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generation Koreans, although born in Japan, are not regarded as citizens and do not have 
full resident status. In the opinion of Zenroren s Director these kinds of domestic social 
issues should be dealt with before the country decides to open up its markets under 
bilateral or region-wide agreements464• 
4.5.2 The Service Sector 
According to a Senior Analyst at Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting and a former 
MOFA official responsible for services and the WTO service negotiations in Geneva, 
the Japanese service sector is not interested in a region-wide FTA 465. Japanese 
companies in this sector set up service branches or subsidiaries abroad on an individual 
basis, and due to the nature of the sector they are not interested in third-party trade 
agreements. The financial service sector's knowledge and understanding of FTAs is still 
limited although the insurance sector has been more active in lobbying for bilateral 
FTAs or the inclusion of certain provisions than the rest of the sector, for example the 
elimination of limitations on foreign participation whereby a country imposes 
limitations on the nationality of board members or workers466• The same Senior Analyst 
admits that in the future the sector could profit from certain aspects of a high-level 
region-wide agreement, for example, the recognition of professional qualifications in 
industries such as banking services, investments and telecommunications 467 • 
Additionally, the financial sector would like to see more WTD-plus provisions in future 
FTAs, for example provisions on licensing, establishing branches, and minimum capital 
levels for setting up branches468• There is usually a queue for obtaining the license 
needed to set up branches. Bilateral FTAs might offer provisions to eliminate or shorten 
the period of waiting. Such problems can be resolved under the WTO negotiations and 
not necessarily under FTAs. According to a former Director for FTA Affairs at METI's 
Trade Policy Bureau, negotiating this type of provision with East Asian partners is 
difficult, as the Asian countries are reluctant to include them469 • The service sector 
would in particular like to see deep liberalisation provisions included in Japan's FTAs 
464 Ibidem. 
465 Interview no. 45. 
466 Ibidem. 
467 This could be, for example, similar to ASEAN's Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA) on 
Engineering Services signed in Kuala Lumpur in 2005. 
468 Interview no. 45. 
469 Interview no. 4. 
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with Vietnam, Thailand, and India47o• Thailand is the hub for ASEAN countries and the 
manufacturing industry has invested heavily in that country. Hence there is a market for 
Japanese services. Similarly, Vietnam is seeing an intensification of Japanese 
investment from the manufacturing sector, which creates a demand for Japanese 
services. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The chapter has presented the preferences of the Japanese government, its industry (four 
sectors) and other domestic groups regarding a region-wide free trade agreement. It has 
answered three key questions. First, it discussed suitable frameworks for such an 
agreement according to selected groups of actors. It then demonstrated their preferences 
regarding the type of agreement Japan should be aiming to sign. The private sector, in 
particular, has a clear vision of the provisions which it would like to see included in all 
prospective FTAs. Finally, the chapter discussed possible approaches to the 
harmonisation of existing agreements. There is no clearly outlined strategy or concise 
vision within the Japanese government as to how the country should proceed with 
region-wide negotiations, how to sequence multilateral regional PTAs, or how to 
harmonise them with existing treaties. In a way, coexistence and participation in several 
regional frameworks is the de facto strategy. As discussed, MOPA acknowledges that at 
some point in the future overlapping FTAs in East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions will 
need to be 'docked and merged'. So far, however, no efforts have been made to 
streamline coexisting treaties and frameworks. The fieldwork research presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that, in the opinion of government officials, Japanese 
scholars and private sector representatives, the coexistence of FTAs is not a major issue 
and does not cause inconvenience to FTA users. It could be further argued that 
according to the Japanese government, the situation will naturally resolve itself in the 
future. At the present moment, there is no indication that Japan is intending to lead the 
process of the harmonisation of regional FTA frameworks. On the contrary, the country 
will most likely react to outside developments. For example, external circumstances 
such as the planned enlargement of the TPP agreement and the US' engagement in the 
initiative have caused the DPJ administration to announce that it is considering joining 
the negotiations. The conducted fieldwork has identified Japan's competition with 
470 Interview no. 45. 
210 
Korea as the main external factor driving Japanese bilateral and multilateral FTA policy. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, both the government and the private sector are increasingly 
aware of Korea's FTA policy. In particular, the signing of the EU-Korea agreement, as 
well as the Korea-US FTA and the intensification of efforts to finalise the agreement in 
the second half of 2010, has led the bureaucracy and the DP J administration and to pay 
greater attention to Japan's foreign trade policy, in an attempt not to 'be left behind' 
(Prime Minister Naoto Kan, cited by Sakamaki 2010). Therefore, it can be argued that 
just as the competition with China has led Japan to opt for the ASEAN+6 instead of the 
ASEAN+3 framework, Korea's FTA policy is steering Japan towards the TPP and FTAs 
with a higher level of complexity, e.g. the DPJ's commitment to increase its efforts to 
finalise the Australia-Japan agreement and the recent progress of the trilateral FTA 
initiative. Both for the government and the industries external factors to a great extent 
determine preferences regarding a region-wide FTA. In addition, there is no clear, 
concise strategy on how to proceed with negotiating such an agreement. Since the early 
stages of Japan's FTA policy, the country has intended to sign free trade agreements 
with ASEAN members due to the location of Japanese production networks. This has 
now been realised and the remaining, planned bilateral or broader FTAs are politically 
or economically difficult (e.g. with Korea, Australia, and China). Japan's FTA policy 
seems to be at an impasse and the country is uncertain which direction to take. For all of 
the above reasons, Japan is passive and reactive when it comes to a region-wide FTA 
and remains highly influenced by international developments. 
The private sector does not strongly support the idea of a region-wide agreement. 
Despite the fact that both trade theory and econometric studies of FTAs471 state that 
there is a correlation between the size of the FTA and the economic gains that result 
from it, Japanese industries are far more interested in improving the quality of existing 
bilateral treaties than in signing a region-wide one. There are several reasons behind this 
lack of interest. First, Japanese companies expect that a region-wide FTA, either 
ASEAN-centred or APEC-wide, will most likely be a low-level, 'lowest common 
denominator' type of agreement. This opinion is shared by some ministry 
representatives, as demonstrated in the earlier parts of the chapter. Secondly, the 
conducted fieldwork indicates that Japanese corporations are mostly interested in deep 
liberalisation and WTD-plus provisions, in particular trade and investment facilitation 
provisions. All of the interviewed companies admitted that reducing lead time is 
471 For example, Kawai and Wignaraja (2007: 18 cites Gilbert et at. 2004), Zhang et at. (2006), Urata and 
Kiyota (2003). 
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currently one of their main concerns. As a low-level FTA would not provide such 
provisions and would take a considerable amount of time to negotiate, Japanese 
industries prefer to improve and deepen existing FTAs, for example through 
renegotiations. The low utilisation rates of Japanese FTAs, as mentioned in Chapter 3, 
can also result from the fact that the type of agreements being negotiated are a political 
compromise and do not reflect the real needs of the companies. JETRO's White Paper 
(2009: 138) comments that "the meaning of FTAs is not in their conclusion, but in their 
use by companies". Furthermore, from an industry perspective, further liberalisation 
could be achieved by other means, such as the WTO negotiations. Japanese companies 
show little interest in a region-wide agreement, as like the AJCEP it will probably offer 
no additional advantages. The industries do not lobby the government to sign such an 
agreement. However, the interviewed companies admit that any convergence of rules or 
standards would be welcomed. Japanese industries are conscious of international 
developments, for example, Korea's FTA policy, and are seriously concerned by the 
increased competition in the European and American markets. This competition causes 
them to support Japan's participation in the TPP or to opt to sign bilateral FTAs with a 
higher level of libera lis at ion, despite protests from the agricultural sector. 
The pervious chapters have demonstrated a number of issues which currently 
constrain Japan's FTA strategy: for example, the reform and liberalisation of the 
agricultural sector, which is directly related to the question of what type of agreement 
the country is aiming to participate in. The same problems impede the formation of a 
clear strategy for a region-wide FTA. As in the case of bilateral FTA strategy, these 
questions need to be addressed before Japan can take the initiative in a regional 
framework and overcome the current FTA policy impasse. The following chapter looks 
for the sources of this impasse in Japan's policy formation process and assesses how a 
political shift impacted FTA strategy. The change of the government and the DPJ's rise 
to power in 2009 allowed for a reconsideration of the country's FTA strategy. 
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Chapter 5 
The Aggregation of Domestic Preferences into Japan's Trade Policy 
5.1. Introduction 
Following on from the argument contained in the previous chapters, this chapter 
analyses the reasons for Japan's impasse in FTA policy and the fact that the agricultural 
sector remains one of the main hindrances in overcoming this from a structural 
perspective. It also focuses on the domestic decision-making and how these decisions 
are presented to foreign partners during international FTA negotiations. Therefore, it 
demonstrates how the domestic win-set is formed. The theoretical framework in 
Chapter 1 referred to Putnam's two-level game model and the government as playing 
the role of a transmission belt between the interests of domestic actors and international 
partners. The government aggregates domestic preferences and fonns them into a 
national strategy in the process of fonning a domestic win-set. When speaking of 
Japan's FTA policy, this chapter refers to the decisions and the decision-making process 
that has taken place during negotiations with the country's FTA partners rather than 
official government papers. During each FTA negotiation four ministries have played a 
pivotal role: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), and 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The fonnation of Japan's FTA strategy, as well as the 
aggregation of domestic preferences into a domestic win-set has taken place as a result 
of the communication and coordination between these four ministries and their 
constituencies. This chapter describes this process: the functions, roles and 
constituencies of the four ministries and the roles of actors such as the Prime Minister 
and the Cabinet Office and the interaction between them during the different stages of 
the FTA negotiations. In order to analyse how domestic preferences are aggregated into 
state policy (how the level 2 game occurs), particular attention is paid to the official and 
unofficial communication channels between domestic interest groups and the ministries 
to ascertain whether, and how if so, the interests of the fonner become incorporated into 
the policies of the latter. This part of the thesis focuses on the role each of the actors 
play in the domestic policy (win-set) fonnation process, their communication, and the 
coordination of their preferences. The chapter also analyses the FTA negotiation from 
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the Japanese perspective. This includes the technical aspects of the negotiation process 
such as who negotiates the treaties as well as general observations on Japan's 
negotiating style in relation to Putnam's two-level game model. 
At the end of August 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the general 
election for the House of Representatives472 , after over half of a century of almost 
uninterrupted leadership by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as mentioned in 
Chapter 3. The change in administration was followed by further changes to the 
country's policy, the function of the government, and the decision-making process. 
Additional comments are made on the influence of DPJ's administration on the 
domestic level of the policy formation process. 
5.2. The Four Ministries, their Constituencies and Other Actors 
The four ministries involved in the FTA policy formation have different jurisdictions. 
MOFA's task is to coordinate the work of the other three ministries and to represent 
Japan during the international stage of the FTA negotiations. METI is responsible for 
the liberalisation of trade in goods and services. The Ministry of Finance is in charge of 
rules of origin and procedures; it plays a secondary role. MAFF represents the 
agricultural sector. This section analyses the inter-ministerial policy formation stage. 
This includes the role of each of the four ministries in the FTA policy-making process 
and the communication channels between them and the interest groups they are in direct 
contact with and which impact their preferences. 
5.2.1 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
According to Japanese legislation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the only organ 
allowed to represent Japan during international FTA negotiations. MOFA's official role 
is to coordinate FTA policy between the ministries. It leads discussions and represents 
the government as a main negotiator. Within MOFA, the Economic Partnership Division, 
which is part of the Economic Affairs Bureau, is responsible for trade agreements policy. 
From the beginning, MOFA has been responsible for drafting working-level 
propositions and final position papers, such as the 2002 'Japan s FTA Strategy' 
472 This is the lower house of the Japanese Diet. 
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document, the 2004 'Basic Policy' and the November 2010 'Basic Policy on 
Comprehensive Economic Partnerships '. Around 2005 equilibrium developed and the 
four ministries established a division of responsibilities, described at the beginning of 
this section. According to the EPAIFTA Policy Division (MOFA) Director's recollection, 
around 2003 a kind of 'ministerial turf wars' took place and it was not certain who 
would lead FTA policy in tenns of internal coordination473. The conflict did not concern 
the direction of FTA policy, although, as described in Chapters 3 and 4, at times 
MOFA's and METI's positions on FTAs varied significantly. For example, during the 
Japan-Mexico FTA negotiations Mexican officials complained that the MOFA and 
METI did not speak in one voice (Manger 2005). At this time, both MOFA and METI 
were jockeying for power and the position of domestic coordinator of FTA strategy. In 
the opinion of MOF A's representative, METI was ambitiously attempting to increase its 
influence over international negotiations. This can be partially explained by the fact that 
foreign economic policy has traditionally been a domain of METI, in particular the 
bureaucrats within the ministry (Sato 2001: 15). Sato (ibidem: 14) gives an example of 
Prime Minister's Yasuhiro Nakasone's attempts to increase the position of MOFA vis-a-
vis that of MET!. After several rounds of FTA negotiations with Singapore and Mexico, 
the situation reached the point where it was futile to continue the domestic struggle. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, partially by default, was charged with a coordinating 
function. This was because MAFF would oppose to the idea of METI drafting the 
policy proposal, as it expected that such a proposal would be biased towards the 
interests of the business sector. Similarly, METI would not agree with MAFF taking a 
leading role in FTApolicy fonnation. The Ministry of Finance's position was neutral474. 
MOFA supports FTAs from a strategic point of view: as such agreements help to 
tighten the diplomatic and economic ties between states. On the other hand, it needs to 
take into account the preferences of groups and ministries who oppose trade 
liberalisation. As it is responsible for all aspects of foreign policy, MOFA assesses trade 
liberalisation strategy from a broad range of perspectives, including national security 
and political issues475 . Therefore, MOFA's position on FTAs is constrained by other 
ministries' interests and considerations exceeding trade policy. According to a Senior 
Researcher Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies the Ministry's position can 
be described as "mixed, slightly positive but very weak,,476. Although the Ministry is 
473 Interview no. 9. 
474 Interview no. 12. 
475 Interview no. 46. 
476 Interview no. 42. 
215 
often approached by a number of lobby groups, it is not subjected to strong lobby efforts, 
as it is the case for MET! and MAFF. Being responsible for foreign policy it does not 
represent any particular interest group. However, according to the Director of MOFA's 
EPAIFTA Policy Division, who is responsible for negotiations with India and Australia, 
during FTA negotiations MOFA occasionally tries to use external pressure (negotiating 
partner's position) to influence other ministries, for example to persuade the agricultural 
sector to show more flexibility477. To that end, it demonstrates that Japan needs to make 
sacrifices in order to convince the FTA partner to make concessions. Using an example 
of ongoing FTA negotiations with Peru, the Director of the EPAIFTA Policy Division 
describes this as MOFA speaking on behalf of Peru and Peruvian interest groups to 
MET! or MAFF and the domestic interest groups they represent. 
5.2.2 The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and its Constituencies 
5.2.2.1 The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is the single most important pro-FTA 
force in Japan. Its role in the country's shift towards FTAs and in developing foreign 
trade policy has been stressed in previous chapters. MET! has been advocating and 
supporting the signing of FTAs from the beginning. In terms of constituency and lobby 
groups, METI represents, first and foremost, the preferences of the manufacturing sector, 
but also the service sector and other business sectors. MET! is strongly influenced by 
industry preferences and interests, and in tum, it influences other ministries, the Cabinet, 
and the Prime Minister's (PM's) Office478• The Ministry's officials are sometimes asked 
to explain FTAs and their merits to the DPJ's politicians479• Within inter-ministerial 
meetings MET! attempts to demonstrate that the benefits of FTAs exceed their costs, 
which can be counterbalanced by appropriate measures480• It is important to point out 
that, contrary to common belief, MET! does not have a unified position on the subject 
of FTAs. Amongst METI's several bureaus, agencies and groups there are two sub-
organisations particularly involved in trade agreements' policy, as mentioned in 
Chapters 3 and 4. The first one is the Trade Policy Bureau. The Bureau's task within the 
477 Interview no. 9. 
478 Interview no. 50. 
479 Interview no. 3. 
480 Interview no. 6. 
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Ministry is to formulate foreign economic policy. In terms of FTAs this function is held 
by the Economic Partnership Division, a division focusing solely on free trade 
agreements. The Trade Policy Bureau does not directly represent any industry sectors or 
interest groups. Its position is independent. It is responsible for aggregating METI's 
final policy from the information it receives from the Manufacturing Industries Bureau 
and other bureaus. It communicates this policy or the preferences of the private sector to 
other ministries and coordinates them with the preferences of the other actors. In the 
words of the Trade Policy Bureau's Director for Economic Partnership (EPAIFTA) "the 
Trade Policy Bureau is like the Manufacturing Industries Bureau when speaking to 
MAFF and like MAFF when talking to the Manufacturing Bureau .. 481 • In other words, it 
acts in the manner of Putnam's transmission belt in going between the business sector 
and other ministries, although the communication between METI and MAFF occurs 
mainly through MOFA. On occasion, METI discusses policy directly with MAFF. This 
happens mainly when there is a deadlock in the FTA negotiations, when it attempts to 
convince MAFF to make a compromise. In the FTA negotiation process, the Trade 
Policy Bureau takes part in inter-ministerial preparatory coordination meetings and in 
the official negotiation rounds with foreign partners. As the Trade Policy Bureau does 
not work directly with the industries it is rarely lobbied by the private sector. For the 
private sector the usual channel for communicating with the government is through the 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau. However, the Trade Policy Bureau does sometimes 
discuss issues directly with the industry representatives. This is usually the case when 
cross-cutting, common issues, such as rules of origin, are involved. The coordination 
committee is organised within the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, where the Trade 
Policy Bureau speaks directly to member companies. When it comes to rules of origin 
(RoO). each industry has strong preferences. hence it is difficult to coordinate policy 
without joint consultation482• 
The second bureau involved in FTA policy is the Manufacturing Industries Bureau. 
The Manufacturing Industries Bureau focuses on private sector preferences. The Bureau 
is in charge of coordinating the manufacturing industry's interests. It has a division for 
each major industry sector, for example: the Automobile Division or the Industrial 
Machinery Division. Those divisions have direct contact with companies in each sector 
as well as their counterpart business industry associations. e.g. the Japan Chemical 
Industry Association. Because of this, the Bureau's policy is well coordinated with the 
481 Interview no. 5. 
482 Interview no. 7. 
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private sector. The Bureau also communicates regularly with Keidanren (Japan Business 
Federation)483 and its working committees for prospective FTAs. The Bureau organises 
joint meetings with industry associations and the Federation. Each association 
formulates their position on the planned FTA and communicates it to the Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau. The sectoral coordination is at the individual industry association 
level. Then, inter-industry discussion and coordination take place at a joint meeting 
between Keidanren, the associations, and the Bureau. Keidanren s role is to facilitate the 
final discussion, which is usually quite formal, while the coordination and final 
decision-making takes place at METI's Manufacturing Industries Bureau484. Previously, 
before the intemationalisation of Japan's production networks, exports from Japan were 
the Bureau's only concern and it was easy to express a unified voice for private sector 
interests. However, this is no longer the case and, as demonstrated in the previous two 
chapters, even the preferences of companies in the same sector can vary. It is difficult to 
present the overall opinion of the manufacturing sector. For that purpose, the 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau evaluates each FTA on a case by case basis and 
establishes a special task group485. 
In order to make the final decision on a proposed FTA, the Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau attempts to assess the benefits and losses of each prospective 
agreement. It makes a judgement based on economic considerations: for example, trade 
volume can be one objective criterion. According to the Bureau's Director-General, 
even if some sectors are negatively affected by an FTA, the Bureau can still support the 
agreement provided that the benefits for other sectors are greater than those losses486. In 
the Bureau's opinion, from an economic perspective it is often fairly easy to judge 
whether an FTA will engender positive results: what causes difficulties are the political 
aspects of such decisions. For example, automotive companies normally benefit from 
FTAs as they have a large trade volume from Japan. On the other hand, small textile 
companies may be forced to go bankrupt as a result of the same agreement. From an 
economic viewpoint, making a judgement is quite easy, but the Bureau must also 
consider political implications in addition to economic ones. In that case, one solution is 
to offer assistance to sectors which lose profits because of an FTA. For example, they 
may offer technical cooperation or assistance to help workers to change their 
483 This communication exceeds FTA issues. Trade issues are only one of the subjects discussed between 
Keidanren and the Manufacturing Bureau. Green taxes are another example of other matters that are 
being covered. 
484 Interview no. 7. 
48S Interview no. 28, Bilateral Committees under Keidanren will be discusses later on in this chapter. 
486 Interview no. 7. 
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occupations or to make production more efficient. Such supplementary measures are 
often inevitable in order to reach a consensus even within the Manufacturing Industries 
Bureau. They are discussed and agreed on a case-by-case basis. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 3, during negotiations with Mexico, the Japanese Automobile Manufacturing 
Association was divided in its preferences regarding the agreement. The Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau was in charge of coordinating the final position of the industrial 
sectors. On a national level, the interests of the whole country needed to be considered, 
including those of the agricultural sector, ,as the farmers were cautious about increasing 
imports from Mexico. They needed to be persuaded by the Prime Minister. On the other 
hand, even if the liberalisation of certain products causes farmers to lose profit, 
consumers may benefit from the low cost of fresh fruits. To make a final decision, the 
interests of consumers, producers and manufacturing agencies need to be balanced. In 
this particular case, the final decision was made by the PM and the Cabinet Office487• 
The Manufacturing Industries Bureau's FTA preferences often differ from those of 
the Trade Policy Bureau, as the former directly represents Japanese corporations. 
Chapter 3 divided Japan's FTAs into those supported by the Trade Policy Bureau and 
those supported by both Bureaus. Hence while the Trade Policy Bureau is the driving 
force behind Japan's FTAs and is always in favour of them, the Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau is sometimes indifferent. The Trade Policy Bureau occupies the 
stronger position within the Ministry and during the inter-ministry meetings the 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau often needs to make compromises 488. Despite 
occasional differences of opinion, the two Bureaus cooperate closely in FTA policy 
formulation. Japanese traditional management practices, namely job rotation, facilitate 
this process. There is a constant movement of personnel between the two Bureaus, 
which allows officials from both sections to understand each-other's position and to 
resolve conflicts on a case-by-case basis489• 
The Manufacturing Industries Bureau, and other METI bureaus, exchange views 
not only with industry associations and Keidanren, but with foreign business 
associations and domestic labour unions. The Bureaus have met more frequently with 
the trade unions (e.g. Rengo) since the DP] won the election in 2009 490 • When 
international negotiations are in progress, METI continues to coordinate policy with its 
constituency through the Manufacturing Industries Bureau. This communication does 
487 Ibidem. 
488 Interview no. 42. 
489 Interview no. 7. 
490 Interview no. 3. 
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not usually take place through Keidanren but directly with individual companies. 
5.2.2.2 Between METI and Companies: Communication Channels and Gathering 
Information on Domestic Preferences 
5.2.2.2.1 The Private Sector 
Several types of organisations assist MET! in the process of gathering information on 
industry preferences and thus participate in the FTA policy formation process. They are 
intermediaries between the companies and the government. Often, those organisations 
are business associations, where individual companies are members. Below is an 
analysis of how different organisations and interest groups communicate their 
preferences to METI and influence policy-making within the Ministry. 
As demonstrated in the previous two chapters, there are several Japanese companies 
which strongly support FTAs. These are usually companies which have affiliates in 
foreign countries and export parts from Japan. However, their support is often less 
visible and weaker than the opposition from the agricultural sector491 • In terms of 
outbound interests, there is usually no conflict between various industries492• Problems 
arise during discussions on inbound demands from the FTA partner states, as industries 
want to protect existing regulations. Each industry is represented by an organisation that 
works to protect its interests, for example industry associations, such as the Japan 
Chemical Industry Association, the Japan Textile Federation, and the Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers Association. Companies in various sectors are also directly represented 
in the government. The role of the Manufacturing Industries Bureau within METI has 
already been discussed. Other ministries have similar connections with the non-
manufacturing sectors. For example, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism has divisions for different sectors within its Policy Bureau (e.g. construction), 
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications oversees the IT and 
telecommunication industries. If heaIthcare goods or the labour movement is discussed 
during FTA negotiations, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare joins the 
discussions, working alongside MOFA. 
Communication between MET! and the private sector takes place directly through 
491 Interview no. 42. 
492 Interview no. 4. 
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the Manufacturing Industries Bureau and indirectly through Keidanren. During each 
round ofFTA negotiations, MOFA receives requests to lower manufacturing tariffs from 
the international partner. Depending on the level of the talks, the request can be passed 
to METI's International Trade Bureau, which represents the Ministry in negotiations. 
The Bureau conveys this request to the Manufacturing Industries Bureau, who then 
speaks, through the relevant division, to the companies or industry associations 
representing the particular sector493 • The private sector's response is passed from the 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau to the International Trade Bureau, which in tum 
communi~ates it to MOFA, the ministry responsible for negotiating with the foreign 
counterpart. MOFA then passes the domestic response to the FTA partner. Hence this 
channel works both ways. It is also used before the start of the official negotiations, in 
order to establish the bottom line of what concessions can be made on the part of the 
domestic industries and what the industries would like to see liberalised by the FTA 
partner state. For example, if Japanese companies are interested in decreasing the tariffs 
on three products, METI will try to list them in order of priority, according to their 
desirability494 495. The least desirable items on that list will be dropped first during the 
international negotiations round. The same kind of list, in an inverted order, is complied 
for the inward tariff reductions' request (the issues on which Japan will compromise 
first). A representative of one of the leading Japanese MNCs in the electronics sector 
confirms that there is a common interest and understanding between the company and 
METI, but the latter is often constrained by the interests of the other ministries496• For 
that reason, whenever the company has a chance, for example during Keidanren s joint 
meetings, it attempts to present their position to the members of the other ministries and 
offer the necessary evidence. 
5.2.2.2.2 Industrial Associations 
The industrial associations unite companies in the same sector and are in close contact 
with METI's Manufacturing Industries Bureau. For example, the Japan Textile 
Federation (JTF) has monthly meetings with the government. It speaks mainly to 
493 Interview no. 8. 
494 The Trade Policy Bureau composes the list and communicates with international partners, while the 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau discusses the order with the companies. 
495 Interview no. 4. 
496 Interview no. 19. 
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METI's Manufacturing Industries Bureau, but sometimes to the Trade Policy Bureau. 
During such meetings, FTAs are a major issue. The EU, Korea, China, Thailand, Taiwan, 
and Japan have an inter-governmental steel industry meeting group designed to increase 
cooperation and limit trade frictions. This is attended by the Japan Iron and Steel 
Federation, which was also asked to make a presentation during the China, Japan, and 
Korea trilateral FTA study meeting. Although Japanese business associations support 
FTAs they do not strongly lobby the government, as they do not wish to openly confront 
the agricultural lobby groups 497 • Hence their official position is that Japan should 
protect its agriculture but also needs to conclude FTAs. Unlike companies and business 
associations in the EU and the US, Japanese business associations do not have a history 
of strong lobbying. Hence FTA negotiations are usually initiated, or led, by the 
government or scholars rather than by business associations498• However, many business 
associations consider trade and investment liberalisation to be an important part of their 
agenda to increase the competitiveness of Japanese products. A good example is the 
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), which supports FTAs and 
further efforts to create an integrated, single ASEAN market (JAMA 201Oa: 12). To that 
end, it proposes undertaking steps such as the harmonisation of technical regulations 
and the promotion of Mutual Recognition of Approval. In addition to trade liberalisation, 
JAMA strongly advocates the trade and investment facilitation provisions described in 
Chapter 4. It promotes (JAMA 2010a:16) the international harmonisation of standards 
and cooperation on automatic parts supply. This is not necessarily done through FTAs, 
but can be achieved through other forums499• 
5.2.2.2.3 Keidanren 
Keidanren mainly represents large companies. It was originally formed in 1946. The 
organisation, as it is known today, was established in 2002 when the Keidanren in its 
earlier form and Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers' Associations) amalgamated. 
It has an FTA committee and member companies cooperate with the government in 
497 Interview no. 4. 
498 Ibidem. 
499 JAMA has also been, for example, participating in the AEM-METI Economic and Industrial 
Cooperation Committee Working Group on Automobile Industry (AMEICC-WGAI) meeting since 
1998. . 
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order to promote them 500. However, it usually finds itself in opposition to the 
agricultural sector, although it does not like to enter into direct confrontation with this 
group501. Within Keidanren, there are Bilateral Economic Cooperation Committees for 
particular countries, for example a committee on Thailand or Indonesia. They 
encompass companies with operations in the particular country and often discuss issues 
connected to FTAs. The Federation shares the responsibility of organising Bilateral 
Economic Cooperation Committees with the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
which organises a number of the bilateral committees. Keidanren also cooperates with 
the Chamber's offices in other countries. 
Keidanren works closely with METI502. This communication takes several forms. 
Like MET!, Keidanren has a general international department and an industries 
department503. The general international department often speaks directly to the Trade 
Policy Bureau, while the industries' department consults with the appropriate division 
within the Manufacturing Industries Bureau 504. Keidanren's member companies also 
contact the Manufacturing Industries Bureau directly and MET! might additionally 
contact Keidanren during FTA negotiation rounds, if further information is needed505. 
This occurred, for example, during the re-negotiations of the Japan-Mexico FTA. The 
government asked Keidanren for a detailed evaluation of the agreement's current form, 
as it was suspected that it was not sophisticated enough in terms of such aspects as rules 
of origin. The Federation also receives complaints on certain FTA provisions (e.g. trade 
facilitation issues) directly from the manufacturing companies and it can then request 
that the government implements changes, for example allowing for self-issued 
certifications of origin. Therefore, the Federation participates indirectly in the decision-
making process by providing the government with information on the private sector's 
preferences. In addition, agricultural cooperatives have a member within the Keidanren. 
Hence the interests of the agricultural sector and the manufacturing industries can be 
discussed directly within this forum. 
The Federation issues policy proposals related to various issues. It also cooperates 
with another body working on trade liberalisation - the APEC Business Advisory 
Council (ABA C), as well as the Support Council for ABAC-Japan (SCABAC-J). ABAC 
SOO Currently, the Federation is focusing on promoting an agreement with the EU. 
SOl Interview no. 24. 
S02 Keidanren had a strong position under the LDP's administration. This position somewhat weakened 
under Yukio Hatoyama's administration, however, it gradually started resuming discussions with the 
government when Naoto Kan became Prime Minister. 
S03 Interview no. 5. 
s04lbidem. 
sos Interview no. 24. 
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comprises industry representatives from each country. It advises the 21 APEC member 
economies on behalf of the business sector. The Council issues an annual report to 
APEC's leaders before the Ministerial Meeting in October and the APEC Economic 
Leaders' Meeting in November. The report is based on a consensus between ABAC 
members506• The Council discusses the trade liberalisation or trade facilitation issues 
raised by the MNCs in APEC. Keidanren cooperates with ABAC through the 
SCABAC-J. As discussed in Chapter 4, ABAC was the initial supporter of the Free 
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) leading to a formal proposal during the APEC 
Summit in 2004 (Penghing 2010:6). In order to work out an optimal policy proposal, 
ABAC meets four times a year and consults with Keidanren and other business 
organisations before sending a unified message from the private sector to APEC's 
leaders. Additionally, ABAC's representatives sometimes meet directly with the 
companies to hear their preferences. 
5.2.2.2.4 The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) is heavily involved in the FTA 
policy formation process. While the first agreements were being negotiated, the JCCI 
explained its position on FTAs to the government507• Although supportive of FTAs, it 
considered them to be complementary to the WTO activities. According to the 
Chamber's Project Leader, there was a difference in opinions between the Chamber and 
Keidanren, as for the latter FTAs were an alternative to liberalisation under the WT0508• 
Currently, as confirmed in fieldwork interviews, the Chamber's views are similar to 
those of Keidanren, as confirmed by representatives of both organisations 509. JCCI 
represents mainly medium-size companies. It is involved in the FTA process in several 
ways. First, the Chamber is responsible for issuing certificates of origin. In order to 
receive a certificate the company submits an application including a copy of its 
registration number with a signature and the cost analysis of the product along with 
other documents which demonstrate how it complies with the value added or a change 
in tariff classification rule of origin. The company is then given an ID number. When it 
wishes to export the product, it uses a computer system to input its ID number and the 
S06 Interview no. 26. 
507 Interview no. 25. 
S08 Ibidem. 
509 Interviews no. 24 and 25. 
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order data: the product, the invoice number, and the shipment method. The certificate is 
issued within two days for a small fee (2,000 JPY). Previously the JCCI required 
additional detailed infonnation on the suppliers the company was using and the 
percentage of their input to the final value of the product. Two years ago, the 
government asked the Chamber to soften the procedure 510. The JCCI receives 
complaints from companies who would prefer self-certification, which would be an 
important step towards trade facilitation. However, this is a decision that needs to be 
made by the government. Some of Japan's current or prospective FTA partners, for 
example the Mexican government, refuse to accept self-certification for RoO. One of 
the major issues during the FTA negotiations with India was the fact that the country 
requested stricter RoO procedures. Furthennore, ASEAN is reluctant to allow self-
certification as the member countries are afraid of the trans-shipment of products from 
ChinaslI • On the other hand, one of Japan's current FTA partners, Switzerland, does 
accept self-certification. Despite only having a small volume of trade with this partner, 
some companies obtained the position of an Authorised Economic Operator and are able 
to self-certificate. 
Apart from issuing certificates five to seven times a year, the JCCI gives seminars 
for private companies on applying the rules of origin in each of Japan's FTAs. In the 
opinion of JCCl's Project Leader, this is not sufficient to solve the problem of Japanese 
companies' lack of knowledge of FTAs, particularly the smaller companies 512 • The 
seminars are held in Tokyo and other major cities in Japan, and companies who cannot 
travel to them because they are located in rural areas and smaller cities still struggle to 
comprehend the RoO system. In addition to such events, the JCCI provides a daily 
infonnation service on rules of origin. Despite the fact that Japan's first FTA was signed 
in 2002, many companies still request infonnation on the most basic issues (for 
example: what are RoO? or what is the Hannonised System code?). 
Similarly to Keidanren, the JCCI passes the infonnation on the private sector's 
interests in prospective FTAs to the government on. These recommendations do not 
differ substantially from the opinions collected by Keidanren. The two organisations 
represent similar interest groups, which is why their preferences are also very similar. 
Along with Keidanren, the JCCI runs Bilateral Economic Cooperation Committees. 
Keidanren runs the Committee for Thailand and Indonesia, while the Chamber deals 
510 Interview no. 25. 
511 Interview no. 41. 
m Interview no. 25. 
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with Malaysia, the Philippines, and India. Through the work of those Committees the 
JCCI consults with its counterparts in other countries and reports back to MET!. It also 
requests that companies submit their comments on the planned FTA to the Committee. 
Additionally, study groups are organised in order to request the opinions of the industry 
representatives and academics, for example in the case of the Japan-EU, the Japan-Peru, 
and the Japan-Switzerland FTAsS\3. Within the government, the JCCI communicates 
mainly with MET!. However, in the case of service trade negotiations it invites the 
representatives of all the relevant ministries to join the discussion, for example the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
5.2.2.2.5 Keizai Doyukai 
Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) was established in 1946. 
Its members are approximately 1,300 top corporative executives, from 900 large 
corporations. Because of that, the Association prides itself on taking a wider economic 
perspective rather than seeking to represent particular companies. Although the 
organisation has supported the WTO over the promotion of the liberal economic order, 
in the past decade it has also promoted FTAs. In the opinion of the organisation's 
Managing Director, further liberalisation of investment as well as trade would profit 
Japan's economy, its citizens, its companies, and other countries 514. The WTO is 
considered to be the most effective path to achieving this goal. Keizai Doyukai also 
promotes regional and bilateral arrangements, as such schemes are within the concept of 
the GATT/WTO framework. In the opinion of Keizai Doyukai s Managing Director the 
government is overly passive when it comes to FTAs and should make more effort to 
create a favourable environment for Japanese business in the region, instead of adjusting 
itself to the already established systemS1S • In his words "this is not system creation, but 
system adaptation"S 16. This has caused a discrepancy in the regional de facto and de jure 
integration discussed in Chapter 1. 
Over the past 20 years, Keizai Doyukai has issued economic policy proposals to the 
government. Each year it issues between 30 and 40 policy proposals mainly on macro-
SI3 Interview no. 39. 




level issues. Those that are considered to be of use to foreign leaders are translated into 
English. The recommendations are distributed to the government, bureaucrats, 
politicians, and Keizai Doyukai members. Depending on the case, some of the proposals 
are taken directly to the PM's Office or to the relevant ministers. The Association also 
organises an international conference and policy forum to discuss the details of the 
published document, for example the fiscal reform, and invites politicians, bureaucrats, 
and journalists to discuss the matter. This kind of informal consultation takes place two 
or three times a year. The organisation contacts relevant politicians, ministers or the PM 
directly, depending on the issue under discussion. 
In terms of cooperation with other organisations, on the domestic front Keizai 
Doyukai has worked with the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) on a 
committee that seeks to promote inward FDIs in Japan517• Promoting inward FDls was a 
new challenge for JETRO, as the organisation'S main function is to promote Japan's 
investments abroad. The Organisation was charged with finding potential investors and, 
in a certain amount of time, to realise ten percent of those proposed investments (for 
example, establishing an office) 518. The Association also participates in several 
international meetings, although recently, the number of these has lessened. One of the 
international fora in which the organisation has been discussing its policy 
recommendations for the past 35 years is the ASEAN-Japan Business Forum. The 
Forum meets once a year, in an ASEAN country, and every third year in Japan. The 
subjects under discussion have included regionalliberalisation issues and the ASEAN-
Japan FTA. Keizai Doyukai is also indirectly involved in the EU-Japan Business 
Roundtable. This forum has a sector- oriented approach and has recently been 
discussing" the proposed EU-Japan FTA. Several of Keizai Doyukai's members 
participate in the Roundtable and submit a report to the Association after each meeting. 
Additionally, the Association's Committee for Economic Development organises an 
international meeting with its counterpart organisations in other countries. In late 
October 2010, the meeting was held in New York and the participants focused on the 
issue of corporate governance. 
Sl7 The committee no longer meets. 
518 In Japan there is no ministry that is in charge of promoting inward FDls and with the authority to 
negotiate conditions. Interview no. 23. 
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5.2.2.2.6 The Japan Machinery Centrefor Trade and Investment 
The Japan Machinery Centre for Trade and Investment (JMC), established in 1952, is 
one of the broader industry associations and an example of an alternative way for 
companies in various sectors to discuss their position on FTAs with the government. 
JMC's members include approximately 270 major- and medium-size compames 
manufacturing and creating a range of diverse products from heavy machinery, 
industrial plants, aircrafts and related parts to home appliances, semiconductor parts, 
cameras, and microscopes. The JMC has committees for discussing issues of trade and 
investment, as well as FTAs. It also, on occasion, invites government officials to speak 
about FTA policy or rules of origin. As Keidanren and the JCCI organise Bilateral 
Economic Cooperation Committees to prepare for prospective FTAs, the JMC members 
communicate their preferences directly to those Committees. However, the JMC also, 
on occasion, establishes a committee and invites governmental officials onto it. During 
these meetings, which have an informal character, the government representatives can 
offer policy briefs and the member companies can express their preferences519• 
The JMC collects and analyses information regarding the position of the domestic 
sectors and trends in the overseas markets. It also promotes intra-industry cooperation. 
The Centre's most important input in FTA policy formation is its database, entitled 
'Issues and Requests relating to Foreign Trade and Investment', on the difficulties with 
trade and investment that Japanese companies are facing abroad. The JMC sends out an 
annual questionnaire to companies on the subject52o• Government officials can access 
the database and ask for further details if required: in this case, the JMC contacts the 
company directly. An example is a complaint received from a company in the 
electronics sector. This company complained about India's additional duty, which was 
not compatible with the WTO rules521 • The issue has been partly solved. The JMC has 
been involved in the discussions on RoO since the Uruguay Round of the WTO 
negotiations, when the Rules of Origin Agreement (on non-preferential trade) was 
concluded. In the words of the Centre's Senior Manager of the International Trade & 
519 This is not an official communication channel, but it was mentioned as a useful way of expressing 
private sector opinions by one of the interviewed companies in the electronics sector. Interview no. 28. 
520 Called 'Questionnaire on Problems relating to Trade, Investment and Local Manufacturing in the 
Asian and Pacific Countries and Area' and done by the Japan Business Council for Trade and 
Investment Facilitation. It is similar to the EU's Market Access Database, European Commission's 
report on the private sector's complaints regarding trade barriers in each country. One important 
difference between the two is that the EU accepts complaints alJ the time, while the JMC conducts a 
survey once a year. 
521 Details of this complaint are confidential, according to interview no. 28. 
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Investment Group: 
"The government has increasingly been taking care of (the) private 
sector S interests, for example by negotiating FTAs. In terms of WTO 
negotiations, they can do it by themselves and they know everything 
about it, but in (the) case of bilateral negotiations they need the help and 
experience of (the) industries ,,522. 
Additionally, the JMC takes part in discussions on: standards and procedures, US 
security issues, the harmonisation of rules, trade facilitation and the environment. 
5.2.2.2. 7 The Japan External Trade Organisation 
JETRO plays a secondary role in Japan's FTA policy formation process. It is organised 
and functions as a secretariat office for pre-FTA study groups for free trade agreements 
with the EU, Switzerland, and Peru523• In terms of the agreement with the European 
Union, JETRO hosted a work group studying the potential for an Economic Integration 
Agreement (EIA) between the EU and Japan, between January 2007 and July 2008. In 
2009, JETRO became a secretariat for the EU-Japan EIA Research Committee. JETRO 
has an indirect input in Japan's FTA policy as the organisation is the source of important 
research data, analysis and intelligence. JETRO's White Papers and annual large-sample 
surveys were discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
5.2.3 The Ministry of Finance and the Financial Sector 
5.2.3.1 The Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
The Ministry of Finance supervises issues related to tariffs and custom procedures. It is 
one of the three ministries to have been engaged in the FTA policy from the outset524• 
MOF is mainly responsible for tariff systems (Custom Tariff Law), tariff collections, 
and the Japan Customs. It is especially interested in procedures such as rules of origin525• 
S22 Interview no. 28. 
m Interview no. 40. 
S24 MAFF was not involved in the JSEPA negotiations. 
m Interview no. 12. 
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The liquor, tobacco and salt industry come under MOF's jurisdiction. The liquor sector 
falls under the National Tax Agency Japan, the tobacco and salt monopolies under MOF. 
These three industries are exceptional cases and their position differs from that of the 
other sectors. At the beginning of the 20th century, Japan experienced a salt shortage. 
Hence the government has used a monopoly to control the price since the end of the 
Meiji Era (1905). Similarly, Japan's tobacco monopoly, Japan Tobacco, is a 
governmental corporation. The Ministry of Finance occasionally receives requests from 
the liquor industry but the other two sectors do not oppose FTA negotiationss26• The 
tariff rates for tobacco are already low in Japan. 
The Ministry of Finance is in an interesting position when it comes to free trade 
agreements. Like MOFA, it does not have an industry group behind it527• Furthennore, 
the Ministry does not benefit directly from such agreements and they are not a part of its 
broader agenda. Therefore, MOF has a neutral policy and a very narrow interest in 
FTAs 528. Its main concerns are procedures, tariffs, and customs authorities. It also 
receives inbound certificates of origin. As tariffs are already only a small part of total 
revenue the Ministry does not oppose further liberalisation but advocates the 
simplification of tariffs and is interested in the effects proliferating FTAs have on that 
system. MOF's Customs and Tariff Bureau, responsible for tariffs (also preferential), is 
in close contact with the Budget Bureau within the Ministry. The Budget Bureau is 
concerned about the prospect of having to compensate for lowering import tariffs and 
other negative domestic effects of FTAs. For example, if the tariffs on agricultural 
products are reduced, the Ministry of Agriculture will request more money. On the other 
hand, FTAs may strengthen the Japanese economy, which, in MOF's understanding, 
includes increased revenue either in corporate tax or other fonns of income. 
According to a fonner Customs and Tariff Bureau bureaucrat official, most of the 
discussions on FTA within the Ministry focus on domestic issues, mainly rules of 
origin529• In tenns of inward RoO (imports to Japan) METI would like to have as many 
product-specific rules (PSR) as possible. This type of rules of origin can be viewed as 
restricting access to domestic markets and to be a fonn of protection. Despite lower 
tariffs, METI and companies in less competitive industries would still like to have some 
type of protection from foreign exports. Hence in the experience of the MOF official, 
METI and MAFF would like to see complicated and difficult-to-satisfy inbound RoO, 
m Ibidem. 
m See point 6.2.3.2 for details. 
S28 Interview no. 12. 
s29Ibidem. 
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while having simple outbound R00530. On the other hand, MOF prefers simpler systems, 
and opts for sector general rules. The fieldwork indicated that Japanese companies 
would like to see simple rules for both outbound and inbound trade. However, during 
FTA negotiations, the ministries are under strong pressure from interest groups, which 
often results in a complicated PSR system. 
The DP J's accession to power has changed the decision-making process within the 
Ministry of Finance. The structure of the Ministry is as follows: the politicians are 
represented by the Minister, two Senior Vice-Ministers and two Junior Vice-Ministers. 
The bureaucrats are represented by another Vice-Minister and four Director-Generals 
responsible for different bureaus. During LDP's administration, the bureaucrats reported 
to the Vice-Minister on the bureaucrat's side and only sometimes to the LDP's Vice-
Ministers or the Minister. This can be demonstrated by the fact that a MOF's former 
Customs and Tariff Bureau official recalls not even knowing the name of the LDP's 
Vice-Ministers whilst working for the Customs Bureau53 !. The change of administration 
to the DPJ affected this reporting order. Currently the MOF's political statT meet about 
once a week to make decisions on policy issues. The bureaucrats report to this internal 
ministers' council, namely the DPJ's Senior Vice-Ministers, and carry out its decisions. 
The Customs Bureau officials report to the DPJ's Junior Vice-Minister in charge of the 
Bureau who then passes it the internal ministers' meeting and no longer reports to the 
bureaucratic Vice-Minister. 
5.2.3.2 The Financial Sector 
The financial sector falls under the jurisdiction of the Financial Services Agency: it is a 
governmental body that has been separate from MOF since 2000. It deals with the 
regulation of the financial industry, while MOF oversees financial policy. The Japanese 
Bankers Association is a business association including major banks, with a rotating 
chairmanship and smaller banks as members. The Association communicates with the 
Financial Services Agency regarding its policy preferences. The financial industry is not 
directly involved in FTA negotiations. The officials from MOF join the negotiation and 
represent the sector but the Financial Services Agency is excluded. Despite that, there 




their preferences. One of the ways to do so is through Keidanren, but the Japanese 
Bankers Association and the General Insurance Association of Japan (GIAJ: the 
business association for the insurance industry) also have a direct communication 
channel with the government. As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, the banking sector 
does not have a strong preference when it comes to FTAs, as it does not utilise them to 
the same extent as the manufacturing sector532• As explained in Chapter 3, Japanese 
companies in this sector do not use FTAs despite the fact that they export many types of 
services to East Asia. This is due to the type of agreements being signed and the lack of 
provision of interest to the banking sector. 
5.2.4 The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Agricultural 
Sector 
5.2.4.1 The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) 
The structure of MAFF is similar to that of MET!. The International Affairs Department, 
under the Minister's Secretariat, functions like the Trade Policy Bureau. It is responsible 
for overall foreign policy. The Agricultural Production Bureau is similar to the 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau and has divisions for products or sectors, for example, 
the Milk and Dairy Products Division. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries represents farmers and agricultural cooperatives and is subjected to a great 
deal of pressure from farming interest groups. The agricultural lobby groups and the 
politicians who support them are the strongest interest group influencing Japan's FTA 
policys33. They check the contents of every planned FTA and strongly oppose any plans 
for liberalising products in their sector. In particular, the farmers and the agricultural 
cooperatives oppose the importations of rice, wheat, barley, beef, and fruit. As explained 
in Chapter 3, the agricultural cooperatives have played an important role for many years. 
They have branches in every village and using this framework they are able to gamer 
the farmers' opinions and also their votesS34• MAFF is the only ministry which has a 
532 Interview no. 45. 
533 Another interest group, although with a very limited influence, are the consumers. In recent years, 
those groups have become more conscious about food security, contamination and overall food quality. 
They do not want to buy Chinese food products, despite the fact that they are significantly cheaper. 
Not only farmers, but also, to a lesser degree the consumer, oppose importing food, and rice from 
abroad. Interviews no. 42 and 44. 
534 Interview no. 42. 
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formal contact channel with the agricultural associations and cooperatives53S• 
5.2.4.2 The Changing Role of Agricultural Cooperatives and the New Decision-making 
Process Under the DPJ 
The FTA policy formation process within MAFF and the role of the agricultural 
cooperatives has changed significantly as a result of the change in administration. Out 
of the four main ministries, MAFF's internal communications and decision-making 
process has been probably the most affected by the transition536• The LDP had a strong 
connection with the agricultural cooperatives and JA-Zenchu (Japan's Association of 
Agricultural Cooperatives). Before the start of the negotiations for each FTA, the LOP 
held informal consultations to understand the position of the agricultural cooperatives, 
which are strongly connected to local politics. The Ministry consulted the LDP on all 
details of agricultural policy, who in turn consulted with local-level LOP politicians. 
During the initial stages of an FTA process, MAFF bureaucrats would visit the LDP 
headquarters each day and report on the current situations37. The LDP politicians would 
travel back to their constituencies (local areas) and collected preferences on the matter. 
If the LDP politicians encountered strong opposition at the local level, MAFF would not 
start negotiations. The connection between JA-Zenchu, LOP politicians and MAFF were 
often referred to as the iron triangle powerS38• The metaphor captures the way in which 
the three sides are "are interlocked in a mutual exchange of favours dependent on the 
continuing flow of benefits" (George Mulgan 2001 :4). The politicians, as the voice of 
the agricultural sector539, could, in return, count on rural areas' support during elections. 
According to the Director of MAFF's International Economic Affairs Division, 
participation in an initiative which the JA-Zenchu opposed, without prior consultation, 
would put the Ministry in a very difficult position due to the organisation's influence in 
the LDPs4o. 
This situation changed when the DPJ took office in 2009. The current 
administration does not consult with JA-Zenchu, due to their strong connection with the 
S3S Interview no. 3. 
536 Interview no. 10. 
537 Ibidem. 
538 More often this name was given to the connection between the LDP, bureaucrats and big businesses, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
539 These are members of the so-called Norin-zoku - Agriculture and Forestry Tribe, one of the 'tribes' 
within the LDP party, an agricultural lobby group within the party. 
540 Interview no. 10. 
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opposition LDP party. This is not to say that the agricultural cooperatives or the 
agricultural sector have lost their influence. The DP J's (2009b:28) 2009 general election 
manifesto included a statement on promoting the "liberalisation of trade and investment 
through the conclusion of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States". The 
agricultural cooperatives and the LDP strongly opposed this proposed policy and the 
plan was suspended. In later documents and speeches, the DPJ changed their focus from 
the conclusion of the Japan-US FTA to the facilitation of the negotiations on the Japan-
US agreement without jeopardising the interests of the farmers or rural areas. The DPJ's 
administrations do not have strong ties with agricultural cooperatives and the party's 
politicians are less influenced by the sector's interest groups. However, it is important to 
point out that there is also a DPJ agriculturallobby541. The DPJ is influenced by and has 
ties with local politics and local farmers rather than with an institutionalised lobby 
organisation as was the case with the LDP. In reality, the DPJ is also dependent on the 
support of rural areas. The party attempted to obtain the support of the rural 
constituencies in the 2009 general election as well as in the 2010 House of Councillors' 
(Upper House) election542. If it had been able to secure a majority in the Upper House in 
the 2010 election in addition to the one in the Lower House, the DPJ would have had a 
couple of years of uninterrupted governance, and it could have implemented bolder 
policy reforms. The party did not garner enough seats to achieve a majority in the Upper 
House without the support of their coalition partners. As a result, the DPJ's agricultural 
trade policy lacks a strong political direction and has been denigrated as ambivalent and 
internally contradictory543. 
Agriculture remains a serious issue, especially for local politics in certain regions. 
For example, in Hokkaido, agricultural production is highly concentrated and remains 
an integral part of both the economic and the social aspects of the local community. In 
Hokkaido, agriculture is the main industry and the level of dependency on production in 
this sector is high. According to the Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy 
Bureau, even the local manufacturing industries support Hokkaido farmers in their 
opposition to trade liberalisation544. For that reason, the flexible approach of Japan's 
FTA partners, allowing for exclusions and replacing tariff reductions with cooperation 
provisions, was necessary in order for the country to be able to sign trade agreements. 
Without accommodating the interests of the agricultural sector Japan would not be able 
541 Interview no. 5. 
542 Ibidem. 
543 Interview no. 5. 
544 Interview no. 3. 
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to do so. Another reason behind the agricultural sector's continued influence is the 
concerns about food security and self-sufficiency. At the moment domestic production 
covers only about 39 percent of the national requirement, while 61 percent of food is 
imported. The national aim is to raise this to 50 percent545• 
The new administration, directly influenced by local agricultural politics, has tried 
to decrease the influence of JA-Zenchu and the cooperatives. Throughout 2010, MAFF's 
bureaucrats did not have official contacts or consultations with agricultural cooperatives. 
This was the result of a direct request from the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries 546. Since 2009, the Ministry's officials take direction directly from the 
Minister and JA-Zenchu is losing its contact channels with the government. MAFF's 
product divisions have experts on each commodity and the Ministry's bureaucrats can 
collect the information that is necessary for policy-making without speaking directly to 
farmers or cooperatives. The consultation process under the LDP administration was 
never aimed at gathering information but was designed to discover JA-Zenchu s political 
opinion and gain support. During the previous administration, it was the LDP which was 
the highest authority for MAFF rather than the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries547• The politicians whom the MAFF bureaucrats currently speak to are the 
Minister and other DP] representatives at the Ministry. The bureaucrats pass 
information and data directly to the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, who 
makes the final judgement. The Ministry is then in charge of implementing the decision. 
Hence for MAFF officials the change of administration meant a disruption of their old 
decision-making processes and communication channels. This was not the case for the 
other ministries: for example, MET!. In the opinion of MAFF's Director for APEC and 
European Affairs, International Economic Affairs Division, METI's bureaucrats are able 
to operate much more independently from the politicians, the ministers, and even the 
ruling party, which is why they can continue their FTA policy in a more or less 
unchanged fashion 548. As industrial policy causes less political divisions, METI's 
bureaucrats have a mandate to act independently. In the agricultural sector, there are 
sharp differences in opinions, which cause MAFF to be greatly affected when the 
political landscape changes. 
S4S Ibidem. 




5.2.4.3 The Agricultural Trade Policy, its Impact on FTA Policy and the New Income 
Support System 2010 
One way of dealing with the opposition to agricultural trade liberalisation would be to 
compensate those who could lose in such a scenario. This decision would need to be 
supported by strong political leadership, as it would require spending a substantial 
amount of money from the National Treasury. According to some calculations, in order 
to compensate one farmers' household, the government would need to spend about 
US$ 50,000-60,000 per year (four to five million JPy)549. According to the Director for 
APEC and European Affairs at MAFF's International Economic Affairs Division, if the 
government wished to abolish all tariffs it would need to inject up to three trillion JPY 
into the sector550. One of the DPJ's problems during their first year in office was the loss 
of support attributed to budgetary funding issues SSI • For example, the government 
established a child allowance of 13,000 JPY in 2010, per month, per child. This scheme 
raised questions about the government's public spending 552. In 2011, the child 
allowance was supposed to be increased to 26,000 JPY. This was later changed to 
20,000 JPY. However, in 2011, the government cancelled this increase. 
In 2010 the DPJ administration introduced a new form of income compensation for 
farmers (the individual farm household income support system for rice began in FY 
2010). The idea behind the programme was not new. The expectation amongst the 
policy observers was that the DPJ would provide subsidies for farmers in exchange for 
lowering the agricultural products' tariffs and opening up the Japanese market. However, 
there was no agreement within the party on whether this should be doness3• It was also 
supposed to change the form of protection from high tariffs to direct compensation. The 
system had the potential to "transfoI')l1 Japan's agricultural policy from a system relying 
upon price support and consumer burdens to one resting upon direct payments and 
taxpayer burdens and create a domestic agricultural sector with no need for protection 
by high tariffs" (Sugawara 2010:15). Subsidies and various forms of protection have 
caused Japanese consumers to pay 1.7 times the market price for food (Katz 2010). 
However, the system did not achieve this aim and the farmers are receiving 
compensation while the high tariffs remain intact. The way the subsidies' scheme was 
549 Interview 42. 
550 Interview 10. 
m Interview no. 42. 
m For more on DPJ's 2010 and 2011 fiscal problems and spending cuts see Nagata 2010b. 
553 Interview no. 6. 
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implemented has defeated its goal. 
Under the WTO, in the Agreement on Agriculture (negotiated during the Uruguay 
Round), there are three types of agricultural subsidies: amber box, green box, and blue 
bOX554 • The tariffication of import restrictions, including quantity, was a part of the 
WTO Uruguay Round negotiations. Yamashita (2009:619) writes that: 
"Japan has agreed to raise the minimum access tariff quota of 5 per cent 
of domestic consumption in the case of tarifjication to 8 per cent. 
However, in 1999, Japan ceased the application of the special treatment 
and introduced tarifjication, because the increase in minimum access 
would lead to even more reductions in production. As a result of Japan s 
delay in introducing tarifjication, however, the minimum access rate was 
raised to 7.2 per cent and remained the same ever since ". 
The minimum access quota is the volume of trade allowed under the lower tariffs. Both 
the US and in 2003 the EU lowered their agricultural tariffs by implementing 'green 
box' direct payments for farmers (Yamashita 2009:620). A type of trade policy measure 
being used is decoupled payments, which do not depend on the type or volume of 
production. The current tariff on rice in Japan is 778 percent (Yamashita 201Oa). Japan 
defends rice tariffs under the WTO negotiations. In 1995 the Food Control Law was 
abolished and a set-aside programme implemented in its place. The set-aside 
programme was designed to maintain the price of rice by limiting rice production. To 
avoid the overproduction of rice, around 29 percent of paddy fields were set aside. In 
order for farmers to join the production-limiting programme the Japanese government 
gave annual subsidies to farmers, establishing a cartel (Yamashita 2009:626). 
Since the late 1990s the price of sensitive agricultural goods, such as rice, wheat, 
soybean, and milk, were maintained through direct payments. This was explained by the , 
Ministry of Agriculture by the fact that direct payments are less trade-distorting than 
maintaining artificially fixed market prices, which were abolished for rice in 1998. The 
wholesale price of rice dropped by 30 percent between 1993 and 2000 (Sakuyama 2003). 
Between 2004 and 2005, at the time of Doha Round negotiations, the LDP Cabinet 
discussed this issue with the rice, wheat, and soya bean sectorssss . It considered shifting 
SS4 Amber box policies distort production and trade or support prices. Subsidies directly related to 
production quantities fall into this category. Blue box policies are defined as potentially trade 
distorting, but as having conditions that limit distortion. Green box policies are not trade distorting. 
They do not burden the consumer and do not involve price support (WTO 2002). 
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the protection measures for these foods from 'amber box' to 'green box', non-trade 
distorting direct payments. Since 2005, the current 70 percent 'amber box' price support 
payments (filling the gap between the price of production and the farmers' income) for 
wheat, sugar, and soya bean, were changed to decoupled payments, which fit in the 
'green box' category (Yamashita 2009:627). According to Bloomberg (25 March 2011 
cites the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), Japanese farmers 
derive 47 percent of their revenue on average from subsidies, price supports, and 
restrictions on imports. That compares with ten percent for the US and 24 percent for 
the European Union. 
In 2010, the income compensation programme for all rice-farming households was 
implemented. It included 'amber box' subsidies and the maintenance of the production-
limiting programme 556 • The current compensations' scheme differs greatly from the 
DPJ's original plan for agricultural policy reform. Due to the shrinking national budget, 
the LDP government decided to limit subsidies to a group of farmers above a certain 
threshold of production. This policy was not supported by the part-time farmers, who 
constitute the majority of Japan's farmers557• Part-time and small-scale farmers opposed 
reforms aimed at supporting only full-time farmers. In JA-Zenchu both the full-time and 
part-time farmers' votes were counted equally, hence the part-time farmers' interests 
prevailed. The previous version of the scheme was based on the elimination of the rice 
production limitation programme (programme to set-aside paddy fields). The proposed 
policy reform was designed to decrease prices, in order to make it unprofitable for part-
time farmers to continue producing rice. After part-time farmers released their land, 
direct payments could be made to full time farmers who would then be able to 
consolidate and accumulate land and farm more efficiently. Reducing the price of rice 
and increasing production efficiency would also facilitate Japan's participation in high-
level FTAs and the WTO negotiations. Japan's population decrease correlates to the 
total domestic demand for rice. Rice's price has decreased 25 percent in the last ten 
years as a result. Rice consumption per capita has also dropped: it halved in the last 40 
years (Yamashita 201 Oa). In order to cope with the changing demand, without the policy 
being reformed the production-limiting programme will need to increase by setting 
aside more and more land. The set-aside programme can maintain artificial high rice 
prices. However, currently, about 40 percent of paddy fields have been set aside and it 
556 Interview no. 11. 
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would be difficult to increase this numbers58 • Therefore, the price of rice has been 
dropping. If the price continues to fall and the production cost to go up, the gap between 
the two will increase. At the moment, the gap is small but is likely to widen, requiring 
higher direct payments. On the other hand, having an efficient rice production system 
would allow Japan to export surplus rice to China and other Asian countries. Full 
utilisation of the existing paddy fields would also help to increase Japan's food self-
sufficiency. This was the DPJ's way of thinking until 2003559• According to the Director 
for APEC and European Affairs, International Economic Affairs Division at MAFF and 
a former Agricultural and Development Economics Division of the UN, the former 
president and secretary-general of the DPJ, Ichiro Ozawa, was one of the people behind 
the initial DPJ policy proposal560• His plan was to eliminate tariffs, reduce prices, and 
then substitute duties by direct payments. Ozawa was against subsidies given to farmers 
without any conditions and those who participated in the set-aside programme as this 
made it impossible for Japan to cope with the rules of the WTO or high-level FTA 
negotiations S61 • However, before the election to the Upper House in July 2004, the 
proposal was changed. In the new version, direct payments would be given to every 
farmer regardless of the size of their land. The change was supposed to ensure the 
farmers' support. Giving subsidies to every farmer would impede the structural reform 
of agriculture. Before the August 2009 general election to the Lower House, another 
change to the proposal was implemented: the DPJ dropped the idea of dismantling the 
set-aside programme. In effect, the high rice price continues to be maintained and 
backed by the set-aside programme in addition to direct subsidies to all farmers. This 
strengthens the protection of small scale farmers, who are likely to keep their land and 
not release it to the full-time farmers, thus preventing consolidation (Yamashita 2010b). 
This would increase the numbers of small- scale farms, which is contrary to the initial 
intentions of the reform. In 2005, a Japanese policy specialist, Aurelia George Mulgan 
(2005 :298), argued that the pace of structural change and the market opening of the 
agricultural sector will indicate how the Japanese economy is adapting to increasing 
globalisation. She explained that, while "selective income support policies may also 
hasten the departure of small-scale farmers from the industry" it is unlikely that 
"Japanese agriculture will reach internationally competitive levels in the short to 
medium term" and "maintaining the momentum on trade agreements will mandate 
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policies that protect and preserve an uncompetitive farm sector while at the same time 
offer partial concessions on market access" (Ibidem). This prediction was correct, with 
the exception of the introduction of selective income support. 
Some of the members of the DP] are still interested in the agricultural reform that 
would tie subsidies with opening up of the market. Additionally, a small party, Minna no 
To (Everyone's Party), headed by Yoshimi Watanabe adopted this idea in their 
manifesto during the 2009 election. The Research Director of the Canon Institute for 
Global Studies and former Deputy Director-General of MAFF's International Affairs 
Department, who has been a strong supporter of the policy proposal since the beginning, 
advocates limiting the eligibility for direct payments to full-time farmers and decreasing 
the overall amount of payments562• Part-time farmers' income from farming is quite 
small. From a paddy field of a one-tenth hectare a farmer can receive a negligible 
annual profit of 26.000Y ($US 320). Several analysts agree that the compensation 
programme should be selective. For example, offered for a limited time to farmers who 
lost profits as a result of trade liberalisation, or for farmers who are taking steps to 
reform and modernise their production systems563• 
JA-Zenchu also criticises the new subsidies' scheme. According to JA-Zenchu's 
Deputy General Manager the organisation would prefer to shift from trade-distorting to 
non-distorting trade policy measures, which would be in line with WTO 
recommendations564• However, he believes that maintaining the set-aside programme is 
necessary in order to keep the current high price of rice, as the programme, together 
with government payments, help to retain the balance between supply and demand. 
According to a former MOF official, the Ministry also does not favour the direct 
payments scheme. As the ministry responsible for the national budget it considers the 
subsidies to be 'spoiling' farmersS65• In addition, the official argues that Korea, which 
introduced direct payments in the agricultural sector, in exchange for lowering tariffs, is 
a good example for Japan to follows66• In Korea, as in Japan, agriculture accounts for 
less than three percent of GDP (World Bank, World Development Indicators, December 
2010). However, the country was able to sign an agreement with the US and the EU, 
despite the farmers' strongly voiced protests. 
The direct payments scheme has had an impact on the agricultural cooperatives' 
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position, as the new compensations scheme has caused them to lose profit. Since its 
victory in the 2009 Lower House election, the DPJ has attempted to weaken the 
cooperatives' influence. The party started to examine JA-Zenchu 50 financial performance 
and operations567• The Japanese Committee of Deregulations currently has a working 
group who focus on agricultural cooperatives. It is one of the three biggest issues, 
according to a Committee member568• The Committee is also looking at Zenno's (the 
National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Associations) exemption from anti-
trust laws, which gives the organisation a strong economic and political power. The 
agricultural cooperatives have already expressed their opposition to deregulation. An 
exemption from anti-trust laws is, in their opinion, quite necessary, as without it farmers 
couldn't jointly purchase fertilisers or jointly sell their products. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, under the LDP the cooperatives bought rice from farmers, offering them a 
good profit margin. This was possible as JA-Zenchu was able to offer farmers 
predictable and stable prices. Currently, however, this is no longer the case. The 
organisation cannot predict and set a forward price, as they are unsure of the future 
financial performance569• The price offered by cooperatives is too low in the farmers' 
opinion, and causes them to sell directly to the private market. Additionally, the 
cooperatives organised the farmers' votes in the LDP era. The DPJ wishes to obtain 
farmers' support directly, skipping the middle man. Coupled with the new decision-
making process within MAFF, the DPJ administration is continuing its efforts to weaken 
the agricultural cooperatives position. 
5.2.5 Labour Unions: Rengo, Zenroren, and the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare 
MAFF is well known for its opposition to FTAs and to trade liberalisation in the 
agricultural sector. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare is another source of 
opposition, as well as strong 'welfare tribes' within the LDP party. The fieldwork, and 
hence the analysis in this chapter, was limited to the main four ministries which playa 
central role in the negotiation process. However, it did include the labour unions as a 
second, after the agricultural cooperatives, interest group. As the movement of people 
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has been included in some of Japan's FTAs, the labour unions have been increasingly 
involved in domestic FTA policy discussions. Japan has two main labour unions: Rengo 
(Japanese Trade Union Confederation) and Zenroren (National Confederation of Trade 
Unions). Rengo represents 6.8 million workers and organises multinational companies 
and the public sector organisations. Zenroren is the smaller of two unions and represents 
around 1.2 million members. It mainly represents companies in the public sector and 
small- and medium- size enterprises (SMEs). According to some observers, under DPJ's 
administration the labour unions are said to have more influence on Japan's FTA policy 
than under the previous administration570• However, this is not easily measurable. 
Writing about the Japan-Mexico FTA, Manger (2005:817) argued that the labour 
unions, although officially critical of the agreement, did not strongly oppose it, while in 
the case of other FTAs their opposition was expressed by the Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare. The fieldwork conducted for this thesis indicates that Japan's labour 
unions do not oppose FTAs. In particular, Zenroren does not have strong preferences 
when it comes to such treaties and does not lobby the government, as there are no plans 
for a notable increase in the number of foreign workers coming to Japan 571. As 
mentioned throughout the thesis, the unions were not much aware of the possibilities or 
dangers of FTAs. The issue that awakened their interest in free trade treaties was the 
inclusion of provisions on 'the movement of natural persons' in the agreement with 
Indonesia and the Philippines. In the case of nurses and caregivers it is difficult to speak 
of opposition and lobbying from the labour unions. There is very little fear of inflow of 
an increased foreign workforce, according to one of Zenroren ~ managers 572. The 
number of Indonesian and Filipino nurses admitted under the FTAs is restricted by 
various provisions, as explained in Chapter 3. As a result, those numbers are not 
significant enough to affect Japanese nurses' and caregivers' wages S73 • The labour 
unions are aware of the increasing global competition and their views on FTAs are often 
similar to those of the management. They support FTAs as they strengthen the Japanese 
companies' ability to compete574• 
The Japanese labour unions have ways to express their opinions of FTAs. The 
government enacted the International Labour Organisation's 'C144 Tripartite 
Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention' from 1976, which 
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establishes a tripartite consultation body between the government, employers, and 
workers. This body functions both as a central-level commission, and on the prefecture-
level. In the central-level commission, both labour unions and employers are 
represented by 15 members. On the labour unions' side the members are mostly scholars 
and academics. Since Rengo and Zenroren divided into two separate bodies in 1989 all 
15 appointed representatives were from Rengo. Zenroren became involved in the 
activities of the organisation in 2009, when one of the 15 positions was given to one of 
its members for a period of three years. The organisation focuses on several issues, 
including FTAs. The tripodal organisation functions as a tribunal where trade unions 
and employers can file complaints. The disproportionate number of members between 
Rengo and Zenroren indicates that in terms of policy formation, the influence is in the 
hands of corporations, as Rengo does not represent SMEs. This is the case not only 
when it comes to discussing FTAs, but other domestic problems as well. An example of 
how domestic policy formation is skewed towards the interests of the MNCs is lIakenho 
(the Labour Dispatching Law). The law was revised in 2004, allowing the agency's 
workers (temporary workers) to be used in production sites, which was discussed in the 
trilateral tribunal. Zenroren demanded a fundamental review of this law, as around 
200,000 temporary workers, mainly in the manufacturing sector, were fired during the 
last economic crisis575• During the Koizumi administration the law was changed. Since 
then Toyota, Nissan, Canon, and other big corporations, have been using many part-time 
workers in their factories. In times of economic downturn, part-time workers are easy to 
fire. Zenroren requested the prohibition of part-time workers; however, Rengo opposed 
the proposal as part-time workers are of great use for MNCs. 
5.2.6 The Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Japan 
The National Diet has the power to refuse or approve the enforcement of a signed FTA 
(the ratification process). The Cabinet Office is an organisation within the Cabinet of 
Japan, which is the executive branch. The politicians have the final vote in the FTA 
decision-making process. In theory, the Prime Minister sets the overall direction for the 
FTA policy. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's 
visions for regional economic integration have been discussed in Chapter 4. When there 
is a disagreement between the ministries, the final decision-making power lies in the 
m Ibidem. 
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hands of the PM. For example, before starting negotiations with Australia, Koizumi 
decided to enter into negotiations with this country, despite the opposition of the LDP 
politicians with links to agriculture. Therefore, the preferences of the PM and the ruling 
party should be an important factor behind the formation of FTA policy. During the 
fieldwork research, none of the interviewees mentioned the PM as being a leading force 
in Japan's FTA policy formation process. On the contrary, the fieldwork indicates that a 
lack of strong political leadership from the Prime Minister is one of the causes of the 
current FTA policy impasse. Lord (2010:28) confirms this finding, arguing that 
"although the PM makes decisions and signs treaties it is a bureaucratic-centred system", 
which results in "what is often described as a bureaucratic-centric decision making 
system in which Kasumigaseki, home of Japan's ministries, plays a critical role in 
creating Japan's policies and laws". The issue of the PM's rolc in the FTA policy 
formation process is discussed in detaillatcr on in this chapter. 
Similarly, the Cabinet, which includes ministers from the four previously discussed 
ministries, has a limited decision-making power, as its primary role is to coordinate thc 
efforts of the ministries 576. While MOFA coordinates FTA policy in international 
negotiations, the Cabinet Office is supposed to play this role during domestic-level 
consultations, before the official FTA negotiations577• This is difficult as the Cabinet 
Office does not have a section for FTA policy. During Koizumi's administration, the 
PM's Office established the Economic Planning Agency to be responsible for economic 
policy coordination, with a focus on macroeconomic issues and economic reform 
measures including FTA policy. According to a former member of the Agency, its 
activities included promoting FTAs and reforms supporting further trade 
liberalisation578• The Agency included scholars, politicians and leaders from the private 
sector. It was a small body, in charge of formulating basic policy, which the ministries 
were supposed to implement. During the Shinzo Abe and Yasuo Fukuda administrations 
the office remained but its position was very weak 579. It was later merged with the 
Cabinet Office and ceased to exist after the DPJ took office. 
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5.3. Formulating; of the FTA Policy and International FTA Negotiations 
The Japanese government usually discusses FTA policy on a case by case basis s80 • 
There are individual strategies for individual FTAs. However, what is lacking is a clear, 
coherent overall FTA strategy. After the 2004 ministerial meeting document (MOFA 
2004), the national FTA policy was not updated until 2010 as a result of the ministerial 
meetings which took place throughout this year. Under the previous administration, 
Japan did not have a strong FTA policy coordination mechanism, for example one 
operated by the Cabinet Office or the Diet. Hence it developed a balanced 'best-
practice' based on the cooperation of the four leading ministries with different 
jurisdictions: METI is responsible for the liberalisation of trade in manufactured goods 
and services; the Ministry of Finance is in charge of rules of origin; MAFF represents 
the agricultural sector; and MOFA's task is to coordinate the work of the remaining 
three ministries and represent Japan during FTA negotiations. This system developed in 
the middle of the 2000s, after several disagreements amongst the ministries. Over time, 
the FTA policy preferences of three of the ministries (MOFA, MErI, and MOF) 
converged and an equilibrium developed: MAFF opposes FTAs while the other three 
ministries support further liberalisation, although to a different degree. Any conflicts are 
usually between MAFF, which doesn't want to lower its tariffs, and MErI, whose tariffs 
are already very low. The roles of the four main ministries have not changed as a result 
of the election of the DPJ. What has changed, to a certain extent, is domestic 
coordination and policy-making. It is too early to assess the DPJ's FTA policy. However, 
there have been some visible changes in the way that FTA policy is discussed and who it 
is discussed by. 
5.3.1 Pre-FTA Coordination . 
5.3.1.1 Inter-Ministerial Meeting 
The coordination of domestic FTA policy takes place between the four ministries. 
Before starting international negotiations, domestic preferences are coordinated using 
this system. Finally, MOFA requests permission from the Prime Minister to start 
negotiations. The structure of the pre-FTA negotiations' consultations has changed 
580 Interview no. 4. 
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significantly with the change in administration. During the LDP administration, there 
was no official forum for this process. Only one inter-ministerial meeting was held on 
the ministerial level, which resulted in the 2004 document (MOFA 2004). The four 
ministers coordinated their preferences without a formal system in place. Important 
decisions were discussed with the PM. Before the start of FTA negotiations, when the 
final position papers were being prepared, MOFA's representatives discussed the policy 
with the remaining three ministries. There was no official, regular contact between 
MAFF and MET!, apart from in exceptional circumstances581 • MOFA was entrusted to 
speak on behalf of the other ministries and to draft the final position paper. 
After the change of administration, ministerial-level meetings were held much more 
frequently. Under the DPJ, the ministerial meetings are the most important dccision-
making body for FTA policy582. Still, throughout 20 I 0, the ministerial meetings served 
as a forum for discussion and, so far, have not engendered a new decision-making 
mechanism. The ministries' consultation group meets to discuss FTA policy on different 
levels. Before each ministerial meeting, the Deputy Director-Generals (DDG) from the 
four ministries meet frequently. In 2010 the PM, the Cabinet Secretary's officials, the 
Minister, the Vice-Minister and the DDGs from each of the four main ministries (MOFA, 
METI, MOF, and MAFF) met every other month or at times even once a month. The 
Ministers and Vice-Ministers are members, while the DOGs are observers. A 
compromise between the preferences of each ministry is reached during those meetings. 
The level of the meeting depends on the importance of the matter under discussion. The 
participation of the Cabinet Secretary's Office or the Prime Minister ensures a stronger 
political coordination power583. MOFA's Minister, Katsuya Okada, initiated this type of 
meeting. The Cabinet Office intervened, as it wanted to strengthen the PM Office's 
position584. The meetings are now run by the Cabinet Office. Minister Okada (or his 
successor) chairs the meetings and supervises the progress of each of the ongoing FTA 
negotiations. The Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, estimates 
that around 15 such meetings took place between November 2009 and August 2010585. 
Depending on the topic, the other ministries can participate. One of the first meetings in 
2010 was focused on conducting future trade negotiations in a unified fashion586. The 
content of the subjects under discussion remains confidential, however the majority of 
581 Interview no. 5. 
582 Interview no. 12. 
583 Interview no. 3. 
584 Interview no. 4. 
585 Interview no. 3. 
586 Interview no. 48. 
246 
meetings focused on the fonnulation of the new FTA strategy document S87 , On 6 
November 2010, the Ministerial Committee on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships 
published the 'Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economic Parfnerships'(DPJ 201Oa). In 
tenns of actual policy direction the new document was scarcely different to the 2004 
document. This was the DPJ's intention, as according to Minister Okada "it is not good 
to make a drastic policy change every time there is a change in govemment"S88. The 
2010 strategy document is more detailed than its predecessor. The content of the 2004 
document is still valid and sets a general direction for Japan's policy, while the new 
strategy deals with more serious issues, for example whether Japan wants to sign 
bilateral FTAs with big markets such as the EU or the US or whether Japan will join the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. What is different about the new document 
is that there was no coordination with the business associations, for example Keidanren 
or other interest groups, during its drafting. This was a purely political decision made by 
politicians from the four ministries and the Prime Minister's Office. The top political 
leaders had submitted documentation on their preferences to MOFA's Minister. 
As explained in the previous section, DP J's administration initially attempted to 
limit the role of bureaucracy in FTA policy fonnation. Within MOFA the new 
administration dispensed with a large number of working-level meetings and a bottom-
up style of workings89. However, the Ministry's political staff members were not able to 
handle the complexity of the FTA strategy, as they often lacked experience in the matter. 
Hence, from April 2010, working-level preparatory meetings took place in addition to 
ministerial level meetings. Although this might appear to be a reversal of policy, it is 
actually different than the situation under the LDP's rule in several ways. The Director 
of the EPAIFTA Policy Division at MOFA explains the difference between the two 
processesS90, Within the Ministry, political representatives are now setting an agenda 
and instructing working groups to prepare certain documents for the meetings, (e.g. 
statistics). Previously, under LDP's administration, the bureaucrats used to prepare 
recommendations for the political leaders, who adopted or rejected policies. The 
working groups prepared detailed infonnation on the recommended optimal solution. 
Under DPJ's administration, the working groups are required to provide several options, 
including a list of pros and cons, for the political staff to choose from. 
S87In the summer of 2010, the DP] (2010b:56) announced the release of the new strategy document (DP] 
2010a) by autumn. 
588 Press Conferences at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ), August 2010, Tokyo. 
589 Interview no. 9. 
590 Ibidem. 
247 
5.3.2 International FTA Negotiations Stage 
International FTA negotiations take place in rounds. During the negotiations rounds a 
similar, although slightly more formal system is used than at the preceding domestic 
coordination stage. The meetings take place on three levels591 : 
• The third level is also known as the expert's level. The members are various 
experts from the negotiating countries. The negotiator from MOFA is the chair, 
usually in a Director or Senior Deputy Director rank. 
• The second level is the DDG level. The DDGs from the four main ministries 
preside over the meetings as co-chairs. The bulk of the negotiations are done on 
this level. Additionally, many officials from the general level and Assistant 
Directors are present. 
• The first level is the Vice-Minister's level. The partner country is also usually 
represented by a Vice-Minister. MOFA's Deputy Minister chairs the meetings. 
No representatives of other ministries attend those meetings. This is due to the 
Japanese legislation and the provision on the division of responsibilities and 
power. Only MOFA has the authority to conduct diplomatic negotiations. 
The majority of negotiations are done on the second level, which consists of four DDGs 
representing different interest groups. Each of the involved ministries has their own 
targets and goals. Hence often the most difficult part of FTA negotiations takes place 
between the ministries and not with their foreign counterparts 592. Part of this 
coordination process takes place before the rounds of negotiations commence, during 
the four ministries' meetings. The goal of the pre-negotiations consultations is to 
formulate a common domestic position. However, under changing circumstances, 
adjustments are implemented parallel to the negotiations. During the international FTA 
negotiations consensus-building can continue to take place between the ministries and 
their constituencies (e.g. METI and the private sector). There is a constant exchange of 
information and opinion between the two. In urgent cases this is often done over the 
telephone. The ministry informs its constituency about the progress of negotiations, asks 
about any existing complaints, and in problematic cases discusses a compromise. The 
concessions are usually made sector by sector. Therefore, the government contacts trade 
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associations which deal with that specific industry's interests593• The four DDGs always 
coordinate domestic policy. Representatives of the main four ministries are present 
during negotiations to make sure that last-minute adjustments are possible and that there 
are no misconceptions. Japan's FTA negotiations process can be prolonged once a 
difficult issue, such as sensitive agriculture products, arises. In the partner state, the 
negotiating authority is usually concentrated in one ministry, most commonly the 
ministry of trade. In Japan this is not the case, therefore the presence of all four 
representatives is desirable594• 
Each round of negotiations takes a couple of days (usually four). On the first day 
there is a meeting at the DOG level, during which overall matters are discussed. After 
that, the negotiators separate to discuss prospective parts or chapters of an FTA, e.g. 
trade in goods and services. Over the next two or three days, the experts meet. A 
representative from MOFA (at Director level) chairs the meetings; however, officials 
from relevant ministries are also often present. On the last day of the round, or 
whenever it is deemed necessary, there is a wrap-up meeting at the DOG level. 
Additionally, once every two or three rounds, a meeting on the first level is organised. 
This is done for ceremonial reasons and in order to involve more senior officials in the 
negotiation process. Meetings on the first level serve as a last resort, if there is an 
important issue that cannot be solved at the DDG level. The Vice-Ministers have the 
authority to negotiate and make compromises on behalf of their states. Depending on 
the issue, representatives of ministries other than the main four are also present at the 
rounds. During negotiations on trade in services or the labour movement other 
ministries join the discussions. The same thing occurs when the liberalisation of the 
construction sector or the communications industry is discussed. During the 
negotiations on the liberalisation of the se,rvice sector the number of representatives on 
each side can increase to ten or 20 people. 
5.3.3 Cross-Ministry Bargaining 
Given the specific domestic decision-making system, the Japanese government prefers 
to conduct FTA negotiations in a sector by sector manner. This means that during the 
international stage of the FTA negotiations, the bargaining and the trade-offs are usually 
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done within the jurisdiction of each ministry. METI negotiates the liberalisation of trade 
in industrial goods with its foreign counterpart, while MAFF discusses concessions in 
the agriculture sector with its counterpart. If METI wants the FTA partner to commit to 
bigger tariff reductions, it can offer investment promotion, ODA, etc in exchange. As 
was demonstrated in Chapter 3, when Japan wishes to open up its partner's auto 
industry, and has little to offer in return, as its manufacturing tariffs are already very low, 
it offers various types of cooperation. A similar situation occurs in the agricultural sector. 
In order to keep existing tariffs, the Japanese side can offer the FTA partner some form 
of agricultural cooperation (making production more efficient or high-tech, or offering 
assistance to farmers). Therefore, in a way, the agricultural sector and the non-
agricultural sectors are discussed independently59s, For the Japan-Thailand FTA, MAFF 
completed negotiations first, due to the agreement on excluding rice reached previously, 
as discussed in Chapter 3596• The majority of negotiations with other ASEAN member 
countries were also conducted in this sector-by-sector manner 597. Usually, Japan 
requests concessions in industrial tariffs, while Japan's FTA partners ask for barriers to 
be lowered in the agricultural sector. In the cases of issues that can be solved within 
each ministry, a consensus can often be reached before the international negotiations' 
stageS98• However, sometimes, during the negotiation rounds, the FTA partner requests 
concessions or offers a reduction on one product in conjunction with another product. 
With the representatives of four ministries present, coordination can be done on site. 
At the final stages of the negotiations, the sector by sector discussions can be 
replaced by cross-ministry bargaining. This is usually prompted by the FTA partner 
although, according to the Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, it is 
not always clearly stated599• If the partner country tries inter-ministerial bargaining (the 
liberalisation of agricultural products in return for lower tariffs in the automotive 
industry, for example), the Japanese ministries need to discuss the issue. This is a 
difficult stage, as if there is a disagreement there is the possibility that one of the 
ministers will walk out and break the negotiations. This can make the counterpart 
country feel like they are negotiating with several ministries at the same time, as in the 
case of the Japan-Mexico FTA, which was the first example of inter-ministerial 
bargaining. Mexico wanted to open up Japan's agricultural sector, while Japan 
595 Interview no. 8. 
596 Interview no. 54. 
597 Interview no. 3. 
598 Interview no. 39. 
599 Interview no. 3. 
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demanded concessions in the automotive, or the mineral resource, sector600• The two 
countries were able to close the gap within each sector up to a point, but then the 
negotiations became stuck. JA-Zenchu s Deputy-General Manager recalls that in the last 
stages of the negotiations there were four items on which the two sides could not agree: 
pork, oranges, automobiles and automobile components, and steel601 • In his opinion, it 
was part of Mexico's negotiating strategy. The country had two products 'in offence' 
and two 'in defence', meaning that for the two products for which Japan wanted to 
receive concessions, the Mexican side demanded a compromise on two products in the 
agricultural sector. METI criticised MAFF's stand on imports of pork and other 
agricultural products, which caused MAFF to retaliate and threaten to leave the 
negotiations602• MOFA was the body overseeing and managing the entire process, but 
after a certain point it formed a 'troika' with the two other ministries603 • The lead 
negotiator, the Foreign Minister and the Ministers from METI and MAFF tried to 
coordinate their positions. Reaching a compromise under such circumstances is a very 
time-consuming and difficult task. Therefore, in the opinion of the Director of MOPA's 
EPAIFTA Policy Division, Japan needs to have a strong, consolidated position before 
the start of the international negotiations604• This kind of coordination should ideally be 
done by MOPA. However, the Ministry does not have enough political power to 
coordinate the preferences of two strong ministries: METI and MAPp6os• Therefore, in 
the case of the Mexican negotiations the final decision was made by the PM's, Cabinet 
Office606• One of the ways to solve the issue of cross-sectoral bargaining is for Japan to 
make concessions in its requests for the liberalisation of their counterpart's market (Le. 
abandon its request). This took place, for example, during negotiations with Thailand, 
when Japan abandoned its request regarding the automotive industry protecting its rice 
market, as explained in Chapter 3. A similar phenomenon occurred in the recently 
concluded negotiations with Peru. Up to a certain point, bargaining took place within 
the sectors, but there was also a disparity between the interests of the two states, i.e. 
agriculture versus certain industrial areas, for example automobiles and motorcycles. 
Peru realised that if it lowers tariffs in those industrial sectors, Japan would not open up 
its agricultural market, hence it delayed making a commitment in this field. In the words 
600 Interview no. 9. 
601 Interview no. 29. 
602 Interview no. 54. 
603 Interview no. 9. 
604 Ibidem. 
60S Interview no. 46. 
606 Interview no. 7. 
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of the Director of MOFA's EPNFTA Policy Division, the automotive industry was 
'taken hostage,607. Australia is a similar case. If Japan does not make concessions in the 
agricultural field, the Australian side is unlikely to reduce tariffs in the manufacturing 
sector608 . Cross-ministry bargaining is an additional constraint that weakens Japan's 
position during FTA negotiations609. 
5.4 The Characteristics of Japan's Domestic FTA Policy Formulation and Decision-
making Process 
5.4.1 Changing of the Government Administration 
During the LDP era, the ministries and their bureaucrats held a much stronger political 
position than the politicians or the government. They were considered to be "the largest 
and smartest think-tanks in Japan,,610. Therefore, they were in charge of making policies 
and drafting laws. In Japan, few laws originate from the Diet611 . In a 1998 article 
Mikuni (1998) wrote that a politician's role "is to formalise what is decided by the 
bureaucracy". This thesis is also confirmed by Johnson in 'Japan: Who Governs? The 
Rise of the Developmental State' (1995). Japanese bureaucrats retire in their early fifties. 
As their salaries are quite low, they generally seek further positions after retirement612. 
Usui and Colignon (2004) speak about the links between politicians and bureaucrats in 
Japan. They analyse two of the most common ways of entering national political office: 
being an ex-bureaucrat and being a hereditary politician. According to the authors, over 
60 percent of the seats in the 2003 election were taken by a person representing one of 
those categories. Usui and Colignon write (2004:20): 
HBy definition, seikai tenshin (ex-bureaucrats) politicians link the central 
bureaucracy with national and local political office, creating a base for 
regional policies and inducing alliance among local government, central 
bureaucracy, and local business. (..) The stability of seikai tenshin in the 
Lower House of the Diet represents the fusion of the bureaucracy with 
high political office. In contrast, the dominance of hereditary politicians 
607 Interview no. 9. 
608 Interview no. 3. 
609 Interview no. 9. 
610 Interview no. 54. 
611 Interview no. 23. 
612 The practice called 'amakudari' (descent from heaven), mentioned in Chapter 3. 
252 
at all levels of political office represents the fusion of local interests into 
national politics". 
In the media, the writer of an article in the Asia Pacific Times, 'Bucking the Japanese 
system, Hatoyama s real revolution will take place behind the scenes', Neidhart (2009), 
quotes Karel Van Wolferen, who has called Japan a "paralyzed superpower" with a 
"strong position of bureaucrats and the lack of influence over the country's policies of 
politicians". A similar thesis has been argued by Johnson (1975) as early as 1975. The 
DP] ran for office with a programme that spoke of limiting the role of bureaucracy and 
increasing the influence of politicians. The 2009 DPJ Manifesto (2009b:3) spoke of 
"restoring true democracy by establishing an administration controlled by politicians". 
The change of administration was supposed to bring about a change in the governing 
structure. Additionally, the new administration wanted to reduce the size of the 
government and hence, costs. The 2010 DP ]'s Manifesto (201 Oc: 17) states: 
"The Administrative Vice-Minister Meeting, which symbolised the 
bureaucracy s control of government administration, has been abolished. 
The process of drafting, coordinating and deciding policy is now led by 
the politicians in the top three positions in each ministry (minister, senior 
vice-minister, and parliamentary secretary. II 
The DPJ's vision to limit the role of bureaucracy also impacted the domestic FTA policy 
formation process, where the politicians started playing a bigger role. This change has 
been already described in regards to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 
In each ministry there are currently five politicians, mostly from the Democratic Party: 
the Minister, two Vice-Ministers and two supporting officials (Deputy Vice-Ministers). 
In addition, the National Policy Unit was established to coordinate ministries' activities 
and report to the Prime Minister. Bureaucrats are not allowed to represent the ministries 
during press conferences. This function has been limited to five politicians within each 
ministry613. Initially, after the DPJ's victory, the bureaucrats were sidelined and their 
influence was minimised, in the attempt to establish a centralised authority in terms of 
trade negotiations614. As explained by the Director of MOFA's EPAIFTA Policy Division, 
initially, there was a mutual distrust between the DPJ's politicians and the bureaucrats61S . 
613 Interview no. 54. 
614 Interview no. 48. 
615 Interview no. 9. 
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Part of the problem was the DPl's conviction that the policies were made by the 
bureaucrats and the role of politicians was limited to rubber-stamping the final projects. 
The DPl was not familiar with the internal policy formation process, as the party had 
been in opposition for several years and excluded from governmental decision-making. 
The policy of limiting the role of the bureaucrats caused them to attempt to control all 
aspects of policy-making, including FTA strategy. This proved to be time-consuming 
and resulted in several difficulties. In order to successfully formulate and implement 
policies the DPJ needs to utilise the bureaucrats' vast experience and knowledge, which 
is the result of years of engagement in trade issues. The party has slowly learned how 
the process functions and, after the initial transition stage, has started to apportion 
responsibility to the bureaucrats. 
The DPl's manifesto (2009b) mentioned the promotion of FTAs and the conclusion 
of the Japan-US agreement. In his 'Singapore Address' speech Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama (2009) mentioned the finalisation of negotiations with Korea, India and 
Australia and the promotion of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia 
(CEPEA) and FTAAP. As discussed in Chapter 4, the DPJ's 'On the New Growth 
Strategy (Basic Policies) , (2009a:21) spoke of achieving FTAAP by 2020 and "doubling 
the flow of people, commodities and money into Japan". Despite this initial interest, 
since coming into power the party has been preoccupied with other issues (such as the 
US military base, and the global economic crisis). Hence it had little resources to 
actively engage in the promotion of free trade agreements. Additionally, the topic of the 
Okinawa military bases attracted a lot of attention and media coverage at the end of 
2009 and throughout 2010. On the other hand, within Hatoyama's government the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) strongly supported the protection of the agricultural 
sector and opposes increasing imports in this sector (Sugawara 2010: 11). However, in 
the opinion of METI's Director-General for International Trade Policy, the DPl 
administration is much more involved in the discussions on FTA policy than its 
616 predecessor . 
The DPl's attempts to centralise FTA policy making culminated in the 'Basic 
Policy on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships'(DPl 2010a) published as a result of 
inter-ministerial coordination meetings. Amongst others, the document declares Japan's 
intention to sign high-level FTAs with major trade partners. As it has been discussed in 
the previous chapters, such agreements would require conducting domestic reforms, for 
example in the agricultural sector. So far, this has been difficult to achieve due to a 
616 Interview no. 6. 
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strong opposition from farming pressure groups and the vested interest of the 
government (the LDP and to a lesser extent the DPJ) in this sector. The new FTA 
strategy introduces structural changes in the government, which are designed to enable 
"appropriate domestic reforms with respect to areas of the agricultural industry, 
movement of natural persons workers from abroad to Japan, and regulatory reforms" 
(DPJ 20IOa:3). Firstly, the government will organise 'Ministerial Meeting for 
Realisation of a Free Trade Area in the Asia Pacific' (this is a provisional title), in 
which representatives of relevant ministries, as well as the Prime Minis'ter's Office, will 
participate. With respect to agricultural-sector reform, the document announces the 
creation of 'The Headquarters for the Promotion of Agricultural Structural Reform' 
(also a provisional title). The headquarters will consist of the Prime Minister (the Chair), 
the Minister of State for National Policy (the Vice-Chair), and the Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (another Vice-Chair). The new governmental body 
was expected to develop basic policy until June 2011. With respect to overall regulatory 
reforms for 'opening up the country' and increasing the inflow of foreign workers to 
Japan, a detailed plan was supposed to be put forward in 2011 by the Government 
Revitalisation Unit at the Prime Minister's Office. However, due to the triple disaster 
that hit Japan on 11 March 2011 this has been postponed. The Government 
Revitalisation Unit is one of the governmental bodies created by the DPJ as a part of the 
centralisation of decision-making under the politicians' lead. It was established in 
October 2009, under Prime Minister Hatoyama's administration. One of its purposes 
was to "review the division of roles among the national government, local public 
authorities, and private companies" (Cabinet Secretariat, 2009). The new FTA policy 
document (DPJ 20IOa) confirms the increasing role of intra-governmental bodies and 
politicians in FTA policy formation, which is in accordance with the general direction 
the DPJ has been undertaking in this respect since it came into power. 
5.4.2 The Decision-making Process 
Sugawara (2010:2), a former advisor of Japan's Permanent Delegation to the DECO and 
a MOFA official, wrote in March 2010, that "Japan's international trade policy faces an 
impasse in bilateral, regional and global levels". This impasse, referred to throughout 
the thesis, includes the opposition to further liberalisation that makes it difficult for 
Japan to sign FTAs with major trade partners. It partially results from the dearth of 
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organs within the government able to take responsibility for political decisions. The 
main characteristic of Japan's free trade agreement policy is the fact that the role of· 
Putnam's transmission belt is not played by one governmental organisation or ministry, 
but jointly by four ministries and, to a much lesser extent, by the Prime Minister's 
Office. The coordination takes place not only between preferences of domestic interest 
groups but also between the ministries which represent them. Lord (2010:27) explains 
that Japanese trade policy is "crafted amid tension between different ministries, a direct 
consequence of the diffusion of power and authority throughout the bureaucracy that 
permeates the Japanese political system". Such a consultation process, to a certain 
extent, takes place in every country. The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) is a unified gateway for the US' FTA policy and represents the 
country as a centralised organ responsible for trade negotiations. Lawyers representing 
each industry can submit their proposals directly to the USTR. The organisation also 
needs to coordinate its policy with each ministry, as well as the Department of 
Agriculture and the agricultural sector, where such products are concerned. Hence in 
this respect, it does not have independent power. In the case of Australia, the ministry 
responsible for trade negotiations is the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It 
combines the functions of Japan's METI and MOFA. However, there is still a great deal 
of internal coordination needed due to the Ministry's dual function. However, in Japan, 
this process is particularly time-consuming. Japan's preference for consensus-based 
decision-making is well known. According to Konno (2009:25), a former METI's 
Minister, the fact that Japan's policy is, arguably, reactive to other countries' initiatives 
is related to a specific decision-making process within the government. He writes 
(ibidem:26): 
"First, government decisions must be made by consensus. Second, every 
ministry, however remotely is the mailer in question concerned with their 
business, must be involved in the decision. Third, each ministry is staffed . 
with life-long employees, has permanent jurisdictions over a certain 
segment of Japanese society, and stands on its own power base in the 
political parties". 
Prior to each round of FTA negotiations, lengthy consultations between the government 
and various interest groups take place. Before the start of the negotiations the four 
ministries discuss their position. The consultation process continues parallel to the 
rounds and between them, until the final agreement is reached. The government 
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attempts to facilitate the consensus by making sure that all four ministries are included 
in the FTA discussions at all levels. The coordination of domestic preferences is a 
lengthy and arduous process in Japan but it is viewed as necessary for obtaining a 
domestic consensus617. Another issue slowing down the decision-making process is the 
lack of communication between various divisions and departments dedicated to FTA 
policy within the Japanese ministries618. Decision-making is extremely time-consuming 
and requires repeated consultations on several levels. The situation is even more 
difficult when the policy proposal goes against the interests of a domestic pressure 
group or part of the governing party's constituency (Konno 2009:26). For all of the 
above reasons, reaching a domestic compromise and a final position overlaps with 
international-level negotiations: negotiators discuss the agreement with the foreign 
partner on all three levels, but at the same time, the four ministries and their 
constituencies continue to coordinate the policy amongst themselves. Each decision 
needs to be accepted both by the foreign partner and the international-level negotiators, 
as well as by the relevant ministries on the domestic front. The negotiators have little 
discretion to make policy decisions independently from their ministries and the 
numerous consultations, before the start of negotiations as well as during them, prolong 
the decision-making process. FTA policy is not the only area where Japan's 
coordination process takes a long time. During APEC meetings, Japan is represented by 
two Senior Officials. It is common practice that a country has one representative. Japan 
is an exception to this rule, being represented by representatives from both MOFA and 
METI619. Some observers feel that, in the case of FTA policy, this should be a domestic-
level discussion, and only after reaching a unified front should the ministries present 
their position in the international forum. Part of the reforms proposed by the DPJ was 
intended to improve the decision-making process. For example, according to the 
Director of MOFA's EPAIFTA Policy Division, the DPJ's Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Katsuya Okada, has been 'strongly' intervening in the FTA Division's activity within 
MOFA and giving top-down directions62o. Nonetheless, these efforts have brought little 
results. In the opinion of Keizai Doyukai s Managing Director, Japan is a bureaucratic 
society and not a private sector-orientated one621 . Different groups' interests are deeply 
intertwined, creating a resistance to change. 
617 Interview no. 50. 
618 Interview no. 49. 
619 Interview no. 48. 
620 Interview no. 9. 
621 Interview no. 23. 
257 
5.4.3 The Changing Role of Politicians and Bureaucrats and the Need for Stronger 
Political Leadership 
It is widely agreed that a strong PM or robust political leadership is needed to overcome 
the recent impasse in Japan's FTA policy622. The FTAs with ASEAN countries and the 
Association were negotiated relatively easily623. There was a general consensus on the 
need to sign those agreements; hence during the last years of LOP's administration 
strong political leadership was not necessary to conduct further FTAs. As explained in 
detail in Chapters 3 and 4, currently, all the 'easy' agreements have been signed. The 
Asian Development Bank Institute (Asian Policy Forum 2010: 12) calls this a principle 
of "moving from the easy to the difficult FTA". The trade agreements that were 
negotiated without much political effort have already been concluded. In order to 
proceed with FTAs, Japan will need to find solutions to its domestic problems. This 
requires strong political leadership from the Prime Minister's Office or another part of 
the government. This sentiment is strengthened by Korea's expanding FTA network and 
Japan's unwillingness to be left behind other countries in the region and the world. 
Without a stronger political leadership it will be difficult for Japan to overcome the 
current impasse in FTA policy, open up its agricultural market, or participate in any 
high-level FTA, whether bilateral or minilateral. This notion was strongly reflected in 
the fieldwork624 . A fonner MOFA official expressed the opinion that MOFA or the 
Cabinet Office should play a bigger role, similar to the American model, in order to 
successfully promote further FTAs 62s • In Japan, however, this kind of leadership is 
lacking. If the Prime Minister were to strongly and finnly support trade liberalisation, 
then the opposition from the agricultural sector could be overcome. Such strong support 
could result from a belief that gains from further liberalisation for the industries and the 
Japanese society as a whole clearly outweigh the losses in the agricultural sector or a 
believe that the country would be at a disadvantaged position as a result of not taking 
any action. A strong political leadership would also be easier to achieve if the elected 
officials relied less on the political support of the representatives of the agricultural 
sector and hence were not dependent on their approval. However, the Japanese PM is 
constrained by the necessity of consultations with all of the involved parties and 
622 Interview no. 42. 
623 Interview no. 12. 
624 Interview no. 10,5 and 54. 
625 Interview no. 46. 
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ministries, has little responsibility, and in reality does not make many decisions626• 
Urata (2011) argues that declining popularity ratings were one of the reasons behind 
Prime Minister Naoto Kan's inability to secure Japan's participation in the TPP 
negotiations during the APEC Summit in 2010. He explains that "without strong support 
from the general public, the Cabinet cannot implement policies of their preference, 
especially controversial policies such as the TPP" (ibidem). Similarly to METI and 
MOFA, the PM and the Cabinet Office are reluctant to enter into a direct confrontation 
with the agricultural sector. Hence the Prime Minister's role is, in many ways, very 
limited. A former advisor of Japan's Permanent Delegation to the GECD, a former 
MOFA official, recalls that even under Junichiro Koizumi's administration, the 
influence of the Cabinet Office on FTA policy was limited627• He considers the lack of 
strong leadership and political coordination as a major problem for Japan's FTA policy 
and one of the main reasons behind the current impasse. In 2004, George Mulgan 
(2004:5) argued that due to the strong ties between the ruling party and bureaucracy and 
a related lack of institutional power, Japan lacks the 'transformational leadership' that 
could be embodied in the Prime Minister, which could lead to, for example, economic 
reform. She explained that "Japanese prime ministers and their cabinets have generally 
appeared weak and self-effacing, responding to political events rather than attempting to 
shape them" (ibidem:8). After the DP] took over it was expected that the new PM's 
Office would provide strong political leadership. This has not been the case. In the 
opinion of Keizai Doyukai s Managing Director, during the former Prime Minister 
Yukio Hatoyama administration each minister acted like the Prime Minister: hence, 
there was no one leader628• Similarly, Lord (20 I 0:31) argues that "without powerful 
Prime Ministerial leadership, it is unlikely that the bureaucratic rivalry which has 
characterised much of Japan's trade policy to date will playa less significant role in 
future FTA policy" and "as long as the Prime Minister's biggest contribution to FTA 
policy is delegation of authority, FTAs will continue to lack overarching strategic 
coherence". 
The situation in Japan, and the country's lack of political leadership, is often 
contrasted to Korea's successful FTA policy. There are several reasons behind the 
differences in the two countries' FTA strategies. For example, Katz (2010), editor-in-
chief of the Oriental Economist, points to the disparity in representation and writes that 
626 Interview no. 42. 
627 Interview no. 46. 
628 Interview no. 23. 
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in Japan "roughly one-half of the people live in the six most urban prefectures, but they 
get only 38 percent of the district seats in the Upper House", while in Korea "by 
contrast, the highly urban region around Seoul houses 48 percent of the voters and 
. elects 45 percent of the seats in the unicameral parliament". Still, it is the political 
system that seems to have the greatest impact on the differences in the countries' FTA 
policy. Korea has a presidential system and a top-down style of decision making that is 
very different from Japan's method of governance. The Korean President has much 
more political authority than the Japanese Prime Minister. He has the deciding vote 
when it comes to promoting FTAs, and the negotiating team has a mandate to act 
independently during FTA negotiations. According to the Director for Economic 
Partnership (EPAlFTA) at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, the presidential system in 
Korea plays an important role in the promotion of FTAs629• Pre-FTA consultations with 
interest groups and the sectors' representatives are kept to minimum. This makes the 
Korean decision-making process much quicker than Japan's process. In the opinion of 
Keidanren s Deputy Director, unlike his Japanese counterpart the President is willing to 
ignore what the interest groups want in order to sign a politically important FTA 630. 
Korea's FTA policy "has been shaped by a top-down political initiative rather than a 
bottom-up demand from various interest groups and the general public" (Koo 2008:2). 
Korea has two strong protectionist interest groups: the agricultural sector and the 
labour unions. Koo (2008:2) points out that when President Kim Dae-jung decided to 
sign the first FTA with Chile, these opposition forces were disorganised and pre-
occupied due to the IMF's austerity programme and the economic reforms undertaken 
in the aftermath of the 1997/98 East Asian financial crisis, which allowed the 
government to commence negotiations. After the implementation of the Korea-Chile 
FTA in 2004 the government passed a series of side-payments to the industries and the 
groups who were harmed in the effect of trade liberalisation. The Office of the Minister 
for Trade (OMT) plays an important role in Korea's FTA policy. The Office was formed 
after 1998 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Its purpose was to design 
and implement foreign trade policy and to lead trade negotiations. In time, it became the 
strongest force in Korea's foreign trade policy. The Office is, to a large extent, immune 
from interest group pressure but consults closely with various private business councils 
and the National Economic Advisory Council under the President's Office (Koo 
2008: 18). It does not consult SMEs or farmers, and the majority of the feedback it 
629 Interview no. 5. 
630 Interview no. 24. 
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receives comes from large businesses or their associations. Koo (2008:3) describes 
Korea's FTA policy-making style as 'embedded autonomy' (a term used originally by 
Peter Evans in 1995): President Kim's strong initiative to sign the first FTAs was 
promoted by the OMT, while the government provided side-payments to the groups 
which lost profits as an effect of economic liberalisation. The strong presidential support 
for signing FTAs continued in President Moo-hyun Roh's administration. For President 
Roh FTAs were the core element of economic policy and regional strategy (Koo 
2008:15). During his time in office, the OMT gained the central position in FTA policy 
formation. As previously discussed, in Japan, FTA negotiations tend to take place 
separately, within each ministry's jurisdiction. There is a possibility that one of the 
ministries will break the discussions by refusing to compromise and walking away from 
the talks. In Korea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is responsible for the 
entire process and hence can control all aspects of the negotiations and make 
appropriate decisions when difficulties arise (Katz 20 I 0). 
The US-Korea FTA proposal was initially strongly opposed by the majority of 
Korean society. It was expected that Korea would need to agree to the imports of 
sensitive agricultural products such as beef and pork. Nonetheless, the Korean President 
decided to promote the agreement in order to tighten diplomatic ties with the US631 • For 
Korea, it is imperative to have a relationship with the US, mainly due to security 
concerns over North Korea. In order to decrease the tension, the Korean President 
decided to sign the Korea-US agreement, at the cost of accepting additional agricultural 
imports. In 2010, most Korean citizens supported the agreement. This is an example of 
Korea's top-to-bottom style of governance, whereby the government implements the 
President's decisions632• This type of decision-making style is not without limits. For 
example, gaining support for the ratification of a signed FTA can pose a problem: this 
was the case in the US-Korea agreement. The Japanese style of decision making, 
including long domestic negotiations, is time-consuming. However, once a consensus is 
reached the ratification of an FTA is automatic. 
631 Interview no. 42. 
632 For more on the comparison of domestic decision-making processes between Japan and Korea and an 
analysis of how the Korean government overcomes agricultural sector's opposition to trade 
liberalisation see Choi and Sej in (20 II). 
261 
5.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated how the government collects information on preferences 
through its ministries as well as the mechanisms behind the formation of a domestic 
win-set. The characteristics of Japan's domestic FTA policy formulation process include 
a decentralised decision-making system, which makes it difficult to overcome interest-
group pressure. The preferences of each domestic group are opposed, limited, and 
constrained by the interests of others. FTAs with ASEAN member countries have been 
negotiated on a sector-by-sector basis, with the ministries seeking to avoid infringing on 
each other's jurisdictions. There was little joint coordination between the ministries and 
hence little incentive towards cohesive Japanese position on FTAs. In addition, as 
confirmed by the former Director for FTA Affairs at METI's Trade Policy Bureau, the 
Japanese government preferred to make decisions regarding its FTAs policy on a case-
by-case basis633 • As several observers have pointed out, there was no clear, grand FTA 
strategy within the government634 • Hence the trade agreements that were being signed 
were relatively easy agreements: they did not demand a drastic overhaul of the domestic 
policy, which was in accordance with the initial government's assumptions, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. Those problems were passed on to the DPJ's administration. With no 
centralised body responsible for FTA policy and weak political leadership it is difficult 
to overcome the domestic impasse and to implement bolder policy solutions. Based on a 
compromise between domestic voices, the outcome does not always favour the majority 
of citizens but can be determined by small groups with a strong measure of political 
influence or those who are decisively opposed to reforms and trade liberalisation (e.g. 
agricultural sector lobby groups). Pro-FTA groups are reluctant to enter into an open 
conflict with agricultural lobby groups. For that reason, international political and 
economic factors can play a crucial role in overcoming the domestic impasse. In 
particular, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the recent rise of Korea as an active FTA 
player had a profound impact on Japan's foreign trade strategy and caused the newly 
elected DPJ government to implement certain changes to the policy formation process. 
Konno (2009:24), a former MET! minister, writes that Japan's shift towards multi-
layered trade policy in the late 90s resulted from the "domestic reflection and 
revaluation of policy objectives as well as external factors, for example proliferation of 
FTAs signed by the EU and the US". 
633 Interview no. 4. 
634 Interview no. 50,41 and 38. 
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Similarly, external circumstances and the pressure resulting from other states' 
activities, has caused Japan to attempt to reinvent, or at least to redefine, its approach to 
FTA strategy. The major changes introduced by DPJ include the establishment of 
frequent inter-ministerial meetings on FTAs; the formulation of a new FTA strategy 
document based entirely on discussions between ministers and not on consultations with 
interest groups; and shifting the balance of power towards the politicians within the 
ministries, although to a varying extent in the four discussed institutions. The domestic 
debate on the need for stronger political leadership by the Prime Minister instead of by 
the ruling party, as well as on the need for policies to be formulated by politicians and 
not by bureaucrats, which was mentioned earlier in the chapter as one of the main initial 
concerns of the DPJ's agenda, are not new topics. In the aforementioned article, George 
Mulgan (2005:297) mentions both issues and argues that the question of stronger 
leadership by the Prime Minister was also discussed during the Koizumi administration. 
Nonetheless, the conducted fieldwork clearly points to the need for stronger political 
leadership in order to conclude further bilateral FTAs with important trading partners or 
to participate in multilateral agreements with a significant level of market opening. 
Although there is always a necessity for adjustments between the domestic standpoint 
and the international partner's requests, the lack of strong political leadership and a 
centralised decision-making body, when it comes to FTA policy, weakens Japan's 
position and prevents the efficient formation of such a domestic compromise. The 
ministries, supported by domestic actors, enter negotiations as separate bodies and do 
not present a unified front. The distinctive character of Japan's FTA policy formation is 
the fact that a domestic compromise is not accomplished before the beginning of 
negotiations and the ministries often act as independent bodies, representing only their 
sectors and not the domestic position as a whole. With a lack of centralised policy 
coordination, when it comes to FTAs the final domestic position (compromise) is not 
achieved on a national level but on a sectoral level or rather at a ministerial level, and 
the four discussed ministries share the role of Putnam's transmission belt. For that 
reason, reaching a domestic consensus is often as time-consuming as international 




6.1 Summary of Conclusions and Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis has assessed the preferences of selected groups of actors to analyse Japan's 
FTA policy. It has argued that the interplay of these preferences within the state, 
together with a specific decision-making and policy formation process, have constrained 
Japan's FTA strategy to date and continue to have an immense impact on the current 
policy towards the proposed East Asian FTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 
The thesis views Japan's FTA policy as embedded in a broader economic and political 
environment, both on a national and an international level. Changes in this environment 
can affect actors' preferences and lead to changes in countries' free trade agreements 
policies. One example of this is the FTAs signed by other states. By providing market 
opportunities or incentives to sign defensive agreements, third-party FTAs can impact 
the balance of pros and cons for further preferential trade liberalisation. In Chapter 1 of 
the thesis, this environment was defined as the four groups of factors: domestic political, 
international political, domestic economic and international economic. The main 
stakeholders of Japan's FTA policy were identified as the government, mainly the four 
ministries, and the two most powerful domestic interest groups, the business sector and 
agricultural lobby groups. The choice of actors was dictated by the characteristics of the 
policy formation process and the communication flows between these groups, as 
described in detail in Chapter 5. Using Putnam's (1988) model, the thesis has 
demonstrated how the preferences of the main actors have become the state's policy in 
the process of establishing a domestic win-set. Having identified the main actors in 
Japan's FTA strategy and the level of analysis determined by the choice of preferences 
as the main concept of the thesis, the fieldwork research targeted representatives of the 
groups of actors who are, or were, directly involved in the FTA policy formation process. 
Sixty interviews were conducted with, amongst others, members of the FTA divisions 
within ministries and senior managers with an overview of their company's FTAs 
utilisation policy. Apart from identifying preferences, the fieldwork addressed two other 
issues: communication channels and the issue of representation. It discussed how the 
preferences of domestic interest groups are communicated and represented within the 
government and how this affects the domestic policy formation process. 
264 
Chapter 1 of the thesis presented the research questions and placed the study in the 
broad theoretical context of the political economy field. It discussed the research 
framework and relevant theoretical models, as well as other studies on the impact of 
domestic preferences on foreign policy in East Asia. The chapter concluded with a 
description of the fieldwork data collection process. Chapter 2 introduced FTAs: their 
characteristics and classifications. The analysis of Japan's FTA policy in the following 
text was based on the definition and information provided here. The chapter introduced 
the concept of the spaghetti bowl and gave an overview of the multilatcralising 
bilateralism debate in relation to FTAs. Chapter 3 opened with a brief explanation of 
Japan's economic development in the post-war period and the country's industrial policy. 
It introduced the agricultural cooperatives and spoke of the origins of their political 
influence. It then focused on Japan's FTA policy and its development to date. The 
analysis in the chapter was divided into the preferences of the ministries, including the 
agricultural cooperatives, the manufacturing industry, and other interest groups 
regarding bilateral and minilateral FTAs. The chapter argued that the agricultural sector 
has opposed trade liberalisation and constrained Japan's FTA policy since its early 
stages. It further discussed the specific provisions of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (AJCEP), namely the flexible clause and cumulation, and argued 
that this agreement is rarely utilised by the multinational corporations (MNCs) in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Chapter 4 focused on the planned region-wide FTA and its possible membership. It 
discussed the desirability of the agreement from the perspective of the target groups as 
well as their preferences regarding its depth and scope. The chapter also presented the 
manufacturing industry's main concerns regarding current FTA policy and introduced 
the concept of lead time. It argued that both the ministries and the industries expect the 
region-wide agreement to have many similarities with the AJCEP. The chapter argued 
that Japan's MNCs have only a limited interest in a broader regional agreement, as they 
expect it will not include sufficient deep liberalisation provisions and help reduce lead 
time. Chapter 5 presented the domestic actors involved in the policy formation process. 
It discussed the four ministries and their roles, as well as the channels which used to 
collect the interest groups' preferences. It also introduced other organisations and 
groups involved in the process, including the business associations. The chapter 
discussed the impact of the change of administration to the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) in 2009 on the decision-making process within the ministries and the position of 
the agricultural cooperatives. The new compensation scheme, and its consequences for 
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the prospects of further trade liberalisation, was also mentioned. Chapter 5 analysed the 
domestic decision-making process and how these decisions are presented to foreign 
partners during international FTA negotiations. Therefore, it demonstrated how the 
domestic win-set is formed. It argued that the Prime Minister's lack of strong leadership 
and interest groups' ability to constrain foreign policy arc the main factors behind the 
current impasse of Japan's FTA strategy. This chapter presents a summary of 
conclusions to answer the research questions. 
6.2 The FTA Policy Impasse 
6.2.1 Japan's FTA Policy to Date and Actors' Preferences 
By 2011, Japan's FTA policy was at a standstill. Chapter 5 included a quote from a 
former Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) official and foreign policy analyst, 
Sugawara (2010:2), who has claimed that Japan's FTA policy is at an impasse on many 
levels. The thesis argued that this impasse results from two factors: 1) the domestic 
balance of preferences, in particular the position of the agricultural sector, and 2) the 
characteristics of domestic policy formation and decision-making processes. FTAs are 
said to support and 'lock in' domestic economic reforms (Manger 2005:807). Trade 
treaties influence the distribution of gains from international trade and hence have a 
significant impact on domestic groups' preferences. By opening the economy to foreign 
competition, FTAs can lead to the restructuring of uncompetitive sectors. According to 
some scholars, this is an important motivation behind governments' pursuing FTAs 
(Vrata 2003:98). Dent (2006:51) argues that this type of motivation may be particularly 
relevant to countries such as Japan and Korea. As discussed in Chapter 3, bilateral trade 
agreements may also be a way of directing foreign pressure (gaialsu) in order to 
overcome domestic opposition to economic reforms and market liberalisation. Shujiro 
Vrata (2003:98) points out that this role was previously fulfilled by the US and 
participation in international organisations, such as the WTO. Aggarwal and Koo 
(2005:205 cite Pempel and Urata 2005) also mention FTAs' ability to stimulate 
economic reforms. They (ibidem) argue that bilateral trade agreements and related 
foreign pressure are a more acceptable. reason for conducting necessary reforms than 
participation in a multilateral agreement. Krauss (2003:319) points out that part of the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's (MET!) motivation for pushing for Japan's 
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first FTAs was to stimulate economic reforms. However, in the past decade, consecutive 
FTAs did not bring about a significant liberalisation of the agricultural sector and many 
'sensitive' products were exempt from tariff reduction in all Japan's FTAs. 
A conventional explanation of why Japan names its FTAs 'economic partnership 
agreements' (EPAs) points to the deep scope of liberalisation, for example including 
provisions on trade in services, intellectual property rights and trade facilitation 
provisions. The name signifies a commitment to a comprehensive approach to FTAs that 
exceeds trade liberalisation. The fieldwork research suggested another explanation, 
however. MOFA's Director of the EPNFTA Policy Division explained that part of the 
motivation was to widen the scope of the agreements in order to compensate for an 
exclusion of certain products635 • This was confirmed during other interviews636• Japan's 
FTAs were never meant to reach fullliberalisation across all tariff lines. It was expected 
that agriculture and other sensitive sectors would be mostly excluded. As confirmed by 
MOFA's Director, Japan has been signing partial economic cooperation treaties as 
opposed to agreements with comprehensive trade liberalisation provisions which the 
Ministry would like to see realised in the future637• This has caused Lincoln (2004) to 
refer to Japan's FTAs as 'so-called free trade areas'. The goal was to sign FTAs which 
supported the activities of the multinational corporations (MNCs) but did not lead to a 
policy overhaul. The special position of the agricultural sector and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) on the domestic political scene was the 
main reason behind this decision. Chapter 3 also mentioned Japan's experiences with 
the liberalisation of the agricultural sector under the WTO negotiations and the position 
of MAFF at the time. 
Milner (1997:60) pointed out that while the preferences for the international 
cooperation of political actors are influenced by "electoral calculations", interest 
groups' preferences are affected by the domestic distribution of gains and losses. The 
signing of an FTA brings economic gains which are unequally distributed within the 
nation. While certain groups profit from preferential trade liberalisation, others do not. 
MAFF and the agricultural cooperatives are the main domestic source of opposition to 
trade liberalisation. Chapter 3 explained the origins of the agricultural cooperatives, 
their specific position in society and their connections to the government. Japan's 
agricultural sector is the owner of scarce factors of production within the economy and 
63S Interview no. 9. 
636 Interview no. 28, 46, 60. 
637 Interview no. 9. 
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produces import-competing goods, according to the trade theory models discussed in 
Chapter 1 (e.g. the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson models). For that reason, 
the preferences of the agricultural sector remain virtually unchanged when it comes to 
FTAs. The fieldwork indicated that it is opposed to further liberalisation under bilateral, 
minilateral and region-wide FTAs. The agricultural sector, supported by the agricultural 
cooperatives and represented by MAFF, managed to secure special treatment for Japan's 
products in this sector in all FTAs. Although Japan made compromises on agricultural 
products during subsequent trade negotiations, none of the agreements has led to a 
significant domestic reform. Other domestic groups, including METI, do not want to 
enter into an open confrontation or conflict with MAFF and the cooperatives. 
Schelling's conjecture (1960), discussed in Chapter 1, explains that the protests of a 
strong domestic group (e.g. farmers) may cause the negotiating partner to limit demands 
in this sector. One of the negotiating parties is significantly constrained by its domestic 
opposition and the other believes that an agreement that goes against such domestic 
protests is impossible to accomplish and hence abandons its requests. This can, perhaps, 
explain how the agricultural lobby groups represented by MAFF during international 
negotiations managed to protect tariffs in the sector. 
The MNCs own abundant factors of production and manufacture export-competing 
goods. Therefore, they have potentially the most to gain from trade liberalisation. 
Chapters 3 and 4 indicated that the preferences of Japanese MNCs regarding a particular 
planned FTA vary between companies in different sectors as well as within the same 
sector. According to the fieldwork research, there are two reasons for this. First, 
Japanese MNCs produce and export the majority of their goods from the East Asian 
states where they have located subsequent stages of the production process. As a result 
of this internationalisation of production networks, they rely heavily on third-party 
FTAs. Therefore, their preferences regarding FTAs are complicated by the number of 
countries from which they export. The second, closely related issue is the fact that for 
MNCs, free trade agreements are inherently competitive. A company's position in the 
international markets depends on its relative position versus that of foreign companies 
in the same sector as well as versus domestic competitors. This means that its 
preferences regarding an FTA will depend on: 1) how such an agreement is expected to 
affect its relative position, for example will it level the playing field and reduce the 
negative effects of a previously signed third-party FTA, 2) how it will affect the position 
of domestic competitors, and 3) how it will affect foreign companies. When the 
proposed FTA was expected to benefit some domestic competitors more than others, 
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opinions within a given sector were divided. This occurred, for example, in the case of 
the Japan-Mexico FTA, as described in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 also explained that MNCs have had a strong interest in FTAs with 
Japan's trading partners, particularly in East Asia. Due to the vertical integration of 
production networks, the agreements with ASEAN member countries were strongly 
supported by companies in all target sectors. The ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (AJCEP), which overlapped with bilateral agreements with the 
Association's members, introduced the co-equal rule of origin and cumulation. As the 
rules of ASEAN's internal FTA (AFTA) changed before the AJCEP went into effect, the 
agreement offered little additional benefits. Tariffs for the majority of products are 
higher under the minilateral agreement than under bilateral ones, as explained in 
Chapter 3. Therefore, companies prefer to utilise bilateral FTAs for exporting from 
Japan and AFTA for exporting between ASEAN countries. This is possible due to the 
flexible clause introduced in the AJCEP. This has allowed companies to choose which 
of the overlapping agreements they want to trade under. As a result, the conducted 
research has demonstrated that the coexistence of the overlapping agreements does not 
cause a problem for the Japanese companies, due to a low level of utilisation of the 
AJCEP and the flexible provisions included in the agreement. 
In regard to the proposed region-wide agreement, there has been little interest from 
the manufacturing industry. This sector has a clear vision of the provisions it would like 
to see included in all prospective FTAs. One of the main issues currently concerning 
Japanese MNCs is the reduction of lead time638, as explained in Chapter 4. In order to 
help reduce lead time, an FTA would need to include deep liberalisation and trade 
facilitation provisions as well as support the convergence of rules and standards. 
Japanese companies are still facing several non-tariff barriers in East Asian countries 
and would like to see this situation improve. This could be done under a high-level 
minilateral, or a multilateral, agreement, for example under the WTO. The MNCs are 
interested in improving the quality of existing bilateral agreements and deepening 
regional economic integration rather than negotiating a region-wide FTA. According to 
the fieldwork research, companies and certain governmental officials expect that a 
region-wide APEC or an ASEAN-centred FTA will be a low-level, 'lowest common 
denominator', agreement, similar to the AJCEP. 
For the ministries, FTAs were supposed to fulfil certain economic or strategic 
638 Lead time is the time from when the decision to start the production is made to when the manufacture 
of the final product is completed and it has arrived at its destination. 
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functions. Bilateral FTAs were to a large extent motivated by the economic interests of 
the MNCs. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, they were driven by both domestic and 
international economic factors and functional considerations. METI expected to serve 
companies in the manufacturing sector and prevent economic isolation resulting from 
third-party FTAs. Chapter 3 explained how the FTAs which Japan signed were shaped 
by this goal. For MOFA, isolation avoidance and 'FTA catch up' were important 
motivations639• The notion of 'not being left behind' and 'catching up' has bcen present 
in Japan's FTA policy since Kaoru Yosano's speech in 1998 and continued to feature in 
the government's rhetoric in 2010. The DPJ's 'Basic Policy on Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership' (2010a) mentions that Japan aims to sign agreements with major 
trading partners, which "will withstand comparison with the trend of other such 
relationships". During the APEC Yokohama Summit in 2010, Prime Minister Naoto 
Kan (cited by Sakamaki 2010) spoke of not being left behind. This research 
demonstrates the pivotal role of isolation avoidance, the economic domino effect and 
competition with Korea for the development of Japan's FTA strategy. Ravenhill 
(2009:16) argues that the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia is caused mainly by a 
political domino effect and refers to Munakata's (2006b) argument that FTAs in the 
region are signed not to reduce trade costs but as a result of competing visions of the 
region. This argument is repeated in his 2010 paper (Ravenhill 2010: 179). Ravenhill 
(2009:16) also refers to Dent's (2006) survey results, stating that 'strengthening 
diplomatic relations with key partners' is the most quoted reason for engaging in FTA 
negotiations. The fieldwork conducted for this thesis offered no confinnation for this 
argument in relation to Japan. On the contrary, strengthening diplomatic relations was 
not a relevant factor, according to the respondents: instead, they mentioned isolation 
avoidance and economic competition. This argument was strongly reflected in Chapters 
3 and 4. It has been an important factor shaping the preferences of both the government 
and the industries. However, Ravenhill (2010: 199) views isolation avoidance as 
motivated by political factors and the governments' fear of "potential exclusion from a 
new dimension of regional economic diplomacy". The thesis argued that isolation 
avoidance motivation stems from economic as well as political factors: just as the 
isolation resulting from not being a member of an FTA would have both economic and 
political implications. The economic aspect of Japan's isolation avoidance motivation is 
particularly visible when it comes to competition with Korea. This issue, mentioned in 
639 Other issues, such as the lack of progress of the WTO negotiations, played a supporting role in 
facilitating the shift from a multilateral to a multi-layer foreign trade policy. 
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all of the 60 interviews, was defined as a result of changes in the relative position of 
Japanese products in international markets and not of competing conceptions of the 
region 640. Competition with Korea was brought up in relation to how Japanese 
corporations, mainly in the electronics sector, compete with Korean firms such as 
Samsung, the world's biggest technology company by sales. The political factor that 
Ravenhill (2009) refers to could arguably have determined the shift of Japan's focus 
from the ASEAN+3 to the ASEAN+6 framework. However, METI was also strongly 
motivated by economic considerations and the fact that the lattcr grouping includes 
countries where Japanese MNCs' located their production networks64l • As demonstratcd 
throughout the thesis, MET! and multinational corporations are the strongest pro-
liberalisation group in Japan. Consecutive trade agreements, even if initially proposcd 
by the FTA partner, were driven by one of the two METI Bureaus, depcnding on the 
motivation behind them: interests of specific industries (Manufacturing Industries 
Bureau) or broader trade policy issues (Trade Policy Bureau). Japanese MNCs are also 
highly concerned about the proliferation of FTAs and the negative effects of third-party 
agreements. Their preferences for particular negotiations depend on economic factors 
and result from a desire to gain advantage over compctitors. Ravcnhill (20 I 0) argucs 
that low utilisation rates of East Asian FTAs are an indication of the existcnce of a 
political domino effect. However, according to the understanding demonstratcd in this 
thesis, low utilisation rates can result from the fact that during the FTA negotiation 
process MET! is constrained by preferences of other domestic actors and of the 
international partner. Therefore, the final trade agreement is formed based on both 
domestic and international win-sets and, as such, does not necessarily fulfil the 
industries' expectations. This does not undermine the role the MNCs have played in 
supporting Japan's FTAs, in particular the Manufacturing Industries Bureau-driven ones. 
Nonetheless, the fieldwork findings confirm Ravenhill's (ibidem) argument that the 
lobbying efforts of pro-liberalisation groups were often offset by protectionist interests: 
in Japan's case mainly from the agricultural sector. 
The fieldwork research indicated the importance of external factors for Japan's FTA 
policy. Chapter 3 argued that the domestic impasse in FTA policy causes Japan to be 
particularly reactive to international-level factors. The importance of external factors is 
even stronger for region-wide agreements. This could be explained by the larger size of 
the agreement and, hence, the fact that there is a wider spectrum of international actors 
640 This issue is discussed later in the chapter. 
641 Interview no. 7. 
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and preferences to accommodate. The state's preferences are more constrained. As a 
result, there are more potential domestic 'costs'. Moreover, it can be argued that the 
isolation avoidance and economic domino effect factors are stronger when it comes to 
wider FTAs, as the results of being excluded from such agreements are more significant. 
Therefore, Japan's region-wide FTA policy is more passive and reactive and is highly 
influenced by developments on the international stage. The fieldwork demonstrated that 
there is little domestic interest in a region-wide agreement in East Asia in terms of 
expected economic gains for the manufacturing sector. However, there is a strong 
pressure to avoid being left behind in the face of Korea's FTA policy, namely the EU-
Korea FTA and the intensification of efforts to finalise the Korea-US agreement in the 
second half of 20 1 0 culminating in the ratification of the agreement by both countries in 
2011, and the progress of the TPP negotiations. The thesis has argued that economic 
competition with Korea is one of the main issues of Japan's current FTA policy. All of 
the 60 respondents mentioned Korea's FTA policy as a major economic threat to Japan. 
Just as competition with China has led Japan to opt for the ASEAN+6 instead of 
ASEAN+3 framework, Korea's FTA policy has caused Japan to focus on the TPP and 
the FTAs with a higher level of difficulty. This was demonstrated by the DPJ's 
commitment to increase efforts to finalise the Australia-Japan FTA and recent 
endeavours to commence the trilateral China-Japan-Korea FTA negotiations. 
The MNCs' rivalry with their Korean counterparts is evidenced not only by their 
support for entering the TPP negotiations and signing FTAs with a higher level of 
liberalisation but also by recent developments, in particular in the electronics sector. 
Chapter 3 analysed the preferences of the manufacturers of liquid-crystal display (LCD) 
televisions and panels. It mentioned how competition with Korea and Taiwan has 
caused them to support the AJCEP. At the end of August 20 II, Sony, Toshiba, and 
Hitachi announced a planned merger of their LCD operations and the forming of a joint 
venture, Japan Display (The Japan Times Online 2011). 70 percent of the new 
company's shares would belong to Innovation Network Corp., an investment fund 
mostly owned by the Japanese government. This merger is aimed directly at Korean 
competitors, such as Samsung, as well as other important players; for example. 
Taiwanese LCD producers. This relates to two issues discussed throughout the thesis. 
Firstly, it shows how, in an increasingly competitive international environment, 
Japanese companies are taking steps to remain competitive. Supporting FTAs can be 
viewed as one of these steps. Secondly, it demonstrates that the Japanese government is 
becoming increasingly aware of this competition and is undertaking a wide range of 
272 
actions to help support MNCs' activities. 
Another reason for the impasse is the fact that the policy of signing agreements 
with the exception of sensitive sectors is no longer sustainable. Japan has already signed 
all of the 'easy' FTAs where it could proceed without conducting substantial domestic 
refonns. Sugawara (2010) has called the finalisation of the AJ CEP negotiations the end 
of the first stage of Japan's FTA strategy. Now that Japan has achieved what it set out to 
do, to reach agreements with ASEAN members, Sekizawa (2009) points out that there 
are three options for the future: 
• Negotiating agreements with major trade partners such as Australia, the EU, and 
the US 
• Participating in a region-wide FTA 
• Signing FTAs with other, smaller trading partners, for example Peru. 
The first option requires the signing of high-level agreements. Such FTAs would 
need to include a much higher level of liberalisation than has been achieved under the 
treaties signed so far. Japan has been negotiating an agreement with Australia since 
April 2007. As explained in Chapter 3, the lack of compromise in the field of agriculture 
is the main reason behind the slow progress of negotiations. Japan has also been 
intensifying its efforts for an FTA with the EU. As was explained in Chapter 3, there is 
less interest in the agreement on the European side, in particular as Japan has failed to 
make a sufficient commitment to removing non-tariff barriers. Chapter 4 discussed the 
issue of Japan's participation in a region-wide FTA initiative. The government's vision 
of the region-wide agreement is not clearly defined. MOFA uses the tenn 'dock and 
tnerge', but there are no specific ideas on how to harmonise the different levels of trade 
agreements. The AJCEP's solution to the coexistence of FTAs is far from perfect, and 
its application to a region-wide FTA is questionable. As explained in Chapter 4, in a way, 
coexistence, functionalism and participation in several regional frameworks is the 
government's de facto strategy. The third option allows Japan to continue FTA policy in 
a relatively unchanged fashion but offers little economic gains. The results of such FTAs 
would be limited, at best. Whether negotiating a bilateral agreement with the EU or 
participating in the TPP negotiations, Japan will encounter the same problems and be 
faced with the same constraints on the domestic level. Without solving the issue of 
sensitive domestic sectors, Japan will be unable to sign high-level FTAs with major 
economic partners or participate in the TPP negotiations which would require a series of 
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· domestic refonns. This impasse in FTA policy is even more problematic in the view of 
external circumstances, namely the competition with Korea that was discussed earlier. 
6.2.2 The Characteristics of the Domestic Policy Formation and Decision-making 
Processes 
In tenns of establishing the domestic win-set, the fieldwork indicated that the main 
political actors were the four ministries: METI, MOFA, MAFF and the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). As explained in Chapter 5, there is a division of labour bctwecn the 
four ministries when it comes to FTAs. METI and MAFF reprcscnt the two strongest 
interest groups discussed in this thesis. MOFA represents Japan in intcrnational 
negotiations. MOF is responsible for technical aspects of FTAs, such as rules of origin. 
Chapter 5 pointed out the specific policy coordination process within MAFF and how it 
was affected by the change of administration to the DPJ. It argued that there is no 
centralised decision-making organ when it comes to the FTA policy formation process. 
Although MOFA is the ministry responsible for foreign affairs, METI is heavily 
involved in economic foreign policy, including FTAs. This has been previously 
described, amongst others, by Chalmers JOhnsons (1982) and Sato (2001:14) who also 
points out that "despite Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's effort to enhance the 
standing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) during his tenure in the 1980s, the 
MOFA's role in foreign economic policy has been limited". METI's Trade Policy 
Bureau is the single strongest supporter of trade Iiberalisation and FTAs. The thesis has 
stressed the role played by METI and the Trade Policy Bureau in particular in the FTA 
policy fonnation process from its inception. Japan's FTA policy can be traced back to a 
1998 speech by the Minister of International Trade and Industry, Kaoru Yosano, and 
METI's 'The Economic Foundations of Japanese Trade Policy - Promoting a Multi-
Layered Trade Policy' (2000b) paper, as well as the Japan-Korea FTA projcct proposed 
in the same year. METI was also behind the ASEAN+6 initiative and the shift of policy 
priority from ASEAN+3 to ASEAN+6. Therefore, the thesis has argued that METI is 
leading Japan's FTA policy while MOFA is lagging behind. 
Within METI, there are two separate divisions working on free trade agreements: 
the Trade Policy Bureau, which focuses on the overall trade policy, and the 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau, which represents the interests of the manufacturing 
sector. METI communicates with the manufacturing sector through several official and 
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unofficial channels. The Manufacturing Industries Bureau within METI has a division 
responsible for industries and communicates directly with companies in this sector as 
well as with industrial associatio~s. Business associations, for example Keidanren, 
Keizai Doyukai and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, are another platform 
from which the MNCs can express their interests and preferences. These organisations 
cooperate closely with METI and publish policy recommendations. The Trade Policy 
Bureau participates in this information exchange and occasionally communicates 
directly with the companies. As explained in Chapters 3 and 5, the preferences of the 
two Bureaus can differ. While the Trade Policy Bureau always supports further trade 
liberalisation and FTAs, the Manufacturing Industries Bureau can be ambivalent, 
depending on the preferences of manufacturing industries. The conducted research 
demonstrated that FTA projects which have had the support of both bureaus were easier 
to conclude and more successful in overcoming the agricultural sector's opposition. 
'Failed' FTA negotiations, in particular the Australia-Japan FTA process, indicate that 
the difficulties of concluding an agreement without strong support from the 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau and with simultaneous protests from MAFP. With a 
low level of interest and the mounting demands of the foreign partner the costs 
outweighed the expected gains and there was little progress in the negotiation process. 
The domestic balance of preferences can be portrayed in the following way. MAFF has 
constantly opposed the liberalisation of the agriculture sector, especially sensitive 
products. The intensity of its protests has depended on the level of demands of the 
foreign partner in the field of agriculture. The Trade Policy Bureau has consistently 
supported the signing of further FTAs. The position of the Manufacturing Industries 
Bureau has depended on the preferences of the industries. Although the Bureau is 
generally in favour of FTAs, the strength of its interest depends on how much the 
industries are expected to gain from such an agreement. The two 'failed' FTA cases 
demonstrate that there needs to be a positive balance of expected gains versus expected 
costs for the agreement to take place. On the other hand, when there is little interest or 
expected profit but at the same time there are no serious obstacles or sensitive issues 
involved, an agreement can still be signed. Depending on the source of the initial 
interest and support, this thesis has divided Japan's FTAs into Trade Policy Bureau-
driven agreements (Singapore, Switzerland, and the AJCEP) and the Manufacturing 
Industries Bureau-driven ones (agreements with ASEAN members). The former are 
examples of treaties dictated by strategic goals and not economic gains. The latter are 
FTAs with major trade partners or treaties supported by manufacturing industries for a 
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particular reason, such as off-setting the negative effects of a third-party FT A. 
As discussed, Ravenhill (2009:16) argues that Japan's FTA strategy is largely 
government-driven and the business sectors' lobbying efforts are not of great 
consequence. However, the fieldwork indicated that due to a close connection between 
the government and the interest groups, the preferences of MNCs and other domestic 
groups have a strong impact on the government's actions. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, 
METI forms its position on FTAs based on consultations with the business circles. 
Therefore, the fieldwork research did not confirm Ravenhill's (2009: 16) claim that the 
Japanese government has "autonomy from societal interests" similar to many Asian 
governments. Interest groups' preferences are embedded in the policy formation process. 
They are expressed directly to the relevant part of the government, for example METI's 
Manufacturing Industries Bureau then passed on to the Trade Policy Bureau and outside 
MET! to MOFA and MAFF. Therefore, domestic groups' preferences are an integral 
part of the domestic win-set formation process. This contradicts Ravenhill's (ibidem:29) 
argument that "regional cooperation in Asia has been overwhelmingly a top-down afTair, 
driven by politics rather than economics". 
Similarly to METI, MAFF has two departments involved in FTA policy. The 
International Affairs Department is responsible for the overall policy while the 
Agricultural Production Bureau has a division for each commodity. Under the 
administration of the Liberal Democratic Party's (LOP), the ministry cooperated closely 
with the agricultural cooperatives and the local-level LDP politicians. This ceased to be 
the case after the change of administration to the DPJ in 2009. Now, the agricultural 
cooperatives no longer communicate with the ministry. The decisions are made by the 
political (elected) members of the ministry, and there is little coordination with outside 
organisations. The Agricultural Production Bureau gathers information directly from 
farmers. This has been a significant change in the functioning of the Ministry'S internal 
decision-making process. MOFA's internal dynamics have also bcen affected by the 
change of administration, as explained in Chapter 5. In comparison, METl's officials 
have indicated that their daily activities have remained relatively unchanged since the 
DPJ came into office . 
. Together, the four ministries coordinate FTA policy. The research demonstrated that 
there are two main problems on the governmental level. Firstly, there is no formal, 
centralised mechanism of policy coordination or decision-making. During the LOP 
administrations, the four ministries met only a handful of times to discuss FTA policy. 
MOFA was charged with the task of liaising between the other three ministries. Under 
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the DPJ administration, the situation changed slightly and the four ministries cooperated 
closely in order to publish the DPJ's new FTA strategy, a 'Basic Policy on 
Comprehensive Economic Partnerships' (DPJ 2010a). This strategy was developed 
based entirely on discussions between the four ministries, and they did not consult with 
interest groups. Between November 2009 and November 2010 when the document was 
published, several meetings took place on different levels. They were chaired by 
MOFA's minister. This can be seen as an attempt to introduce a new coordination 
system between the four ministries. Choi and Sejin (2011 :253) attribute Japan's inability 
to liberalise the agricultural sector to the 'fragmented' coordination mechanism and 
domestic trade governance which "gave disproportionately larger weight to agricultural 
interests within the Japanese government". 
The second constraint of the domestic policy formation model is the lack of strong 
political leadership and the relatively weak position of the Prime Minister (PM). The 
need for stronger political leadership by the PM was brought up during research 
fieldwork as well as by several scholars (e.g. Urata 2011, Lord 2010:31, George Mulgan 
2004:5). This is not a new problem. Sato (2001 :15) refers to Karel Van Wolferen 
(1990:49) who, in a 1990 Foreign Affairs article, wrote that there is "no centre of 
accountability" and that each ministry is concerned with their own interests while the 
PM is not in a position to speak for the entire country. George Mulgan (2005:297) 
mentions that the need for the PM to assume a stronger position was also discussed 
during Junichiro Koizumi's administration. Without a strong, centralised decision-
making organ or a coordination mechanism, the domestic win-set cannot be created 
before the international stage of FTA negotiations. None of the ministries or 
organisations has sufficient authority and political influence to work out a domestic 
compromise to the different preferences and harmonise the conflicting demands of 
various interest groups. As explained in Chapter 5, on the domestic level this function 
has to some extent been fulfilled by MOFA. During international negotiations, as in the 
case of Mexico, the Prime Minister was in charge of coordinating the policy and 
resolving any potential conflicts of interest. 
Many of Japan's FTAs, in particular the ones with ASEAN members, were 
negotiated on a sector-by-sector basis. This means that the agricultural sector negotiated 
the liberalisation of agricultural products with representatives of the same sector from 
the partner state. Ministries avoided entering each other's jurisdiction. As described in 
Chapter 5, there was no effective system for overcoming conflicts arising from cross-
ministry bargaining situations. Japan's position in international negotiations has been 
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weakened by its lack of strong political leadership and a centralised decision-making 
body. When decisions and negotiations are based on sector-by-sector principles and 
there is no cross-sector coordination, this prevents the formation of a domestic win-set. 
Ministries enter the international stage of negotiations as separate bodies and do not 
present a unified front. They act as independent organs, representing only the interests 
of certain groups. The domestic win-set is hence not achieved on a national level, 
between ministries, but on a sectoral level. In addition, with no centralised organisation 
responsible for FTA policy and weak political leadership, it is difficult to overcome the 
opposition of domestic interest groups and implement bolder policy solutions. This is 
another reason why external factors play such a crucial role: they help to break such 
domestic constraints and impasses. 
6.3 Originality and Contribution 
The thesis makes an original contribution in terms of: 1) empirical data and theoretical 
framework, and 2) new insights into the FTA policy formation process in Japan and 
evidence in the multilateralising bilateralism debate. As explained in Chapter 1 of the 
thesis, this study was based on 60 in-depth interviews. The interviewees were chosen 
due to their direct involvement in the FTA policy or tthe fact that they have experience 
in using FTAs, in the case of industry representatives. As such, they represented a fairly 
comprehensive sample of the main groups of actors. In accordance with the framework 
assumptions, the interviews were conducted with: 1) representatives of the government, 
mainly the four main ministries and their internal bureaus or divisions, 2) MNCs in four 
manufacturing industry sectors, 3) the agricultural cooperatives, representing the 
interests of farmers, and 4) the service sector and labour unions. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, individual farmers were the only group that was not represented. The 
originality of the theoretical approach lies in combining Putnam's (1988) two-level 
game metaphor with using preferences as the central concept of the thesis and the 
inclusion of four types of factors in the analysis of Japan's FTA policy: domestic, 
international, political, and economic. Putnam's model was used to separate the 
international and domestic levels of the policy formation process and to conceptualise 
the latter as bargaining between various groups of actors (domestic negotiations). The 
preferences of main stakeholders were used as a tool for understanding the underlying 
motivation behind this policy. This had several implications. First, concentrating on 
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preferences determined which aspects of Japan's FTA policy the thesis focused on: its 
formation on the domestic level (level two of the game). Second, focusing on 
preferences allowed taking into account the differences between the interests and 
motivations of the main actors (the ministries and the industries). Furthermore, it drew 
attention to the tensions in the domestic decision-making process, resulting from the 
differences in preferences of each of the parties participating in this process. The thesis 
, 
viewed Japan's FTA policy as a result of domestic compromise, the shape of which 
depends on the relative position of groups of actors and the strength of their preferences, 
as explained in Chapter 1. It conceptualised this policy as interplay of preferences, with 
the final outcome being shaped by the domestic decision-making and policy-formation 
processes. Bridging the gap between different preferences is an inherent part of the 
policy formation process. Therefore, the thesis makes a contribution to the body of 
knowledge on FTAs by highlighting the domestic tensions between the preferences of 
different actors and the importance of internal decision-making process to the formation 
of Japan's FTA policy. 
Adopting of this framework has led to uncovering of several trends in Japan's FTA 
policy which would have been overlooked if the study analysed this policy through 
focusing on the international-level game and did not allow for the inclusion of all four 
types of factors. These trends, or key findings, were discussed throughout this chapter 
and contribute to the body of knowledge on Japan's FTA policy. The difficulties in 
dealing with the agricultural sector's opposition and issues with the domestic decision-
making process pointed to the lack of strong political leadership in Japan's FTA policy 
formation. The framework has also provided the opportunity to look into the 
preferences of ministries and highlight any possible differences, for example, a slight 
difference in reasons for supporting trade liberalisation between the two METl's 
bureaus. As a result, the thesis distinguished between the Trade Policy Bureau-driven 
FTAs and the Manufacturing Industries Bureau-driven ones. Finally, as actors' 
preferences were the key concept of the framework, factors that influence and shape 
these preferences were understood to be central to the analysis of Japan's FTA policy 
formation process. This resulted in uncovering of certain key factors dctcrmining this 
policy. The importance of isolation avoidance motivation for the MNCs and the 
government was stressed throughout the thesis. As previously discussed, this factor 
could be applied both in an economic and geopolitical context. The increasing 
importance of competition with Korea was one of the key findings of the thesis. Apart 
from representatives of MAFF and the agricultural cooperatives, all of the respondents 
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chose this factor as one of the most significant determinants of Japan's current FTA 
policy. Representatives of the other two groups viewed it as important as they believed 
that competition with Korea will cause industries to increase their lobby efforts and 
strengthen the pro-liberalisation rhetoric within the government. These findings 
demonstrate the advantages of the adopted framework. Their implication is that both the 
four levels of factors and preferences of domestic groups should be taken into account 
when analysing Japan's FTA. 
The thesis offers contribution to the multilateralising bilateralism debate. The 
analysis of Japan's approach to overlapping and coexisting FTAs provides new evidence 
in this debate. The thesis analysed the technical aspects of the coexistence of Japan's 
bilateral agreements with the AJCEP and focused on preferences and motivations that 
have led to this outcome. The same was done in regards to the proposed regional FTAs. 
The thesis offered three main findings in the context of the multilateralising bilateralism 
debate. First, it assessed that Japan does not have a clear vision for harmonising or 
multilateralising of the overlapping FTAs, both current and prospective. Chapter 4 
discussed the ideas regarding the possible consolidation of existing treaties into broader 
regional agreements advocated by Japanese scholars and representatives of the 
government and industries. However, these visions seem to be limited to discussing the 
order of sequencing of such consolidation (e.g. ASEAN+l agreements would be 
transformed into EAFTA which would then be transformed into CEPEA). In a way, the 
thesis argued, coexistence is the preferred solution for harmonising overlapping 
agreements: for example, through implementing a flexibility clause similar to the one in 
the AJCEP. Second, the thesis demonstrated that the consolidation of bilateral trade 
agreements in not always a step forward on the path to multilateralisation. The AJCEP 
could be viewed as a consolidation of existing bilateral FTAs with ASEAN countries as 
in majority of cases it applies the same tariffs and phrase-in schedules. It also extends 
preferential treatment to other ASEAN countries that did not have an FTA with Japan. 
The conducted fieldwork demonstrated that the coexistence of multiple levels of 
regulations and rules of origin under this FTA does not necessarily increase the 
domestic pressure for harmonisation or renegotiation of the existing agreements642• On 
the contrary, signing of the AJCEP and the inclusion of the flexibility clause has 
convinced many of the interviewed governmental officials that overlapping regulations 
do not pose a problem for the MNCs. This was confirmed by the interviewed 
642 Menon (2009: 1396) argued that for this reason consolidation is the least preferable solution for the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
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representatives of the multinational corporations643• Therefore, signing of the minilateral 
agreement did not create an incentive to harmonise existing treaties. Third, the thesis 
makes an original contribution to the multilateralising bilateralism debate by presenting 
the preferences of Japanese industries for future trade liberalisation. While Japan's 
regional FTA policy is often discussed in the subject literature, it is mainly in the 
context of the government's official policy: the interests of the manufacturing sector are 
often omitted. The thesis argues that Japanese manufacturing companies are mainly 
interested in the inclusion of trade facilitation provisions, as explained in detail in 
Chapter 4. Therefore, they would prefer to see the deepening of existing agreements 
than signing broader regional ones, unless this would mean being excluded from an 
important treaty, such as the TPP. 
6.4 Conclusions and Implications 
This research has found that Japan has been signing pragmatic, 'easy' FTAs motivated 
by economic ad-hoc factors rather than by regional community-building. At the same 
time, external factors, such as economic competition with Korea or the progress of the 
TPP negotiations, have forced Japan to rethink its FTA policy. This has caused 
Sugawara (2010:18) to argue that "Japan is currently standing at the crossroads, in need 
of a new policy agenda enabling it to tackle the huge impending shift of its international 
trade environment". 
The issues discussed in this thesis have strong implications for Japan's current FTA 
policy. The systemic problems which developed during the LDP's administration were 
passed on to that of the DP J. Without stronger political leadership, it will be extremely 
difficult to overcome the domestic opposition of the agricultural sector or conduct any 
necessary reforms, for example the removal of non-tariff barriers requested by the EU. 
This is also the case when it comes to a broader regional FTA. The empirical findings in 
this thesis add to the understanding of Japan's current position with regard to the TPP 
negotiations. As discussed, Prime Minister Naoto Kan's (2010) speech of October 2010, 
announcing that Japan would consider participating in the TPP agreement, was met with 
strong protests from the opposition as well as members of the DPJ. Former Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama asked Prime Minister Naoto Kan to take the agricultural 
643 However, the coexistence of bilateral and minilateral agreements may pose a problem for smaller 
companies. 
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sector's interests into consideration and to be 'cautious' when expressing interest in the 
TPP (Kyodo News 2010). As a result, an announcement by Prime Minister Kan at the 
Yokohama APEC Summit stated only that Japan would start consultations with the nine 
negotiating countries of the TPP and reach a decision on whether to join the agreement 
by June 2011. The decision was postponed due to the Tohoku earthquake in March 2011. 
The developments which took place in the second half of 2011 support the findings of 
this research. Just as in the case of Japan's overall FTA policy, when it came to deciding 
whether the country would enter the TPP negotiations, Japan's actions were constrained 
by a clash of powerful domestic interests. As discussed, the business associations 
strongly supported Japan's participation in the TPP. In particular, Keidanren has voiced 
its opinion that stronger political leadership is needed on this issue in order for Japan 
not to be left behind (The Japan Times Online 20 11 b). This is in line with the 
conclusions of Chapter 5 and the importance of isolation avoidance motivation 
discussed throughout the thesis. The business sector, in particular export-oriented 
industries such as those in the automotive and electronics sectors, has also shown its 
support for the TPP (The Japan Times Online 20IIc). The Japan Times Online (Nakata 
13 November 2011) quoted METI's reports stating that in 2010 alone Japan's 
automotive companies paid "more than ¥130 billion in customs duties to seven nations 
in the TPP talks". On the other hand, several members of the DPJ and the agricultural 
sector, represented by the JA-Zenchu, have continued to strongly oppose the initiative. 
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced that Japan will join the TPP negotiations 
during a press conference after a meeting of the Cabinet on 11 November 2011: a day 
before parting for the APEC 2011 Summit. On 10 November, during a TPP debate in the 
Diet, 232 members representing both parties submitted a resolution opposing Japan's 
participation in the negotiations (Fukue 2011). Despite the government's plans to invest 
in and strengthen the agricultural sector, further protests seem inevitable. In light of the 
analysis in this thesis, it is seems characteristic that Prime Minister Noda's 
announcement was followed by a discussion on whether Japan would pull out of the 
negotiations if the government decides they conflict with national interests. Although 
there has not been any agreement reached on this matter, such a move is likely to have a 
negative impact on the special partnership with the US (Martin 2011). The results of this 
research indicate that Japan's FTA policy oscillates between isolation avoidance, 
expressed by the interests of the business sector, and systemic constraints, namely the 
lack of a centralised decision making organ. With the continuous protests from the 
agricultural sector, the government tries to proceed with the trade liberalisation agenda 
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while adapting safeguarding measures aimed at easing the concerns of the opposition. It 
would be interesting to assess the effects of the preferences of the strong domestic 
interest groups on Japan's FTA policy in the later stages of the TPP negotiations; in 
particular, to see if the planned agreement will aim to remove tariffs on sensitive 
agricultural products, such as rice. The protests from farmers and agricultural 
cooperatives might indeed cause Japan to leave the talks. Further studies might explore 
how the government continues to balance the agricultural sectors' protests with MNC's 
isolation avoidance motivation in the future years of the TPP negotiations. 
As this thesis covers events up to 2011, a further study could also explore the 
developments of Japan's FTA policy and/or preferences of domestic actors in the 
upcoming years. Another potential direction for future studies is to apply the framework 
used in this thesis in a different setting, provided that there is an opportunity to obtain 
empirical data on preferences of main actors' groups. It would be interesting to assess 
the application of the framework for studying FTA policy in other East Asian countries 
and to compare how preferences are transformed into a domestic win-set. Finally, 
futures studies could be enriched by the preferences of individual farmers. 
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APPENDIX 1. Japan's Free Trade Agreements 
Name of the agreement Date of Signature Date of entry into 
force 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic 
31.05.2011 1.03.2012 
of Peru for an Economic Partnership 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic 15.02.2011 1.08.2011 
of India 
Agreement on Free Trade and Economic 
Partnership between Japan and the Swiss 19.02.2009 1.09.2009 
Confederation 
Agreement between Japan and the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam for an Economic 25.12.2008 1.10.2009 
Partnership 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership among Japan and Member 
14.04.2008 1.12.2008 States of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic 
20.08.2007 1.07.2008 
of Indonesia for an Economic Partnership 
Agreement between Japan and Brunei 
18.06.2007 31.07.2008 Darussalam for an Economic Partnership 
Agreement between Japan and the Kingdom 
3.04.2007 1.11.2007 
of Thailand for an Economic Partnership 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic 
of Chile for a Strategic Economic 27.03.2007 3.09.2007 
Partnership 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic 
of the Philippines for an Economic 9.09.2006 12.11.2008 
Partnershi p 
Agreement between the Government of 
Japan and the Government of Malaysia for 13.12.2005 13.07.2006 
an Economic Partnership 
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Agreement between Japan and the United 
Mexican States for the Strengthening of the 17.09.2004 1.04.2005 
Economic Partnership 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic 
of Singapore for A New-Age Economic 13.01.2002 30.11.2006 
Partnership 
Source: METI 2012, FTAlEPNBIT, Available from: 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/external_economy/trade/FTA_EPA/index.html. Accessed January 
2012 
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APPENDIX 2. List of Interviews 
I. INTERVIEWS 
Ministries 
1. Assistant Section Chief, Economic Partnership Division, Trade Policy Bureau, METI. 
10.02.2009, Tokyo. 
2. (Person A) Director for FTA Affairs, Economic Partnership Division, Trade Policy 
Bureau, METI. 10.02.2009, Tokyo. 
3. (Person B) Director for FTA Affairs, Economic Partnership Division, Trade Policy 
Bureau, METI. 23.08.2010, Tokyo. 
4. Director for Electricity Market Division, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, 
MET!. Former Director for FTA Affairs, Economic Partnership Division, Trade Policy 
Bureau, MET!. 11.05.2010, Tokyo. 
5. Director for Economic Partnership (EPNFTA), Trade Policy Bureau, METI. 
Responsible for FTA negotiations with India and Australia, as well as joint ClK 
Trilateral FTA Study Group. 12.08.2010, Tokyo. 
6. Director-General for International Trade Policy, Trade Policy Bureau, METI. 
17.08.2010, Tokyo. 
7. Director-General for Manufacturing Industries Policy, Manufacturing Industries 
Bureau, MET!. 03.06.2010, Tokyo. 
8. Former Director-General for International Trade Policy, Trade Policy Bureau, MET!. 
Former Director-General, Multilateral Trade System Department, Trade Policy Bureau, 
MET!. Negotiator of the Japan-Philippines and Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership 
Agreements. 22.05.2010, Tokyo. 
286 
9. Director, EPAIFTA Policy Division, MOFA. Involved in the CJK Trilateral FTA 
Study Group. 06.09.2010, Tokyo. 
10. Director for APEC and European Affairs, International Economic Afl'airs Division, 
Minister's Secretary, MAFF. Responsible for FTA negotiations with Switzerland, fornlcr 
official of the Agricultural and Development Economics Division at the United Nations. 
12.08.2010, Tokyo. 
11. Research Director of the Canon Institute for Global Studies. Senior Fellow at 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry (RIETI). Senior Fellow at Tokyo 
Foundation. FOffiler Deputy Director-General at the International Affairs Department, 
MAFF. FOffiler Director of the GATT Affairs Division, MAFF. Member of the Japanese 
Committee of Deregulations. 21.05.2010, Tokyo. 
12. Assistant Counsellor, Secretariat Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, 
Cabinet Secretariat. FOffiler employee of the Customs and Tariff Bureau, MOF. 
27.08.2010, Tokyo. 
13. Office of Regional Cooperation, Customs and Tariff Bureau, MOr. 13.10.2010, 
Tokyo. 
Private Sector 
14. Senior Staff, Trade and Industrial Affairs, Toshiba. Chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Rules of Origin at the Trade Policy Committee, Japan Electronic and Infonnation 
Technology Industries Association. 09.02.2009, Tokyo. 
15. Senior Staff, Trade and Industrial Affairs, Toshiba. Chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Rules of Origin at the Trade Policy Committee, Japan Electronic and Information 
Technology Industries Association. 20.05.2010, Tokyo. 
16. Director, Liaison Department, Sharp Co. 20.10.2010, Tokyo. 
17. Acting General Manager, Sustainability Energy & Environment Strategic Planning 
Department, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 28.05.2010, Tokyo. 
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18. Staff member of the Corporate Strategy & Research Department of Mitsubishi 
Corporation. 14.06.2010, Tokyo. 
19. Senior Manager, International & Public Policy Affairs, External Relations 
Department and FTA Department, Sony Corporation. 16.09.2010, Tokyo. 
20. Manager, General Affairs Division, Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 16.09.20 I 0, Tokyo. 
21. General Manager, General Affairs and Communication Coordination OlTIce for VW, 
Global Alliance, Suzuki Motor Corporation. 31.07.2010, Tokyo. 
22. General Manager, Corporate Strategic Planning Division, Toray Industries, Inc. 
30.11.2010, Tokyo. 
Business Associations, Interest Groups and Others 
23. Managing Director, Keizai Doyukai (Japanese Association of Corporate Executives). 
11.05.2010, Tokyo. 
24. Deputy Director, International Cooperation Bureau, Nippon Keidunren (Japan 
Business Federation). 27.05.2010, Tokyo. 
25. Project Leader, APEC Japan 2010 SME Summit Secretariat, Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, (JCCI). 28.05.2010, Tokyo. 
26. (Person A) Deputy Executive Director, Support Council for AllAC-Japan, APEC 
Business Advisory Council (ABAC). 03.06.2010, Tokyo. 
27. (Person B) Deputy Executive Director, Support Council for AllAC-Japan, APEC 
Business Advisory Council (ABAC). 03.06.2010, Tokyo. 
28. Senior Manager, International Trade & Investment Group, Japan Machinery Centre 
for Trade and Investment (JMC), 04.06.2010, Tokyo. 
288 
29. Deputy General Manager, Agricultural Policy Department, JA-Zenchu (Central 
Union of Agricultural Co-operatives). 08.10.2010, Tokyo. 
30. Manager, Zenkoku-Shoko-Dantai-Rengokai, ZENSHOREN (National Fcd~ration of 
Traders and Producers Organizations). 15.06.2010, Tokyo. 
31. (Person A) Manager, International Trade & Cooperation Group, Market Research & 
International Economic Affairs Division, The Japan Iron and Steel Federation. 
14.10.2010, Tokyo. 
32. (Person B) Manager, International Trade & Cooperation Group, Market Research & 
International Economic Affairs Division, The Japan Iron and Steel Federation. 
14.10.2010, Tokyo. 
33. Director, International Bureau, Zenroren (National Confederation of Trade Unions). 
24.05.2010, Tokyo. 
34. Minister Counsellor, Commercial Affairs Division, Embassy of Malaysia. 
12.08.2010, Tokyo. 
35. Policy analyst at the Australian Commonwealth Treasury, Foreign Investment and 
Trade Policy Division. 06.08.2010, Tokyo. 
36. Chief Staff, Business Affairs & Research Group, Japan Chemical Fibers Association. 
30.11.2010, Tokyo. 
37. Assistant Director General, International Department, Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers Association, Inc. 03.12.2010, Tokyo. 
Research Institutes 'and Think-Thanks 
38. Senior Researcher at the International Economic Research Division, Overseas 
Research Department, JETRO. 04.02.09, Tokyo. 
39. (Person A) Deputy Director, International Economic Research Division, Overseas 
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Research Department, JETRO. 23.04.2010, Tokyo. 
40. (Person B) Deputy Director, International Economic Research Division, Overseas 
Research Department, JETRO. 23.04.2010, Tokyo. 
41. Senior Research Fellow and Assistant Director of International Relations and 
Conflict Studies Group, Interdisciplinary Studies Centre, Institute of Developing 
Economies, IDE-JETRO. 02.02.2009, Tokyo. 
42. Senior Research Fellow, Area Studies Centre (Korea), Institute of Developing 
Economies, IDE-JETRO. 30.04.2010, Tokyo. 
43. Research Fellow, International Relations and Conflict Studies Group 
Interdisciplinary Studies Centre, Institute of Developing Economics, IDE-JETRO. 
26.05.2010, Tokyo. 
44. Research Fellow at the Japan National Committee for Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (JANCPEC), the Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs (lIlA). 06.04.2010, 
Tokyo. 
45. Senior Analyst, Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting. Former MOFA employee 
responsible for service negotiations under the WTO. Former Keidanren employee. 
25.05.2010, Tokyo. 
46. Senior Research Officer, Research Department- Public Policy, Mizuho Research 
Institute Ltd. Former Advisor to Japan's Permanent Delegation to the OECD. Former 
MOFAemployee. 26.07. 2010, Tokyo. 
47. President of the Centre for International Public Pol icy Studies. 22.11.2010, Tokyo. 
Academic Institutions 
48. Associate Professor of International Economics, Department of Law and Economics, 
Chiba University. Member ofFTA Study Meeting at the Institute for International Trude 
and Investment. 19.04.2010, Tokyo. 
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49. Professor, Faculty of Economics, Senshu University. Member of FTA Study Meeting 
at the Institute for International Trade and Investment. 19.04.2010, Tokyo. 
50. Professor and Executive Director of the Department of International Affairs, 
Institute of Asian Studies, Asia University. Member of FTA Study Meeting at the 
Institute for International Trade and Investment. 22.04.20 10, Tokyo. 
51. Hasegawa, S., Professor of Commerce, Faculty of Social Sciences, Wuseda 
University. 28.01.2009, Tokyo. 
52. Itoh, M., Professor and Dean of Graduate School of Economics and Faculty of 
Economics, University of Tokyo. President of the National Institute for Research 
Advancement. 18.02.2009, Tokyo. 
53. Kimura, F., Professor of Economics, Keio University. Chief Economist of the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). 06.02.2009, Tokyo. 
54. Kimura, F., Professor of Economics, Keio University. Chief Economist of the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). 06.05.20 I 0, Tokyo. 
55. Terada, T., Professor of International Relations, Institute of Asian Studies, Waseda 
University. Free Trade Agreements specialist. 23.01.2009, Tokyo. 
56. Urata, S., Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda 
University. Free Trade Agreements specialist. 09.02.2009, Tokyo. 
57. Professor of International Political Economy, Department of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, Keio University. Former Chief Negotiator of the Japan-Mexico FTA. Co-
author of MOFA's 2002 'Basic FTA Strategy' document. 18.02.2009, Tokyo. 
58. Yamazawa, I., Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University. Former President of the 
International University of Japan. Former President of the IDE-JETRO. Former 
coordinator of the Japan-Korea FTA Study Group. Chair of an FTA Study Meeting at 
the Institute for International Trade and Investment. 24.01.2009, Tokyo. 
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59. Yamazawa, 1., Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University. Former President of the 
International University of Japan. Former President of the IDE-JETRO. Former 
coordinator of the Japan-Korea FTA Study Group. Chair of an FTA Study Meeting at 
the Institute for International Trade and Investment. 06.06.2010, Tokyo. 
60. Professor of Economics, Department of Humanities and Social Science, Tokyo 
Denki University. Member of the Economic Planning Agency under PM Koizumi. 
Involved in the CJK Trilateral FTA project. 10.06.2010, Tokyo. 
II. PRESS CONFERENCES 
Press Conferences at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ), 
Yurakucho Denki North Building 20F, Yurakucho 1-7-1, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 100-
0006 
Masayuki Naoshima, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, METI, 15.01.2010 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund (lMf), 
18.01.2010 
Osamu Suzuki, Chairman & CEO, Suzuki Motor Corporation, 21.01.2010 
Jim Adams, World Bank Vice President for East Asia and Pacific, 15.03.2010 
Haruhiko Kuroda, President of Asian Development Bank (ADB), 17.03.2010 
Katsuya Okada, Minister for Foreign Affairs, MOFA, 25.08.2010 
Kent E. Calder, Director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Centre for East Asian Studies, 
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 09.12.2010 
DI. OTHER EVENTS 
ADBI-OECD Roundtable on Asia's Policy Framework for Investment: Investing in a 
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Stronger, Cleaner, and Fairer Asian Economy, the Asian Development Dank Institute 
(ADBI), Tokyo, 6-8.04.2010 
What Next for Asia-Europe Economic Ties? A Panel Discussion organized by ADB and 
ADBI, Tokyo, 12.05.2010 
Achieving the Bogor Goals and Beyond, 2010 APEC Study Centres Consortium 
(ASCC) Conference, IDE-JETRO, Tokyo, 8-9.07.2010 
The Political Economy of Asian Regionalism, Annual Conference, Asian Development 
Bank Institute, Tokyo 3.12.2010 
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